British "Fighting Spirt"

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Lightbob
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#61

Post by Lightbob » 20 Jul 2011, 18:35

Rich you said there was no RAF bombing on D Day. On the night 5/6th of June the RAF heavy bombers attacked as followed;

5/6 June 1944
1,012 aircraft - 551 Lancasters, 412 Halifaxes, 49 Mosquitos - to bomb coastal batteries at Fontenay, Houlgate, La Pernelle, Longues, Maisy, Merville, Mont Fleury, Pointe du Hoc, Ouisterham and St Martin de Varreville. 946 aircraft carried out their bombing tasks. 3 aircraft were lost - 2 Halifaxes of No 4 Group on the Mont Fleury raid and 1 Lancaster of No 6 Group on the Longues raid. Only two of the targets - La Pernelle and Ouisterham - were free of cloud; all other bombing was entirely based on Oboe marking. At least 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped, the greatest tonnage in one night so far in the war.

But the night (4/5th) before the RAF Heavies attacked the following targets;

4/5 June 1944
259 aircraft - 125 Lancasters, 118 Halifaxes, 16 Mosquitos - of Nos 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 Groups to bomb 4 gun positions; 3 of these were deception targets in the Pas de Calais but the fourth battery, at Maisy, was in Normandy between what would soon be known as Omaha and Utah Beaches, where American troops would land in less than 36 hours' time. Unfortunately, Maisy was covered by cloud and could only be marked by Oboe skymarkers, but it was then bombed by 52 Lancasters of No 5 Group. 2 of the 3 gun positions in the Pas de Calais were also affected by bad weather and could only be bombed through cloud but the position at Calais itself was clear and was accurately marked by the Mosquitos and well bombed by Halifaxes and Lancasters of No 6 Group. No aircraft lost on these operations.

They all hit the target see the photo of Pointe de Hoc for the cratering before the Rangers landed

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/jun44.html

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#62

Post by RichTO90 » 20 Jul 2011, 22:02

Lightbob wrote:Rich you said there was no RAF bombing on D Day.
Good to see you're unchanged as ever Bob old bean, but I never said any such thing (and neither did "Rish"). I stated that "the RAF heavy bombers were not tasked with hitting the beach defences", which is quite true and was the point being contended. As to your inane comments regarding the Cherbourg bombardment...do you really imagine that was only the bombardment plan I posted? Thanks for confirming that you simply read what you want and give no real thought to your spew. BTW, just what does Corry have to do with the bombardment of Cherbourg?

Unfortunately I'm just out of hospital after emergency surgery so I'm in no mood to play.
Cheers!
Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.


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Attrition
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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#63

Post by Attrition » 23 Jul 2011, 15:31

Glad you're still here. ;O)

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EKB
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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#64

Post by EKB » 14 Mar 2012, 15:54

Lightbob wrote:Sorry I have been so late in answering but I have been on my travels for the last three weeks and only got back at the week end.

I have been busy myself since last summer, and for that reason it is probably just as well that I missed your message earlier when it was moved by the moderators. I am not sure what you hope to prove by giving a free pass to Churchill and some of his subordinates for such behavior.

Your explanation contains an awful lot of caveats and addendums.


Lightbob wrote:However the US did prove the point, On Omaha beach the USAF missed their targets completely, leading to heavy casualties in the assault infantry. (Perhaps the Planners of Jubilee was not altogether wrong).

Which targets?

Oberstleutnant Fritz Ziegelmann (Chief of Staff 352nd Infantry Division) verified that in May 1944, USAAF B-26 Marauders knocked out three of the six 155mm guns at Pointe du Hoc, using 2,000 lb. bombs. Two of these guns were in open ring mounts which provided a 360 degree field of fire, while the third gun was inside of a casemate when hit. The three guns were replaced before D-Day, after which all six were pulled back a short distance inland and camouflaged so they would not invite further bombings.

All that concrete was a magnet for air strikes.

Lightbob wrote:Again this lacks a certain historical integrity to the reason for Op Jubilee. It was thought at the time, an early invasion would mean that the Allies would have to capture an enemy held port for re supply. WSC was wary of the US plan because the 120,000 troops would be mainly British and if this gesture to the Russians failed, the losses to the British would be on the scale of Dunkirk. More importantly this size of raid would provide the Allies with much needed experience in conducting an amphibious assault on a defended coast especially in the use of armour on a beach assault, the last large scale amphibious assault by the British had been at Gallipoli during the First World War.

Prime Minister Churchill and Field Marshall Alan Brooke were in Egypt during the disaster at Dieppe. They never sanctioned the final tactical orders, nor were they given a chance to preview the final plan. The more that Churchill learned of the details, the more he expressed grave doubts about the blueprint for Operation Jubilee.

Shortly after the evacuation from Dieppe, Churchill attended a dinner party at Chequers where he watched Field Marshall Brooke openly attack Admiral Mountbatten over the soundness of planning. Lord Beaverbrook confronted Mountbatten at another social function, and said "You have murdered thousands of my countrymen, their blood is on your hands". The news agencies also turned hostile, especially in Canada. Mountbatten was soon under siege for the poor results, high losses, and the credibility of his own after-action report.

All this had Churchill worried that his initial support in front of the House of Commons was a serious mistake. He wrote to General Hastings Ismay demanding a full investigation, as quoted by Richard Lamb, Churchill As War Leader, 1991:

"Although for many reasons everyone was concerned to make this business [Jubilee] look as good as possible the time has come when I must be informed more precisely about the military plans. Who made them? Who approved them? What was General Montgomery's part in it? and General McNaughton's part? What is the opinion about the Canadian generals selected by General McNaughton? Did the General staff check the plans? At what point was V.C.I.G.S. informed in C.I.G.S. absence? At first sight it would appear to a layman very much out of accord with the accepted principles of war to attack the strongly fortified town front without first securing the cliffs on either side, and to use our tanks in frontal assault off the beaches by the Casino, etc. instead of landing them a few miles up the coast and entering the town from the back."

Is that your idea of a ringing endorsement?


Lightbob wrote:Of course there no documents to prove it, simply, as you know that Gen Marshal told his Generals not to commit any contentious subjects to paper.

George Marshall was not a member of the British Army. And no British documents will substantiate your delusion that Winston Churchill agreed to risk thousands of Commonwealth soldiers, sailors and flyers because he supposedly wanted to persuade the U.S. Army that invasion was impossible.

Churchill's biographers could not find archive evidence that he was ever involved in the planning for Operation Jubilee, or that he signed a written approval for it.

Get your facts straight Bob. What Churchill said publicly about Dieppe (to protect reputations) and what he wrote privately were radically different reactions.


Lightbob wrote:Bombing by heavy aircraft was not considered accurate enough at this period in the war. In this operation pin point accuracy was needed, but certainly later the RAF did improve, they could and did do it in Normandy.


Unless you want to split hairs, British bombing accuracy did not improve much.

From March 1944 to June 1944, RAF Lancaster, Stirling, and Halifax bombers aimed thousands of heavy bombs at the concrete forts known as Morris, Hillman, and Merville. The guns and occupants of these positions proved to be very much alive when visited by British troops.

The bunkers at Ouistreham were also bombed and this caused no significant damage. In any case the British troops soon discovered that the blockhouses were deserted because the coastal guns had been removed.

Strike photographs show that relatively few bombs landed inside the perimeter defenses at Merville, and only one raid (on 19th May) caused damage to some of the guns. But the casemates stood firm and all gun positions were put back in action. One of the largest RAF efforts was on the night of 9th May, when 56 Lancasters aimed over 1,000 bombs at the Merville Battery. Nearly all bombs landed well south of the position and the defenders noted that only two bombs struck a casemate, which failed to penetrate the 2 metre-thick walls.

To make matters worse, the thick blanket of smoke caused by the predawn RAF bombing raid on D-Day obscured the dropping zones for the 9th Parachute Battalion. Anti-aircraft fire caused the pilots to take evasive action in all directions. Lt. Colonel Terence Otway said that his battalion was scattered over 50 square miles, with no more than 20% landing near the assembly points.

(Referenced from Georges Bernage, Red Devils in Normandy: 6th Airborne Division, 2002).


Lightbob wrote:The bombing of their own troops during Cobra was another salutary lesson for the US.

Evidently the UK did not learn the same lesson, because a few weeks later the RAF heavily bombed their own troops during Tractable.

Persistent carpet bombing was a double-edged sword. It was very expensive in material, fuel, and manpower. Direct hits were few and far between. Thousands of large bomb craters and debris from destroyed buildings could slow the attacking troops, and heavy smoke obscured targets during follow-up attacks. Fear of air attack might persuade the enemy to abandon obvious targets like concrete emplacements, but unfortunately this also meant that the guns were moved into mobile camouflaged positions that were not easily pinpointed by spying planes.

The main benefit of air or naval saturation bombardment was that it produced a temporary shock effect on enemy troops, but only if properly timed. Even if the pounding did not cause significant material losses, it could delay the enemy reaction to a ground assault, and the Allied troops at Dieppe needed all the help they could get.


Lightbob wrote:Who knows how many lives were saved in later amphibious landings, particularly Normandy, as a result of the casualties at Dieppe?

Probably none. In December 1942, Admiral Mountbatten produced a report which identified lessons that were supposedly learnt from the landings at Dieppe. After reading it, Field Marshall Brooke declared that he was "very disappointed with the paucity of ideas".

In any case German fortifications, mass flooding, and other high casualty-producing anti-invasion obstacles were almost nonexistent in Normandy until 1944.

Worst of all, you overlooked that material and manpower resources from the build-up in England were diverted to North Africa and the Middle East, which did more to cause delays for a Cross-Channel invasion than the entire catalogue of pinprick raids on German occupied territory.

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Re: Why Was Britain Defeated in Malaya?

#65

Post by EKB » 14 Mar 2012, 15:55

Lightbob wrote:Pointe du Hoc. After training under the Commandos, Major Cleveland A. Lytle was to command three companies of the 2nd Ranger Battalion in the assault at Point du Hoc.

If Lytle were alive today, he would have noted that you have the results of Ranger missions confused with the results of Commando missions. It was the British Commandos (not the Rangers) who failed to find the coastal guns that were removed by the Germans.

The Rangers quickly found all six guns and a stockpile of 155mm shells in the apple orchards right behind Pointe du Doc. They destroyed the whole lot in a sneak attack. As well, they demolished the coastal guns and radar station at Pointe Raz de la Percee.

The outcome at Sword Beach was very different. The Germans removed the coastal guns that the British Commandos expected to find at both sites. They attacked empty bunkers, and did not find the repositioned guns. They also failed to reach the radar station at Douvres-la-Délivrande, despite having tank support. The Commandos did not eliminate this target until eleven days later, and only because they got help from a massed artillery barrage backed by armored engineer vehicles.

The British 9th Parachute Battalion did not destroy the battery at Merville, or the radar station at Sallenelles. They could not find any thermite grenades or other explosives capable of causing permanent damage to the guns. After the British survivors withdrew from Merville, the Germans regrouped and managed to get at least two 100mm guns back in action. Lovat's Commandos then had a go at the Merville Battery and tried to hold the position, which changed hands four times during the first two days of the invasion. By the next day the Commandos were mopped up, and Merville Battery remained firmly under German control until August 1944.

On the other hand, small teams of US paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division destroyed the two artillery batteries at Brecourt Manor and Holdy. The four concrete blockhouses for the La Madaleine Battery were deserted. Only one of the wheeled 122mm guns was found there, and destroyed with a bangalore torpedo. The German artillery unit that manned this battery was wiped out during a surprise assault on their barracks and mess hall, near St. Martin de Varreville.

The American Rangers and airborne troops outperformed their British counterparts in these D-Day missions. Training, leadership, and personal initiative made a bigger difference than your vague definitions of fighting spirit.



Lightbob wrote:During a briefing he heard that Free French sources reported the guns thought to be there had been removed.

French spies revealed that the guns were removed from the Riva Bella battery, and that the Merville and Colleville batteries were armed with nothing but short-ranged 100mm light howitzers. The British planners dismissed these reports, and guessed incorrectly that 150mm or larger long-range guns must be at these sites based on grainy air reconnaissance photographs.


Lightbob wrote:no Commando worth his salt would allow a piper to compromise his position or that of his mates. I think that this story is a direct result of that Anglophobe Stephen Ambrose's story about 12 Commandos being shot in the head whilst following the Piper across Pegasus Bridge.

This is not knowledge, it is faith and conjecture. Playing bagpipes in combat was officially banned by the British Army as a result of the high losses from the first World War.

Brigadier Lovat ignored this direct order because he was reckless and deranged.


Lightbob wrote:The Pipes historically been used to rally Scottish troops in the attack and still are.

Was that the form in Helmand province? Tripping the same wire twice in one stumble is a dicey proposition, especially for someone wearing a kilt.


Lightbob wrote:Lytle became quite vocal that the assault would be unnecessary and suicidal and was relieved of his command at the last minut. They never trusted the rest of the Rangers with the information, Why? What every one seems to call a futile attack led to heavy casualties for the Rangers taking part.

How could it be a 'futile' attack when all of the guns were destroyed?

After they rope-scaled the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc, Sgt. Leonard Lomell and Sgt. Jack Kuhn of D Company took a few advance parties of Rangers and followed the tracks exiting the casemates. They soon found five guns from the battery, which were pulled back and repositioned to expand the field of fire, and most of them were pointed towards Utah Beach. The Rangers used silent thermite grenades to destroy the guns, and they also blew up the ammunition dump right under the noses of the owners. The sixth gun and its ammo supply were found and destroyed by a E Company team dispatched by Sgt. Robert Lang.

As they quietly slipped past the German artillerymen, at no time did the Rangers play bagpipes, hunting horns, or other musical instruments that might alert the enemy of their presence.


The four 11-inch guns of Battery Graf Spee at Brest were silenced even more efficiently. Four Rangers sneaked into the perimeter of the surrounding fortress, overpowered a daisy chain of sentries, and burst into the air-conditioned office of the rightly surprised German commander. After a number of threats were made to his personal safety, Oberstleutnant Martin Fürst was persuaded to pick up the telephone which he used to order all men under his command to surrender. With that, 817 German soldiers dropped their weapons and walked out with their hands up. A pretty good day for Lt. Robert Edlin, Sgt. William Dreher, Sgt. Warren Burmaster, and Sgt. William Courtney.

That's one Ranger per 280mm gun captured; all accomplished without firing a shot.


Lightbob wrote:However the total disaster on Omaha was averted when the ‘puny’ guns on the British destroyers sailing in close and destroying the untouched German guns.

Testimony from the captain and crew of HMS Talybont gave proof that the Royal Navy was directly responsible for causing higher losses in the Ranger battalions.

All of the Ranger landing boats had British crews. The three Ranger assault companies (D, E, F) destined for Pointe Du Hoc landed almost one hour late because the lead navigator set course for Point Raz de la Percee by mistake.

The flotilla of LCAs and DUKWs were misdirected to shore by Motor Launch 304, a British coastal forces patrol boat commanded by Lt. Colin Beever. The side effects of his mistake multiplied rapidly, and caused a lot of people to get killed. It's amazing that that he could not find the target beach, because the Rangers and the crew of HMS Talybont could clearly see the massive impact explosions on Pointe du Hoc from shells fired by the battleship USS Texas.

Lt. Colonel Jim Rudder tried to signal ML 304 without success, so he ordered the helmsman of LCA 888 to correct his heading for Pointe du Hoc. Other boats carrying Companies D, E, F followed, though by this time the landing craft were less than 1,000 yards from shore, which forced them to run the gauntlet of German coastal guns on on a parallel route with the beaches. Not only did the landing boats endure the barrage of return fire longer than expected, but the Rangers had to wade ashore long after the carefully timed naval bombardment. The Germans who survived the pounding from the warships had plenty of time to regain their senses.

Lt. Commander Edward Baines (captain of HMS Talybont) said of the British LCAs: "their course from Raz de la Percee along the shore to Pte. du Hoc was suicidal". Baines noted in his log book that the destroyer USS Satterlee was very efficient at reacting to this unwanted situation, and that its crew did not ask for or require assistance from the Talybont. The Satterlee moved closer to shore, from where they moved down the coast and picked off German positions at point blank range.

(Referenced from Robert Black, The Battalion: The Dramatic Story of the 2nd Ranger Battalion in World War II, 2006).


Lightbob wrote:The 5th Rangers landed on the wrong beach Omaha instead of Pointe du Hoc, stealthily of course.

They landed on the wrong beach courtesy of the British navy. All six companies of the 5th Ranger Battalion expected to follow right behind the 2nd Rangers at Pointe du Hoc, but only if they received a radio signal that the target was secured by a specific time.

The 5th Rangers were fortunate to be in the second wave. Lt. Colonel Max Schneider noticed that the 116th Infantry Regiment was taking heavy fire from certain parts of the beach, so he told the British boat commander to land his troops about 100 yards east of their intended positions. Several former Rangers have confirmed that this decision saved the battalion from higher casualties.


Lightbob wrote:Almost the whole establishment of Ranger Battalions were allowed to wither on the vine in the European theatre, until they were all disbanded by the end of the war.

This also describes the fate of British Army Commandos in Northwest Europe. It's just another example of the double standards on which you base your replies.


Lightbob wrote:29th Rangers would seem to be good at games, however they cannot have been that good they were disbanded shortly after without firing a shot.

All of them were members of the 29th Infantry Division. This division had no combat experience and the army never intended to use them as an independent raiding force. Not all of the Rangers were pleased with that decision, but they were ordered to return to their parent units and if they learned anything useful in Scotland they were to share that information with the other beach assault units.

The battle-tested 1st Division did not bother with this. From past experience, they knew that the British Commandos had no new ideas or tactics that might be helpful on Omaha Beach.


Lightbob wrote:The German Parachutists never made another major parachute attack after Crete their losses had caused Hitler to lose heart.

The British 1st Airborne Division never made another major parachute attack after Arnhem.

The most striking differences are that the Germans held the field after both battles, and that Hitler obviously learned more from the Crete experience than did Churchill.


Lightbob wrote:At Anzio the 4th Rangers attack at Cisterna was noted as being very badly organized The result of the operation was the capture almost completely of the whole Ranger battalion. They obviously did not use their famed stealth!!!!

The math does not add up in your favor.

So the Rangers lost a battalion. The British Middle East Commando lost a brigade. The U.S. II Corps lost 6,500 men at Kasserine Pass. The British 8th Army lost 50,000 men at Gazala; the equivalent of an entire corps!

Everyone makes blunders while learning the ropes, but the British Army had more than two years of combat experience, numerical and material superiority, and a better supply situation than the enemy. It beggars the question, why are you pursuing this game of tit-for-tat so ineffectually?

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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#66

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 16 Mar 2012, 18:41

EKB,

Thanks for the informative post - although I'm a very British chap and occasionally overly defensive of British performance during WW2 myself, it is always interesting to read the "other guys" opinion. :D

The performance of the RN landing craft crews on D-Day is one element of your post that particularly interested me, I have read some "good" reports and some "bad" reports and guess that, like in most historical accounts, the truth probably lies somewhere between the two.

I was interested to read that the CO of HMS TALYBONT made reference to the British LCA crews and wondered if the details in the book you refer to are available elsewhere. You couldn't have a look in the book for me could you and see if the author says where he found the information? I did look in the UK National Archives for information about TALYBONT without success, thanks for the research lead I will be sure to follow it up. :) Another book for my groaning bookshelves :roll:

I thought you might be interested to know, however, that there is a report by the Commander RN of HMS Prince Charles, who was CO of landing force O-4 which was responsible for landing the Rangers; it can be seen at ADM199-1645. He states that the CO of ML304 clearly made a navigational error and also that he should have broken radio silence after "H" hour to inform command that the Ranger landings would be late. This report states that the landing was actually 35 minutes late (I think you stated an hour). He also states, however, and I think it is worth quoting in full, that:
The Ranger assault was not carried out according to the time table for one reason only: the weather and the state of sea.
Now there may clearly be an element of RN defensiveness in the face of American complaints (and we could debate whether "the weather and the state of sea" are one or two reasons :lol: ) but in the light of the scattered American landing all across Omaha Beach (not to mention the mislanding at Utah Beach) I think that it is fair to say that the LCA crews (and all the landing craft crews) were operating in marginal conditions at best and the fact that they got the Rangers ashore in the right place eventually speaks volumes for the determination of the LCA crews to do well by their passengers.

BTW have you come across any contemporary official complaints by the Rangers - I ask because in the same file I also found a letter from the CO of the other ML in the force (who correctly led his LCA's onto the main beach as you describe in the absence of a signal from the first wave) stating that he was upset about the slurs being made against him, but this was in 1945, after the war had ended I think. Did somewhere complain in print or in the newspapers? And who was meant to send the "success signal" the troops ashore or one of the vessels off shore, do you know?

As I have stated elsewhere on this forum, the sort of "tit-for-tat", "our guys were better than your guys", threads can be very dull, however, in this case you and your valiant British opponent have at least led me to some information on TALYBONT that I would never otherwise have found. So congratulations and thank you to you both - long live the "special relationship"! :lol:

Now I'm off to restart the debate on Eisenhower's "broad front strategy" :lol: :lol: Only joking!

Regards

Tom

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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#67

Post by phylo_roadking » 16 Mar 2012, 20:16

The German Parachutists never made another major parachute attack after Crete their losses had caused Hitler to lose heart.
The British 1st Airborne Division never made another major parachute attack after Arnhem.

The most striking differences are that the Germans held the field after both battles, and that Hitler obviously learned more from the Crete experience than did Churchill
But that was only one british Airborne Division that was never used in a major action again; don't forget the 6th Airborne Division in VARSITY! :wink: It's orders show that British planners DID learn from experience and amend their tactics - that unlike MARKET GARDEN, the airborne forces would be dropped only a relatively short distance behind German lines, thereby ensuring that reinforcements in the form of Allied ground forces would be able to link up with them within a short period; this avoided risking the same type of disaster that had befallen the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem ;)

If anything, Crete showed that the Germans couldn't learn a painful lesson; despite the losses of Holland, and the only-at-the-last-gasp success of airfield seizures in Norway, they still thought it was a good idea to send lightly-armed airborne troops with a minimum of heavy weapons and stores to take very specific objectives hundreds of miles out of reach of support and reinforcement. Those very few airfield seizures at the start of BARBAROSSA shouldn't really have been enough to convince them that the tactic was viable after the major manpower and transport aircraft losses of Holland; but that's a failure the Germans consistently made in WWII - analysing events/intelligence for confirmation that their ideas were correct...not for data for and against a given position/opinion!
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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#68

Post by sunbury2 » 19 Mar 2012, 08:30

I have been in two minds posting in this thread, it seems it's just who can pi$$ higher on the wall. But I do find some of EKB's comments to be simply "anti british" and not really supported.

Firstly the issue of the Ranger boats landing in the wrong place, you blame the Royal Navy for navigation errors, and that is not reasonable when taken in context of what was happening all around. You ignore the conditions of the heavy swell, the difficulty of sailing flat bottomed boats and ignore that the whole Utah landing was also in the wrong spot.
“It is difficult to pinpoint the cause for this error. Both Red Beach control vessels had been lost, and one of the Green Beach control vessels had gone back to bring in the LCT's carrying DD amphibious tanks. Guiding the initial assault waves to the proper beaches was therefore the sole responsibility of one control vessel. The possibility of error was increased by the strong tidal current as well as by the beach drenching administered by naval fire support craft, which threw up a tremendous cloud of smoke, dust, and fine sand, obscuring the beach for many minutes just prior to and after the jump-off from the line of departure.”
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/utah/utah3.htm

You can’t have your cake and eat it to. The reasons for Utah must apply equally to those RN vessels. Or do different standards apply?

One question though, how much did the machine gun fire from the British landing craft assist the Rangers on their climb up the bluff? The Destroyers could not provide close fire during the actual climb. Some say it was critical, making your comments churlish.

Exactly how did the American Rangers and airborne troops outperform their British counterparts on D-Day? Training, leadership, and personal initiative were displayed by all troops not just your Americans.

You show no knowledge what the 6th Airborne Division primary objectives for D-Day actually were. It’s primary function was to shield the sea landing from German intervention over the Orne River. It achieved all it’s objectives, the Orne and Caen Canal Bridges held, the Dive Bridges destroyed. The heights around Ranville held and the linking of the airborne and seaborne troops occurred. Even Stephen Ambrose recognized the strategic importance of holding the Orne Canal Bridges. They were critical to the success of D-Day.

The American Airborne Divisons did not take all their first day objectives, Carentan was not taken and the bridges over the river Douve were still in German hands.

So who were the most successful? The British in position to protect the left flank from massive German reinforcements and shield the sea borne landings, or the Americans scattered and failing to achieve their objectives? It is moot really, its only raised to put your comments in some kind of perspective.

You quote 101st Airborne destroying some batteries, you realize of course the British actually killed Germans to? They also faced threat German Armour attacking them in force.
“The Germans reacted swiftly against these units and attacked Ranville almost at once, but they were repulsed with the loss of a number of enemy prisoners of war and one German tank destroyed. At 1045 hours a further attack developed supported by self-propelled guns, which penetrated the village but was beaten off by 12th Parachute Battalion while 4th Air-landing Anti-Tank Battery accounted for three self-propelled guns and one tank……….. In the fighting at Ranville there were many gallant actions but one was outstanding. Lieutenant J. A. N. Sims, 12th Parachute Battalion, was in charge of a position held by a few men. German infantry attacked, supported by two self-propelled guns, one of which Lieutenant Sims knocked out. The other gun killed his men one by one at point-blank range. However, the officer held his ground until the gun withdrew, leaving him with only three men.”
http://warchronicle.com/dday/pegasus/pegasus.htm

Bravery exists in all armies.

I do agree with you about the Merville Battery, almost. The Germans recaptured it on the 7th and got two guns into action, they were only able to fire one shot every ten minutes due to the damage done.

Two points, the Airborne troops stopped the Battery firing on D-Day, that was all they were capable of doing with the forces on hand. They were not meant to hold the position but to move to protect the left flank with the other airborne troops. Secondly you ignore that the Battery never had any impact on the Landings on the 6th or any other day there after.

The fact it remained across the river in German hands to August shows it had no relevancy on the British sector. It was 3 Commando who retook it on the afternoon of the 7th. Not Lovatt’s men but Peter Young’s 3 Commando. Young was a veteran of Dieppe, leading one of the few successes of that disaster.

http://www.batterie-merville.com/the-me ... ry?lang=en


Though you cannot compare the Melville Battery with the Pointe du Hoc assault as you try to do. The German defences were light years apart. An Airborne night attack against a fully manned and heavily defended battery, is totally different to a seaborne day attack against a lightly defended empty position. You also fail to recognize the fact, that the Merville Battery was on the edge of major German forces whilst the Pointe du Hoc battery was situated between Omaha and Utah beaches. It was cut off within days. Military maps can show so much detail.


EKB wrote
“The Rangers quickly found all six guns and a stockpile of 155mm shells in the apple orchards right behind Pointe du Doc. They destroyed the whole lot in a sneak attack…………. The Rangers used silent thermite grenades to destroy the guns, and they also blew up the ammunition dump right under the noses of the owners……………….. As they quietly slipped past the German artillerymen, at no time did the Rangers play bagpipes, hunting horns, or other musical instruments that might alert the enemy of their presence."
The guns when found at Pointe du Hoc were not manned nor even guarded, so please explain how a sneak attack is done against no enemy?

The Rangers may have wished for bagpipes, horns etc when the relief force from the 743rd Tank Battalion opened fire on them and killed four Rangers and wounded another six. Later another relief force coming from the south west opened fire on the first relief force. Colonel Rudder was reduced to try standing in the open and holding up an American flag to show where his men were. Desperate, dangerous and so amateurish.

Your comments though about bagpipes, horns etc, fails to cover the situation at Pegasus bridge. To avoid friendly fire, attacking troops need to know exactly where each other is. They need to make noise to alert one another. Ambrose goes into it in some considerable detail in his book on Pegasus Bridge, recognizing the value of sound at night to draw troops together. Something that the US Airborne Divisions did not do and were scattered for days.

The bagpipes told the Glider troops at the Bridge that reinforcements were arriving and Major Howard continued to blow his whistle to tell them where his men were. It was not deranged as you claimed, it was deliberate. It was simple and it worked.

I do not understand why you blame the British Air reconnaissance about the batteries, US Air reconnaissance were equally involved in mapping the Normandy area. To suggest just the British are at fault is again churlish. SHAEF Intelligence Officers judged by the size of the fortifications to guess the size of the guns.

Your comparing British and Americans also is to simplistic, the only comparsion should be where they were to achieve a common goal.

There was only one, the join up line for Omaha and Gold Beach at the Port-en- Bessin. 47 Commando moved 10 miles towards Port-en Bessin , while US troops measured their advance in feet.

47 Commado reached their objective and took the town and the port before any US forces arrived. The Big Red 1 Division with tanks arrived late on the 7th, eventually managed to capture part of the outskirts of the town. The British bore the main brunt of the battle. The facts the Americans used tanks, was that the same cheating as you inferred when the British used them?

I am glad though you do not blame the slaughter at Omaha beach on the British

EKB wrote
“The battle-tested 1st Division did not bother with this. From past experience, they knew that the British Commandos had no new ideas or tactics that might be helpful on Omaha Beach”
Yes the slaughter of the “battle experienced” 1st Division and the 29th Division was purely an American affair.

Did you know that 47 Commando on Gold Beach fought the same German 352nd Division as the Big Red One at Omaha Beach and faced a sea wall twice the size than at Omaha? Yet they broke through in hours. Perhaps there was a lesson to be learned after all?

The Graf Spee battery story is Ranger folklore and was a brilliant success. What you failed to mention though was the impossible tactical position that Battery was in by September 1944, cut of hundreds of miles behind the lines. The German Battery Commander took the opportunity presented to surrender his position and save face. There are two sides to every story.

The comment about Parachute Divisions, after Arhhem, so what? Yes the 1st Airborne Division didn’t do anymore combat drops nor did the 101st and 82nd Airborne. They were not needed in that role anymore.

Your comments on Crete show incredible shallowness, the Island was lost due to the Luftwaffe having complete control of the air. The German Parachute Division never undertook any large scale combat jumps again, it was decimated. The British took away the lesson of control of the air and used it decisively in the Desert and at Normandy. Obviously Churchill took more away than Hitler.

Playing tit for tat works both ways. The US Official War History is a source that is hard to attack,so perhaps we can look there for an example?

The question of the 82nd Airborne role in Market Garden makes interesting reading.

read the thread “Market Garden. Whitewashing History.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1683793
“One of the major ones was the failure of the US 82nd Airborne to capture the Nijmegen Bridge over the Waal River on the first day.

On Day One, the 1st Battalion of the 508th Regiment was tasked with the capture of the road bridge. Here confusion starts to creep in, Gavin said afterwards they were to attack immediately, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Lindquist said the battalion was not to attack till all other Regimental objectives were attained.

The battalion commander Lt Colonel Warren said his objective was the to prepare a defensive position near De Ploeg and then move onto the bridge itself. It was not till 1830hrs he sent a patrol forward, a single platoon and a radio section. The Dutch had reported there were only 19 Germans guarding the Bridge.

At 2000 hrs Warren moved two rifle companies to take the bridge, A & B,. B Company got lost, so only A Company moved forward. They moved slowly and at around 2200 hours, came under fire from elements of the 9th SS Panzer Divison Reconnaissance Battalion who had just arrived. From that point on, the 82nd Airborne did not have the capability to take the Bridge unaided.”
There you go, a major US blunder. Remember Gavin always said to take a bridge you have to attack it from both sides at once. Yet here he clearly failed to do that. Worse he made no effort for many many many hours to even send light forces to take the bridge. Puts the "Garden" aspect of Market Garden in a new perspective. Those 33 lost hours in fighting to take the bridge, the 2nd Battalion of the Paras held out for about half of them and were just 8 miles away.

Where I am in complete agreement is your observation about the British Generals in the Western Desert. Why were they so useless after fighting Rommel for almost 2 years?

The Australian General Thomas Blamey in 1941 made the comment about “the bloody trade union of British Generals”. Meaning time and again incompetent British Generals were promoted above their ability and protected for far to long. That “Trade Union” extended to D-Day and beyond, Villers Bocage showed that clearly.

Still on the Desert, you ignore the whole point of Kasserine Pass, the US Army arrogantly considered it had the means to beat Blitzkrieg. A small German attacking force conclusively proved that theory wrong.

In fact I know of only one force who defeated the German blitzkrieg on their first meeting, when the Germans were still all powerful. Those troops, the Australian Ninth Division at the Siege of Tobruk in April 1941. They were green troops bundled into unfamiliar surroundings, yet they stopped blitzkrieg cold. They are not British nor American, so can safely be ignored.

Finally the issue of bagpipes, suffice to say the Scots played them at every opportunity during the war. Probably more to annoy the English than anything else. During Operation Crusader in 1941 to relieve Tobruk, the 2nd Battalion The Black Watch was recorded as advancing with pipes playing into battle.

At Dieppe Canadian Corporal Alec Graham, played the bagpipes during the last twenty minute run-in to shore. The Calgary Highlanders went up Hill 67 in July 1944 with company pipers playing. So it was not just the Scots.

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Attrition
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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#69

Post by Attrition » 19 Mar 2012, 09:08

I thought that your post was rather interesting but this caught my eye most,

The Australian General Thomas Blamey in 1941 made the comment about “the bloody trade union of British Generals”. Meaning time and again incompetent British Generals were promoted above their ability and protected for far to long. That “Trade Union” extended to D-Day and beyond, Villers Bocage showed that clearly.

I would have thought that structural problems better explain the mixed results of the British in the desert, since Compass and Crusader were such un-failures you might call them successes. Australian generals didn't uniformly cover themselves in glory either.... As for Villers-Bocage, isn't that the place where a Tiger battalion was reduced by approximately 50% in three days? Both sides fought successful encounter battles then the Allied force saw off an attack on a prepared position.

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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#70

Post by The_Enigma » 19 Mar 2012, 10:57

While agree it would appear this topic has degenerated into mine is bigger than yours, i do have a question:
I do agree with you about the Merville Battery, almost. The Germans recaptured it on the 7th and got two guns into action, they were only able to fire one shot every ten minutes due to the damage done.

Two points, the Airborne troops stopped the Battery firing on D-Day, that was all they were capable of doing with the forces on hand. They were not meant to hold the position but to move to protect the left flank with the other airborne troops. Secondly you ignore that the Battery never had any impact on the Landings on the 6th or any other day there after.
I was under the impression, although it has been a while since i have read anything on the subject, that due to shelling post-D-Day Sword was closed down to shipping?

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Empiricist
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Re: British "Fighting Spirt"

#71

Post by Empiricist » 02 Nov 2022, 11:20

ECB Said;
Operation Thursday by the Chindits was the second largest Airborne operation in the war when 25,000 men, mules, guns etc where flown in and maintained. I suppose getting 20,000 pack mules would be a problem but they had found a way round it by using a special type of horses from Australia and I suppose they could use elephants and bullocks the Japanese did and the British had earlier in the invasion.
I do not know what is the source of this information about "25,000 men" and Thursday as a "second largest Airborne operation in the war" but these are absurdities.

5318th PAU (later 1st ACG) had in Operation Thursday 13 C-47s only. Next 13 C-47s detached USAAF Troop Carrier Command. 26 C-47s only worked over Burma in total to support Opration Thursday. The Allies delivered then almost 10,000 men, over 1,000 mules, and approximately 250 tons of supplies but nothing more.

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