.Correct me if I’m wrong here, but you basically advocate two arguments why Britain was defeated in Malaya
No, the break up of the Anglo Japanese treaty combined with the US/Brit embargos etc. gave Japan no alternative than take a risk of going to war and perhaps if we had not broken that treaty Japan would not have attacked Malaya. An idea held by ‘Billy’ Hughes the Australian Prime Minister when he pleaded for Britain to maintain its treaty with Japan in 1921. Japan was very proud of its relationship with Britain and felt insulted by its abrogation. See Thompson’s ‘Battle for Singapore’.
I also said that the weakness of British intelligence which from 1936 onwards allowed the Japanese to infiltrate all levels of colonial society. Although the intelligence service failed it had been noticed that the Japanese had a habit of investing personnel at key strategic points such as Terengganu and Kelantan and across Johor from Kota Tinggi to Batu Pahat
on the west coast. They had contact with the Malaya nationalist and formed a limited 5th Column and the Indian Army with plans for it to change sides. The Japanese had agents in situ gathering information from loose talk, The Japanese also had information regarding the intentions of the British toward Singapore, gained by the German surface raider ‘Atlantis’ when she captured the Blue funnel liner ‘Automedan’. I think that Japanese intelligence together with their excellent reconnaissance troops certainly undermined the confidence of the allied troops
Regarding lack of fighting spirit and power, I have previously said that basis of this deficiency was the effects of WW1 and after. Regarding the Senior officers I suppose it is true to say that the better ones died in the Flanders mud. But I suppose the German ones died also. The junior officers were almost entirely recruited from the middle class. The ordinary regular soldier tended to be apolitical and any sympathy for their civilian brothers was soon knocked out of them by a military establishment that was on the whole almost extreme rightwing. Of course the regulars all develop ‘espirite de corps’ from the first day of training.
Steve goes on;
Not quite, there is a lot debate among historians that the British never quite recovered their true spirit. There is much argument that the British performance in Normandy was much behind the German’s and the Americans. What is true that Montgomery’s strategy and tactics were designed not particularly for speed but economy in lives, by letting fire power take the brunt, not blood.And this argument only holds for up to somewhere into 1942-43.
You are quite right about the regular battalions did fight well after suffering a number of disasters. I think that there are a number of associated reasons for that. Did it increasingly become a fight for survival, or perhaps the stories of the IJA bayoneting their prisoners made them fight harder and I would like to think they had began to get the measure of the INJ
Norway, was an ill founded operation from the start, the regular brigade fought well and at Kvam, 1/KOYLI secured a victory, stopping the Germans in their tracks. But the 49th TA Division, short one of its brigades had a torrid time but managed to escape thanks to Norwegian Railways and the RN. The same Division in Normandy earned the sobriquet from the Germans as the ‘butcher bears’ Their Div sign was a polar bear. But still the division lost a battalion in Normandy the 1/6th DWR were sent back to UK as unfit for battle. See;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duke_of_We ... Battalions
In 1940 whilst the rest of the BEF were being evacuated at Dunkirk, a Brigade of Riflemen were sent to hold Calais. With orders to hold it until Dunkirk was clear and they did. The brigade consisted of two regular battalions and a TA battalion. So in every campaign there are exceptions perhaps they prove the rule. Strangely enough the best divisions in the war were on the whole TA divisions.
Steve adds;
As a comparator, the Australians, exceeded, they were all volunteers. Was it because they held a looser discipline regime, allowing more independence of action at that level, or just plain good fighting spirit.
Good fighting spirit, but only in Johor! In Singapore the Australians literally fell apart. They are accused of by Percival’s staff officers of failing to carry out patrols across in Johor. In fact the patrols were supposed to give the defenders an early warning. When finally persuaded to patrol the warning of IJA activity arrived at GHQ after the Japanese had landed.
I have heard and read somewhere that a rumour went around the Australian division that they were being evacuated causing the troops to abandon their positions. Where did the rumour come from? One apophasis is that news got out that Bennet and his staff were already leaving, seeming to confirm the rumour, since Bennet had planned much earlier to leave it is easy to see how rumours would soon get round.
Steve your comment regarding the Essex where did you find that they left Malaya? I know they served in Burma with the Chindits but can find no record of their service in Malay until after the war during he Emergency.