State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Hi all,
I'm looking to get an idea of the manpower strength and tank/equipment strength of the British and Canadian units after Operation Goodwood and before subsequent Operations Express, Spring, Bluecoat, and Totalize.
The losses after Goodwood are well recorded (at least tank losses, I haven't looked at how well the infantry casualties were recorded). Following Goodwood, however, how well were the forces involved replenished, if at all? For that matter, what was the state of all the British and Canadian Armour and Infantry Brigades and Divisions at the end of July?
The British Armoured Divisions would take part in Operation Bluecoat 10 days after Goodwood. I'm sure many replacement tanks and men were provided but does anyone have exact or rough figures? My reading so far of Operation Bluecoat doesn't indicate the relative strength of the units involved. Even the 3rd and 51st would subsequently take part in following operations and I don't know if the manpower crunch was preventing units from being full strength.
Compare this to the Americans at the time of Operation Cobra. Per Blumenson in Breakout and Pursuit, the Americans look to have brought their divisions up near to full strength. This was helped by the lull period before launching the attack.
I have a number of books on Normandy, including the books from Buckley and Daglish, but I have not found the information in them.
Thanks.
I'm looking to get an idea of the manpower strength and tank/equipment strength of the British and Canadian units after Operation Goodwood and before subsequent Operations Express, Spring, Bluecoat, and Totalize.
The losses after Goodwood are well recorded (at least tank losses, I haven't looked at how well the infantry casualties were recorded). Following Goodwood, however, how well were the forces involved replenished, if at all? For that matter, what was the state of all the British and Canadian Armour and Infantry Brigades and Divisions at the end of July?
The British Armoured Divisions would take part in Operation Bluecoat 10 days after Goodwood. I'm sure many replacement tanks and men were provided but does anyone have exact or rough figures? My reading so far of Operation Bluecoat doesn't indicate the relative strength of the units involved. Even the 3rd and 51st would subsequently take part in following operations and I don't know if the manpower crunch was preventing units from being full strength.
Compare this to the Americans at the time of Operation Cobra. Per Blumenson in Breakout and Pursuit, the Americans look to have brought their divisions up near to full strength. This was helped by the lull period before launching the attack.
I have a number of books on Normandy, including the books from Buckley and Daglish, but I have not found the information in them.
Thanks.
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Hello,
I'm out at the moment so working from memory but iirc 11th Armoured Division which led the Goodwood attack and therefore had the largest losses was all but full strength 8 days later ready to move into position for Bluecoat. I'll check this wjth my sources later but think this is correct.
Mark.
I'm out at the moment so working from memory but iirc 11th Armoured Division which led the Goodwood attack and therefore had the largest losses was all but full strength 8 days later ready to move into position for Bluecoat. I'll check this wjth my sources later but think this is correct.
Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
You will find it easier to obtain details of tank states./ There are several threads on AFV losses in Op Goodwood, but in summary armoured units were brought up to strength in AFVs and replacement crews in a matter of days. The British kept a large reserve of AFVsDunnigan wrote:Hi all,
I'm looking to get an idea of the manpower strength and tank/equipment strength of the British and Canadian units after Operation Goodwood and before subsequent Operations Express, Spring, Bluecoat, and Totalize.
The losses after Goodwood are well recorded (at least tank losses, I haven't looked at how well the infantry casualties were recorded). Following Goodwood, however, how well were the forces involved replenished, if at all? For that matter, what was the state of all the British and Canadian Armour and Infantry Brigades and Divisions at the end of July?
The British Armoured Divisions would take part in Operation Bluecoat 10 days after Goodwood. I'm sure many replacement tanks and men were provided but does anyone have exact or rough figures? My reading so far of Operation Bluecoat doesn't indicate the relative strength of the units involved. Even the 3rd and 51st would subsequently take part in following operations and I don't know if the manpower crunch was preventing units from being full strength.
Compare this to the Americans at the time of Operation Cobra. Per Blumenson in Breakout and Pursuit, the Americans look to have brought their divisions up near to full strength. This was helped by the lull period before launching the attack.
I have a number of books on Normandy, including the books from Buckley and Daglish, but I have not found the information in them.
Thanks.
viewtopic.php?p=1659904#p1659904
Infantry strengths are a much harder topic to address. The aggregate numbers of infantry replacements are only part of the story. If you are looking at fighting strengths you need the number of men in the rifle companies. There is probably an MA or PhD for someone who goes through the strength returns for each of the infantry battalions and makes some sense of the matter.
By the end of July the British infantry were well under strength in their rifle companies.
In early August 129(?) brigade went into the attack with three battalions with a combined strength of less than one battalion.
On Op Bluecoat the 3rd Infantry Division seems to have rested 2nd Lincolns which had taken over 100 casualties in Op Goodwood.
There is an OR report on casualties in Goodwood itself. This was not the only operation mounted in July 1944 as Op Greenline, Pomegranate, Jupiter, Maori, Charnwood and Windsor were all mounted that month.
The Op Goodwood CAB study does have an appendix on casualties.
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
I can't give exact figures, but both the Guards and 7th armored divisions were slated for the exploitation phase of Op Spring, which was only 5 days after Goodwood, so they must have been brought up to near full strength rather quickly.Dunnigan wrote:The British Armoured Divisions would take part in Operation Bluecoat 10 days after Goodwood. I'm sure many replacement tanks and men were provided but does anyone have exact or rough figures? My reading so far of Operation Bluecoat doesn't indicate the relative strength of the units involved.
In his book 'No Holding Back' Brian Reid describes how the replacement shortages forced the 51st H div to reorganize its infantry battalions. One went with a 3-company arrangement while another kept it's 4 companies intact but reduced the squads from 10 men to 7.Even the 3rd and 51st would subsequently take part in following operations and I don't know if the manpower crunch was preventing units from being full strength.
Note that a month later 21st AG felt it necessary to disband the 59th ID in order to provide replacements, so the crunch was widespread.
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Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Not precisely true, but I am unsure how closely Blumenson looked at the issues.Dunnigan wrote:Compare this to the Americans at the time of Operation Cobra. Per Blumenson in Breakout and Pursuit, the Americans look to have brought their divisions up near to full strength. This was helped by the lull period before launching the attack.
As of 2400, 24 July, the 1st ID was slightly overstrength, reporting 15,668 effectives. The 4th ID reported 14,700 and was slightly understrength. the 9th ID was in bad shape, with just 13,437 effectives and had absorbed over 2,000 casualties in the previous ten days. The 30th ID, with 13,906 effectives was in between, but had suffered 80 reported casualties in the short bombing that day. It too had received a significant number of replacements. The 2d AD reported 15,909 and the 3d AD 14,700, meaning the first was overstrength and the later understrength.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
The state of formations isn't simply about the number of men on strength. The quality of commanders matters. It also takes a while for them to know and get the best from their commands.
A big influx of replacements will need some time to be be integrated with their unit before they can be effective. IIRC one of the most dangerous jobs in WW2 in the US Army was to be an infantry replacement - the FNG. Replacements who joined in combat were particularly vulnerable.
If units need to implementing tactical changes, it helps to have time out of the line to train. The 1st US Division took advantage of its static role near Caumont to perfect its hedgerow tactics, as did 29 Division. There was little time between Operations Goodwood, Spring and Bluecoat.
The re-organisation of the Guards Armoured Division into four combined arms battlegroups for Op Bluecoat seems to have been made without much prior preparation with the initial groupings were based on proximity on the line to march.
A big influx of replacements will need some time to be be integrated with their unit before they can be effective. IIRC one of the most dangerous jobs in WW2 in the US Army was to be an infantry replacement - the FNG. Replacements who joined in combat were particularly vulnerable.
If units need to implementing tactical changes, it helps to have time out of the line to train. The 1st US Division took advantage of its static role near Caumont to perfect its hedgerow tactics, as did 29 Division. There was little time between Operations Goodwood, Spring and Bluecoat.
The re-organisation of the Guards Armoured Division into four combined arms battlegroups for Op Bluecoat seems to have been made without much prior preparation with the initial groupings were based on proximity on the line to march.
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Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Granny.Sheldrake wrote:The state of formations isn't simply about the number of men on strength. The quality of commanders matters. It also takes a while for them to know and get the best from their commands.
Egg.
Suck.
I rather suspect it was the most dangerous job in any army. That is why I mentioned the status of replacements in the 9th ID. BTW, after checking I realized the source I used, Carafano's After D-Day, understated the situation. The 9th ID absorbed 3,358 replacements in the 10 days prior to 25 July! that was to make up for the 3,079 battle casualties and 915 DNBI suffered since 10 July.A big influx of replacements will need some time to be be integrated with their unit before they can be effective. IIRC one of the most dangerous jobs in WW2 in the US Army was to be an infantry replacement - the FNG. Replacements who joined in combat were particularly vulnerable.
The 1st ID was pretty much a unique case. After suffering heavily on D-Day, it received an influx of replacements and RTD. By the end of June, it reported 2,093 battle and 1,135 non-battle losses versus 2,252 replacements and 444 RTD. However, it kept in action, getting nickled and dimed to the tune of an average 14.7 battle and 37.8 non-battle casualties per day in the first 14 days of July before it was finally pulled out of the line in preparation for COBRA. To 24 July it only received 22 replacements, but 604 RTD. So yes, in good shape and it did do quite a bit of training to deal with the hedgerows.If units need to implementing tactical changes, it helps to have time out of the line to train. The 1st US Division took advantage of its static role near Caumont to perfect its hedgerow tactics, as did 29 Division. There was little time between Operations Goodwood, Spring and Bluecoat.
However, the 29th ID did not have time to train. It was continuously engaged until 20 July in the St. Lo battle, suffering 3,201 battle casualties there from 11 to 20 July. From 1-20 July it received 4,021 replacements and unlike the 1st ID they did not record their RTD. They then were on the line, but only mildly engaged, averaging just 5.25 battle casualties per day until the 25th. What they benefited from was Gerhardt's "battle school", which he set up with convalescents returning to duty, with the mission of giving replacements a taste of reality before assigning them to a divisional unit.
Getting back to the British and Canadian's though...
7 AD effective strength reported as of 0600 was 15,183 on 18 July, 15,307 on 19 July, 15,657 on 20 July, 15,338 on 21 July, 15,260 on 22 July, 15,532 on 23 July, 15,482 on 24 July, 15,467 on 25 July, 15,431 on 26 July, 15,371 on 27 July, and 15,189 on 28 July. 11 AD for the same dates was:
14,389
14,451
14,484
14,536
14,264
14,283
14,242
13,837
13,841
13,893
13,921
Guards AD was:
15,609
15,295
16,169
15,063
15,036
13,700
14,511
14,580
14,366
14,494
14,529
But I only have those because VIII Corps reported effectives in each division for that period - no one else did. However, somewhere I do have the 21 AG reports for "average battalion strength" by division, which was considered more important for obvious reasons. I should have some for the Canadians.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Yes, you are absolutely correct, state of formations isn't just number of men and I should have been a bit more precise. At the basic level, I am looking for combat infantry manpower and AFV strength per battalion. A relative percentage helps give me an idea (90% of battalion full strength, 75%, 60%, etc.), yet as I suspect, this would still be hard to come by. The Goodwood CAB study you posted is excellent, and one would just need to guess how many replacements each battalion would receive before Bluecoat.Sheldrake wrote:The state of formations isn't simply about the number of men on strength. The quality of commanders matters. It also takes a while for them to know and get the best from their commands.
A big influx of replacements will need some time to be be integrated with their unit before they can be effective. IIRC one of the most dangerous jobs in WW2 in the US Army was to be an infantry replacement - the FNG. Replacements who joined in combat were particularly vulnerable.
If units need to implementing tactical changes, it helps to have time out of the line to train. The 1st US Division took advantage of its static role near Caumont to perfect its hedgerow tactics, as did 29 Division. There was little time between Operations Goodwood, Spring and Bluecoat.
The re-organisation of the Guards Armoured Division into four combined arms battlegroups for Op Bluecoat seems to have been made without much prior preparation with the initial groupings were based on proximity on the line to march.
Normandy Crucible and a few other sources do have good numbers on available replacements with respect to casualties suffered but these are overall numbers.
Patrick Delaforce seems to have the monopoly on British division histories and gleaning of his books indicate that virtually all infantry battalions were understrength yet received some replacements but never enough to be full strength again. From the 56th Infantry Brigade history, they were assigned to the 59th Division on August 5th giving the 176th Brigade a rest. This seems to show the attrition of the 59th that eventually led it to be disbanded at the end of the month. Likewise the disbandment of the 70th Brigade from the 49th Division would also indicate that this brigade was severely understrength.
Now, I was taking American divisional manpower (battalion combat fighting strength) for granted given Blumenson's comment. While I'm sure his statement wasn't universally true for all the American formations prior to Cobra, I can see that for much of the VII Corps and possibly V Corps. VIII Corps, particularly the 83rd and 90th, seems to have suffered losses right prior to Cobra in preparation for the breakout. Likewise, there is a mention that the 8th Infantry Division's Rifle Companies averaged between 90-100 men before Cobra. XIX Corps, specifically the 29th Division and then the 35th Division, lost a large number of men taking St. Lo. It looks like they did receive replacements before Cobra but I don't believe the former was on the frontline on July 24-25.
Thanks for the responses so far. This has been helpful.
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Thanks Richard. Where are these figures from and is it possible to list the other American Division strengths?Richard Anderson wrote:Not precisely true, but I am unsure how closely Blumenson looked at the issues.Dunnigan wrote:Compare this to the Americans at the time of Operation Cobra. Per Blumenson in Breakout and Pursuit, the Americans look to have brought their divisions up near to full strength. This was helped by the lull period before launching the attack.
As of 2400, 24 July, the 1st ID was slightly overstrength, reporting 15,668 effectives. The 4th ID reported 14,700 and was slightly understrength. the 9th ID was in bad shape, with just 13,437 effectives and had absorbed over 2,000 casualties in the previous ten days. The 30th ID, with 13,906 effectives was in between, but had suffered 80 reported casualties in the short bombing that day. It too had received a significant number of replacements. The 2d AD reported 15,909 and the 3d AD 14,700, meaning the first was overstrength and the later understrength.
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Likewise, any chance of providing the average battalion strength for the British and Canadians if you can find it?Richard Anderson wrote:
But I only have those because VIII Corps reported effectives in each division for that period - no one else did. However, somewhere I do have the 21 AG reports for "average battalion strength" by division, which was considered more important for obvious reasons. I should have some for the Canadians.
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Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
FUSA G-1 Periodic Reports.Dunnigan wrote:Thanks Richard. Where are these figures from and is it possible to list the other American Division strengths?
What other divisions are you interested in?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
I'll see what I can dig out. May take a day or so.Dunnigan wrote:Likewise, any chance of providing the average battalion strength for the British and Canadians if you can find it?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Unfortunately I'd be interested in all US Divisions in France from 24 July to 31 August.Richard Anderson wrote:FUSA G-1 Periodic Reports.Dunnigan wrote:Thanks Richard. Where are these figures from and is it possible to list the other American Division strengths?
What other divisions are you interested in?
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Re: State of British and Canadian forces after Goodwood
Send me a PM.Dunnigan wrote:Unfortunately I'd be interested in all US Divisions in France from 24 July to 31 August.Richard Anderson wrote:FUSA G-1 Periodic Reports.Dunnigan wrote:Thanks Richard. Where are these figures from and is it possible to list the other American Division strengths?
What other divisions are you interested in?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell