British Army at home September 1940

[Knouterer]

Hello,
I'm trying to avoid the dreaded S-word which, as has been noted by other contributors on this forum, seems to bring out the worst in people. Nevertheless, the subject continues to interest me.
So I would like to share some of my notes, hoping that it will interest some readers and that others will also contribute. All suggestions and corrections welcome of course.
The following bit is mostly based on the "The War in France and Flanders" (Official History, by L.F. Ellis), "The Territorial Army" (P. Dennis, 1987), and "The Commonwealth Armies" (F.W. Perry, 1988).

On 25 April 1939, the government decided on a limited conscription measure. 34,000 men (known as “militia”) were called up and began to join the colours in July.
At the same time, many new volunteers flocked to the Territorials. In March it was decided that the authorized strength of the TA would be doubled, to 340,000, and that all existing TA battalions would “throw off” a second one. This duplication was supposed to take about six months, but certain units took much less time, the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry found enough men in a fortnight and the London Rifle Brigade (membership of which conferred a certain social standing, they had a waiting list even in peacetime) was even faster.
At the outbreak of war in 1939 there were 30 Regular cavalry and tank regiments, of which 10 were serving abroad, and 140 Regular infantry battalions, of which 79 were abroad.
In the Territorial Army there were 29 Yeomanry regiments, of which 8 were still horsed, 12 tank battalions and 232 infantry battalions (after duplication).
The numbering and naming of infantry battalions within regiments is a bit complicated. As a rule of thumb, in 1939 battalions numbered 1 to 3 were Regulars and those from 4 onward were TA.
Perry, page 48: “Although Cabinet Minutes show that duplication would be achieved by over-recruiting to form a cadre from which the new unit would be formed, no precise instructions were issued and each unit went its own way. Some units, such as 4 Suffolk Regiment, divided themselves geographically, others, such as 4 KOSB, retained for themselves all men recruited before a more or less arbitrary date and formed a new battalion from those recruited later, others, such as 5 Royal West Kent Regiment, recruited to double strength and then split. (…) Individuality was reflected in the styles and titles adopted by the duplicate units and formations. Some repeated numbers used by the “second line” in the previous war, others used former New Army titles, some revived units disbanded or converted in recent years, while others simply continued the regiment’s numerical series.”
So the 2/5th Queens in 1st (London) Division, for example, was the “duplicate” of the 5th (Territorial) Battalion, but might equally well have been named the 11th if that regiment had so decided.

When war broke out in September the government decided to create one national army and as far as possible to get rid of the distinctions between the Regular Army, the TA and the newly created Militia. Under the Armed Forces (Conditions of Service) Act all land forces became part of the British Army for the duration of the war. For the Territorials this was signified by the order to discard the brass “T” that had always been part of their uniform.

Gerard

[Knouterer]

How all this worked in practice can be seen from the following list of war-raised battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, which also indicates the fast rate at which new battalions were raised:

WAR RAISED BATTALIONS 1939 -1946

11th.Battn.TA
1939 April 19th. Raised at Potters Bar as a duplicate battalion of 8th.Battn.RF
12th.Battn.TA
1939 June 14th. Formed at South Ruislip as a Duplicate of 9th.Battn.RF
13th.[Holding]Battalion
1939 September 1st. Formed from 20 Group National Defence Companies of 8th. & 9th.Battns.T.A.
14th.[Overseas Defence]Battalion
1940 February 3rd. Formed from personnel of 15th.[Holding]Battn. at Citadel Barracks Dover
February 5th. Halstead,Essex
February 23rd. Le Havre-Defence of France-Withdrawn to England on Fall of France
October 16th. 2 Companies to Iceland to form No.1.Independent Garrison Company
14th.[Holding]Battalion
1940 Tonbridge : Renumbered 50th.Battn.RF then 23rd.Battn.RF
East Coast Defences
15th.[Pioneer] Battalion
1940 March 18th Formed at Cowley Barracks,Oxford - Thame-Dover
HQ+2 Companies Duke of York's School : 2 Companies at Deal
October 24th. Converted to Infantry : in Pill Boxes on Northern Perimeter of Dover-
16th.[Pioneer]Battalion
1940 March 27th. Formed at Tenby
June Liverpool - Dungannon - Cookstown
October 24th. Converted to Infantry - Wales
17th.[Pioneer]Battalion
1940 March 9th.- May 1st. Formed at Alnmouth,Northumberland
December 17th. Monmouth
18th.Battalion
1940 March 21st. Formed in Devonshire as a Pioneer Battalion
October 24th. Converted to Infantry - East Coast Defence
19th.Battalion
1940 July 4th. Hounslow
July 15th. Marbury Hall,Northwich,Cheshire
November 7th. Newbury racecourse
December 8th. Isle of Wight
20th.Battalion
1940 June 21st. Formed at Mill Hill
July Marbury Hall,Cheshire
December Isle Of Wight
21st.Battalion
1940 July 4th. Formed at Marbury Hall,Cheshire 214th.Infantry Group 14th.Brigade
To Newbury
November Isle Of Wight - Rye - Sandown
22nd.Battalion
1940 August Formed at Devizes,Wiltshire - To Kirkintilloch
Ipswich - Wivenhoe - Clacton - Brightlingsea - Jaywick - East Coast Defences
1941 Colchester

[Knouterer]

I spent a couple of hours this morning trying to work out (in a very general schematic way) where the stoplines were situated in relation to the German invasion plans.
As we know, the initial invasion force, according to the (more or less ) final plan would consist of nine divisions (7 infantry, 2 mountain) which would push inland about 10-15 miles and establish a bridgehead, as indicated on the map (from R. Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion, 1958), which they then would have to hold for about 9 days until substantial armoured forces could be brought across.
Always supposing the Royal Navy would not interfere to any significant degree of course.
As you see, the planned bridgehead was well south of the main GHQ line defending the approaches to London.
The XII Corps Line, from Dover Castle passing east of Canterbury and reaching the coast again at Reculver would have been useless as it was facing east to meet a landing in the Deal-Margate area.
TW = Tunbridge Wells, which I added because the HQ of XII Corps was there.
The Royal Military Canal line from Hythe to Rye was thinly held, as far as I can make out, until the very end of September 1940 when the 31st Independent Infantry Brigade Group arrived.

[Knouterer]

How well would the pillboxes have stood up to enemy fire if an invasion had taken place? Later in the war, the US Army conducted tests with various German direct fire weapons to determine their effect on fortifications and the necessary degree of protection against them. The results were laid down in FM 5-35 (Corps of Engineers Reference Data).
Sufficient protection against the 7.92 mm PzBüchse 39 AT rifle (of which every German infantry platoon had one in 1940) at 100 yards was deemed to be: 2 feet brick masonry, 1.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1 ft concrete (reinforced), 1.5 ft stone masonry, 5 ft timber, 2.5 ft sandbags (filled with dry sand), and so on.
Against 20 mm fire (in the Sealion scenario, the KwK30 of the Pz II and Flak 30 AA guns, which fired the same ammunition) at 200 yards: 2.5 feet brick masonry, 2 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1.5 ft concrete (reinforced), 2.5 ft stone masonry.
Against 37 mm fire (AT and tank guns) at 400 yards: 5 feet brick masonry, 3.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 3 ft concrete (reinforced), 4.5 ft stone masonry.
As the manual emphasized, these are thicknesses required to provide adequate protection against single shots; to withstand five or six shots hitting close together, thickness would have to be approximately twice those numbers.
We can therefore conclude that the “bulletproof” pillboxes with walls only 1 foot thick were indeed no more than that. But judging by the American data even 3 ft walls could not have withstood repeated hits, closely grouped, from a 37 mm AT gun – of which each German infantry divison had no fewer than 75 in 1940.
By which I do not mean to suggest that an invasion would have been successful, of course, just that (most of) the pillboxes would have been of limited value in resisting it.

[phylo_roadking]

As the manual emphasized, these are thicknesses required to provide adequate protection against single shots; to withstand five or six shots hitting close together, thickness would have to be approximately twice those numbers.
We can therefore conclude that the “bulletproof” pillboxes with walls only 1 foot thick were indeed no more than that. But judging by the American data even 3 ft walls could not have withstood repeated hits, closely grouped, from a 37 mm AT gun – of which each German infantry divison had no fewer than 75 in 1940.
By which I do not mean to suggest that an invasion would have been successful, of course, just that (most of) the pillboxes would have been of limited value in resisting it.

However...

Sufficient protection against the 7.92 mm PzBüchse 39 AT rifle (of which every German infantry platoon had one in 1940) at 100 yards was deemed to be: 2 feet brick masonry, 1.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1 ft concrete (reinforced), 1.5 ft stone masonry, 5 ft timber, 2.5 ft sandbags (filled with dry sand), and so on.
Against 20 mm fire (in the Sealion scenario, the KwK30 of the Pz II and Flak 30 AA guns, which fired the same ammunition) at 200 yards: 2.5 feet brick masonry, 2 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1.5 ft concrete (reinforced), 2.5 ft stone masonry.
Against 37 mm fire (AT and tank guns) at 400 yards: 5 feet brick masonry, 3.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 3 ft concrete (reinforced), 4.5 ft stone masonry.

...look at the ranges Those penetrations are requiring virtually pointblank range for some of the weapon types, and certainly well within small arms range of the defenders AND any covering forces. Are the defenders dozy enough to provide a potential enemy with cover at a hundred yards??? Remember, pillboxes alone weren't supposed to hold the Lines, often entrenched infantry to either side was to protect them, as with the pillboxes etc. on the actual invasion beaches.

And note should be taken of the length of time some British-manned beseiged blockhouses and pillboxes held out on the Continent in May 1940...how long do they have to hold out for a local counterattack to be organised to clear a threat? The various Defence lines in the UK weren't supposed to hold while the British Army skedaddled to the rear behind them as on the Continent - nor hold the Germans on their own; they were to hold while the British Army moved up to strengthen the Lines in depth, to "solidify" the front.

And of course - as long as a given pillbox or blockhouse was in contact with its command structure by wireless or telephone - it can request divisional arty support if and when one of those major threats appeared...

I've seen noone anywhere ever postulate that the Stop Lines were to be left to try and halt the German advance alone - just the men in the pillboxes, with no artillery support, no reinforcement, no counterattacking... The troops in the so-called "Coastal Crust", yes in extremis - but not the actual major Stop Lines.

[phylo_roadking]

And of course...

Sufficient protection against the 7.92 mm PzBüchse 39 AT rifle (of which every German infantry platoon had one in 1940) at 100 yards was deemed to be: 2 feet brick masonry, 1.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1 ft concrete (reinforced), 1.5 ft stone masonry, 5 ft timber, 2.5 ft sandbags (filled with dry sand), and so on.
Against 20 mm fire (in the Sealion scenario, the KwK30 of the Pz II and Flak 30 AA guns, which fired the same ammunition) at 200 yards: 2.5 feet brick masonry, 2 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1.5 ft concrete (reinforced), 2.5 ft stone masonry.
Against 37 mm fire (AT and tank guns) at 400 yards: 5 feet brick masonry, 3.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 3 ft concrete (reinforced), 4.5 ft stone masonry.

...what sort of velocity will those rounds retain after penetrating a pillbox? For instance, how many single rifle-calibre AT rounds from a panzerbüchse are going to penetrate a pillbox to then actually hit - let alone kill - any individual...before the Bren gun is turned on them?

And...

Against 20 mm fire (in the Sealion scenario, the KwK30 of the Pz II and Flak 30 AA guns, which fired the same ammunition) at 200 yards: 2.5 feet brick masonry, 2 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1.5 ft concrete (reinforced), 2.5 ft stone masonry.
Against 37 mm fire (AT and tank guns) at 400 yards: 5 feet brick masonry, 3.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 3 ft concrete (reinforced), 4.5 ft stone masonry.

...I presume those penetration figures are for their anti-tank AP shot or AP Composite Rigid...the "period" 2 cm Sprgr. 39 HE round won't have had the same penetration

[Dunserving]

How all this worked in practice can be seen from the following list of war-raised battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, which also indicates the fast rate at which new battalions were raised:

WAR RAISED BATTALIONS 1939 -1946

11th.Battn.TA
1939 April 19th. Raised at Potters Bar as a duplicate battalion of 8th.Battn.RF
12th.Battn.TA
1939 June 14th. Formed at South Ruislip as a Duplicate of 9th.Battn.RF
13th.[Holding]Battalion
1939 September 1st. Formed from 20 Group National Defence Companies of 8th. & 9th.Battns.T.A.
14th.[Overseas Defence]Battalion
1940 February 3rd. Formed from personnel of 15th.[Holding]Battn. at Citadel Barracks Dover
February 5th. Halstead,Essex
February 23rd. Le Havre-Defence of France-Withdrawn to England on Fall of France
October 16th. 2 Companies to Iceland to form No.1.Independent Garrison Company
14th.[Holding]Battalion
1940 Tonbridge : Renumbered 50th.Battn.RF then 23rd.Battn.RF
East Coast Defences
15th.[Pioneer] Battalion
1940 March 18th Formed at Cowley Barracks,Oxford - Thame-Dover
HQ+2 Companies Duke of York's School : 2 Companies at Deal
October 24th. Converted to Infantry : in Pill Boxes on Northern Perimeter of Dover-
16th.[Pioneer]Battalion
1940 March 27th. Formed at Tenby
June Liverpool - Dungannon - Cookstown
October 24th. Converted to Infantry - Wales
17th.[Pioneer]Battalion
1940 March 9th.- May 1st. Formed at Alnmouth,Northumberland
December 17th. Monmouth
18th.Battalion
1940 March 21st. Formed in Devonshire as a Pioneer Battalion
October 24th. Converted to Infantry - East Coast Defence
19th.Battalion
1940 July 4th. Hounslow
July 15th. Marbury Hall,Northwich,Cheshire
November 7th. Newbury racecourse
December 8th. Isle of Wight
20th.Battalion
1940 June 21st. Formed at Mill Hill
July Marbury Hall,Cheshire
December Isle Of Wight
21st.Battalion
1940 July 4th. Formed at Marbury Hall,Cheshire 214th.Infantry Group 14th.Brigade
To Newbury
November Isle Of Wight - Rye - Sandown
22nd.Battalion
1940 August Formed at Devizes,Wiltshire - To Kirkintilloch
Ipswich - Wivenhoe - Clacton - Brightlingsea - Jaywick - East Coast Defences
1941 Colchester

Interesting information.

Is there any evidence that the proliferation of battalions was proportional to the number of men recruited?

Did a battalion have to reach a particular size before duplicates were formed, or were the battalions being formed early so that there were places to put the men, ie forming with a command structure and little else?

[Dunserving]

How well would the pillboxes have stood up to enemy fire if an invasion had taken place? Later in the war, the US Army conducted tests with various German direct fire weapons to determine their effect on fortifications and the necessary degree of protection against them. The results were laid down in FM 5-35 (Corps of Engineers Reference Data).
Sufficient protection against the 7.92 mm PzBüchse 39 AT rifle (of which every German infantry platoon had one in 1940) at 100 yards was deemed to be: 2 feet brick masonry, 1.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1 ft concrete (reinforced), 1.5 ft stone masonry, 5 ft timber, 2.5 ft sandbags (filled with dry sand), and so on.
Against 20 mm fire (in the Sealion scenario, the KwK30 of the Pz II and Flak 30 AA guns, which fired the same ammunition) at 200 yards: 2.5 feet brick masonry, 2 ft concrete (not reinforced), 1.5 ft concrete (reinforced), 2.5 ft stone masonry.
Against 37 mm fire (AT and tank guns) at 400 yards: 5 feet brick masonry, 3.5 ft concrete (not reinforced), 3 ft concrete (reinforced), 4.5 ft stone masonry.
As the manual emphasized, these are thicknesses required to provide adequate protection against single shots; to withstand five or six shots hitting close together, thickness would have to be approximately twice those numbers.
We can therefore conclude that the “bulletproof” pillboxes with walls only 1 foot thick were indeed no more than that. But judging by the American data even 3 ft walls could not have withstood repeated hits, closely grouped, from a 37 mm AT gun – of which each German infantry divison had no fewer than 75 in 1940.
By which I do not mean to suggest that an invasion would have been successful, of course, just that (most of) the pillboxes would have been of limited value in resisting it.

There were a number of pill box designs. Some had internal walls such that penetration at one point would not necessarily disable the entire structure.

Furthermore, to hit it first you must shoot at it. Before you shoot at it, you have to be able to see it, and aim at it.

Many were well concealed and protected and had a good chance of surviving long enough to do a great deal of damage.


Others, it must be admitted, were little more than death traps for the occupants - but because of their position not simply because of the risk of destruction from German weapons.

For an example of a ludicrously sited pill box go on Google Maps. Search for "Stockbury, Kent ME9".....
It is a tiny village between Maidstone and the Isle of Sheppey.
Now look to the due east of the Google position marker. You will find a big field that has the A249 road along one side. Easy to get the right field as it is from two images and so the green shows up as two different shades.
Zoom in and you'll see there are some cattle in the field, and a light coloured square shape pretty much in the centre of the field. It has a shadow to the north of it.

Now go to the A249 and use Google Streetview and see what it looks like from the road.

Not hard to spot is it? Half way up a slope and out in the open.....

[Dunserving]

The XII Corps Line, from Dover Castle passing east of Canterbury and reaching the coast again at Reculver would have been useless as it was facing east to meet a landing in the Deal-Margate area.

The Royal Military Canal line from Hythe to Rye was thinly held, as far as I can make out, until the very end of September 1940 when the 31st Independent Infantry Brigade Group arrived.

Worth noting that the British did not know where Sealion was planning to land, so a XII Corps line was a good idea - not really useless and the men and equipment there could have moved if need be. As other could have moved to them had landings been in Sandwich Bay...

The Royal Military Canal line only needed to be thinly held at that time. The canal itself was a huge barrier and problem for an invader. And was still an impressive defence structure in its own right the last time I was there. Which was three hours ago.

[phylo_roadking]

The Royal Military Canal line only needed to be thinly held at that time. The canal itself was a huge barrier and problem for an invader. And was still an impressive defence structure in its own right the last time I was there.

And of course - being along the canal line greatly limited the directions of approach any attacker had And not a lot of cover there to their front! Even less in 1940...

The XII Corps Line, from Dover Castle passing east of Canterbury and reaching the coast again at Reculver would have been useless as it was facing east to meet a landing in the Deal-Margate area.

Worth noting that the British did not know where Sealion was planning to land, so a XII Corps line was a good idea - not really useless and the men and equipment there could have moved if need be. As other could have moved to them had landings been in Sandwich Bay...

It's perhaps worth remembering that there were occasional elements of planning against Deal on the Germans' part A strange motor launch-carried operation against Deal remained an optional element in the 2nd, "narrow front" version of Sealion...

As I've noted before - I've always found it strange just how much the British seem to have learned about specific German plans...

[Dunserving]

We have to remember that vegetation has changed in 73 years, but it is clear from those pictures that invaders would have had to cross a wide area with zero cover to protect them.

No doubt the pill boxes would have had some form of camouflage at the time - and a clear field of fire that plant growth now denies them. Two men with a Vickers and a bountiful supply of 0.303 nastiness would have been horrifically effective.

As I wrote earlier, it only needed to be thinly held.

[phylo_roadking]

As I wrote earlier, it only needed to be thinly held

...and not for very long, what with the various pre-organised counterattacking forces bearing down on the Boche!

Two men with a Vickers and a bountiful supply of 0.303 nastiness would have been horrifically effective.

...especially against landsers trying to paddle across the Canal in their rubber dinghies lugged up, still dripping, from the beaches!

But of course the REAL threat to the RMC as a defensive line is the one that naturally DIDN'T exist when it was created as an artificial barrier to an invading enemy that could use all of Romney Marsh as a bridgehead...the threat from above As we know, the RMC pillbox line was as likely to come under attack from the FJ that were to drop in its rear as from the 17th Inf. Div. coming ashore...

Which might JUST have been why -

"The Royal Military Canal line from Hythe to Rye was thinly held, as far as I can make out, until the very end of September 1940 when the 31st Independent Infantry Brigade Group arrived."

Fleming does an excellent job recounting the period of "panic" in the UK vs. paratroop attack from above The Stop Lines were newly-planned defences, created in the environment of the "new reality" I.E. post-Norway, Post-Holland...as were the hastily thrown-up beach defences...but the RMC pillbox line defended the Canal, they weren't necessarily sited in this case to ALSO defend each other well, and thus were vulnerable to attack from the rear.

It would be interesting to see the history of the development of the RMC pillbox line I.E. what happened when...as those certainly aren't Victorian defences in the pics above! It's possible that the more modern MG pillboxes simply weren't available until September...have to look into it.

The Canal itself is a quite amazing piece of early 19th century military technology Only when viewed from the air can it been seen today that it was laid out in "staggered" sections so that cannon positioned at each "corner" could enfilade the section it commanded as any invader tried to cross it!

And right at the bottom of the pic you can see a WWII pillbox doing exactly the same thing! Which is why in most of the pics above the pillboxes seem to be on bends in the canal...

[Andy H]

Hi Phylo

Thanks for posting that pic of the canal.
In all my yrs looking at Seelowe I've never given much thought of the topography,geography or the actual physical 'layout' of the canal beyond that it existed and was a barrier! I know more detail about the Maginot line defences than I do about the canal

Regards

[Gooner1]

‘Here is a canal made for the length of thirty miles to keep out the French; for those armies who had so often crossed the Rhine and the Danube were to be kept back by a canal thirty feet wide at most!’
Willam Cobbett.

[phylo_roadking]

‘Here is a canal made for the length of thirty miles to keep out the French; for those armies who had so often crossed the Rhine and the Danube were to be kept back by a canal thirty feet wide at most!’
Willam Cobbett.

One of course has to ask if every inch of the Rhine and Danube was enfiladed by pre-positioned cannon??? And of course, it was just too deep to be fordable/wade-able...