Commonwealth A Tk Gun tests and doctrine 1941

[verdenpark]

As this is a report from an Australian Division, I may be able to muddy the waters a little further. Going by the date, it appears to be about the time that Infantry Battalion were being issued A.T. guns for the first time. They came from the Divisions' A.T. Battalion as the 6pdr.s arrived. Each Battalion received four guns, which were issued to the utterly useless A.A. Platoon. These were then redesignated A.T. Platoons. The extra personnel required to fill out the Platoon came from within the Battalion H.Q. Company (cooks, clerks, etc.). These Platoons eventually had between 6 and 8 guns.

While the report correctly states that a projectile cannot be seen at any range, The disturbed air behind it can. From personal experience shooting long range pennant with a .308, the disturbed air can be clearly seen with the aid of binoculars, or spotting scope. It appears as a conical mirage with a series of thin, dark rings within it. It can only be seen when the light is low, and the humidity is just right. This occurs on a sunny winters day in the late afternoon, or in the case of this report, early morning desert conditions.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Verdenpark,

Sorry I missed your post. The original report was from July 1941, so long before any 6-pdrs arrived.

Thanks for the information about following shot.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Gents, back to Commonwealth A Tk gun doctrine in the summer of 1941, and all that: (this time from WO201/2655 - which contains a whole host of reports and lessons documents from Greece thereby demonstrating that the British (and Commonwealth) forces were making efforts to learn from experience and disseminate the information:

14A
SECRET
SUBJECT: Report on 2-pr A.Tk. gun.
General Headquarters,
Middle East,
CAIRO.

CRME/9209/7/RA
21 Jun 41
H.Q.
N.Z.A.

With ref to your report [13A] on the 2-pr A.Tk. gun, dated 18 JUN, and attached report of actual engagements of enemy tanks.

1. It is hoped to produce something further on this subject at a later date, possibly in the nature of lessons from operations in GREECE and CRETE.

2. It may be of interest to you to hear that the report [3A] of the 102 (NH) A.Tk Regt RHA on the operations in GREECE is full of praise for the performance of the 2-pr, but it does make a point which appears to be brought out in the report attached to your paper – that a tank should not be considered “dead” when stopped by one shot. It should if possible be given 2 or 3 more quickly, and it is reported that when this was done no instance was noted in which the crew were seen to escape.

3. The actual statement from 102 (NH) A.Tk. Regt. RHA report reads:-

“The gun was most effective against the medium tanks and gave the men great confidence in their weapon. Tanks were knocked out at ranges from 150 – 900 yards. If a gun stops a tank it is a good thing to put 4 or more rounds into it quick before the crew can get out.”

[sgd: G.B. Vaughan-Hughes, Lt Col for]
Brigadier, Royal Artillery.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
13A
SECRET
B.R.A.
Middle East.

Re: 2-Pr. Anti-Tank Gun.

With reference to your CRME/9209/7/RA dated 14 June 1941, my remark that the 2 pr is ineffective against the heavier natures of German tanks was based on reports by the Regimental Commander as follows:

“Effectiveness of 2 pr A.Tk. guns against A.F.Vs: Opinions on this are rather vague, but it is known that enemy light tanks were successfully put out of action, in some cases by one round.”

“A tank engaged at 1100 yards was hit but not stopped, although it retired. This appeared to be of “cruiser” type. At the OLYMPUS tunnel it is reported that tanks of this type armed with a 2-pr type gun were hit by our 2 prs but failed to stop.”

The paper, “Report of Tank Committee, G.H.Q., Middle East”, (CRME/9209/4/G(Trng)) appeared to substantiate the above view. The report of tests against the German Mk IV Tank since received is reassuring, though presumably these tests were made by shots fired at right angles to the armour being tested. In action many hits may be obtained which would be less effective.

With the return of some personnel from CRETE I have been able to obtain further reports of the results of engagement of enemy tanks in GREECE. I append hereto a further report. With reference to para (a) of the report it will be seen that the original report of the O.C. Anti-Tank Regt. in regard to the OLYMPUS tunnel action is to some extent contradicted; but unfortunately the troop commander and one No. 1 concerned are now missing.

With regard to the ability of our gunners to hit enemy tanks this report perhaps supplies the answer; but it will be noted that in all cases except those in (a), the tanks or other vehicles were of lightly armoured type, against which the effectiveness of the gun is NOT challenged.

[sgd: R. Miles Brigadier,
C.R.A. N.Z. Div.
H.Q. N.Z.A.
18 Jun 41.

I'll post up the following report in a couple of days.

Regards

Tom

[Attrition]

Thanks Tom.

[Urmel]

It is astonishing that the Brigadier R.A. appears to be willfully misreading reports from the field, in defense of the 2-pdr for reasons that are unclear to me.

[Tom from Cornwall]

These are reports from Greece, so not sure I follow this remark:

It is astonishing that the Brigadier R.A. appears to be willfully misreading reports from the field, in defense of the 2-pdr for reasons that are unclear to me.

He was quoting from the following report which is also in WO201/2655:

3A
SECRET
Subject: Report on Operations in Greece.

HQ. 2 Sp. Gp.

Herewith for information a copy of a report on operations in Greece submitted by this Unit to GHQ, Middle East.

[sgd: ??]
Lieutenant.
A/Adjutant.
Northumberland Hussars.
Camp 37.
20th May 1941.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Report on Operations in Greece.

GENERAL.
[…]

The prime A.Tk. lesson of the campaign was the tremendous value of a mobile reserve on wheels which could fire from the portee.

[…]

5. TARGETS ENGAGED.
Light and medium Tanks and Armd. Troop Carriers.

The gun was most effective against the medium tanks and gave the men great confidence in their weapon. Tanks were knocked out at ranges from 150 – 900 yds. If a gun stops a tank it is a good think to put 4 or 5 more rounds into it quick before the crew can get out. Had H.E. been available considerable effect might have been obtained at SOTER against Germans in the AMYNTAION STATION buildings (1500 yds away), and debussing behind them. It is suggested too that H.E. is more effective than solid shot against the troop carriers; too often the whole crew debusses apparently unharmed after their carrier is stopped.

At THERMOPYLAE guns were sited to deal with boats landing. A machine gun was engaged and silenced at about 1000 yds.

The use of the 2 pdr. for close support might well be investigated and exploited. So far as I am aware, except for its use against pill-boxes in France, this has not been much considered. I am convinced that with a few H.E. shell it could be most valuable.

Interesting remarks about A/Tk guns in support role - I have seen reports from later campaigns that refer to this happening but not sure how organised this was in terms of training / doctrine / equipment, etc.

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

Thanks, misread that. Also interesting that they ask for H.E., and thought Portees were the bee's knees.

[Attrition]

Portees are surprisingly popular in Syria these days too.