British "Fighting Spirt"

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British "Fighting Spirt"

#1

Post by Attrition » 24 May 2011, 21:45

From topic Why was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

I don't see it as donkeys led by lions; the British state doesn't seem to lack poor young men willing to go abroad with guns these days and the Welfare State is a fond memory. I think it's more a matter of coming to terms with the necessity to fight more like Germany, Japan and Russia. The technological, machine-filled battlefield anticipated in 1917-1918 and then implemented in a small way in Iraq and Palestine interwar still needed a considerable sacrifice of infantry when confronted by a 'proper' army, rather than a nationalist militia. This was the indigenous commodity the British state was shortest of, when competing so strongly in the air and at sea against other industrial countries.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#2

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 24 May 2011, 22:15

OK Lightbob, hooked me
Lightbob wrote:Steve the mistake was made when we allowed the US to encourage us to break our good relations with the Japanese in the twenties. If we look at the time scale from the invasion of Burma until the victory in 1945 almost 4 years. But, the 14th Army was armed with same range of weapons as they were in Malaya except that the 14th got what was obsolescent to the Armies in Europe. But, having said that, the British army was on the whole better armed and equipped that the Japanese in 1941 the difference was the will to use what they had.

Attrition, I must agree with Edgerton the problem as I have said before was simply that the British army did not want to fight. John Ellis in his book ‘The Sharp End’ mentions this lack of fighting spirit as a hang over from the depression of the 20s and 30s, only solved by the promise of the welfare state when the war was won. To persuade the troops a massive propaganda like policy of information was circulated around the units by thousands of young Education Sergeants many with left wing associations, Dennis Healy was one such. He later was decorated for his work on the beach at Anzio
The thread is titled "Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya? My apologies if I seem to be nit picking here, but I'm struggling with some of what you say.

Are you suggesting we lost the ability to defend Malaya because we chose the USA over Japan as our prefered ally back in the 1920's. Is there a suggestion we could never defend Malaya against an aggressor, in which case if the USA chose to attack us, again we would have failed?

Onto Edgerton, once I realised we weren't talking about Burger King, I found the other David (exposing my ignorance here)
who is an interesting author challenging many of the established views of how Britain planned organised and fought WW2.
However I will ask for more clarification on this statement in relation to this thread. Just who lacked fighting spirt. British infantry, or Indian and Australian included, or the entire Malaya Command, does this include the RAF and/or the Royal Navy. And what examples would you point to in this campaign.

I'll leave Denis Healey to another thread if anyone wants to discuss that subject.

Damn! Attrition has just posted, means I gotta read that post and and comment!
Ouch Attrition, thats gonna take me some time to digest

Steve
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#3

Post by Lightbob » 28 May 2011, 11:28

Attrition says:
I don’t see it as donkeys led by lions; the British state doesn't seem to lack poor young men willing to go abroad with guns these days and the Welfare State is a fond memory. I think it's more a matter of coming to terms with the necessity to fight more like Germany, Japan and Russia. The technological, machine-filled battlefield anticipated in 1917-1918 and then implemented in a small way in Iraq and Palestine interwar still needed a considerable sacrifice of infantry when confronted by a 'proper' army, rather than a nationalist militia. This was the indigenous commodity the British state was shortest of, when competing so strongly in the air and at sea against other industrial countries.
I’m sorry but you seem to miss the point or you are a little short on social history. I have never said that their was incompetence among the officer corps as in WW1. The point is that the majority of the infantry in WW1 was recruited from the working class. The promise of a ‘land fit for heroes’, never materialized, in fact exactly the opposite, with poverty, penury and even malnutrition. Thus the reluctance of the conscript to fight for the Empire. I don’t know whether you have noticed that the present Army is all regular, well paid (in comparison with the 1939 regular). For an example of a reluctant conscript army and its affect on the prosecution of a war, I would suggest you look at the experience of the US in Vietnam. Of course we had man power shortage however we had a bottomless sources of manpower in Africa and India which we released in 1941 and onward.

Steve; Says;
The thread is titled "Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya? My apologies if I seem to be nit picking here, but I'm struggling with some of what you say
Yes you’r nit picking and even worse you are compartmentalising the Malaya campaign as if events after WW1 did not effect the long term outcomes including the outset of WW2.

Our abandonment of our 1904 treaty with Japan shattered our good relationship with them and helped force the Japanese in to an economic situation that made them think that an attack on the colonial empires was a viable and profitable venture.

Steve goes on;
However I will ask for more clarification on this statement in relation to this thread. Just who lacked fighting spirit. British infantry, or Indian and Australian included, or the entire Malaya Command, does this include the RAF and/or the Royal Navy. And what examples would you point to in this campaign.


I obviously I did not hook you early enough! I have already explained the situation. The British Conscript in Malaya was a very reluctant warrior. As was his comrades in France, Norway, Greece and North Africa. Most of the Infantry in Malaya were regular Battalions but all had a large number of conscripts and there are occasions in almost every battle were troops withdrew without permission. The Indian Army was torn between its loyalty to their regiment and Indian nationalism. In every battle we have examples of Indian troops deserting their posts and hiding in the Jungle until they could give them selves up to the Japanese. In fact the first units of the INA were formed from Indian troops who had surrendered at Kota Baru and Jitra. The Indian loyalty problem was solved by the promise of independance and the support of Ghandi. The Australians lost their will to fight at the invasion of Singapore were they abandoned their defensive positions. In fact Percival in his report of the surrender and in his book blames the Australians for the loss of Singapore. During the war in the far east there are quite a few occasions of mutiny among RAF ground staff and although there is no evidence of this in Malaya, it does give some indication of fragile morale among some ground crews especially conscripted ones. I also repeat that after the fall of Malaya Churchill made the quote ‘ When are they going to fight’

Steve:
I’ll leave Denis Healey to another thread if anyone wants to discuss that subject
However, whether you leave it or not, it is background to proving the lack of fighting spirit in the British up to and during the Invasion of Malaya, other wise why would the promise of a welfare state and the recruitment of men like Healey to promote it seem to have such an effect on the fighting spirit after its announcement, Yes it could be a coincident, but the series of defeats before its announcement certainly weren’t.



I

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#4

Post by Attrition » 28 May 2011, 11:49

~~~~~The point is that the majority of the infantry in WW1 was recruited from the working class. The promise of a ‘land fit for heroes’, never materialized, in fact exactly the opposite, with poverty, penury and even malnutrition.~~~~~

Obviously, that's where the numbers are but until conscription the citizen army was the least working class army Britain has ever produced.

For all the faults of post war society its welfare provision was the best in the world. Notice also that lots of other countries' rulers tried to motivate the population with promises of a better life. Lack of fighting spirit might have existed but I can't accept that it was a dominant fact in the course of the war.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#5

Post by Lightbob » 28 May 2011, 19:18

Attrition further to my thread regarding the effects of social attitudes between the wars and the need to redress the social problems arising from the great slump of the 20s and 30s. Even before the war there was a strong pacifist attitude in the industrial areas especially in the north of England, the Industrial Belt of Scotland and South Wales, it does no harm to remember that these areas produced the bulk of the Army in WW1 with regiments in the North contributing up to 30 battalions. However the dissention was not solely confined to the working class. The Oxford University debating society on the 9 February 1933 of the resolution: "That this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country". It was passed by 275 votes to 153, and became one of the most well-known and notorious debates conducted in the Union.

Also in 1945 before the end of the war a General election the Labour Party ousted Churchill.

Attrition says;
]Obviously, that's where the numbers are but until conscription the citizen army was the least working class army Britain has ever produced.
I think you mean that after conscription the citizen army was the least working class army Britain ever produced. Not in 1939- 40 the unemployed went in first


In the 20s and 30s the unemployed who had a parent working had their dole stopped and given the option of joining the army ( a clever sort of conscription). As the working class especially the labouring classes was conscripted into the infantry in larger numbers than anyone else and the lower middle and middle classes provided the majority of the reserved occupations until the comb out of 1941. The working classes initially were certainly the ones who provided most men into the teeth arms and bore the brunt of the fighting

Attrition also said;
For all the faults of post war society its welfare provision was the best in the world. Notice also that lots of other countries' rulers tried to motivate the population with promises of a better life. Lack of fighting spirit might have existed but I can't accept that it was a dominant fact in the course of the war.
Are we talking about after WW1 or WW2? After WW1 social provision was minimal and no promises were kept (a land fit for heroes) and this caused the disillusionment of the working class. Certainly in the early years of the war there was never less than 10,000 deserters at any one time, among the conscripts this added to the notorious ‘draft dodgers’ you may consider lack of fighting spirit was never a serious issue but certainly the powers that be, did.

According to John Ellis' the 'Sharp End' (First edition) he relates a meeting in he Great Northern Hotel in York, between Churchill and members of his cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the civil service. On the agend was the actions to be taken if the Germans invaded and gained ground. According to Churchhill he believed that the RAF and RN would withdraw to Canada, taking as many of the army a as possible with them and carry on the war from there. But the generals did not agree saying that the regulars might go to Canada, but the rest would 'bugger' off home.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#6

Post by Attrition » 28 May 2011, 20:54

Er, I was referring to the citizen army which volunteered in 1914.

If you look at the welfare provisions of the Liberal reforms 1906-1914 they were based on the contributory principle yet after the Great War governments kept finding the money to extend them so that they became entitlements de facto. They might not have been much (in Britain only rich people get generous public subsidies) but they existed and were more 'generous' than anywhere else.

If the British armies of WWII were so unmotivated, why did their performance change so much in 1942?

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#7

Post by Lightbob » 29 May 2011, 11:37

Steve said
Drawing on a couple of the British infantry battalions in India eg 2nd Battalion Duke of Wellington

The thread where you advocated stripping the colonies of troops to reinforce Malaya, although a politically unsound idea, I thought there was a mistake in the its conception. Your proposal regarding troops in India, seems to forget completely the Invasion of Burma, which was the strategically more important. The 2nd Duke’s and others who were in Burma and lost heavily in the Sittang battle.

Attrition says;
Er, I was referring to the citizen army which volunteered in 1914.

If you look at the welfare provisions of the Liberal reforms 1906-1914 they were based on the contributory principle yet after the Great War governments kept finding the money to extend them so that they became entitlements de facto. They might not have been much (in Britain only rich people get generous public subsidies) but they existed and were more 'generous' than anywhere else.

If the British armies of WWII were so unmotivated, why did their performance change so much in 1942?
The Kitchener 1. relied heavily on the working class for recruits, so much so workmen from strategic industries such as engineering, coal mining, ship building etc, had to be released because the effect of their enlistment had on the war effort was disastrous, especially the manufacture of shells which got the most publicity.

Oh yes the Liberal’s 1904 reforms, they were whittled down progressively during the 20 & 30s slump. So much so that the sight of wounded ex servicemen begging on the streets of the UK became a national scandal and Government policies led in the thirties to the hunger marches led mainly by ex-service men

I previously mentioned the propaganda campaign produced by the government to advertise the new welfare state, which promised help ‘from the cradle to the grave’ and in particular would abolish mass unemployment and create the NHS. However during the fighting in Normandy the Generals complained about the lack of fighting spirit of the British and Canadians Armies. This theme was soon latched on to by the early US historians, and certainly some British ones after them Hastings, Hart and D'este in particular. However Buckley goes a long way to re dressing the balance in his book ‘British Armour in Normandy’.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#8

Post by Attrition » 29 May 2011, 12:05

~~~~~Oh yes the Liberal’s 1904 reforms, they were whittled down progressively during the 20 & 30s slump.~~~~~

Spending on welfare (for poor people that is) reached a peak in 1929 which wasn't matched until 1970 (see Edgerton).

The volunteers of 1914 were decidedly not like the traditional recruits to the army.

Being working class and unemployed, I know what it's like but one of the phenomena of C20th Britain that can't be ignored is the ability of the state to mobilise its class victims in its support. There must be some material foundation for this.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#9

Post by Lightbob » 31 May 2011, 11:55

Attrition says;
Spending on welfare (for poor people that is) reached a peak in 1929 which wasn't matched until 1970 (see Edgerton).
The increase in social spending always increases during a period of mass unemployment and hence the increase in unemployment pay and other associated benefit, see the Thatcher years. It should not be used as a means of measuring the generosity of the Government. Of course the Labour Party formed its first government in 1929 (1929 - 1932) and first thing they did was reform the war pension syste ensuring the Ors received the same basic pension as an officer, with increments for the degree of injury and rank held and eased the rules on claimants for the dole. The 1929 wall street crash soon put an end to this generosity and allowed the following National Government to reverse many of labour’s benefit increases.

Attrition goes on:
The volunteers of 1914 were decidedly not like the traditional recruits to the army.
Of course they were they came from all classes, however the majority came from the working class. The world economic down turn of 1913 affected the working class the most and in some ways acted as a recruiting Sergeant, for Kitchener one.

Could I recommend you read Sir Max Hastings’s book ‘Finest Years’ he illuminates many times about Churchill’s concerns about the British soldiers lack of fighting spirit and power.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#10

Post by Attrition » 31 May 2011, 17:02

~~~~~The increase in social spending always increases during a period of mass unemployment~~~~~

The mass unemployment (or rather mass mass unemployment) arrived in the early 30s. The working class had a far higher number of people in reserved occupations. The class of the volunteers of 1914 was an aberration. Churchill may have fretted but he wouldn't agree to the army increasing its violence against its own members. That was one of the main differences between the British (and US) armies and their enemies in the 2nd WW.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#11

Post by Lightbob » 31 May 2011, 18:33

Attrition says;
The mass unemployment (or rather mass mass unemployment) arrived in the early 30s. The working class had a far higher number of people in reserved occupations. The class of the volunteers of 1914 was an aberration. Churchill may have fretted but he wouldn't agree to the army increasing its violence against its own members. That was one of the main differences between the British (and US) armies and their enemies in the 2nd WW.

I agree in part with your remark about mass unemployment, But in the heavy industrial areas unemployment in these areas never dropped below a million. Regarding Churchill not agreeing to the increase in violence. I assume you mean the death penalty for desertion. Auchinlech tried to bring in the Death penalty for desertion in North Africa where it was endemic. I don’t know whether WSC was against it , but I do know that Alan Brooke was strongly against it and advised that it would have the opposite effect as the one it was meant to have.

Never the less the conditions for the working class in the 20s & 30'swas sufficient for them to consider that the country was not worth fighting for.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#12

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 31 May 2011, 22:54

Hi Lightbob
Correct me if I’m wrong here, but you basically advocate two arguments why Britain was defeated in Malaya. If you allow me, I’ll discuss them in turn.

Firstly the breakup of the British - Japanese alliance for a British - USA one.

This all stems from the USA viewing Japan as her most likely adversary in the Pacific, both military and economically, and a need for both Britain and the USA to avoid another arms race, being, it Britain’s case, exhausted from the First World War. The Washington treaty, and the Singapore strategy was probably Britain’s cheapest realistic option to defend the empires far east commitments. No doubt it was regrettable that relations with Japan worsened, but was there a better alternative. But I can’t see how this automatically meant Britain would be unable to defend Malaya. I would like you to develop your argument on this.

And secondly a lack of fighting spirit among the British working class.

This is, as you pointed out to me, a much wider argument in which Malaya cannot be discussed in isolation. And as I read your posts, the lack of fighting spirit is directed at the rank and file British troops, not officers, and regulars. It doesn’t include the Indian troops who made up half of Malaya command, and who I think you argue, had other issues, being politically unreliable, due to Indian Independence aspirations, as well as the Australian troops. And this argument only holds for up to somewhere into 1942-43.

I take your point on this, as clearly British troops around the world did in both general and particular instances perform poorly. The BEF in France, despite being well equipped, were taken by surprise by the modern warfare Germany unleashed on them. In Norway the British were poorly equipped and deployed piecemeal. Or were they lacking in motivation.

Sudan Nov 1940, Brigadier Slim’s British battalion (1st Essex) broke and ran when it came under fire. Hong Kong Dec 1941, the Royal Scots gave up the Shing Mun Redoubt with surprising ease, and Jitra, Malaya Dec 1941, the two British battalions (1 Leicestershire’s & 2 East Surrey’s)withdrew in chaotic fashion, effectively losing half their strength. No gutsy performances here. But both the Royal Scots and the amalgamated British battalion (Leicestershire’s & East Surrey’s) then went on to fight those gutsy actions I just decried them as lacking of. The 1 Essex were sent back to Egypt however.

In the Norway and the Middle/Far East examples, an argument that these units effectiveness had been watered down by transfer of experienced men, replaced by new recruits, not fully trained is often made. Unpreparedness can also be used, but possibly the biggest defence of their poor performance was the British Army’s tactical doctrine which stifled independent action at the platoon and section level.

As a comparator, the Australians, exceeded, they were all volunteers. Was it because they held a looser discipline regime, allowing more independence of action at that level, or just plain good fighting spirit.

Another comparator is the 2 Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders. These did perform well right from the off. They also had to deal with replacements, but significantly were very well prepared, their commander Lt Col Stewart having trained them well. They were also better equipped, having an armoured car section attached, and became the elite formation that all the young Malayan based plantation managers wanted to serve in during the conflict. Maybe they are an exception to the rule, being motivated by serving a quality commanding officer (good fighting spirit) or being well trained and equipped (well prepared) running counter to both argument and defence of a lack of fighting spirit.

The argument over lack of fighting spirit generally can only be explored within the British Army. In the RAF, mainly its a higher educated class that fought as aircrew, not quite the working class you ascribe a lack of fighting spirit to. And in the Royal Navy, you go where the ship goes, you fight for your home (the ship) and as a ships company, not isolated as individuals or small sections.

I do buy into your argument about lack of fighting spirit, but can’t agree it was the only, or even main factor in Britain being defeated in Malaya, I will agree to it being a contributor to the defeat.

Steve
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#13

Post by EKB » 01 Jun 2011, 08:08

Fatboy Coxy wrote:Hi Lightbob
Correct me if I’m wrong here, but you basically advocate two arguments why Britain was defeated in Malaya. If you allow me, I’ll discuss them in turn.

Firstly the breakup of the British - Japanese alliance for a British - USA one.

This all stems from the USA viewing Japan as her most likely adversary in the Pacific, both military and economically, and a need for both Britain and the USA to avoid another arms race, being, it Britain’s case, exhausted from the First World War. The Washington treaty, and the Singapore strategy was probably Britain’s cheapest realistic option to defend the empires far east commitments. No doubt it was regrettable that relations with Japan worsened, but was there a better alternative. But I can’t see how this automatically meant Britain would be unable to defend Malaya. I would like you to develop your argument on this.

And secondly a lack of fighting spirit among the British working class.

This is, as you pointed out to me, a much wider argument in which Malaya cannot be discussed in isolation. And as I read your posts, the lack of fighting spirit is directed at the rank and file British troops, not officers, and regulars. It doesn’t include the Indian troops who made up half of Malaya command, and who I think you argue, had other issues, being politically unreliable, due to Indian Independence aspirations, as well as the Australian troops. And this argument only holds for up to somewhere into 1942-43.

I take your point on this, as clearly British troops around the world did in both general and particular instances perform poorly. The BEF in France, despite being well equipped, were taken by surprise by the modern warfare Germany unleashed on them. In Norway the British were poorly equipped and deployed piecemeal. Or were they lacking in motivation.

Sudan Nov 1940, Brigadier Slim’s British battalion (1st Essex) broke and ran when it came under fire. Hong Kong Dec 1941, the Royal Scots gave up the Shing Mun Redoubt with surprising ease, and Jitra, Malaya Dec 1941, the two British battalions (1 Leicestershire’s & 2 East Surrey’s)withdrew in chaotic fashion, effectively losing half their strength. No gutsy performances here. But both the Royal Scots and the amalgamated British battalion (Leicestershire’s & East Surrey’s) then went on to fight those gutsy actions I just decried them as lacking of. The 1 Essex were sent back to Egypt however.

In the Norway and the Middle/Far East examples, an argument that these units effectiveness had been watered down by transfer of experienced men, replaced by new recruits, not fully trained is often made. Unpreparedness can also be used, but possibly the biggest defence of their poor performance was the British Army’s tactical doctrine which stifled independent action at the platoon and section level.

As a comparator, the Australians, exceeded, they were all volunteers. Was it because they held a looser discipline regime, allowing more independence of action at that level, or just plain good fighting spirit.

Another comparator is the 2 Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders. These did perform well right from the off. They also had to deal with replacements, but significantly were very well prepared, their commander Lt Col Stewart having trained them well. They were also better equipped, having an armoured car section attached, and became the elite formation that all the young Malayan based plantation managers wanted to serve in during the conflict. Maybe they are an exception to the rule, being motivated by serving a quality commanding officer (good fighting spirit) or being well trained and equipped (well prepared) running counter to both argument and defence of a lack of fighting spirit.

The argument over lack of fighting spirit generally can only be explored within the British Army. In the RAF, mainly its a higher educated class that fought as aircrew, not quite the working class you ascribe a lack of fighting spirit to. And in the Royal Navy, you go where the ship goes, you fight for your home (the ship) and as a ships company, not isolated as individuals or small sections.

I do buy into your argument about lack of fighting spirit, but can’t agree it was the only, or even main factor in Britain being defeated in Malaya, I will agree to it being a contributor to the defeat.

Well put.

"Fighting spirit" is a vague and dangerously abstract idea. Not everyone agrees on the definition or proper application of that phrase. It makes more sense to survey tangible factors that control behavior in the organization; state of leadership, training, discipline, equipment, supply, and all written protocols that governed its overall combat readiness. The results could vary substantially from one battalion to another if the officers commanding did not pay attention.

And, there is a big difference between institutional problems and personal problems.

If the army did not throughly study the potential of the enemy, and did not formalize a well rehearsed emergency response for a certain type of crisis, then all units dispatched to respond would not be prepared. It follows that they might disintegrate in the process. But it's quite another matter if the leader of a combat unit would tolerate large numbers of malcontents, and ignored a situation where the soldiers regulated their devotion to duty according to the latest news editorials about politics or economic malaise back home. In that case the officer in charge allowed his command to become a democracy.

It's not easy to monitor and control everything that happens at a large overseas outpost. There is always plenty of gossip, rumor, drinking, and brawling in the rearmost areas, at fixed bases and installations.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#14

Post by Zaf1 » 02 Jun 2011, 19:04

Hi

Many people would blame the Indian army soldiers that was politically unreliable for the British defeat in Malaya. The Indian troops of the Dogra regiment at the initial battle at Kota Bharu fought bravely to the last man. It was due to the wrong decision by the British commander of the 11th Indian Division caused the defeat at Jitra. The 11th Indian Division was shattered early in the northern Malayan battle which directly make the defeat inevitable. The other factor was the British had too much 'fortress' mentality much like the French's Maginot Line mentality of their defence were very strong. The main factor was that the British believed that the Japanese troops were inferior and greatly under-estimated their capabilities. The main defence was that of the believe that the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales was HMS Unsinkable that any Japanese seaborne invasion would be effectively destroyed by the Royal Navy and that would end to the invasion menace. Even if the Japanese manage to land the British believed that there is only one main road to block defend and the Japanese tanks could not pass through rice paddies and impenetrable jungles.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#15

Post by aghart » 06 Jun 2011, 22:48

Those that look at the strategic ( the bigger ) picture have got it right. During the early part of the war the UK could not be strong everywhere. Of the 3 main zones, only in the far east could we be defeated and yet not lose the war, Defeat in Europe or the middle east (oil) would mean total defeat, the end for Great Britain. The German invasion of Russia to many, seems to have given the UK the opportunity to send forces (especially RAF fighter squadrons)to Malaya. No way, as others have said, Up until the end of 1941 it looked like Germany would defeat the USSR easily and would then be able to come back and finish off the British. With a second Battle of Britain at most only 12 months away, do you really think that sending valuable fighter squadrons to an area still at peace, and weakening the home defence of the UK was really an option?


Once France was defeated and the french fleet lost to the allies,Churchill knew that we needed to get the United States Navy to protect Singapore for us. That is why he insisted on the Prince of Wales and Repulse being sent to Singapore rather than do what the Royal Navy wanted, to build up a fleet of older ships in the Indian Ocean. The US needed to see that Britain was willing to send the naval forces and be willing to defend Singapore. The whole plan was to get the US Asiatic fleet based in the Phillipines to join up with us and face the Japanese together. Britain was building up it's strength in the far east but the Japanese did not read the script and attacked about 6 months too early. Once it became clear (Dec 41 - Jan 42) that Russia was far from beaten and that an invasion of the UK was not likely, then forces from the UK would have been despatched to Malaya and the japanese may well have lost the opportunity.

By the way, the notion that Force Z would have had HMS Indomitable available on 10th December if she had not run a ground is wrong. HMS Indomitable was commisioned in October 1941 and immediately sent to the West Indies to conduct her work up training (especially her air group) in an area out of the war zone. She was not en route to Singapore when she ran aground. She had only just arrived and still had her work up programme to complete. Given the HMS Illustrious took 4 months from commissioning to "joining the fleet" would indicate that HMS Indomitable would likely still be in the Caribbean in December 1941. The myth that she would have been present stems from the fact that she had been "earmarked" for service at Singapore following her work up period.

In Malaya itself, the apparent peace time garrison mentality which seems to have dominated is what irritaes me the most. Like everyone on this site though, I have the benefit of hindsight, crystal balls were in short supply in 1941.

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