British Army at home September 1940

[Knouterer]

I take it you now accept that laying them that near to...or at or below...the waterline was NOT intentional but usually a result of bad planning or lack of familiarity with particular stretches of coastline and the vagaries of tides and sea levels?

I take it you now accept that in 1940 a number of mines were laid - whether "intentionally" or through carelessness or ignorance of local conditions doesn't much matter - where the sea could eventually get at them, which was my whole point from the beginning?

[Knouterer]

According to an earlier report of 2 Aug. 5,500 mushrooms had by then been laid in the XII Corps area, of which no less than 3,700 at Newhaven and 750 at Cuckmere Haven, plus smaller numbers at Shoreham East (600), Bexhill (200 on the golf course), Galley Hill, Cliff End and Kingsdown. Why (apparently) none at all were laid on the coast of Kent by this date is unclear.

It is once you read this again in conjunction with David Newbold's thesis; that early in the "Sealion months" of 1940, the threat to East Anglia and Norfolk was seen to greatly outweigh any possible threat to Kent and the South Coast; the change in emphasis only began around the middle of the month with the interception (SIGINT) of large portions of the Germans' plans, and even after that - as late as 5th September - the Chiefs of Staff were still briefing that the main threat was to the East Coast although suitable preparations had been and would be made for Kent and the South Coast.

I'm well aware of that. But I don't for the life of me see how the fact that initially the main threat was perceived to be against East Anglia is supposed to explain the (apparent) fact that some extensive minefields were laid in Sussex at that time, but not in Kent?

[phylo_roadking]

I take it you now accept that laying them that near to...or at or below...the waterline was NOT intentional but usually a result of bad planning or lack of familiarity with particular stretches of coastline and the vagaries of tides and sea levels?

I take it you now accept that in 1940 a number of mines were laid - whether "intentionally" or through carelessness or ignorance of local conditions doesn't much matter - where the sea could eventually get at them, which was my whole point from the beginning?

It was perfectly obvious from all you posted that any incidences of this happening was ENTIRELY ACCIDENTAL or done through lack of knowledge. You were the one who refused point blank to countenance that.

I'm well aware of that. But I don't for the life of me see how the fact that initially the main threat was perceived to be against East Anglia is supposed to explain the (apparent) fact that some extensive minefields were laid in Sussex at that time, but not in Kent?

Because a lot of the early Sealion counterplanning seems to have been a carry-over from Gen. Kirke's period at Home Command when the MAIN threat was seen to be a large raid aimed at London, in divisional or multi-divisional size; Sussex offered more and better beaches, avoided the bad rip tides in the Narrows, depth issues at locations like the Downs, and once through the immediate obstacles of the South Downs a far more direct avenue of approach to London across country for a decapitation raid than landing along the Kent coast...same reason as Norfolk and especially the Essex coast contained so much apparent "threat" for so long; for many months from September 1939 on, an "invasion" of the size the British thought the Germans could mount only made sense if it was fastmoving (highly mecnanised/motorised) and could reach the government before the defenders could react in the strength needed to halt it.

Eventually finding out that the Germans were headed for east Sussex and Kent ALSO informed the British that the Germans were intending something FAR more determined and slow moving than a "raid" I.E. nipping off areas like Romney Marsh and the area contained by the Royal Military Canal, and their being prepared to land on unfavourable beaches like Sandgate etc. would have indicated that the Germans were intending to get ashore, take a port if possible and otherwise develop a beachhead for longer-term exploitation - a more deliberate and better prepared-for breakout supplied by a long-term "sea bridge"- not a quick raid depending on reaching objectives before the defenders got there!

Which of course suddenly meant that all possible and conceivably useable beaches in the now-known invasion area had to be protected; not just the best ones at the locations that to the British seemed to be the best for the job Reading Newbold's thesis this seems to have been a major failing of planning in the Kirke and Ironside tenures; even with the threat now real and sitting 22 miles away, the British at that point were still planning on dealing with the invasion they "wanted" to have to face, a German invasion carried out the way THEY would have best done it if it had been them!

[Knouterer]

I take it you now accept that laying them that near to...or at or below...the waterline was NOT intentional but usually a result of bad planning or lack of familiarity with particular stretches of coastline and the vagaries of tides and sea levels?

I take it you now accept that in 1940 a number of mines were laid - whether "intentionally" or through carelessness or ignorance of local conditions doesn't much matter - where the sea could eventually get at them, which was my whole point from the beginning?

It was perfectly obvious from all you posted that any incidences of this happening was ENTIRELY ACCIDENTAL or done through lack of knowledge. You were the one who refused point blank to countenance that.

Phylo dear boy ... I do not refuse anything "point blank" (but neither am I interested in endless round of pointless bickering).

But the incident reports from Hythe/Sandgate that I mentioned clearly state that the mines exploded "on the beach".

On that particular stretch, "on the beach" means "in font of the seawall", unless I'm mistaken.

"In front of the seawall" means "below the storm high water mark" which must have been fairly obvious to those laying the mines.

Col. Rodney Foster in his diary even noted that a sergeant was "believed to have been blown out to sea" Being familiar with local conditions, he would not have written that if the explosion was 50 or 100 yards from the waterline.

I have just been reading "Target Folkestone" by Roy S. Humpreys, which also reproduces that IWM picture of Sandgate on 10 July with the lone soldier and the barbed wire, and the caption says "mines were laid between the groynes".

I could also quote minelaying instructions which somewhat cavalierly state that the "mushrooms" are "reasonably waterproof" but that care should be taken to avoid more than two feet of water on top of them because that might be enough to set them off.

Anyway, not that it all matters much, in cases where there were (still) some mines on the foreshore shells or bombs would most likely have set (most of) them off before the first invaders set foot ashore.

[phylo_roadking]

Phylo dear boy ... I do not refuse anything "point blank" (but neither am I interested in endless round of pointless bickering).

But the incident reports from Hythe/Sandgate that I mentioned clearly state that the mines exploded "on the beach".

On that particular stretch, "on the beach" means "in font of the seawall", unless I'm mistaken.

"In front of the seawall" means "below the storm high water mark" which must have been fairly obvious to those laying the mines.

How do you know it was obvious? That's your assumption once again. Remember, I DID note...

I take it you now accept that laying them that near to...or at or below...the waterline was NOT intentional but usually a result of bad planning or lack of familiarity with particular stretches of coastline and the vagaries of tides and sea levels?

Even "non-storm" high water marks vary :roll: For instance...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neap_tide# ... _and_neaps

The semi-diurnal range (the difference in height between high and low waters over about half a day) varies in a two-week cycle. Approximately twice a month, around new moon and full moon when the Sun, Moon, and Earth form a line (a condition known as syzygy[8]), the tidal force due to the sun reinforces that due to the Moon. The tide's range is then at its maximum; this is called the spring tide. It is not named after the season, but, like that word, derives from the meaning "jump, burst forth, rise", as in a natural spring.

When the Moon is at first quarter or third quarter, the sun and Moon are separated by 90° when viewed from the Earth, and the solar tidal force partially cancels the Moon's. At these points in the lunar cycle, the tide's range is at its minimum; this is called the neap tide, or neaps (a word of uncertain origin).

Spring tides result in high waters that are higher than average, low waters that are lower than average, 'slack water' time that is shorter than average, and stronger tidal currents than average. Neaps result in less-extreme tidal conditions. There is about a seven-day interval between springs and neaps.

You're assuming that all the RE personnel involved in laying mines were familiar with local tidal ranges? Didn't you previously post up a detailed account of problems where they IGNORED good local advice on same?

Col. Rodney Foster in his diary even noted that a sergeant was "believed to have been blown out to sea" Being familiar with local conditions, he would not have written that if the explosion was 50 or 100 yards from the waterline.

Did he also happen to note if that incident happened at....high tide?

I have just been reading "Target Folkestone" by Roy S. Humpreys, which also reproduces that IWM picture of Sandgate on 10 July with the lone soldier and the barbed wire, and the caption says "mines were laid between the groynes".

I take it you appreciate from the Sandgate pics posted previously that the groynes come right up to the sea wall above the average high water mark?

[Knouterer]

A few notes on Coast Artillery (at the end of September 1940):

Manning the guns of all the various forts and batteries constructed since the time of Henry VIII had always been the responsibility of the Royal Artillery, although there never were enough regular gunners available to do so, neither in time of peace nor in time of crisis (as in the early 19th century when invasion by the French threatened), and “invalids”, local volunteers, militia, and whatnot had to make up the numbers.
In June 1899, the Royal Artillery was divided into two distinct and separate corps, the Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery to furnish the horse and field batteries, and the Royal Garrison Artillery to provide the mountain , heavy and siege batteries and to man the coast defences.

In 1926, it was decided that the coast defences in Britain should be manned by the Territorial Army only. The War Office decided that regulars should be retained to man the coast defences in Ireland (a few stations in the Irish Free State were still manned by British troops at that time) and abroad.
Training during the interbellum period was carried out at the Coast Artillery School at Shoeburyness.

In the invasion zone (beaches B, C, D and E) the only defended port was Newhaven with two 6in guns and two 12pdrs (another three 6in guns were added in 1942). However, the emergency batteries sprang up quickly.
Collier (Official History), page 131: “By 12th June a first batch of 46 new batteries, each comprising two 6-inch naval guns and two searchlights, had been added to the fixed defences and was ready for action. As the army was short not only of guns but also of coast defence troops, half these guns were manned by marines or naval personnel until army crews became available later in the summer.”
By the end of September the number of new batteries had increased to over a hundred.

Of the 6in guns supplied by the Navy, many were of the same type (Mk VII) as already used by the coast artillery since 1898; there were various other Marks of 6in BL guns that were not radically different. The same Mk VII gun on a wheeled carriage was by the way also used by the Army as the Mk XIX (two such guns belonging to the 56th Hy Regt were positioned at Udimore and two others at Westenhanger in Sept. 1940, covering both sides of the Dungeness peninsula.).

G.H.Q. Home Forces laid down that personnel for the Emergency Batteries should be provided as follows:
Officers: by posting from the Territorial CA regiments at the major ports and by calling up officers of the “Officers Emergency Reserve” and the “Territorial Army Reserve”;
Senior NCO’s: by posting from the CA Training Unit;
Junior NCO’s: by posting from the Territorial CA regiments at the major ports;
Searchlight personnel: by posting from the School of Electric Lights at Gosport;
Specialists: from recruits under training as such at the CA Training Unit;
Gunners: from Medium and Heavy Regiments returned from France without their guns, plus recruits who had done one month’s basis training at any RA training unit.

Obviously, training must have been somewhat sketchy in many cases. The establishment of the batteries varied according to the size and number of the guns from about 4 officers and 135 men for a three-gun 6 inch battery to 3 officers and 90 men for a two-gun 4 inch battery.

These numbers seem rather large for stationary guns but the idea was that a target (say an enemy destroyer) might appear suddenly and disappear as suddenly, so at any time of the day or night there had to be enough men near the guns and in the BOP (Battery Observation Post) to open fire at a moment’s notice. For the same reason a number of ready rounds (shells and bag charges) were kept next to the guns in the gun houses.

Collier: “Their primary role was seaward defence. In order to save ammunition, conceal the positions of the batteries as long as possible and offset inexperience, the gunners were told to hold their fire until the enemy began to lose sea room some three to four miles from the shore; the guns would thus be limited to about half their effective maximum range of 12,000 yards. Beach defence was a secondary role. The guns and lights were carefully hidden with nets and bunting, later supplemented by disruptive painting.”

This corresponds to instructions to guns in the Brocforce area (around Brighton). The 6" coastal batteries were to “engage hostile vessels approaching within 3 sea miles of the coast.” The 4" and 3" guns were to open fire when the range was between 4 and 5 thousand yards "and take as their targets the largest vessels which are not already being engaged by the 6" guns".

[Knouterer]

Ammunition

In line with the general tendency to dramatize the degree of British unpreparedness, there are a lot of “only ten rounds per gun” stories, but overall the sources do not really bear this out.
According to the Statistical Digest ( “Fighting with Figures”), 39,000 shells for coast artillery were produced in 1939 and 76,000 in 1940. It may be assumed that a considerable part of these were shells for the new twin 6pdrs, which consumed ammo at a very fast rate, but on the other hand there were not yet many of these in service in Sept. 1940 (maybe 20 or so in the entire British Empire). The 12pdr and 4.7in guns had been considered obsolete for some time and it may be assumed that no new ammo (or very little) was being produced for them. If we assume 40,000 rounds (1,000 per barrel) for the twin 6pdrs, that still leaves some 50,000-60,000 new rounds of 6in and 9.2in at the end of September, in addition to whatever was left over from earlier production.
Ammunition of exclusively naval calibres – 4in and 5.5in – should normally not be included in the above production figures. And since HMS Hood was the pride of the Royal Navy, we may assume that there still was a reasonable supply of serviceable ammunition on hand for its 5.5in guns when in 1940 they were removed from the ship and installed at the Mill Point battery at Folkestone, St. Margaret’s and other places.
Similarly, there is no reason to suppose an acute shortage of 4in rounds for the guns in the emergency batteries (and the lorry-mounted guns).
Maurice-Jones, page 217: “The ammunition for both 9.2 inch and 6 inch guns had been improved during the period between the two wars (…) Armour-piercing shell with base fuses, which had optional delay/non-delay plugs, and H.E. shell with nose fuses for unarmoured vessels or for firing landwards were now the normal coast-defence ammunition”.
The War Office Textbook of Ammunition of 1936 has in fact a drawing of a 6 inch coast defence H.E. shell indicating that it could be fitted with different types of nose fuse for firing seawards, landwards or against beach landings.
From which we may (tentatively) conclude that the 6in shrapnel shell for use against landings, which was issued in the early days (WWI and before), had fallen into disuse, like shrapnel shells generally (there is however a reference in the War Diary of the 56th Hy Regt to their 6” guns firing shrapnel shells in early 1941).

[Knouterer]

Fire control

Maurice-Jones, page 227:
“The second problem (after ammunition -K) was to equip those emergency batteries with the necessary searchlights (with their engines) and instruments, for without the former no firing could be done at night, and without the latter such firing as was done by day would be most inaccurate and ineffective. Searchlights were in very short supply and could only be issued to batteries being erected along what was considered to be the most threatened part of the coast, i.e. from Harwich to Portsmouth, but all kinds of substitutes were produced for the other batteries, ranging from portable lights on tripods to magnesium flares burnt in front of polished metal reflectors.”
Normally each emergency battery, when fully equipped, had two searchlights on either side of the gun houses about 200 yards away, although this varied a lot with local circumstances.

Regarding fire control, apart from Maurice-Jones good explanations can be found in “The Guns of the North-East. Coastal Defences from the Tyne to the Humber” by Joe Foster (2004)”. Without going into technical detail, the men in the BOP had various instruments (depression rangefinders etc.) with which they could determine where the shells should land, and this info was relayed electrically to the guns, which had dials on their mounts that indicated the required traverse and elevation.

The guns were also equipped with so-called autosights which permitted reasonably accurate fire out to 4,000 yds or so for bigger ships and 2,000 yds for smaller vessels. However, the naval guns coming out of storage in the summer of 1940 did not have these, so there must have been a certain amount of improvisation.

The CA prided itself on its ability to hit moving targets at long range with the first shot, but in a Seelöwe scenario such skill would not really be required. The typical target would have been a pair of barges (one powered, one unpowered) lashed together, slowly heading for the shore at about three knots. And after they ran aground, it would take a while before the water level had dropped enough to start unloading vehicles, during which time they would have been stationary targets at close range.
In fact, before that the first targets to come into view and into range would have been the minesweepers and Vorpostenboote carrying the troops of the Vorausabteilungen, which would have to slow down and possibly come to a complete stop to allow those troops to launch their assault boats and inflatables.
A well-trained CA crew could fire seven rounds per minute with a 6in gun, but it seems likely most of the EB gun crews did not (yet) have that level of skill. In any case, even at a more leisurely rate of say 3 rpm a supply of 75-100 rounds would have been expended in about half an hour, before the enemy main force hit the beach, so there would have been little point in firing faster.


Local defence: at a later date, many batteries received 40 mm Bofors AA guns, 75 mm field guns, spigot mortars and other weapons, but in September 1940 most batteries seem to have had only one or two Lewis guns for AA defence.

[Knouterer]

How effective would the emergency batteries have been in battle? Since they were never put to the test we can only speculate, but there are some interesting historical events that permit tentative conclusions.
On the morning of 16 December 1914, three German battlecruisers, with a combined armament of 20x11” (28 cm) guns, 12x8” guns and 32x6”guns, bombarded Hartlepool, which was defended by three 6” Mk VII coastal guns (still standard equipment in 1940) manned by Territorials of the Durham Royal Garrison Artillery. Although the very first German shell severed the telephone communications between the command post and the guns, they managed to put up an effective resistance, scoring a number of hits and killing about 80 German sailors and wounding 200, even though many shells glanced off or failed to penetrate the heavy armour of the ships. The three German ships fired 1,150 shells in all in 42 minutes, mostly at the town, but failed to disable any of the guns, and the gunners suffered only two casualties, both outside the batteries.

Closer to the Seelöwe time frame, during the invasion of Norway, while some Norwegian CBs did not fire at all, or ineffectually, others caused serious destruction.
At Oslo, the heavy cruiser BLÜCHER was heavily damaged and set on fire by two hits from 28 cm guns of the Oscarsborg fortress (plus several hits from a 15 cm battery nearby), and then finished off by land-based torpedoes.
In the continuing action, the Norwegian batteries scored seven more hits on the LÜTZOW and the BRUMMER (which were next in line), and seriously damaged the latter (later sunk). The Germans were forced to put their main ground force ashore south of Oscarsborg, some 20 miles from Oslo city, and make their approach by land (they arrived in the capital late that night).
During the day (on April 9) the Oscarsborg positions were hit with some 500 aircraft bombs (50 and 250kg), plus about 100 shells from the LÜTZOW, without a single gun being disabled. The island forts only surrendered the next day, after Oslo fell.
At Bergen, the cruiser KÖNIGSBERG was seriously damaged by 21 cm guns, and sunk the next day by Sea Skuas of the Fleet Air Arm.
The fortifications at Kristiansand (fortress Odderöy, 21 cm and 15 cm guns) also put up a resolute fight, twice repulsing the landing force led by the cruiser KARLSRUHE.
Other examples that might be quoted are the French CBs at Dakar which in Sept. 1940 caused the British and Free French to abandon the landing attempt (BARHAM was hit twice) or the 5-inch guns on Wake Island manned by the US Marines in Dec. 1941 (lively account: http://www.nps.gov/history/history/onli ... 0/sec2.htm ).
All of which goes to show that coastal batteries could be a serious threat, even if old (the 28 cm guns at Oscarsborg for instance had been installed in 1892) and manned by new recruits or older reservists (the average age of the understrength garrison of Oscarsborg was 40, allegedly, and the commander was 64), and also that in general it took a whole lot of firepower from the sea and/or the air to knock them out.
Or as Admiral “Jackie” Fisher put it, “no sailor but a fool attacks a fortress”.
In how far the coast of Kent and Sussex in Sept. 1940 could be considered a “fortress” is another question of course.

[phylo_roadking]

As noted previously when this was discussed - there are some problems with the above;

Training during the interbellum period was carried out at the Coast Artillery School at Shoeburyness.

Collier (Official History), page 131: “By 12th June a first batch of 46 new batteries, each comprising two 6-inch naval guns and two searchlights, had been added to the fixed defences and was ready for action. As the army was short not only of guns but also of coast defence troops, half these guns were manned by marines or naval personnel until army crews became available later in the summer.”

G.H.Q. Home Forces laid down that personnel for the Emergency Batteries should be provided as follows:
Officers: by posting from the Territorial CA regiments at the major ports and by calling up officers of the “Officers Emergency Reserve” and the “Territorial Army Reserve”;
Senior NCO’s: by posting from the CA Training Unit;
Junior NCO’s: by posting from the Territorial CA regiments at the major ports;
Searchlight personnel: by posting from the School of Electric Lights at Gosport;
Specialists: from recruits under training as such at the CA Training Unit;
Gunners: from Medium and Heavy Regiments returned from France without their guns, plus recruits who had done one month’s basis training at any RA training unit.

Obviously, training must have been somewhat sketchy in many cases. The establishment of the batteries varied according to the size and number of the guns from about 4 officers and 135 men for a three-gun 6 inch battery to 3 officers and 90 men for a two-gun 4 inch battery.

Lavery notes that aiming and fire control systems were of the naval type and parties had to be sent round to re-train the Army to use them in situ. He includes an IWM pic of Army gunners retraining at a battery at Felixtowe...noting what Collier said -

Collier: “Their primary role was seaward defence. In order to save ammunition, conceal the positions of the batteries as long as possible and offset inexperience, the gunners were told to hold their fire until the enemy began to lose sea room some three to four miles from the shore; the guns would thus be limited to about half their effective maximum range of 12,000 yards

As for the RN manning 22 batteries and the Army 25 (Lavery's figures for what was initially agreed as of 19th May 1940...I.E. ropughly half each...he notes that from 23rd June the Army's percentage of batteries under IT'S responsibility grew as the Admiralty demanded its trained gunners back! Which would in turn have exacerbated the re-training issue.

As for this...

Maurice-Jones, page 217: “The ammunition for both 9.2 inch and 6 inch guns had been improved during the period between the two wars (…) Armour-piercing shell with base fuses, which had optional delay/non-delay plugs, and H.E. shell with nose fuses for unarmoured vessels or for firing landwards were now the normal coast-defence ammunition”.
The War Office Textbook of Ammunition of 1936 has in fact a drawing of a 6 inch coast defence H.E. shell indicating that it could be fitted with different types of nose fuse for firing seawards, landwards or against beach landings.
From which we may (tentatively) conclude that the 6in shrapnel shell for use against landings, which was issued in the early days (WWI and before), had fallen into disuse, like shrapnel shells generally (there is however a reference in the War Diary of the 56th Hy Regt to their 6” guns firing shrapnel shells in early 1941).

...it's worth remembering what Lavery notes about the Navy's air-dropped "iron" gravity bombs I.E. it required VERY near misses at the very least to damage stell-hulled barges, as close as within 15 feet. In other words - It's going to require a LOT of ordnance discharged and a LOT of accuracy and not a small degree of sheer luck to achieve a suitable number of barge-killing VERY near or direct hits.

If it required a 500lb iron bomb dropping within 15 feet to damage a barge...how close would a 6in naval shell have to come???

The CA prided itself on its ability to hit moving targets at long range with the first shot, but in a Seelöwe scenario such skill would not really be required. The typical target would have been a pair of barges (one powered, one unpowered) lashed together, slowly heading for the shore at about three knots. And after they ran aground, it would take a while before the water level had dropped enough to start unloading vehicles, during which time they would have been stationary targets at close range.

That statement might bear some research on a battery-by battery basis to determine if they could depress far enough to cover beaches and surf at high water...! Given the number of batteries that occupied clifftop positions...

Closer to the Seelöwe time frame, during the invasion of Norway, while some Norwegian CBs did not fire at all, or ineffectually, others caused serious destruction.
At Oslo, the heavy cruiser BLÜCHER was heavily damaged and set on fire by(plus several hits from a 15 cm battery nearby), and then finished off by land-based torpedoes.
In the continuing action, the Norwegian batteries scored seven more hits on the LÜTZOW and the BRUMMER (which were next in line), and seriously damaged the latter (later sunk). The Germans were forced to put their main ground force ashore south of Oscarsborg, some 20 miles from Oslo city, and make their approach by land (they arrived in the capital late that night).
During the day (on April 9) the Oscarsborg positions were hit with some 500 aircraft bombs (50 and 250kg), plus about 100 shells from the LÜTZOW, without a single gun being disabled. The island forts only surrendered the next day, after Oslo fell.
...
All of which goes to show that coastal batteries could be a serious threat, even if old (the 28 cm guns at Oscarsborg for instance had been installed in 1892) and manned by new recruits or older reservists (the average age of the understrength garrison of Oscarsborg was 40, allegedly, and the commander was 64), and also that in general it took a whole lot of firepower from the sea and/or the air to knock them out.

The Battle of Drøbak Sound in April 1940 isn't the best example to use of shore battery fire foiling an amphibious attack to model the putative events of September 1940 on; those "two hits from 28 cm guns of the Oscarsborg fortress" were the ONLY two shots fired by the two guns that were manned - the THIRD 28cm gun wasn't crewed and didn't manage to fire at all! The defenders managed to muster only one fully-trained crew between two guns...and didn't get time to fire the THIRD fully-loaded and ranged 28 cm gun! Whereas, see my comments above about a LOT of ordnance needing to be discharged by defenders to score enough hits on all that small approaching shipping...

In the continuing action, the Norwegian batteries scored seven more hits on the LÜTZOW and the BRUMMER (which were next in line), and seriously damaged the latter (later sunk).

THREE hits were scored on the Lutzow by 15 cm guns...I'll need to check if she was hit at all in the battle, but the identification of the Brummer as being hit and on fire was a fog-of-war error; it was actually the (109 t) Norwegian cargo vessel Sørland that had stumbled into the battle while on her way from Moss to Oslo with a cargo of paper.

[Knouterer]

As noted previously when this was discussed - there are some problems with the above;

[.

Your "problems" sound, as usual, like much ado about nothing .
Training: as far as I can make out from primary sources, most of the emergency batteries initially manned by the RN were taken over by the RA by about the middle of July- beginning of August. By then many RA officers had followed short courses on naval equipments, where needed. I'm not aware of naval parties going around at a later period for re-training, perhaps you could quote a concrete example?
And in that context, please stop quoting "Lavery" as if it's the Bible. He is a great authority on the Royal Navy at the time of Nelson, but not necessarily on the British army in 1940, and I don't think he would claim to be.
Depression: in the invasion zone, that applies only to the Mill Point battery at Folkestone, which would have plenty of other targets anyway, all other batteries were close to the waterline.
Near misses: of course there would be misses, but there would be many hits as well. For your information, the plating on the "steel-hulled barges" was 5-8 mm thick at most, not enough to keep out a .303 ball round, much less an AP round.
Oscarsborg: so the 28 cm guns got off only two rounds, incidentally scoring two hits. So what? If you want to argue that if the Norwegians -like the British in Sept. - had known they were at war, and who with, and if -like the British - they had had a few months to seriously prepare for invasion, they would have done better, then of course I wholeheartedly agree.
Looking forward to your next SUBSTANTIVE contribution,
Gerard

[Gooner1]

...it's worth remembering what Lavery notes about the Navy's air-dropped "iron" gravity bombs I.E. it required VERY near misses at the very least to damage stell-hulled barges, as close as within 15 feet. In other words - It's going to require a LOT of ordnance discharged and a LOT of accuracy and not a small degree of sheer luck to achieve a suitable number of barge-killing VERY near or direct hits.

If it required a 500lb iron bomb dropping within 15 feet to damage a barge...how close would a 6in naval shell have to come???
.

I reckon a 500 pound bomb exploding 15 feet away is going to spoil the barge passengers trip across the Channel all the same.

[phylo_roadking]

Training: as far as I can make out from primary sources, most of the emergency batteries initially manned by the RN were taken over by the RA by about the middle of July- beginning of August. By then many RA officers had followed short courses on naval equipments, where needed. I'm not aware of naval parties going around at a later period for re-training, perhaps you could quote a concrete example?
And in that context, please stop quoting "Lavery" as if it's the Bible. He is a great authority on the Royal Navy at the time of Nelson, but not necessarily on the British army in 1940, and I don't think he would claim to be.

Perhaps you'd care to disprove Lavery's assertion that it happened? That's how it works around here. Where Lavery provides additional or contradicting information, simply disparaging him...handwaving him away...without evidence isn't regarded as a substantive contribution round here.

Regarding this in particular...

By then many RA officers had followed short courses on naval equipments

G.H.Q. Home Forces laid down that personnel for the Emergency Batteries should be provided as follows:
Officers: by posting from the Territorial CA regiments at the major ports and by calling up officers of the “Officers Emergency Reserve” and the “Territorial Army Reserve”;
Senior NCO’s: by posting from the CA Training Unit;
Junior NCO’s: by posting from the Territorial CA regiments at the major ports;
Searchlight personnel: by posting from the School of Electric Lights at Gosport;
Specialists: from recruits under training as such at the CA Training Unit;
Gunners: from Medium and Heavy Regiments returned from France without their guns, plus recruits who had done one month’s basis training at any RA training unit.

...they must have been busy over the summer cascading their course training to ALL those men...and wasn't it Fleming who noted that there was a shortage of ammunition allocated for practice firing? Whether or not there were sufficient ordnance available for actually fighting the guns...

Depression: in the invasion zone, that applies only to the Mill Point battery at Folkestone, which would have plenty of other targets anyway, all other batteries were close to the waterline.

...looks back at my last post...no, I didn't say anytihng about how close they were to the waterline - I mentioned how high above it they were. And suggested you check on a per-battery basis. Done it already? That was quick...but I suggest you re-check, and see if you're actually correct for the whole Kent and Sussex invasion area...AND the putative "invasion area" as it was regarded as of June 1940 when the first wave of building Emergency Batteries began

Near misses: of course there would be misses, but there would be many hits as well. For your information, the plating on the "steel-hulled barges" was 5-8 mm thick at most, not enough to keep out a .303 ball round, much less an AP round.

Who said anything about keeping AP rounds out? The issue is how good the Army's gunnery HAS to be to inflict damage on invasion shipping, whether from direct hits or very near misses...and the evidence from the Navy's tests in the summer of 1940 showed that VERY near misses at least were required from 500lb bombs...

How much did a 6in naval shell weigh?

Oscarsborg: so the 28 cm guns got off only two rounds, incidentally scoring two hits. So what?

Speed of reloading; remembering how close it will require a naval 6 inch shell to come to a target to do any damage, the Emergency Batteries are going to require a lot of fast reloading to make a dent in any invasion force in front of them...

P.s. have you actually yet sat down with a map and plotted ALL their positions...remembering that more than a few of the EBs of all calibres were sited around the UK in places that wouldn't EVER have borne upon a Sealion invasion force - how many of the EBs were accounted for by being sited in places like...the Firth of Forth, Lowestoft, Berwick, Ramsgate, Ardrossan....

IIRC ADM 234/436 is what you want...

If you want to argue that if the Norwegians -like the British in Sept. - had known they were at war, and who with,....

Perhaps you should do some more research on Drøbak Sound after all; Birger Eriksen ordered the guns of Oscarborg to fire without checking who they were firing at....in breach of standing orders - "Enten blir det medalje eller så blir det krigsrett"

[phylo_roadking]

I reckon a 500 pound bomb exploding 15 feet away is going to spoil the barge passengers trip across the Channel all the same

The majority of them were going to spend the entire crossing puking their guts up; shore batteries firing at them was going to be -

A/ an improvement, and

B/ it meant there was dry land somewhere nearby!

[Knouterer]

To give an impression of the way the Emergency batteries were set up, a few selected entries from the War Diary of the 521st Coast Regiment, HQ in Newhaven Fort (WO 166/1724), about the 6" battery at Seaford:

6.6.1940: ""E" Btys placed under the operational control of F.C. Newhaven. At Littlehampton one gun had been mounted and (for) the other the pedestal had been installed. At Worthing one gun had been mounted and the emplacement was being dug for the other gun. At Shoreham both guns were within a day of being ready for action. At Seaford both guns had been mounted and were ready for action. At Eastbourne one gun had been mounted. At Hastings one gun had been mounted."
19.6.1940: "E" Btys under operational control of F.C. Newhaven were manned as follows: Hastings and Eastbourne by personnel of 220 S.L. T. Regt R.A., Seaford, Shoreham, Worthing and Littlehampton by R.N. and R.M. personnel."
25.6.1940: "R.N. and R.M. personnel manning "E" Btys were relieved by R.A. personnel from Fixed Defences."
19.7.1940: "2/lts MacMath, Barnes Walker and Waterhouse (names hard to decipher) joined 343 Coast Bty R.A. after undergoing short course on naval equipments".
22.7.1940: "T/Capt P.E.L. Carmichael R.A. joined 343 Coast Bty R.A. as O.C. from 1st Hy Regt."
8.8.1940: "6" naval guns at 343 Coast Bty R.A were calibrated."
19.8.1940 (Seaford): "One gun shield arrived and fitting by R.E.s begun. Some difficulty was experienced owing to the low roof of the gun house and it was necessary for the front wall to be partly demolished, before the shield could be brought into the gun house."
26.8.1940 (Seaford): "Both gun shields were fitted."
27.8.1940: "3 rounds of practice ammunition were fired from 343 Coast Bty R.A."
30.8.1940: "Brigadier Burrowes and CFD Dover visited the Fort and 343 Coast Bty. The new BOP for 343 Bty was sited."
(Brigadier Burrowes was in charge of coast artillery in Eastern Command)
1.9.1940 (Seaford): "Night firing was carried out with good results."
22.9.1940: "Work on the new BOP Seaford commenced."
24.12.1940: "New B.O.P. in By. Buckle (343 Battery) used for first time."
9.1.1941: "Fire Commander visited 343 Battery. Lieut. L.H. Wheatley R.A. attached to 343 Battery and assumed command."
27-29.1.1941: "Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 4 D.E.Ls (Newhaven) & 343 Battery D.E.L.s exposed for training purposes."
3.4.1941: "An enemy bomber identified as a Junkers 88 approaching Seaford from the West circled over the town and was engaged by the Lewis gun of 343 Coast Bty R.A."
28 and 29.7.1941: "Practice Seawards carried out at 343rd. Coast Battery."

Similarly, according to the War Diary of the 340th Bty at Hythe,(WO 166/1827) the Royal Artillery took over on 17-19 July, although some naval personnel stayed fon a few more days.

So the normal sequence of events was that the RA took over the batteries from the Royal Navy/Royal Marines when they were ready to do so; they did not install batteries and then sit around helplessly until the Navy came to tell them what to do and how to do it.

I think that sufficiently "disproves" Lavery, if Phylo insists on putting it that way - of course, in logic you can't really prove a negative.

Note by the way that the Seaford battery had only a single Lewis for local AA defence, apparently; the Hythe battery had two, but that seems to have been the maximum that the emergency batteries could hope for at that time.