British Army at home September 1940

[Knouterer]

Feel free to dig around in Air Ministry files Phylo, but we already know that the Operations Record Book of Fighter Command, as quoted by various authors, states that Lympne was out of action, or non-operational, for two days after the August 15 attack. Seems clear enough to me.
As far as I can make out, it was then apparently used as an "emergency landing ground" until about the middle of Sept. when it was upgraded to "forward satellite" again.
I have indeed "repeatedly been told" that the RAF presence was reduced to an "absolute minimum" but I'm still waiting for any hard evidence for that statement, other than that item about two Spitfire pilots who landed there and observed "only a small working party" and then flew on to Hawkinge. I would class that more as anecdotal evidence, it certainly doesn't sound to me as if they got out of their planes and conducted a thorough inspection of the whole airfield and its defences.
I have from my side quoted sources saying among other things that during the attack on Friday 30 August 1940 "at least nine bombs exploded one of which destroyed a hangar, and one hit an air raid shelter seriously injuring five pilots and also caused at least six civilian fatalities." Which would tend to indicate a certain RAF presence, even including pilots.
In any case, the point of this discussion is not to establish how much flying was going on there, but what sort of opposition the Fallschirmjäger would have met if they had landed and tried to take the airfield at the end of Sept.

[phylo_roadking]

I have indeed "repeatedly been told" that the RAF presence was reduced to an "absolute minimum" but I'm still waiting for any hard evidence for that statement, other than that item about two Spitfire pilots who landed there and observed "only a small working party" and then flew on to Hawkinge. I would class that more as anecdotal evidence, it certainly doesn't sound to me as if they got out of their planes and conducted a thorough inspection of the whole airfield and its defences.

You mean apart from them getting out of their aircraft and helping look for ammunition and aviation spirit?

Feel free to dig around in Air Ministry files Phylo, but we already know that the Operations Record Book of Fighter Command, as quoted by various authors, states that Lympne was out of action, or non-operational, for two days after the August 15 attack. Seems clear enough to me.
As far as I can make out, it was then apparently used as an "emergency landing ground" until about the middle of Sept. when it was upgraded to "forward satellite" again.

However - you'll of course note that being out of action for two days THEN being downgraded to Emergency Landing Ground status doesn't confirm that the damage reported from the raid of August 15th was ever repaired??? From raf.mod uk...

At Lympne Aerodrome, heavy calibre bombs were dropped at 1130 hours causing considerable damage to hangars and hutments. Water supply, telephones and electric supply are affected.

As for this...

I have from my side quoted sources saying among other things that during the attack on Friday 30 August 1940 "at least nine bombs exploded one of which destroyed a hangar, and one hit an air raid shelter seriously injuring five pilots and also caused at least six civilian fatalities." Which would tend to indicate a certain RAF presence, even including pilots.

I find it strange that the home security reports for August 30th on raf.mod.uk don't happen to mention pilots...

Nine bombs were dropped at Lympne Aerodrome destroying a hangar and an air raid shelter. There were five civilian casualties but the aerodrome is reported to be serviceable.

....but it IS perhaps worth remembering that, given the activities of the 30th, by the time Lympne was bombed...

Between 0740 hours and 0820 hours, two raids of twenty plus each cruised in the Straits and Calais areas. Two squadrons sent up over the Straits did not sight either raid. Hostile patrols remained active in the Calais - Boulogne area.

At 1106 hours, one hundred plus enemy aircraft passed over Dungeness and Dover, quickly followed by another wave of one hundred plus. These formations split up over Kent and Surrey, sub-divisions attacking targets in the Estuary and the aerodromes at Biggin Hill and Eastchurch. At 1200 hours, another wave of one hundred plus came in over Dover but did not penetrate far inland. Throughout the attack numerous hostile aircraft patrolled the Channel and French Coast, evidently waiting to cover retreating bombers.

Sixteen fighter squadrons met the attack and destroyed twenty-seven enemy aircraft plus three by anti-aircraft at a cost of ten aircraft and five pilots, and by 1230 hours all raids had been driven off.

At 1420 hours, sixty plus enemy aircraft crossed the coast between Dover and Dungeness and some flew towards Kenley and Biggin Hill. Four squadrons were sent up and by 1500 hours all raids had retreated out to sea. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed plus one by anti-aircraft.

At 1555 hours, about three hundred aircraft entered Kent, some crossing the Estuary to Essex. The concentration remained greatest over East Kent but formations of ten to twenty aircraft each spread to Kenley, North Weald, Hornchurch, Debden, Sheerness, Harwich, Bentley Priory and as far west as Oxford at an average height of 10,000 feet. Lympne, Detling and Biggin Hill were attacked.

...there's every chance that a number of RAF pilots found themselves temporarily inconvenienced at one of Eleven Group's EMERGNECY LANDING Grounds! :roll: That was after all Lympne's role during the Battle of Britain...which is very different from any pilots and aircraft being stationed there - which we already KNOW wasn't the case from mid-August to Mid-September.

In any case, the point of this discussion is not to establish how much flying was going on there, but what sort of opposition the Fallschirmjäger would have met if they had landed and tried to take the airfield at the end of Sept.

You don't seem to be grasping that RAF "airfield protection detachments" weren't made up of aircrew or ground crew; they were made of from the rest of a squadron complement - the clerks, the mess orderlies, the chief cooks and bottlewashers; RAF personnel dedicated to flying or keeping aircraft in the air weren't put in the trenches and pillboxes with rifles.

And Lympne didn't have those ancilliary...I.E. spare... squadron staff there even before the raids that resulted in its status being downgraded. On 3rd June its three temporarily-located Lysander squadrons of Army Co-op Command formally left the station - No.16 Squadron left on the 3rd, followed by No.2 and No.26 Squadrons on 8th June, at which date Lympne ceased to be the HQ of 50 Wing Army Co-op. These are the formal dates of the withdrawal of the squadrons as formations from Lympne; all three had been withdrawn from France 7-10 days after the invasion of the West, and operated across to Northern France and the Channel from there for the next three weeks only. In other words - there would only have been an emergency maintanance party there from the 8th of June onwards, when it's only role until the middle of September became a satellite field for the four squadrons operating in Biggin Hill's Sector of Eleven Group, and latterly an ELG.

[Gooner1]

"(iv) Cmds of forward bns and coys must realize what an important effect immediate counter-attacks, even if carried out by forces not greater than pls, may have on any enemy who has effected a landing on the beaches. As many sub-units as possible will be held in res. for this role. Comds and all leaders down to Sec. Comds of all sub-units earmarked for a counter-attack role will be carefully rehearsed in the alternative attacks they may be required to carry out.”

Such bayonet charges down the beach – a staple of Pathé newsreels of the time – do not seem like a particularly good idea against a more numerous enemy well equipped with automatic weapons, and other (later) instructions put more emphasis on sitting tight and leaving counterattacks to larger units designated for that purpose, for example Operation Instruction No. 25 of XII Corps, dated 2 May 1941:

Fixed bayonets possibly, but at the lowest level the counter-attack force is likely to be the Platoon Sergeant and 5 blokes rapid firing and hurling mills bombs to prevent a section post from being overrun.
At battalion level the Carrier platoon is tailor made for a counter-attack force, at Rye and probably elsewhere, the Carrier Platoon was coupled with the Mortar platoon to give mobility and firepower.
I don't think the Operational Instruction contradicts this?
AFAIK Montgomery was even keener on keeping units and sub-units back in the counter-attack role.

[phylo_roadking]

At battalion level the Carrier platoon is tailor made for a counter-attack force, at Rye and probably elsewhere, the Carrier Platoon was coupled with the Mortar platoon to give mobility and firepower.

Indeed - especially given the Carrier counter-attack experiences recently in France, described several times in Montefiore Amour of any kind is still armour, if you're a rifle- or LMG-carrying landser!

Regarding this...

Such bayonet charges down the beach – a staple of Pathé newsreels of the time – do not seem like a particularly good idea against a more numerous enemy well equipped with automatic weapons

...that is wet through, cold, still seasick, getting their landlegs back - possibly (probably!) exhausted after struggling or paddling ashore through fast-running rip tides, etc., etc. - AND who would only in those first minutes be equiped with small arms...if they haven't lost them in the tide...until the barges could start being unloaded. Same advantages in rapid/prompt counterattack to be accrued as in counterattacking parachutists before they can arm/formate....

and other (later) instructions put more emphasis on sitting tight and leaving counterattacks to larger units designated for that purpose

...by "later" do we take from that into 1941 across the board??? This would of course make better sense THEN - given that by 1941, the defenders would be once again FULLY up to roster in artillery, automatic weapons, etc...AND their defensive positions would be greatly improved/matured; the defenders would by then cause greater casualties from the attacker by fighting from behind fixed defences.The attackers however would still be in just as big a mess for those vital few minutes in 1941 as they would have been in 1940...

[Gooner1]

Indeed - especially given the Carrier counter-attack experiences recently in France, described several times in Montefiore Amour of any kind is still armour, if you're a rifle- or LMG-carrying landser!

Often resulting in the award of the MC (posthumous) to the commander if I recall.

The always good but hard to read Pillboxes Suffolk has this:

Infantry Section Leading 1938 gives the following roles for the carrier platoon:

(a) In attack
(i) In a tank attack to advance rapidly from fire position to fire position to give close support to tanks unaccompanied by infantry.
(ii) To assist the advance of riflemen by the infiltration method.
(iii) To protect flanks.

(b) In defence
(i) To move fire power within the position from place to place i.e. to produce counter-attack by fire only.
(ii) To support tank and infantry counter-attacks.
(iii) To provide depth to the defence by fire at long range, working in groups.

(c) In withdrawal to act as the rear guard.

The role of carriers in the defence of Suffolk, as indicated by the unit Defence Schemes, was to act as a mobile reserve. The War Diary of the 9th Lancs states that on action stations the carrier platoon was to report to battalion HQ to form part of the battalion reserve. The War Diary of 2/8th Lancs gives the role of the carrier platoon to act as a mobile reserve with its principal tasks as follows:

(i) To increase the fire power of any threatened post held by Home Guards or the A.M.P.C.
(ii) To co-operate in any counter attack by rifle platoons by providing fire power.
(iii) To act as mobile fire units in street fighting.
(iv) To provide protection for artillery units near Mutfordbig Wood.

This Diary also gives the strength of the carrier platoon as 10 carriers with 10 Bren guns (1,200 rounds per gun), two Boys anti-tank rifles (40 rounds per gun), 84 hand grenades and 100 rounds per rifle.

But the War Diary of 1/6 Lancs states that its Carriers formed part of the Brigade Reserve. On 'Action Stations', carriers were to move to hideouts near their own battalion HQ and to come under Brigade orders to carry out:

(i) Counter attacks against enemy airborne troops
(ii) Counter attacks against any enemy penetration of the beaches.

If a break down in communications occured, the carriers were to act under Battalion orders.

And more here http://pillboxes-suffolk.webeden.co.uk/ ... 4538922298

[Knouterer]

From the War diary of the 136th Brigade (45th Division), 9.7.40: “Brigade Reserve now consists of all the Battalion Carriers – 15 in all – and the 3 Motor-cycle Platoons of a total of approximately 100 Motor-cycles, situated in HAILSHAM Area.”
So that would be exactly half of the normal complement of 10 carriers per Inf battalion. However, from other entries in the WD it would seem that by the end of Sept. they were at full strength.
Caption to the IWM photo: "Universal carrier Mk I of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry on the Sussex Downs, 18 October 1940. The crew demonstrate the use of the 2-inch mortar and Bren gun on an anti-aircraft mounting."
The 2-inch mortar seems a bit premature as these were not yet part of the (official) carrier platoon armament I believe.

[Knouterer]

On the subject of counterattacking forces, a few notes on 29th (Independent) Infantry Brigade (Group) :

In July, 1940, two independent brigade groups were formed in England as a mobile G.H.Q. reserve. These brigade groups were self-contained and, in fact, miniature divisions, each consisting of four regular infantry battalions and the usual supporting arms, gunners, sappers, signallers, R.A.S.C., Ordnance, etc. Both brigade groups were highly mobile with sufficient mechanical transport to move quickly to any area threatened by invasion. They were the 29th Independent Brigade Group (commanded by Brigadier Oliver Leese) and the 31st Independent Brigade Group (commanded by Brigadier H. E. F. Smyth). The infantry units were regular battalions recently recalled from India, the artillery units had been to France and were newly equipped with 25pdrs.

By September, the 29th IB consisted of the following:
• 1st Bn, The Royal Scots Fusiliers
• 2nd Bn, The East Lancashire Regiment
• 2nd Bn, The Royal Welch Fusiliers
• 2nd Bn, The South Lancashire Regiment (only till April 16, 1944)
• 29 Independent Brigade Group Anti-tank Company (1 September 1940 – 18 January 1941)
• 204 Anti-tank Battery, Royal Artillery (16 July 1940 – 5 May 1941)
• 17 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (16 July 1940 – 5 May 1941) – (had been to France with 4th Inf Div)
• "E" Company 5 Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (Machine Guns) 16 August 1940 – 11 June 1941)
• 236 Field Company, Royal Engineers (16 July 1940 – 25 January 1943)
• 29 Independent Brigade Group Company, Royal Army Service Corps 1 August 1940 – 5 May 1941)
• 154 Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps (16 July 1940 – 25 January 1943)
• 29 Independent Brigade Group Workshop, Royal Army Ordnance Corps (27 April 1940 – 10 July 1941)
• 29 Independent Brigade Group Ordnance Field Park, Royal Army Ordnance Corps (29 April 1940 – 5 May 1941)
• 29 Independent Brigade Group Provost Section, Royal Military Police (18 July 1940 – 15 January 1943)

WD of the HQ of XII Corps (WO 166/344), 2 Aug. 1940:
“29 Inf Bde comes under command 12 Corps as Corps Reserve and were placed in area East Grinstead – Buxted – Haywards Heath – Horsham.” Bde HQ was at Staplefield.
In 12 Corps Instruction No. 4 (of early Aug.) it was added that 88 Fd. Reg. (at Crowborough) would come under command of the Brigade. This was a Corps unit that had been to France and was re-equipped in July with 16 x 75 mm guns, to which 4 x 4.5in howitzers were added in Aug. It seems however that by the end of Sept. this unit was assigned to Brocforce (Brighton area).

Tasks were defined as follows:

“3. In the event of an enemy invasion in the areas specified, 29 Inf Bde. will be prepared to carry out the following tasks: -
(a) Under command of 45 Div. to recapture Newhaven.
(b) Under command of 1 M.M.G. Bde. to recapture Shoreham.
In addition to the above primary tasks, 29 Inf. Bde. will be prepared to operate in support of 45 Div. in any part of that divisional area, particularly with a view to destroying or limiting any enemy penetration in the Pevensey or Royal Military Canal areas.

4. In emergency, 29 Inf. Bde. may be required to occupy a sector of the Corps ROTHER LINE. Recce of this line will be carried out with a view to occupation of any sector at short notice.”

[Knouterer]

Working a bit on the coast defences and I have now (provisionally) concluded that the emergency batteries at Cooden Beach (west of Bexhill) and Pevensey Bay were not installed before 1941 (see map). So between the 6" battery at Eastbourne (BOP in the Wish Tower) and the 4" battery at Bexhill, there was only the battery at Norman's Bay with two ex-Japanese Navy 4.7" guns.
See: http://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=181.0

On the other hand, according to the War Diary of the 56th Heavy Regiment (WO 166/1883), at the end of Sept., the batteries were positioned as follows, going from West to East:

A Battery: 2x6in at Windmill Hill (indicated at the top of the map, Schenk’s Karte 5) to cover Pevensey Marshes, BHQ at Normanhurst Court, Catsfield (six miles (9.7 km) north of Bexhill and three miles (5 km) southwest of Battle according to Wikipedia). The two other guns of this bty were apparently all the way over in Wingham, Kent, at that time.

D Battery: 2x9.2in at Picknill Green (2.5 km north of Cooden Beach), 2x9.2in at “Siddeley Green”, (presumably the place usually spelled “Sidley Green”, just north of Bexhill, also about 2.5 km from the shoreline). BHQ?
These guns covered (parts of) the landing zone of the 34th I.D. It is not clear to me why they were so far forward; with a range of 12,740 m and a traverse of 60° they would have covered a much wider sector if they had been positioned further back (like the 9.2ins of B battery). Perhaps the idea was to engage enemy vessels rather than troops landing on the beach. Or perhaps more likely, they were sited at an angle to fire along the beaches instead of straight ahead.

B Battery: 2x8in at Alfriston (covering Cuckmere Haven), 2x9.2in at Peasmarsh and Aldington, BHQ at Pelham Farm, Peasmarsh.
The howitzer at Peasmarsh covered the Camber-Rye-Winchelsea sector. Aldington is eight miles (13 km) south-east of Ashford; “set on a hill top above Romney Marsh, the village offers breathtaking views over the marsh”, according to Wikipedia.

C Battery: 2x6in at Udimore, 2x6in at Westenhanger (north of Lympne), BHQ at Winchelsea View, Udimore. These guns had a range of 17,140 m and the guns at Udimore were it seems intended to cover (part of) the western side of the Dungeness peninsula.

The Op Order of the 45th Division of early Oct. (often quoted before in these discussions ...) lists 2x6in guns and 1x9.2in how at Lydd, but these are not mentioned in the WD of the 56th, so if they were in fact there they probably belonged to the artillery training establishment at Lydd.

Ammunition situation: not so bad apparently. On 3.6.1940 a train arrived at Tenterden Station with ammunition for the Regt: 1350 x 6in, 280 x 9.2in, 360 x 8in. The 56th had so few vehicles at that time that a R.A.S.C. M/T company had to transport the shells to the gun positions.

[Knouterer]

On the same subject, here's an interesting map, taken from http://ads.ahds.ac.uk/catalogue//adsdat ... CASTLE.pdf , showing the field artillery covering Pevensey Bay. In fact this is from a slightly later date, it shows (part of) 57th Field Regt. of the 44th (Home Counties) Division which took over this sector in October, but the arrangements of the 45th division in September were probably not dissimilar (with slightly fewer guns). Note that there is again a mixture of 25pdrs, 4.5in hows and 75 mm guns, and that alternative positions are indicated for each troop.
This coastal area is now much built up along the coastline but the terrain was flat and open in 1940, as can be seen from this photo taken in 1931 (there's some restoration work going on in the castle apparently).

[Gooner1]

This coastal area is now much built up along the coastline but the terrain was flat and open in 1940, as can be seen from this photo taken in 1931 (there's some restoration work going on in the castle apparently).

The Pevensey Levels, lots of little dykes. http://www.walkingclub.org.uk/book_3/walk_66/map.shtml

45th Div. said the majority of dykes were only 3 foot deep thus fordable by foot and only partial anti-tank obstables, but any major advance inland would be confined to the roads.

[Gooner1]

On the other hand, according to the War Diary of the 56th Heavy Regiment (WO 166/1883), at the end of Sept., the batteries were positioned as follows, going from West to East:

A Battery: 2x6in at Windmill Hill (indicated at the top of the map, Schenk’s Karte 5) to cover Pevensey Marshes, BHQ at Normanhurst Court, Catsfield (six miles (9.7 km) north of Bexhill and three miles (5 km) southwest of Battle according to Wikipedia). The two other guns of this bty were apparently all the way over in Wingham, Kent, at that time.

D Battery: 2x9.2in at Picknill Green (2.5 km north of Cooden Beach), 2x9.2in at “Siddeley Green”, (presumably the place usually spelled “Sidley Green”, just north of Bexhill, also about 2.5 km from the shoreline). BHQ?
These guns covered (parts of) the landing zone of the 34th I.D. It is not clear to me why they were so far forward; with a range of 12,740 m and a traverse of 60° they would have covered a much wider sector if they had been positioned further back (like the 9.2ins of B battery). Perhaps the idea was to engage enemy vessels rather than troops landing on the beach. Or perhaps more likely, they were sited at an angle to fire along the beaches instead of straight ahead.

B Battery: 2x8in at Alfriston (covering Cuckmere Haven), 2x9.2in at Peasmarsh and Aldington, BHQ at Pelham Farm, Peasmarsh.
The howitzer at Peasmarsh covered the Camber-Rye-Winchelsea sector. Aldington is eight miles (13 km) south-east of Ashford; “set on a hill top above Romney Marsh, the village offers breathtaking views over the marsh”, according to Wikipedia.

C Battery: 2x6in at Udimore, 2x6in at Westenhanger (north of Lympne), BHQ at Winchelsea View, Udimore. These guns had a range of 17,140 m and the guns at Udimore were it seems intended to cover (part of) the western side of the Dungeness peninsula.

The Op Order of the 45th Division of early Oct. (often quoted before in these discussions ...) lists 2x6in guns and 1x9.2in how at Lydd, but these are not mentioned in the WD of the 56th, so if they were in fact there they probably belonged to the artillery training establishment at Lydd.

Good stuff. 45th Div. lists:
2 - 6" guns (presumably Westernhangen) and 1 - 9.2" how. (Aldington) in "A" Sub-area.
2 - 6" guns (Udimore?) and 3 - 9.2" hows. (Peasemarsh? &?) in "B" Sub-area
2 - 6" guns (?), 2 - 8" (Alfriston) and 2 - 9.2" hows. (?) in "C" Sub-area.

Ammunition situation: not so bad apparently. On 3.6.1940 a train arrived at Tenterden Station with ammunition for the Regt: 1350 x 6in, 280 x 9.2in, 360 x 8in. The 56th had so few vehicles at that time that a R.A.S.C. M/T company had to transport the shells to the gun positions.

Ammunition quantity seems very good. 225 RPG for the 6", 46 RPG for the 9.2" and a 180 RPG for the 8".

[Knouterer]

Just going through WO 199/2524, a file containing correspondence and other documents of the RN Liaison Officer (RNLO) with Eastern Command, one Captain Henderson in the period that interests us. The main topic is the infamous "mushrooms" or "Beach Type C" mines. I'll split it up in sections:

1. Description

Mines used in the beach defences were of two types, normal AT mines (Mk I, II, III and IV, plus wooden-cased mines improvised by the Royal Engineers) and Beach Type C (or “B type C”) mines, generally known as “mushrooms”. This was a code name not based on any physical resemblance; they were initially called “apples” until the end of June 1940, then “mushrooms”, and from early 1941, to confuse enemy spies further, “toadstools”, but the name mushrooms stuck.

It would seem that this mine was originally developed for the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization (Royal Marines) for the protection of bases overseas. They were produced by the Royal Ordnance factories. They packed a serious amount of explosive, 20 lbs. of amatol, about three times as much explosive as AT mines.

According to the Admiralty Handbook on Ammunition, B.R. 932 (1945), “Amatol is a mechanical mixture of ammonium nitrate and T.N.T. The constituents are mixed in various proportions which are indicated by a fraction following the name, for example, Amatol 60/40 contains 60 per cent. ammonium nitrate and 60 per cent. T.N.T. The first number always refers to the percentage of ammonium nitrate. The amatols are powerful and violent main bursting charges. Rather more insensitive than T.N.T., they are safe to handle. They retain the poisonous and irritant properties of T.N.T. They detonate powerfully when suitably initiated, but being comparatively insensitive they require a special exploder system to give complete detonation. Ammonium nitrate is very hygroscopic, and amatols also have this rather serious defect. Moist ammonium nitrate when in contact with copper or its alloys forms sensitive blue crystalline explosive salts. This defect requires the prevention of the access of moisture to an explosive charge and the varnishing of all copper-containing components with which the explosive may come into contact.”

The War Office Hand Book on Ammunition (1936) states that amatol is “almost entirely free of sympathetic detonation” but also notes that “ammonium nitrate in the presence of moisture attacks metals, the corrosion products being in some cases dangerously sensitive, and in any case may finally cause the destruction of or damage to metal components.”
Amatol was it seems not used as a filling for naval shells, but it was widely used from 1915 in army howitzer shells (Amatol 80/20).

The mine was actuated by a pressure of 50-60 lb on the edge or 100 lb (45.4 kg) on the centre of its domed top which reversed a simple bow-shaped spring. The sudden violent motion of the spring drove a striker onto a cartridge cap which exploded a priming charge of 4 ounces of “polar blasting gelatine” (or other explosive according to other sources, the ingredients may have varied in the course of production) and so fired the mine (see drawing). The detonator is described as a “commercial type “Brisha” detonator initiated by flash from a 12 bore cartridge cap”. Approximate cost of a filled mine was £3.

Rubber covers were provided but these were often ill-fitting and not watertight, there was an opening for withdrawing the safety rod (or safety handle), and they deteriorated very rapidly in the ground: according to reports they fell apart after a couple of months if not sooner.

The relatively light pressure needed to actuate the mine was questioned from the start; on 15.6.1940 HQ Eastern Command sent a letter to GHQ Home Forces pointing out that the mines would be “wasted” on infantrymen charging up the beach and that this might create a gap in a mine field through which tanks could pass unharmed. The prompt reply (18.6.1940) stated that the low pressure was necessary because of the way the weight of a tank was distributed over the tracks. It was added (somewhat optimistically) that if a German foot soldier set off a mine, it would create a crater 12 feet wide and 6 feet deep “which would still be a great hindrance to tanks”.

In fact there were quality control problems with the springs, and many required (much) less pressure, particularly if there was already a certain weight of earth or sand on top of the mine. There are numerous reports of relatively small animals like dogs or goats setting them off. In 1941 new mushrooms were fitted with springs made of better quality steel, but retrofitting these to mines already laid was not considered practicable.

It is clear that the mushrooms were never what one might call a “popular item”, many lives were lost in laying them and they kept going off all over the place. HQ Eastern Command refers to them as “this infernal machine” in the exchange mentioned above, and the commander of the 55th Division in a letter to HQ XI Corps of 1.10.1940 mentions some experiments done by his R.E.s (leading to the conclusion, among other things, that the pressure should be increased to 200 lbs.) and states: “While the value of the Mushrooms we have received is fully appreciated it is considered that as and when sufficient quantities of Inf. Anti-Tank Mines Mk IV. become available it would be preference (sic) that they should be issued for beach defence and the supply of mushrooms discontinued.”

[Knouterer]

2. Laying the mine fields

By the end of Sept. 1940, 74,160 mushrooms had been received into Eastern Command of which 46,093 had been laid, according to data provided by the RNLO to GHQ Home Forces.
In the area of XII Corps, 26,304 had been received, of which 12,345 had been laid, so less than half.

However, a few days later (2nd Oct.) the same officer (presumably) sent a message that “12 Corps report that considerable progress has been made since their last return and that they have now laid most of the mines which have so far been received. Will you please expedite, if possible, the issue of the balance of their allotment of 30,000, giving this priority over other issues.”

According to an earlier report of 2 Aug. 5,500 mushrooms had by then been laid in the XII Corps area, of which no less than 3,700 at Newhaven and 750 at Cuckmere Haven, plus smaller numbers at Shoreham East (600), Bexhill (200 on the golf course), Galley Hill, Cliff End and Kingsdown. Why (apparently) none at all were laid on the coast of Kent by this date is unclear. It would seem that the large number in the Newhaven area includes AT mines, even though the table says “mushrooms”; the pillbox.org.uk website lists (for 1941)a field of 1,539 AT mines at Newhaven (MC11), and three fields with 1,859 more at Tide Mills (just east of the harbour entrance).
See:
http://www.pillbox.org.uk/projects/minefields/index.asp
The 1941 instructions quoted there mention a space of 21 feet between mines and a maximum field width of 1200 feet, or about 58 mines. Later instructions (Dec. 1941) decree spacing of not less than 25 feet, with a 75 feet gap (skipping two mines) after every ten mines, with a staggered row behind covering the gap.
All this reflects “best practice” which clearly was not always followed in 1940. In particular:
- Mine fields were often poorly charted, or not at all, and the exact number of mines laid was not recorded;
- Mine fields were insufficiently secured by barbed wire and warning signs, as is evident from the very many fatal accidents involving both soldiers and civilians (of which more later);
- The safety distances between mines, and the gaps between sections of a mine field, were insufficient to prevent sympathetic detonation: some fields went up in their entirety more than once, from causes varying from German bombs to straying dogs;
- Mine fields were often dangerously close to houses and other structures;
- Recovery wires were not always attached to mines, allowing them to move with shifting sands and shingle, often passing under the wire barriers;
- Mines were not far enough from the waterline to prevent them from being “washed out to sea”, as frequently reported.

The file contains a message from Eastern Command to its three Corps (undated, some point in in July), pointing out missing info and discrepancies and stressing that “Unless accurate records are kept of locations it will be impossible to recover mines on termination of hostilities and many casualties during recovery will result.”.

There is also a letter from the Royal Navy to GHQ Home Forces, dated 17 Oct. 1940, requesting detailed maps (6” to the mile) showing the mushroom fields, these to be forwarded to the Coast Guard stations in the relevant area, “… principally so that when ship-wrecked mariners struggle on the shore during the coming winter, some attempt can be made to prevent them immediately blowing themselves up.”

[Knouterer]

3. Mine incidents

As noted, many mine fields went up as a whole at the slightest provocation. Probably the most extreme example of this is noted in an official report from Dec. 1940 on “mine fields destroyed by enemy action, accidental means, or weather”: of a field of 527 mushrooms near Lowestoft, 515 were gone, and the “cause of detonation” is given as “Rough-haired terrier”. It is further stated on the form that the remaining 12 that did not go up had defective firing mechanisms.

However, it may be that the WO handbook on ammunition quoted above was not wrong in claiming that amatol was “almost entirely free of sympathetic detonation”. The Royal Engineers of the 55th Division conducted some experiments in Sept. 1940 (referred to above). In one of these, four mines without primer tubes were placed at 7, 10, 15 and 18 ft from an armed mine, which was then exploded; the other mines did not explode but it was found that the pressure wave at ground level (or slightly below) was strong enough to depress the lids of all four mines on one side and activate the bow springs, so that they would have exploded if the detonators and priming had been in place.

In the mine clearing operations around the coast of Britain after the war some 180 Royal Engineers and German POWs lost their lives, but I’m beginning to think that the number of lives lost in laying the mushrooms (and other mines) may well have been (considerably) higher. For obvious reasons, such deaths were not widely publicized at the time and it seems that in some (many?) cases the next of kin were told that deaths resulted from enemy action.

In the previous sadly defunct SL-thread I already mentioned a number of fatal accidents, and they occur with depressing regularity in the War Diaries I’ve read since.

For example, from the War Diary of 136th Brigade (WO 166/992): 20.9.1940: “An unfortunate incident occurred on the beach west of the breakwater at NEWHAVEN when Sgt. Driver of “D” Coy, 8th (H.D.) Royal Sussex was killed and Sgt. Fall of 562 Fd Coy RE seriously injured by an A/Tk. mine exploding.”
And only two days later and just a few miles down the coast: “50th R. Sussex reported that Capt. Pickard-Cambridge M.C. (50 R. Sx.), 2/Lt Burns, Sgt Lewis and an unnamed driver (all 562 Fd Coy RE) had all been killed by a Naval Beach Mine explosion at CUCKMERE HAVEN. Capt. Pickard-Cambridge has taken the utmost pains and the greatest possible interest in all minefields at CUCKMERE, and his death by such a means is the more to be regretted on this account.”

The highest ranking victim was in all likelihood Major-General Clifford Cecil Malden, commander of the 47th division. On 25 March 1941 he was inspecting coast defences near Shoreham. The brigadier showing him round somehow managed to get on the wrong side of a wire barrier surrounding a minefield; the general trod on a “mushroom” and was blown to bits, the brigadier was blown clean through the wire but survived.

There were also numerous civilian victims. The mushrooms, like death in general, were no respecters of persons and made victims in the highest circles:

“Dover Express - Friday 30 August 1940

EARL GUILFORD'S SON AND DAUGHTER KILLED. We regret to record the deaths of Lord North, son and heir of the Earl of Guilford, Waldershare Park, Kent, and his sister, Lady Cynthia Williams, the Earl's only daughter. They were killed on Sunday morning when they trod on a land mine in the south-east coast area. Lady North received serious injuries. The party were taking a walk at the time in a prohibited area. So violent was the explosion that it could be heard several miles away.”

This incident took place near Sandwich. According to testimony given at the inquest, this particular minefield had been laid recently and was surrounded by a single coil of barbed wire 3 feet high, which the victims apparently had climbed over, but there were no warning signs of any kind. They may have thought the wire was just there temporarily as part of some exercise. Once again, the victims were both completely blown to bits (perhaps they were walking arm in arm) and could only be identified by shreds of clothing, uniform buttons, a pocket knife, and such. The coroner stated that no useful purpose would be served by having the jury view the remains, and apparently nobody disagreed with him.

At the other end of the social scale: Folkestone, Wednesday, 23 Sept. 1941: four workmen repairing war damage at the Royal Pavilion Hotel near the harbour walked into a minefield in the gardens of the hotel while searching for a drainpipe. A mine exploded killing three of the men and seriously wounding the fourth. At the inquest the foreman in charge insisted that no one had told him there were mines in the vicinity.
The mines were still around almost two years later, on 29 June 1943: “… another shell fell in the grounds of the Royal Pavilion Hotel. It set off dozens of landmines in repetitive detonations.”

[phylo_roadking]

According to an earlier report of 2 Aug. 5,500 mushrooms had by then been laid in the XII Corps area, of which no less than 3,700 at Newhaven and 750 at Cuckmere Haven, plus smaller numbers at Shoreham East (600), Bexhill (200 on the golf course), Galley Hill, Cliff End and Kingsdown. Why (apparently) none at all were laid on the coast of Kent by this date is unclear.

It is once you read this again in conjunction with David Newbold's thesis; that early in the "Sealion months" of 1940, the threat to East Anglia and Norfolk was seen to greatly outweigh any possible threat to Kent and the South Coast; the change in emphasis only began around the middle of the month with the interception (SIGINT) of large portions of the Germans' plans, and even after that - as late as 5th September - the Chiefs of Staff were still briefing that the main threat was to the East Coast although suitable preparations had been and would be made for Kent and the South Coast.

- Mines were not far enough from the waterline to prevent them from being “washed out to sea”, as frequently reported.

I take it you now accept that laying them that near to...or at or below...the waterline was NOT intentional but usually a result of bad planning or lack of familiarity with particular stretches of coastline and the vagaries of tides and sea levels?

It would seem that this mine was originally developed for the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization (Royal Marines) for the protection of bases overseas. They were produced by the Royal Ordnance factories. They packed a serious amount of explosive, 20 lbs. of amatol, about three times as much explosive as AT mines....

...The relatively light pressure needed to actuate the mine was questioned from the start; on 15.6.1940 HQ Eastern Command sent a letter to GHQ Home Forces pointing out that the mines would be “wasted” on infantrymen charging up the beach and that this might create a gap in a mine field through which tanks could pass unharmed. The prompt reply (18.6.1940) stated that the low pressure was necessary because of the way the weight of a tank was distributed over the tracks. It was added (somewhat optimistically) that if a German foot soldier set off a mine, it would create a crater 12 feet wide and 6 feet deep “which would still be a great hindrance to tanks”.

In fact there were quality control problems with the springs, and many required (much) less pressure, particularly if there was already a certain weight of earth or sand on top of the mine. There are numerous reports of relatively small animals like dogs or goats setting them off. In 1941 new mushrooms were fitted with springs made of better quality steel, but retrofitting these to mines already laid was not considered practicable.

More investigation into the development history of the Type C beach Mine might be interesting; it might simply never have been intended as an anti-tank mine, the MNBDO ....if they spec'd it at all and it wasn't just handed to them to use "Here, you can use these for port defence..." ...would have been worried about all types of attack on ports they were defending, not just tank attacks from landing craft; hence the low pressure required. By the summer of 1940, exactly how many amphibious attacks against shore targets had been launched in the 20th century supported by armour?