British "Fighting Spirt"

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aghart
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#31

Post by aghart » 19 Jun 2011, 15:34

As i said in an earlier thread, the Japanese attacked 6 months too early for the British ( but at exactly the correct time for the Japanese) Imagine a June 1942 Japanese attack on Malaya?

Gen Pownall will have replaced Brook-Popham as the senior officer, and as a General with up to date experience is likely to have been "banging heads together" for a few months now.

General Percival will have managed to get some "proper" training of the land forces under his belt.

HMS indomitable would be Singapore, Force Z will be a fully worked up unit , it is likely that Australia and New Zealand would have sent a cruiser each and maybe a couple of destroyers as well. HMS Warspite is likely to be at Singapore as are the R class battleships.

The Vildebeeste torpedo bomber Squadrons are likely to have completed their conversion to Bristol Beauforts, The Brewster Buffalo squadrons will be fully worked up.

More importantly, since December 1941 it will have been obvious to the UK that an invasion of the homeland was now highly unlikely and additional "operational" squadrons of Hurricanes, Blenheim, maybe even Beaufighters are likely to be en route to Singapore if not alreay there.

The force levels at Singapore in mid 1942 should mean a much slower Japanese advance down the penisula causing them serious logistical problems and allowing time for major reinforcements ie 7th Armoured Brigade and experienced infantry formations to arrive from the middle east and be built up for offensive operations.

I'm aware that additional British assets in place at Singapore will mean stronger Japanese forces as well, but I feel that a slower Japanese advance down the malay peninsula would result and that benefits the defenders and causes real problems for the Japanese.

A really good what if!

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#32

Post by Lightbob » 19 Jun 2011, 15:58

Attrition;
Citizen as opposed to mercenary ('professional'). I don't disagree with your class analysis by the way, only with the details. It was the existence of millions of demobilised citizen soldiers (how many of them were willing to fight in the civil war?) that ensured that however parsimonious the Poor Law was interwar, it was still there. After 1945 the boss class had to concede more but as we have seen since the 70s, Britain has been recolonised and the working class descendants of the two citizen armies stripped of their entitlements (which have been redistributed to the bosses). It's a bit like Germany after the Weimar republic was assassinated in 1930 by the pre-1914 oligarchs. Callaghan and Thatchler's gleichschaltung turned out to be more durable than Bruning's.




I agree with most of what you say but I take issue with some of what you say; A mercenary is a soldier who fights for the pay usually for another country At a shilling a day less stoppages for cleaning materials and barrack damages I would say the British regular was hardly fighting for the pay. After the war the government turned out the troops and tanks on the demobilised soldiers. This put the fear up the ruling classes who were terrified of a communist revolution. So much so that FM Haig formed the Officers Association and the British Legion both of which would have become the British version of the anti communist ‘Friecorps’ The British Legion had much opposition from other WW1 veterans’ associations who were more left wing. However the ruling classes soon brought the lower middle and the working class into line and reduced the gains they had fought for a simple ‘banking crisis’ works every time and certainly ’forces people in to into line‘. especially when the ruling class no longer fear communism. I must say that I’m all-in favour of a citizen army, wars tend to be righteous and don’t last to long. Brunning’s experience is a classic example as what to expect when Socialists or Liberals form a coalition with the rightwing.


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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#33

Post by Lightbob » 19 Jun 2011, 16:10

Aghart
A really good what if!
I suppose that your ‘if’ includes, ‘Operation Torch’, invasion of Italy, an end to the battle of Atlantic the European bomber offensive. But most important the futile Churchill policy of supplying a country with 39 tank divisions with 200 tanks of doubtful value and outdated aircraft to the same country that’s aircraft were far better than the ones we sent. Lets face it Churchill had effectively written Singapore off in 1936 when as chancellor of the exchequer he dramatically reduced spending on it defence.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#34

Post by aghart » 19 Jun 2011, 17:43

Lightbob wrote:Aghart
A really good what if!
I suppose that your ‘if’ includes, ‘Operation Torch’, invasion of Italy, an end to the battle of Atlantic the European bomber offensive. But most important the futile Churchill policy of supplying a country with 39 tank divisions with 200 tanks of doubtful value and outdated aircraft to the same country that’s aircraft were far better than the ones we sent. Lets face it Churchill had effectively written Singapore off in 1936 when as chancellor of the exchequer he dramatically reduced spending on it defence.
Not at all,
remember, Malaya was already being built up albeit slowly, however with the cerain knowlege that the UK was safe from Invasion that build up would have carried on but likely at a faster pace. In actual history, operation torch, the battle of the atlantic, the european bomber offensive did not stop the UK from reinforcing India in 1942 with both Land (2nd Infantry division) and air assets from the UK. The increased defences at Singapore would I feel slow the Japanese down, allowing reinforcement to arrive in time to be effective. I agree that the fighter sqns in Malaya would have been better off being equipped with Hurricane fighters that ultimately went to russia, instead of Brewster Buffalo's. However, we are talking of only 4 squadrons here. The biq question is would operational RAF Hurricane Sqns have been released for service in Malaya/Singapore during late 1941 early 1942 ?

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#35

Post by Attrition » 19 Jun 2011, 19:06

~~~~~Brunning’s experience is a classic example as what to expect when Socialists or Liberals form a coalition with the rightwing.~~~~~

No, the Bruning government 1930-1932 was the consequence of the elimination of the SPD from the Federal government.When it failed either the pre-1914 elites turned back to them like in 1918-1919 or tried to use the NSDAP. The 1932 elections demnstrated that the nazi surge was past and they were ripe for the picking. Whoops....

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#36

Post by Lightbob » 20 Jun 2011, 16:06

Agart says;
remember, Malaya was already being built up albeit slowly, however with the cerain knowlege that the UK was safe from Invasion that build up would have carried on but likely at a faster pace. In actual history, operation torch, the battle of the atlantic, the european bomber offensive did not stop the UK from reinforcing India in 1942 with both Land (2nd Infantry division) and air assets from the UK. The increased defences at Singapore would I feel slow the Japanese down, allowing reinforcement to arrive in time to be effective. I agree that the fighter sqns in Malaya would have been better off being equipped with Hurricane fighters that ultimately went to russia, instead of Brewster Buffalo's. However, we are talking of only 4 squadrons here. The biq question is would operational RAF Hurricane Sqns have been released for service in Malaya/Singapore during late 1941 early 1942 ?


I cannot see how you can be so certain that Britain was free from the threat of German invasion. The German Russian offensive was going Hitler’s way. So much so that the conservatives in both the US and GB was hoping that Hitler would destroy what they saw as the communist menace If he had would he have turned again to Britain. The British General Staff prevented WSC from sending reinforcements to Malaya, of one infantry division and an armoured brigade. WSC thought they now could be spared from N Africa now that Operation Crusader appeared to be a success. Unfortunately Rommel thought otherwise. The British General Staff thought that these troops could be of better used to save the Suez canal and the oil fields. It must be also remembered that without a fleet Singapore was simply a commercial ‘cash cow’ and of no strategic value. Where as Burma was the gateway to India and was of great strategic value not only for the British defending India but the American supported war in China where the route through Assam and Burma was the only reliable supply line.

During the period 1940 -43 there was great deal of concern regarding the poor performance of the army. According to Max Hastings who devotes a full chapter to this poor performance in his book ’Finest Years’ and is full of remarks such as from Cadogan the Foreign Office Minister, ’Our army is a mockery they are pathetic amateurs compared to the Germans, General John Kennedy, ‘we manage by terrific efforts to pile up resources at the necessary place and then the business seems to go wrong, for lack of Generalship and junior leadership and lack of concentration at the right point’. However the most interesting remark is from the same general, who said, ‘ our soldiers have no interest in the war and do not want to fight for the Empire’.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#37

Post by Attrition » 20 Jun 2011, 16:47

Considering the speed with which the Middle East was reinforced in 1940, the relatively parsimonious despatches to the Far East in 1941 seem to me to demonstrate the relative importance of the two regions.

I don't really know how certain it is but I remember reading somewhere ('Firepower' or 'We Will Shock Them'?) that the army tried to fight a dispersed mobile battle in the early years, which foundered on German concentrations of firepower and that the return to a more concentrated and less mobile battle model made greater demands on the infantry, just as Britain's manpower mobilisation reached its ceiling in 1942. If the pongos were not willing to do or die, this change would make the army more prone to failure wouldn't it?

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#38

Post by Gooner1 » 20 Jun 2011, 17:22

Lightbob wrote: The British General Staff prevented WSC from sending reinforcements to Malaya, of one infantry division and an armoured brigade.
Do you know when that was? The combined chiefs recognised by September 1940 that the Malaya garrison should be 3 divisions including one British and a light tank regiment strong.
It must be also remembered that without a fleet Singapore was simply a commercial ‘cash cow’ and of no strategic value.
Surely being a commercial 'cash cow' is of great strategic value? Did Britain need more than a submarine flotilla or two in Singapore?
During the period 1940 -43 there was great deal of concern regarding the poor performance of the army.
No doubt there was a great deal of concern among the army's plebs about the poor performance of the Generals, the Chiefs of Staff and the Government ..

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#39

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 20 Jun 2011, 21:40

Sorry guys I struggle to keep pace at the moment, so forgive me if at times I'm a page or two behind.
Lightbob wrote: Regarding lack of fighting spirit and power, I have previously said that basis of this deficiency was the effects of WW1 and after. Regarding the Senior officers I suppose it is true to say that the better ones died in the Flanders mud. But I suppose the German ones died also. The junior officers were almost entirely recruited from the middle class. The ordinary regular soldier tended to be apolitical and any sympathy for their civilian brothers was soon knocked out of them by a military establishment that was on the whole almost extreme rightwing. Of course the regulars all develop ‘espirite de corps’ from the first day of training.

Not quite, there is a lot debate among historians that the British never quite recovered their true spirit. There is much argument that the British performance in Normandy was much behind the German’s and the Americans. What is true that Montgomery’s strategy and tactics were designed not particularly for speed but economy in lives, by letting fire power take the brunt, not blood.
I think everyone will agree the slaughter of the first world war had a profound impact on the Britsh "Fighting Spirt" of the second world war. Reading the diaries of Field Marshal Alan Brooke, he continually bemoans the lack of talent in high command within the British Army, it having been killed off in the First World War.

How quickly might the common soldier lose belief in the abiliies of senior commanders, given the stories they had been brought up on of the mindless slaughter of fathers, uncles, elder brothers a generation ago in WW1, and mismanagement that they might observe and experience. Dying for the cause really loses its appeal if you believe your dying because of a mistake of your senior commander. Surely the conscripted man had to be convinced his commander knew what he was doing. This was something Monty did with great effect when he took command of the Eight Army.

Secondly the British didn't have the structure of a large militia, and so couldn't expand as quickly as well as the French or Germans did. Yes they did have the TA, but too many formations were commited to action before they were really ready. Again the Alanbrooke diaries talks of his worries about his corps (II Corps) being trained and prepared in time, thanking god they had the winter of 1939 to give them some time. Too many units were committed not fully trained due to circumstances.

And lastly, as Lightbob mentioned, there was a need to demonstrate to the common soldier that lives were not being jeopardised cheapy, so the slower more careful approach to fighting. This however only works if you have the resources, time and initiative, which they didn'y have until the US fully entered the war. To conduct a blitzkrieg type of warfare requires faith in the tactic and training you have had, and belief in your commanders. Both the Germans in 1940, and the Japanese in 1941 had this, the British didn't.

So I agree with Lightbob, there was a lack of fighting spirt, but not because of any cowardice.
Lightbob wrote: You are quite right about the regular battalions did fight well after suffering a number of disasters. I think that there are a number of associated reasons for that. Did it increasingly become a fight for survival, or perhaps the stories of the IJA bayoneting their prisoners made them fight harder and I would like to think they had began to get the measure of the INJ
Lightbob, I don't think the Britis and Allies had any real idea of the conditions POWs would suffer under the Japanese, and so I don't feel there was any motivation for fighting for survival in the initial Malayan and Burma campaigns.
Lightbob wrote: Steve adds;
As a comparator, the Australians, exceeded, they were all volunteers. Was it because they held a looser discipline regime, allowing more independence of action at that level, or just plain good fighting spirit.


Good fighting spirit, but only in Johor! In Singapore the Australians literally fell apart. They are accused of by Percival’s staff officers of failing to carry out patrols across in Johor. In fact the patrols were supposed to give the defenders an early warning. When finally persuaded to patrol the warning of IJA activity arrived at GHQ after the Japanese had landed.

I have heard and read somewhere that a rumour went around the Australian division that they were being evacuated causing the troops to abandon their positions. Where did the rumour come from? One apophasis is that news got out that Bennet and his staff were already leaving, seeming to confirm the rumour, since Bennet had planned much earlier to leave it is easy to see how rumours would soon get round.
Lightbob, I feel you unjustifiably knock the Australians re their performance in Singapore. If you look at the casualties sustained in Johore, and remenber the replacements came from the scandalous 3,000 semi or untrained troops convoyed in late January (Convoy MS 2A) you can see their performance was probably as expected.
Lightbob wrote: Steve your comment regarding the Essex where did you find that they left Malaya? I know they served in Burma with the Chindits but can find no record of their service in Malay until after the war during he Emergency.
Essex weren't in Malaya, that part of my post refered to the Sudan and Italian East Africa. The point I was making is the poor performance wasn't limited to Malaya, it was happening everywhere.
I believe the Essex were quite quickly withdrawn to Eygpt after their disgraceful act, but later, and no doubt with a better commander, and good training, served in the Chindits in Burma

Steve
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#40

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 20 Jun 2011, 21:52

aghart wrote:As i said in an earlier thread, the Japanese attacked 6 months too early for the British ( but at exactly the correct time for the Japanese) Imagine a June 1942 Japanese attack on Malaya?

Gen Pownall will have replaced Brook-Popham as the senior officer, and as a General with up to date experience is likely to have been "banging heads together" for a few months now.

General Percival will have managed to get some "proper" training of the land forces under his belt.

HMS indomitable would be Singapore, Force Z will be a fully worked up unit , it is likely that Australia and New Zealand would have sent a cruiser each and maybe a couple of destroyers as well. HMS Warspite is likely to be at Singapore as are the R class battleships.

The Vildebeeste torpedo bomber Squadrons are likely to have completed their conversion to Bristol Beauforts, The Brewster Buffalo squadrons will be fully worked up.

More importantly, since December 1941 it will have been obvious to the UK that an invasion of the homeland was now highly unlikely and additional "operational" squadrons of Hurricanes, Blenheim, maybe even Beaufighters are likely to be en route to Singapore if not alreay there.

The force levels at Singapore in mid 1942 should mean a much slower Japanese advance down the penisula causing them serious logistical problems and allowing time for major reinforcements ie 7th Armoured Brigade and experienced infantry formations to arrive from the middle east and be built up for offensive operations.

I'm aware that additional British assets in place at Singapore will mean stronger Japanese forces as well, but I feel that a slower Japanese advance down the malay peninsula would result and that benefits the defenders and causes real problems for the Japanese.

A really good what if!
Hi Aghart

I agree, it would be a good "What If"

Can't you post it in the What If section, and we'll discuss. The forum is so large, and with so many sections, people don't follow all the threads, remaining in their favorite sections, I know I do!, so posting there will present your arguement to more members, as well as being an appropriate post

Steve
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#41

Post by Gooner1 » 21 Jun 2011, 14:03

Fatboy Coxy wrote: I think everyone will agree the slaughter of the first world war had a profound impact on the Britsh "Fighting Spirt" of the second world war.
Not sure I would agree. OTOH Hitler bemoaned that the German soldier of the second war did not have the spirit of the solders of the first as well.
Reading the diaries of Field Marshal Alan Brooke, he continually bemoans the lack of talent in high command within the British Army, it having been killed off in the First World War.
Yet, Britain still produced two outstanding field commanders and numbers of lesser lights. Alan Brooke's own competency, however, as Chief of the Army from December 1941 must be judged in how quickly, or not, he was able to find and place the army's talent.
This however only works if you have the resources, time and initiative, which they didn'y have until the US fully entered the war. To conduct a blitzkrieg type of warfare requires faith in the tactic and training you have had, and belief in your commanders. Both the Germans in 1940, and the Japanese in 1941 had this, the British didn't.
Britain certainly had the material and the time to be able to defeat Japan in Malaya but sadly not the initiative.
Did Western Desert Force not execute as spectacular a 'Blitzkrieg' as anyone December '40 to Feb. 41?

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#42

Post by Attrition » 21 Jun 2011, 14:51

This brings us back to the structure of the army, its equipment, supply and the way it tried to use its military power. Compass and Crusader were big successes as much because of the enemy as the behaviour of the winning side. Gazala seems to me to be Crusader in reverse. On both occasions the side that attacked first won. Malaya could be analogous to Crusader - the losing side never really regained the initiative and the costs of this were the reason for the defeat. Perhaps the soul-searching that went on, the excuse of the dead of the Great War (plenty of potential German Generals must be buried in Flanders), lack of equipment, the poor quality of some of it etc are consequences of a run of failures which it was easy to assume were caused by general failings rather than being caused by the natural ups and downs of military activity and unfortunate decisions by London leading to excercises in futility. It's not as if fighting German and Japanese armies was any easier for other Allied armies is it?

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#43

Post by Fatboy Coxy » 22 Jun 2011, 20:27

A very good point Attrition

The given reason of command failure, a loss of talent in the first world war, must hold up for Germany as well as Britain and France. Only difference is the well established German Staff Officer training at the higher level, and a complete revision of their "losing" battle drills at the lower level after that war. I guess as a winning side, there isn't the drive for that.

But with regard to your last sentence about other allied armies fighting the German & Japanese, no one else did any better up to 1942.

Interestingly a comparator to Malaya might be the Operation Compass, with the British in Malaya and the Italians in the Western Desert, both performing poorly.

Crusader, less of a comparator, could be British (Italians), with Australians (Germans), a poor army, stiffened with some quality troops. But we can only gereralise on these comparators as there is a massive difference between the open desert war of movement, and the jungle dominated war of stratigic locations and lines of communications.

The difference between Malaya and the Western Desert as far as both British Armies is concerned is the Western Desert had our best, and Malaya had whats left!

Steve
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#44

Post by Attrition » 22 Jun 2011, 21:51

Thanks, I wouldn't push the analogy all that far because then the differences become more significant than the similarities. The terrain was different but the loss of air superiority was never complete in the desert or as permanent as it was in Malaya. Clearly terrain and firepower are two of the most important determinants of events but air power can be even more significant and also be unpredictable in its effects. Given that the British were motorised they were bound to have a lot of their forces near roads. This must have simplified the tactical situation for the Japanese (like the northern airfields), except for the times when the British turned the tables (the Argylls showed what better training could achieve).

I don't think that there's any doubt that there was a grand strategic decision that the Middle East should become the bastion overseas and that from this flowed much of the course of the war in 1941 and 1942. To an extent the Axis offensives were in secondary areas (however valuable in themselves). Britain chose war against Vichy and Italy in 1940-41 leaving things to chance in the desert and Far East, then had a bash at the Germans in Europe again. With hindsight the result was dire but at the time the offensive nature of the Greek gamble must have seemed more inviting than the costs, of which we know so much. As well as discussing the second (or third) eleven in Malaya and Burma, we need to weigh the costs of Britain's dispositions in Iran and Iraq (i.e. the 'wrong' end of the M.E.) and the big investment in Bomber Command on peripheral areas.

It also seems to me that the string of defeats in 1941-42 weren't strictly army failures and that several of them were very close run things (hence my recently increased doubts about a 'general crisis of the army' point of view). As you mentioned, the run of bad luck and defeat began to change in late 1942. If there is anything in Edgerton's thesis that lack of equipment is a myth, then the flood of it beginning in late 1942 wasn't as decisive as we might suppose.

Considering that the British build-up in Malaya was too little too late, perhaps the surprise is that they did so well?

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#45

Post by Attrition » 22 Jun 2011, 23:21

Grand Strategy Vol II p. 504 has, 'He [Churchill] viewed with great reluctance the continued diversion of troops, aircraft and supplies to a theatre which was unlikely to become active unless we were heavily beaten elsewhere.'

Interestingly, page 506-507 has '... Egypt was 'not even second in order of priority', for it had been an accepted principle in our strategy that in the last resort the security of Singapore came before that of Egypt... No further reinforcement of Malaya was carried out.... In the meantime our commitments in the Middle East continually increased.'

Evidently confusion between theory and practice began at the top.

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