British Army at home September 1940

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Dunserving
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#256

Post by Dunserving » 14 Apr 2014, 18:30

fredleander wrote:
I'd rather have said around it. Problem with difficult terrain is that the more difficult it is the greater the advantage for the better-trained troops.

You haven't been to Dymchurch, have you?

Dungeness dominates the road off the Marsh towards Hythe and Folkestone, which I am sure you know runs along the coastline just behind the beach for a great deal of its length.

If you try to go around Dymchurch you have to cross farmland. Flat open fields, typically of the order of 150 metres across. And because it is a marsh, the ground is not noted for being firm hard and dry, and all the field boundaries are marked by drainage ditches. Suitable for infantry to cross, but a problem for transport, and even more suited to defenders.

Try looking at the area on Google Maps, using the map option, and you'll see the extent of the water problem that would face anyone seeking to go around Dymchurch. So much more sensible to go through it.

Then try looking at the 1940s imagery of the area on Google Earth - and you'll see that the field boundaries had no vegetation as they do today. It was one vast area with absolutely zero cover for the invading infantry - apart from squatting in a drainage ditch in cold water.

No one, having seen the place as it was then, would try to go around Dymchurch. That way madness lies.

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#257

Post by Knouterer » 14 Apr 2014, 20:37

The difficult terrain at Dungeness would have been much more of a problem for the attackers than for the defenders, it seems to me. Which is probably why the Germans weren't even planning to land east of Camber Sands, and the 5th SLI considered it sufficient to "hold Brookland and Lydd as strongpoints".
Even today - unless I misunderstand my maps completely - anybody attacking Lydd from that direction would be confined to a single narrow road, with water on the left and an artillery range to the right. And in 1940, at the other end of that range there were some very experienced gunners, with a variety of artillery pieces, who knew all the distances downrange to the yard.

The situation at Brookland is similar, ie a single road, flat open terrain, watercourses everywhere so no possibility to deploy to the right or left.

At the Point itself, apart from the 3rd IC (some 280 men) there were perhaps 200 Royal Marines manning the three 6in guns, plus it seems some 40 mm Pom-Poms, plus the gunners of the other coastal battery - in short it would take more than an (already depleted) German infantry battalion to dislodge them. If the Germans had had a battalion to spare for this task, which seems doubtful.
Last edited by Knouterer on 15 Apr 2014, 13:12, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#258

Post by Knouterer » 14 Apr 2014, 20:42

From the local defence scheme about a year later, but the topographical factors hadn't changed much I suppose:

APPENDIX 1 TO “R” SECTOR DEFENCE SCHEME.
TOPOGRAPHICAL & BEACH REPORT.
1. The defence of “R” sector hinges on the defence of LYDD. All roads from the beach converge on LYDD.
SHINGLE.
2. The whole sector is flat. Between LYDD and the beaches a belt of shingle runs inland from the sea to an average depth of 2000 yds. This shingle is an obstacle to wheeled vehicles, and a severe handicap to carriers and light tanks. Medium and heavy tanks would be only partially affected by it. The shingle minimizes the effect of tanks, but increases the effect of S.A. fire. Defensive posns being prepared in the shingle have to be strongly revetted.
MARSH.
3. Immediately around LYDD, and for several miles North of LYDD and across WALLAND marsh the country consists of fields divided by ditches. Some of these ditches, such as JURY’S GUT and DENGE MARSH SEWER, are anti-tank obstacles of a delaying type but most of them would barely handicap infantry.
COVER FROM AIR.
4. Except in LYDD itself, there is in the Sector practically no cover from air whatever.
ROADS.
5. Considering how sparsely populated the area is, what roads there are are surprisingly good, and they all converge on LYDD. There is no good road – only tracks – across WALLAND MARSH. There is no road from the rt of the Sector front to DUNGENESS, but there is a track along the top of the sea wall from pt 18 4236 to east of GALLOWAYS 4835. A M/c could get along this track.
AIR LANDINGS.
6. All ground within 5 miles of the coast has been made unsuitable for air landings by the erection of asparagus. In spite of this it would be possible for troop carrying aircraft to land almost anywhere in the Sector.
O.P.
7. An O.P. in LYDD church tower can see the whole fwd area perfectly, and can see as far back as VP 54 (4041) (Radar station near Rye – Knouterer), BROOKLAND (4244) and OLD ROMNEY (4743) – ISLE OF OXNEY.
BEACHES.
8. The beach from 427560 to 532565 is 13000 yds long. Navigation off this stretch of beach is good. The slope of the sea bed is shallow until approaching the high water mark, where it becomes steep, but DUNGENESS PT itself is an exception to this, as the water round the point becomes deep at once. At high water mark the beaches are shingle, but at low tide there are in most places stretches of sand (not at DUNGENESS PT.)
CURRENT.
9. The current round the coast is about 1 m.p.h. except off DUNGENESS PT where the current is about 2 ½ m.p.h.
SEA LANDINGS.
10. Currents round DUNGENESS PT make landings difficult from barges etc, but as deep water runs right up to the point it would be possible for landings to be made from larger ships. At other places on the Sector front infantry could land at all tides, and AFVs could land at high tide.
SUMMARY.
11. Airborne attack in the Sector would probably be made for one or all of three reasons:
1) To occupy the ROYAL MILITARY CANAL as a br head.
2) To destroy a VP – particularly VP 54.
3) To take the LYDD and beach defenses from the rear.
Provided the enemy is prepared to make crash landings and to accept accident casualties – which he would be – troop carrying aircraft can land almost anywhere in the Sector. Disembarkation can be made from boats or barges anywhere along the beach except at DUNGENESS PT or in square 4236, both of which are strongly held. Tps landing between these two places, where the beaches are not covered by fire, would have to overcome the LYDD garrison before they could penetrate deeply in force.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#259

Post by Knouterer » 14 Apr 2014, 20:54

And, as a special treat for my devoted readers, a map (in two parts) of the area, prepared by the 8th RF who were holding it in the summer of 1941. Of course in Sept. 1940 the defences would have looked somewhat different (no scaffolding for example, less mines probably) but the general idea is clear. Note that the old redoubt at the Point is armed with two 75 mm guns and about four MMGs.
Attachments
Dungeness1941a 001.jpg
Dungeness1941b 001.jpg
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#260

Post by phylo_roadking » 14 Apr 2014, 21:27

That's correct Gooner, C company 18 RF was at Lydd Improving the defences (and it must have been backbreaking work preparing defensive positions in banks of shingle ...) but by the last week of Sept. they were behind the RMC with the rest of the battalion (more details to follow).
Should you ever manage to get to the area, you'll find the said defences are not actually IN the shingle - they're on the top of it; concrete revetments and firing pits along the bank at the top of the beaches - the shingle slopes down from there. The majority of these defences still exist - they're great little sunbathing (drinking) spots!

In other words - no shingle to move. Where time and tide has moved the banks away from the concret structures, you can see that there were simply wooden formers placed on the ground and concrete poured on top of the shingle to harden to form the base of the revetments and firing pits! It sounds quick and dirty - but they've lasted 70 years vs. Mother Nature! SOMEWHERE I have hard copy pics stored away - if I can find them after 26 years!
I would not say big, but a couple of years ago a Ju52 flew over me here in Kent on its way back to Duxford. Stunning how incredibly slow it was. Appeared to be standing still. It wasn't of course, but motion only became apparent when it got very close, and even then it was so slow. Not a hard target to hit!
As the Norwegians....and the Dutch....AND the Commonwealth forces on Crete found out! I've seen varying figures for the Ju52, but "best economy" cruising speed could be as low as 105-110 mph! 8O In terms of deflection shooting that's nearly stationary :P
Since the 18th RF were a Pioneer battalion with their primary role being construction it wouldn't surprise me if their companies were deployed all over the Brigade area.
Indeed; and as we know from events as close to this in time as France in May 1940, "Pioneer" units were notoriously short of arms - particularly LMGs and MMGs I.E. Brens and Vickers MGs. Montefiore's description of "pioneer" troops in France is telling - not all Pioneers even had rifles, they were short on virtually every type and nature of equipment, personal as well as fighting, personnel had ONLY Basic training behind them...and were very poorly disciplined. The three "pioneer" divisions had been rushed to France as a sop to the French the minute they were formated....those divisions which followed them were better equiped, and had received their secondary training in mobile infantry tactics - what I suppose we'd call today "battle camp".

The 18th battalion, re-activated as recently as April 1940, wasn't to be converted to infantry battalion status until the 24th of October 1940, a month later - so during the period of this thread they were STILL labour troops at best. They weren't actually brevetted as an infantry battalion to a senior command until the 5th of November, to 168 Infantry Brigade (formerly 2nd London). It's entirely appropriate that they were behind the line of the RMC prior to that - there would have been a LOT of work to do there! Decades of erosion to the parapet and firing step repaired, trees and bushes obscuring fields of fire removed...on BOTH sides of the Canal!...and someone had to build all those nice 1940 pattern pillboxes on what were formerly enfilading-fire cannon positions!

However, IF as a Pioneer battalion they were as short of heavy weapons as any Pioneer unit - having them there to man those pillboxes with small arms was worse than useless. At best they'd be "placeholders" until units in front of them retired back onto the RMC.
SHINGLE.
2. The whole sector is flat. Between LYDD and the beaches a belt of shingle runs inland from the sea to an average depth of 2000 yds. This shingle is an obstacle to wheeled vehicles, and a severe handicap to carriers and light tanks. Medium and heavy tanks would be only partially affected by it.
However - Knouterer - does Dutch television show the BBC television series "Countryfile"? They spent half a programme over last winter on the point at Dungeness; the shingle is actually bound together once off the beach by low scrub, green "alpine" vegetation and in places heavy Marram grass - which you'll be familiar with from the Dutch coast. It's one of the very very few places where the genus Ammophila thrives not on sand dunes...probably because of the amount of wind-blown sand among the shingle. Only the sloping shingle on the beach is a problem for wheeled vehicles - the flat shingle beyond is fine.

In regards to Dunserving's comments about troops attempting to leave the area across country in the face of a German attack on that part of the coast - not only are there the various sizes of drainage channel, and the salt marshes - that shingle embankment has height over the salt marsh behind; maybe only a yard or two, but anyone ON the shingle bank can see for some considerable distance across the flatland. Anyone trying to get back to Lydd from the coast - or from Lydd back to anywhere else - is in a veritable goldfish bowl.
AIR LANDINGS.
6. All ground within 5 miles of the coast has been made unsuitable for air landings by the erection of asparagus. In spite of this it would be possible for troop carrying aircraft to land almost anywhere in the Sector.
Provided the enemy is prepared to make crash landings and to accept accident casualties – which he would be – troop carrying aircraft can land almost anywhere in the Sector.
This is the sort of over-thinking of the problem that Peter Fleming describes in his book, about the threat from the air. To put it simply - as we know, the LW was short of transport aircraft after Norway and Holland, and the Ju52 was actually quite slow to manufacture NEW...apart from the fact that Junkers and others were ALSO busy trying to rebuild those retrieved in large sections from Holland! The LW was not actually THAT prepared to accept accident casualties and crashlandings - it had been forced into them by events in Holland etc. - someone here is looking at what happened and has made a virtue (on the germans' part) out of a necessity!

The LW would need virtually every transport aircraft it had for the large scale landings to the north - AND would be flying them back and forth to THOSE locations all day long - there were the two drop waves....followed by the THIRD wave actually inside Lympne's perimeter once the field was surrounded by the FJ - and once (if!) Lympne was taken and could be made operational...every transport aircraft the Germans had would be needed to fly men and materiel into there!

And of course - ONCE the fighting for the coast was over and a bridgehead established... :P ...and the breakout battle commenced, every available Ju52 would be needed to keep the frontline resupplied as in Poland.

It's a bit of a flight of fancy (sic!)...OR symptomatic of the panic described by Fleming :wink: ...that the Germans would crash land perfectly good and valuable aircraft just to get men on the ground at Lydd!
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#261

Post by Knouterer » 15 Apr 2014, 11:48

The defensive positions dug into the shingle, which as the Defence Scheme says needed to be "strongly revetted", probably refer to the positions covering the approaches to Lydd (see map). I don't suppose there is anything left to see there now. Any concrete fortifications on the south side of Dungeness are probably from a later date, IMHO.

Regarding the threat from the air, obviously the Germans could hardly afford to deliberately crash a Ju 52 just to land 12 or 15 troops. The idea that they would was perhaps inspired by the sight of all those wrecked Jus littering the Dutch landscape.

In any case, there were all sort of wild ideas about what the Germans might do, if I remember correctly it was seriously discussed at Cabinet level whether the Germans might not try to take London City by a coup de main by 20.000 paras (armed with "gangster guns" ...)

The swift and total German victory made such an impression that it was somewhat overlooked by both sides that the airborne assault on Holland had hardly been an unqualified success; losses were heavy, the Dutch even managed to send many hundreds of captured paras and aircrew over to Britain before they capitulated, and by nightfall on the first day three out of the four airfields that had been attacked in the morning were back in Dutch hands.

The fourth, Waalhaven, would without a doubt have been retaken also and the airborne forces completely wiped out if the Dutch had reacted a bit more decisively - one battalion ordered to attack Waalhaven infamously stopped halfway through their advance because it was time for lunch.

In defence of the Dutch it must be said that they were not even aware they were at war until the bombs started falling that morning, and they were unprepared for this new type of attack (well OK that's not 100% true - reports from Denmark and Norway had caused them to reinforce airfield defences a bit). The situation in Britain in September was rather different on both counts.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#262

Post by Gooner1 » 15 Apr 2014, 15:04

phylo_roadking wrote:
Indeed; and as we know from events as close to this in time as France in May 1940, "Pioneer" units were notoriously short of arms - particularly LMGs and MMGs I.E. Brens and Vickers MGs. Montefiore's description of "pioneer" troops in France is telling - not all Pioneers even had rifles, they were short on virtually every type and nature of equipment, personal as well as fighting, personnel had ONLY Basic training behind them...and were very poorly disciplined. The three "pioneer" divisions had been rushed to France as a sop to the French the minute they were formated....those divisions which followed them were better equiped, and had received their secondary training in mobile infantry tactics - what I suppose we'd call today "battle camp".

The 18th battalion, re-activated as recently as April 1940, wasn't to be converted to infantry battalion status until the 24th of October 1940, a month later - so during the period of this thread they were STILL labour troops at best. They weren't actually brevetted as an infantry battalion to a senior command until the 5th of November, to 168 Infantry Brigade (formerly 2nd London). It's entirely appropriate that they were behind the line of the RMC prior to that - there would have been a LOT of work to do there! Decades of erosion to the parapet and firing step repaired, trees and bushes obscuring fields of fire removed...on BOTH sides of the Canal!...and someone had to build all those nice 1940 pattern pillboxes on what were formerly enfilading-fire cannon positions!

However, IF as a Pioneer battalion they were as short of heavy weapons as any Pioneer unit - having them there to man those pillboxes with small arms was worse than useless. At best they'd be "placeholders" until units in front of them retired back onto the RMC.
Establishment of a Pioneer battalion in May 1940 here http://niehorster.orbat.com/017_britain ... on-bn.html

Don't know if Knouterer has anything to add by way of organization or weapons for the 18th R.F.? Given their location I think it quite probable they would have been issued more LMGs at least.

Unlikely any 'units' would have retired back to the RMC any troops doing so would be doing it without orders.

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#263

Post by phylo_roadking » 15 Apr 2014, 19:21

Establishment of a Pioneer battalion in May 1940 here http://niehorster.orbat.com/017_britain ... on-bn.html
The ideal establishment - however, if you take a look at Montefiore....as of May 1940, many Pioneer units were well under that establishment :(

After May 1940 - the question would then be, post Dunkirk, who...given that the vast majority of the British Army was under esablishment in arms and transport...got brought up to establishment first - fighting units or pioneer units? IIRC David Newbold's thesis has quite a lot to say on this aspect...

It will indeed be interesting to see what the 18th battalion's war diary says on this issue.
Given their location I think it quite probable they would have been issued more LMGs at least.
One would assume so - it could also be that the 18th was simply assigned to that location because it had something approaching establishment. It of course hadn't been to France....so hadn't lost anything on the way home :P The question would be what was a Pioneer Battalion actually doing on the line of the RMC...there was a lot of remedial work being done to the pillboxes on the Canal line as of the late summer of 1940; the pillboxes were getting interior "curtain" walls to protect occupants from live rounds and splinters coming through doorways...and the doorways themselves were getting protecting walls built on the outside of the pillboxes. In many cases today, these later additions to the original pillboxes are in worse shape than the core pillbox themselves - shedding their concrete/cement cladding over the brick work due to the elements etc.
Unlikely any 'units' would have retired back to the RMC any troops doing so would be doing it without orders.
Leaving aside the rhetoric of the Churchillian/Shakespearian "hold or die in place" orders...
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#264

Post by phylo_roadking » 15 Apr 2014, 19:38

Regarding the threat from the air, obviously the Germans could hardly afford to deliberately crash a Ju 52 just to land 12 or 15 troops. The idea that they would was perhaps inspired by the sight of all those wrecked Jus littering the Dutch landscape.
Hence my comment - "someone here is looking at what happened and has made a virtue (on the germans' part) out of a necessity!"
The defensive positions dug into the shingle, which as the Defence Scheme says needed to be "strongly revetted", probably refer to the positions covering the approaches to Lydd (see map). I don't suppose there is anything left to see there now. Any concrete fortifications on the south side of Dungeness are probably from a later date, IMHO.
Actually, there are plenty of concrete revetments or the remains of them still extant all along the coast from there right up to past Hythe - the limit of my wanderings along the coast in 1988 from Angel Park at Lydd. The majority of them simply aren't noticable now - like Normandy bunkers or concrete fighter dispersal points on the RAF airfield next to where I grew up....they're tucked away at the bottom of people's gardens now, or in clumps of trees along the coast the further north along the shore you get, or people have plonked garden sheds or BBQs on the concrete bases... :lol:

Of those few that can be clearly discerned and more importantly freely accessed today for inspection - one thing that's impossible to miss is that they're really badly designed! 8O :lol: Often they're no more than rectangular enclosures coming up to mid-chest level, with no embrasures or fighting slits I.E. nowhere to actually duck down behind and fight! 8O It seems to have been a case of just kneeling behind the parapets, and resting your rifle or Bren gun on top of the wall...head and shoulders silhouetted against the sky...! What also suprised me was how THIN the concrete walls are - 4 to 6 inches at best! Proof against small arms' fire....but not much else 8O
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#265

Post by Juha Tompuri » 15 Apr 2014, 22:17

phylo_roadking wrote:Dunserving...
Quite right that the higher a gun battery and OP, the further it can see and shoot accurately, but with the obvious problem that they have a minimum range due to the limited minimum angle of depression below horizontal. Once invaders get close enough only seal level gun batteries can bombard them, and continue to bombard the as they come ashore.
Exactly.
One question, of course depending on the gun type, but how does the battery height (and the increase of it) also increase the accuracy?

Regards, Juha
Last edited by Juha Tompuri on 15 Apr 2014, 22:18, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#266

Post by phylo_roadking » 15 Apr 2014, 22:31

One question, of course depending on the gun type, but how does the battery height (and the increase of it) also increase the accuracy?
Well, you've missed the important elements of the sentence...
...the higher a gun battery and OP, the further it can see and shoot accurately
...as in - the higher the Battery Observation Post (the "BOP") is above sea level the further it can see out to sea and lay/correct the guns' fire. The guns themselves aren't inherently more accurate - it's the whole packaged function of the "battery" that is more accurate out to greater ranges.

The closer the BOP is to sea level, the shorter the "observed range" - at sea level itself being only three miles to the horizon IIRC.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#267

Post by Juha Tompuri » 15 Apr 2014, 23:02

phylo_roadking wrote:
One question, of course depending on the gun type, but how does the battery height (and the increase of it) also increase the accuracy?
Well, you've missed the important elements of the sentence...
...the higher a gun battery and OP, the further it can see and shoot accurately
I must say I wondered the claims for some time, but as there was the and, I figured it ment the battery height too:
...the higher a gun battery and OP, the further it can see and shoot accurately
Regards, Juha
Last edited by Juha Tompuri on 15 Apr 2014, 23:04, edited 3 times in total.
Reason: adding info & typo correcting

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#268

Post by phylo_roadking » 15 Apr 2014, 23:17

I must say I wondered the claims for some time, but as there was the and, i figured it ment the battery height too:
There are of course issues about there being too much physical distance between the guns of an Emergency Battery and their BOP...especially in places like the coast of Kent and Sussex that would be coming under bombardment, and possibly also from attack by enemy troops once ashore -

1/ the shorter the distance, the shorter any vulnerable telephone wires connecting the two...and

2/ any ground defences protecting the guns from attack - wire entanglements, trench systems, MG/spigot mortar points etc. (see the map of such a layout around an Emergency Battery on the other now-closed thread) can simultaneously protect the BOP.

As an aside - along the peninsula there's the problem that height for Royal Artillery OPs is at a premium - to say the least! - hence the argument over "ownership" of the Martello Tower that Knouterer mentions. They're going to be the highest points in the landscape for some number of square miles around.
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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#269

Post by Juha Tompuri » 16 Apr 2014, 07:53

To get things correct and to get rid of this side track, it seems to be so that increasing the height of the gun battery itself does not improve the fire accuracy, unlike claimed:
phylo_roadking wrote:Dunserving...
Quite right that the higher a gun battery and OP, the further it can see and shoot accurately, but with the obvious problem that they have a minimum range due to the limited minimum angle of depression below horizontal. Once invaders get close enough only seal level gun batteries can bombard them, and continue to bombard the as they come ashore.
Exactly.

However, as mentioned, increasing the height of the OP, enables it to see further and correct the gun's fire better.

Regards, Juha

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Re: British Army at home September 1940

#270

Post by Gooner1 » 16 Apr 2014, 11:55

phylo_roadking wrote: The question would be what was a Pioneer Battalion actually doing on the line of the RMC...there was a lot of remedial work being done to the pillboxes on the Canal line as of the late summer of 1940; the pillboxes were getting interior "curtain" walls to protect occupants from live rounds and splinters coming through doorways...and the doorways themselves were getting protecting walls built on the outside of the pillboxes. In many cases today, these later additions to the original pillboxes are in worse shape than the core pillbox themselves - shedding their concrete/cement cladding over the brick work due to the elements etc.
Yes, there was probably enough M.T. about to send working parties out to other parts of the Brigade area though.

Leaving aside the rhetoric of the Churchillian/Shakespearian "hold or die in place" orders...
So you think all those "all positions to be held to the last man and last round" orders were merely rhetoric?
What the brass really meant was resist until you have felt you've done enough and then withdraw :lol:

One wonders why the British put so much emphasis, time and money on creating Nodal Points and Fortresses if they were thinking of retreat.

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