Great-Britain pushed Finland to cooperation with Germany

[John T]

And thus you fail in your analysis, as you ignore the context.
You simply have to look at both sides options to make sense of it.

Something relevant missing? Please tell. That's why I opened this thread.

You lack Context, you have to at least tell your audience that the British factor in Finnish decisions where much weaker than Soviet or German.

I just can´t see Britain as a major player for Finland and what alternatives had Britain?

You ignore Finnish German war trade agreement.

Personaly I´ve been looking on the Finnish plans from the twenties regarding external support in case of a war with USSR.
(Poland/Sweden/League of Nations) and I see that Germany after the fall of France, fitted the bill perfect.
Simply the only country who actually could guarantee Finlands sovereignity in case of a Sovet attack.

According to Vehviläinen's "Finland in the second world war, between Germany and Russia"
Seems like you missed something..

Germany had refused to start trade negotiations with Finland during Winter War and after it relations between Finland and Germany were on lower level than before the war. Vehviläinen tells about trials to get normal trade working, not military or political connections.

You seriously consider a war trade agreement not to be a political contact?
or explain how you interpret the text:

In the beginning of summer 1940 Germany didn't even allow Finns to get those weapons, which Finland had bought during Winter War or instantly after it, but were in Norwegian harbors when the country was occupied. Veltjens's visit was the first time after Winter War when Germany was willing to sell weapons to Finns.

So according to you conclusion, a Finnish-German trade agreement does not fall within political contacs?
While you claim that Britains trade regulations was the reason Finland aligned her to Germany?

[Seppo Koivisto]

Previous passages of the book:

Page1.jpg (107.25 KiB) Viewed 1396 times

Page2.jpg (165.58 KiB) Viewed 1396 times

https://books.google.de/books?id=3L-JDA ... &q&f=false

[StrangerHereMyself]

Extraordinarily insular and entitled attitude of Finnish President Ryti, expecting the world’s help irrespective of his nation’s behaviour (courtesy of USG’s Office of the Historian):

740.0011 European War 1939/32782: Telegram
The Chargé in Finland ( McClintock ) to the Secretary of State
Helsinki , January 20, 1944—6 p.m.
…
I was struck by basic fact there had been practically no change in President’s estimate of Finland’s situation in year between my interview of January 21, 1943 (see my 116 that day) and today. The President still insisted that Finland was fighting a separate war and its only enemy was Russia, that his policy had been right all the time and that Finland would continue to “wait and see”.
…
I said that … in American eyes, Finland had made a disastrous decision in choosing to cooperate with the Nazis. I asked why the Finnish people seemed universally to fear “unconditional surrender” if they were not a satellite state of Germany and not a Nazi power.
…
President … in recalling events of two wars said many great powers had sought to help Finland: British, French, and “whether we (the Finns) wish it or not”, the Germans. At this point he added that German help had been very welcome and that without it “Finland would not today exist as a nation”. He then said only great power which had not yet been called upon to help Finland was America and that he hoped day would come when U. S. might intercede in Finland’s behalf. I said that as President well knew from record there was nothing in history of 2½ years of our diplomacy with Finland which could lead him to expect such intercession.

Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III, eds. E. Ralph Perkins, S. Everett Gleason, John G. Reid, John P. Glennon, N.O. Sappington, William Slany, Velma Hastings Cassidy and Warren H. Reynolds (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), Document 502. https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 44v03/d502

[antwony]

Extraordinarily insular and entitled attitude of Finnish President Ryti, expecting the world’s help irrespective of his nation’s behaviour (courtesy of USG’s Office of the Historian)

Still cluttering up the thread with your irrelevance, ignorance and hate?

Thread's not about America, who didn't declare on the USA, BTW.

That "entitled" Ryti, being upset about the ceasefire agreement with the Soviet Union that required Finland to pay the USSR more reparations than's Finalnd's pre war GDP. It's almost like the USSR wanted Finland to default. A bit like when Lenin agreed to Finland's independence while arming Finnish communists and helped plan their (thankfully unsuccessful) revolution.

Why's your profile's signature: На Берлин! BTW?

antwony, Britain, although not viewing the Bolsheviks with great favour (warring against them up to 1919),

1919... read some more British history На Хельсинки!

had just as unfavourable a view of the expansionist aims of Finland (and Poland as well*), to the point of British units fighting against White Finns.

When it became clear that the White [Finnish] forces were certain to win the [Finnish civil] war, a fear arose within the Foreign Office that these forces would lay claim to territories belonging to Russia, such as Karelia and Murmansk. The British naval units based at Murmansk were ordered to take action against the White Finns and fight alongside the remnants of the defeated communists. The Foreign Office had little reason for feeling generous towards the Soviet government which had left the war against Germany. It was in fact the fear of German expansion in the Northern region and the effect this might have on the broader European conflict which conditioned the British response. Ideology was not a consideration.

(Gerrard, abstract)

Your Gerrard is an idiot. Ideology was most certainly a consideration. But, yes, White Finland was very pro German, uptil Nov. 1918, when they allied to France and the UK to oppose the USSR.

На Хельсинки!

Finland formally concluded peace with Germany in March 1918, ratifying the treaty in June:

You moron... I'm not even going to touch that steaming pile of dumb. Explain the context of that before trying to claim such stupidity. На Хельсинки!

The pro-German atmosphere in Finland was intertwined with the prospect of at least annexation of East Karelia to Finland. The government of White Finland was openly expansionistic and reckoned to get their aims either as a diplomatic solution, in which Germany would safeguard the creation of Greater Finland, or a military solution, whereby Finns, hopefully with the assistance of the Germans, would incorporate the regions. … For the British, the Finns were nothing but German underlings, who had to be pushed back to Finland.

(Roselius, 135–6)

Summer 1918, Roselius was completely right. Did you want to explain the context?

1919, RAF/ RN were based in Finland and the British Army was in Karelia, fighting Communists.

На Хельсинки!

antwony, with respect to Eastern Karelian ethnicity, you would be better taking up your dispute directly with Ville Kivimäki as I simply used his description (his email is in the book):

Finnish Karelia must be separated from “Eastern Karelia” or “Soviet Karelia,” which has never been part of Finland and the Karelian population of which, unlike the Finnish Karelians, is an ethnic Finnic people of its own.

(Kivimäki, passim, 1).
I don’t really care about Finnish ethnicities

Then why were you mentioning ethnicity? Similarly irrelevant and incorrect to the rest of your "points".

Can't be bothered trying to work out the correct context for this "paste- a- quote" of yours. Kivimäki was probably talking about population transfers during the Protestant Revolution which resulted in large areas of eastern Sweden being resettled by people from western Finland. На Хельсинки!

—I mainly object to my country being blamed for other countries’ actions.

Seriously, of all the anti British stupidity here you object to someone who, vaguely, has a point? На Хельсинки!

Far as I’m concerned, Finland is Russian clay… or Swedish—they should toss a coin for the place (loser is stuck with it).

Does that make you feel like a man? That's put big bad Finland in its place, champ.

When I first read your posts, I just thought you were misinformed about an obscure topic. But no, you're a troll.

Enjoy my reply and try to learn something, rölli, this will be my last reply to you. На Хельсинки!

More relevant than ethnic quarrels is how tenaciously the Eastern Karelians fought against the Finns in 1918, ‘almost annihilating the White Finns along the White Karelia waterway’ (Roselius, 136), suggesting that East Karelians were not overly keen on becoming part of any Suomen valtakunta.

Context, again, plus you're ignorance (again). The Aunus Expedition was initially opposed be Finnish Communist refugees who had, to some extent, also recruited locals. They did not fight tenanciously, they retreated. Later reinforcements of ethnic Finnish Communists and other Leningrad Reds "almost" annihilated that expedition.

What was the UK doing at the time? На Хельсинки!

In what sense, antwony, is it ‘questionable’ that Finland had ‘more than one opportunity’ to avoid conflict with Britain? Did we send in the tanks and the Lancs without prior declaration of war? Or did we send Finland first a warning, then an ultimatum (followed by a personal letter from our PM offering one of the most painless exits from a war ever), and only declared war in response to their rejection of our terms?

Read you claim I was objecting to again. You're even out of context in regards to material you've produced. Does this second claim of yours = (the Finnish equivalent of) screaming banzai.

Churchill might have considered himself an officer and and an anti- Communist, but Mannerheim was the real deal. Corresponding with a foreign politician would have been career suicide, and probably illegal, for Mannerheim. На Хельсинки!

There’s a bit more to the 1918–19 episode, antwony:

Don't try and teach me about the Civil War. I'm qualified to teach history in Finland. На Хельсинки!

Great Britain warned Finland, up to the threat of its declaration of war on Finland, from entering into Eastern Karelia. Great Britain’s warnings and its presence in Viena Karelia (and in the region north of it) supporting and organizing East-Karelians to fight the Finns (Finland was regarded as an ally of Germany) restrained the Finns from proceeding to larger interventions …

(Hannikainen, passim, 34)

Context На Хельсинки!

antwony, my reference to 1921 was to the Karelian uprising against Soviet rule, of which the Repola vote for secession was but one component, which some irredentist Finns tried to exploit (Roselius, 148)—Russia’s difficulty is Finland’s opportunity, as they might have said. That episode finished with the Finns showing their solidarity with Eastern Karelians by returning Repola and Porajärvi—again—to the Soviets in exchange for some Russian land.

No, your intial claim about Finland invading was a complete lie. You're attempts to cover your mendaciousness, along from an out context Roselius quote don't even make any sense. На Хельсинки!

‘Greater Finland’ had its adherents. Note Mannerheim’s Order of the Day of July 10, 1941 (the ‘Scabbard Order’):

In the War of Liberation in 1918...

(Reproduced in Fingerroos, 489.)

Mannerheim sabotaged Greater Finland in 1918, he's not the best person to be quoting. It's rather questionable whether he was any kind of Finn in 1918 anyway. На Хельсинки!

The US State Dept.’s

irrelevant as the US didn't declare war on Finland. На Хельсинки!

More interesting material from USG’s

irrelevant as the US didn't declare war on Finland.На Хельсинки!

same goal of ‘Suur-Suomi’ pursued from the moment Finland’s independence was unilaterally declared in the wake of the collapse of Tsarist Russia.

Jesus wept...

This isn't the best thread, but your crayoning all over it just cheapens the site. Keep schtum

На Хельсинки!

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

My focus is in Britain's Finland policy, which has been in shadows. This part of the history has usually been passed over as well as Finland's willingness to join anti-German embargo (different matter than blockade) after Winter War. Mostly historians are looking Finland-Germany relations only like H.P.Kirby did.

Trade is often used as a political weapon, but normal trade does not mean political or military cooperation. Germany had refused from trade negotiations with Finland in December 1939, but was willing to talk with Finns in February 1940 in Stockholm. Changing coal with the plywood as before the war is only trade; in this case Germany had to to take as a fact that Finland would survive. That's clearly policy - or an act of war - when you limit other country's right to have trade with a third party. In this case Finland's right to buy oil products from USA.

MEW's minister Dalton said in the end of July that Finland should be forced to get oil products from Germany. That was he's goal and tRoyal Navy took care the rest. Great-Britain was active against Finland also in Moscow, where ambassador Stafford Cripps made at least once a proposal to Soviet Union to have aggressive policy towards Finland.

Finland had bought anti-aircraft guns from Germany in the end of 1939, but when the Winter War broke out, Germany cut off arms deliveries. There was almost one year a gap with arms trade. This changed after Veltjens visit which was 17.8.1940. Great-Britain's anti-Finnish policy started during that period.

Great-Britain's policy alone was strong enough to make Finland to build contacts with Germany.

[reedwh52]

Just some context.

As of April 10, 1940 Finland's trade into the Baltic was subject to German control.

By May 24, the Allies were withdrawing from Norway. By June 10, there were no Allied forces on the European continent. Petsamo was the only external port not directly subject to German Control (by under 10 miles) and subject to direct Soviet control (Rybachy Peninsula).

Since the Germans and the Soviets effectively controlled Finland's trade routes, Finland had the unpalatable choice of the Germans or the Russians.

Britain (and France) "pushed" Finland into the German camp by losing the Norwegian Campaign followed by the fall of France.

This is noted in the source quoted above as page2.jpg: "With the fall of France and the withdrawal of the British from the Continent, a Western Orientation ceased to be an option in the Finnish foreign policy. If it wished to ensure it's security and foreign trade, Finland's only remaining alternative was to turn to Germany."

[John T]

Extraordinarily insular and entitled attitude of Finnish President Ryti, expecting the world’s help irrespective of his nation’s behaviour (courtesy of USG’s Office of the Historian):

740.0011 European War 1939/32782: Telegram
The Chargé in Finland ( McClintock ) to the Secretary of State
Helsinki , January 20, 1944—6 p.m.
…
I was struck by basic fact there had been practically no change in President’s estimate of Finland’s situation in year between my interview of January 21, 1943 (see my 116 that day) and today. The President still insisted that Finland was fighting a separate war and its only enemy was Russia, that his policy had been right all the time and that Finland would continue to “wait and see”.
…
I said that … in American eyes, Finland had made a disastrous decision in choosing to cooperate with the Nazis. I asked why the Finnish people seemed universally to fear “unconditional surrender” if they were not a satellite state of Germany and not a Nazi power.
…
President … in recalling events of two wars said many great powers had sought to help Finland: British, French, and “whether we (the Finns) wish it or not”, the Germans. At this point he added that German help had been very welcome and that without it “Finland would not today exist as a nation”. He then said only great power which had not yet been called upon to help Finland was America and that he hoped day would come when U. S. might intercede in Finland’s behalf. I said that as President well knew from record there was nothing in history of 2½ years of our diplomacy with Finland which could lead him to expect such intercession.

Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III, eds. E. Ralph Perkins, S. Everett Gleason, John G. Reid, John P. Glennon, N.O. Sappington, William Slany, Velma Hastings Cassidy and Warren H. Reynolds (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), Document 502. https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 44v03/d502

Yes you might call it insular, or obsessed with only one threat, that of USSR.
In Finnish defence planning already from the twenties, the need to get a strong partner to balance Soviet was a prerequiste for a independent Finland.

So you might not share finnish goverments conclusions and find it strange, Ignoring the big picture and ally herself with Germany in 1940 but
the finns military made similar "strange" decisions to stop their attack into Soviet territory during 1942.

They where silly enough to think they could only defend their homesteads.

To get US support at the end of the war was completely logical from their point of view.
And as history tells, it did work on one way or another, as Finnland kept her independence.


Cheers
/John

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

Britain (and France) "pushed" Finland into the German camp by losing the Norwegian Campaign followed by the fall of France.

This had important role in history and you can call that as passive pushing. Now I'm looking for active pushing.

- -

Two different things:
- Finland's policy
- Great-Britain's (active) policy

The last one is the one I'm analysing.

"The smoking gun" in this piece of history is minister Hugh Dalton's words 30.7.1940 and ambassador Vereker's message 9.10.1940 is a confirmation which tells that Dalton's policy was successful.

Anything which might invalidate those two?

[John T]

Britain (and France) "pushed" Finland into the German camp by losing the Norwegian Campaign followed by the fall of France.

This had important role in history and you can call that as passive pushing. Now I'm looking for active pushing.

- -

Two different things:
- Finland's policy
- Great-Britain's (active) policy

The last one is the one I'm analysing.

I would not call it analysis if you don't look at the issue from both sides.
You have an idea and anything that does not suits that idea are keept out of your "analysis".

I simply can't grasp how you claim to analyse a relation while ignoring one part.

"The smoking gun" in this piece of history is minister Hugh Dalton's words 30.7.1940 and ambassador Vereker's message 9.10.1940 is a confirmation which tells that Dalton's policy was successful.

Anything which might invalidate those two?

Do you have the full text of Dalton's speach 30.7.1940 ?
When Sweden negotiated transatlantic trade wiht Britain during 1940 Daltons speach where used as a basis for the negotiations.
As Dalton speach contained a passage that Britain shold not blockade the neutrals, but rather assist the neutrals to obtain goods.


Petsamo traffic was some 500 000 tons of goods,
Included 200 75mm guns with 209 000 rounds and 32 203mm guns from USA to Finland.
The last Swedish arms shipment from US left New York for Petsamo in November 1940.
Petsamo traffic continued into spring 1941.

Cheers
/John

[StrangerHereMyself]

antwony: ‘Still cluttering up the thread with your irrelevance, ignorance and hate?’
Usual SJW tactic: no facts just insults; and so I stopped reading your diatribe after this whinny nonsense.

Further background to the Finnish imperialist goal of Suur-Suomi.

In the disarray following the Bolshevik revolution and Finland’s unilateral declaration of independence, the inhabitants of the Åland archipelago, the majority of whom considered themselves Swedish and spoke Swedish as their primary or only language, presumed that they too had the right of self-determination.

Finland was eager to win recognition from European States of its sovereignty over Aland. However, the population of Åland was nearly unanimously for Aland’s annexation with Sweden, which the Ålanders regarded as “the motherland”.

A dispute arose between Sweden and the newly independent Finland over the status of the Åland Islands. Sweden called upon Finland to recognise—in respect of the principle of self-determination—the right of the Ålanders themselves to determine their future status. Finland demanded in forceful terms the recognition of its sovereignty over Åland. The two States agreed to submit their dispute to the Council of the League of Nations—ultimately for the Council’s binding decision …

The League Council’s Decision (Resolution), adopted on 24 June 1921, was favourable to Finland. The Council, being aware of Finland’s de facto sovereignty over Åland and Finland’s firm behaviour in the dispute, recognised Finland’s de jure sovereignty over Åland over the protests of Sweden and Åland.

(Hannikainen, 1997, p.57. Italics in original; bold added.)

On January 8, 1918, a delegation from the archipelago had met the Swedish King Gustaf V, armed with the results of a referendum in which 95% desired to be restored to Swedish rule. With Finland in the chaos of its civil war, Sweden despatched troops to Åland on February 13 (Ålandsexpeditionen); the Finnish Whites responded by marching across the ice and seeking the help of its German ally, who sent troops on March 5, causing the Swedes to recall their own. In a second referendum in June 1919, 9,735 out of 10,196 voters on a 96.4% turnout opted for reunification with Sweden. But in pursuit of Suur-Suomi, the Finns refused the Ålanders’ right to the self-determination that they claimed for themselves; and after the Åland Question (Ålandsfrågan) was referred to the newly formed League of Nations to arbitrate, it set its course to eventual failure by bowing before Finnish aggression.

Such Britons with any knowledge of Finland tend to be aware of them only as plucky little Finland battling the Reds in 1940, averting their eyes from the Finns’ later allying with Nazi Germany. However, the more one reads, the more one realises that there was nothing unnatural about that alliance—they were spiritual kin, each pursuing territorial aggrandisement at their neighbours’ expense.

Major references:
Hannikainen, Lauri. “The International Legal Basis of the Autonomy and Swedish Character of the Åland Islands.” Autonomy and Demilitarisation in International Law: The Åland Islands in a Changing Europe, edited by Lauri Hannikainen and Frank Horn, Kluwer Law International, 1997, pp. 57–68.
Lindqvist, Herman. “Då höll Åland på att bli en del av Sverige.” Aftonbladet, 29 mars 2014, n.p. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/kolu ... 8629551.ab

[John T]

antwony: ‘Still cluttering up the thread with your irrelevance, ignorance and hate?’
Usual SJW tactic: no facts just insults; and so I stopped reading your diatribe after this whinny nonsense.

Further background to the Finnish imperialist goal of Suur-Suomi.
....

And in what degree does Åland 1918 help us to understand the British - Finnish relations in 1940?

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

H.P.Kirby made a valuable work even if there are many holes - like Great-Britain's policy which was totally ignored. – What Finland did, is well known. Great-Britain's policy not.

Finland's import & export in the end of 1930's was some 11 MIO tn/year, Petsamo traffic was only some 5% of this and part of it was Sweden's trade.

Dalton's speech was only one matter in the long row. Great-Britain's "body language":
- trade with Finland was cut of first time when the WW2 broke out September 1939
- trade with whole Northern-Europe was cut off April 1940
- navicert policy since June 1940
- oil product limits 16.7.1940 (only one oil tanker was allowed)
- House of Common 30.7.1940: After Dalton there was no reason to treat Finland differently than other neutral countries. So it should be pressed to purchase it's gasoline from from continent from German storages.
- more limits to oil trade August 1940
- after 3.10.1940 Finland didn't got navicert's at all
- 3.11.1940 navicert trade was allowed but more strict conditions
- January 1941 Finns told to MEW that Finns are buying gasoline from Germany but this didn't change British policy
- February 1941 MEW told to ambassador Gripenberg in London, that limits to US trade would press Finns to buy goods from Germany
- 18.5.1940 British confiscated Finland's only oil tanker Josefina Thorden and after that Finland didn't have any ship to transport oil products

Through out this history ambassador Gordon Vereker in Helsinki send several messages to London in which he criticized FO's policy, like "we force Finns into making a pact with the devil." And same time Great-Britain was provoking Stalin to have aggressive policy towards Finland.

[John T]

H.P.Kirby made a valuable work even if there are many holes - like Great-Britain's policy which was totally ignored. – What Finland did, is well known. Great-Britain's policy not.

Depends on how much you read about British Economic warfare and the neutrals.

If you only read books about Finland you dont learn much about Britain.

Finland's import & export in the end of 1930's was some 11 MIO tn/year, Petsamo traffic was only some 5% of this and part of it was Sweden's trade.

Was it Germany , Great Britain or both who cut Finlands trade?

Dalton's speech was only one matter in the long row. Great-Britain's "body language":

Ok so at first the Dalton speach was important, but you did not knew what it said.


How much oil did Finland import between September 1939 and April 1940 ?
What was Finlands import of oil during 1938 so we knew what was considered normal trade?


And regarding Finlands only tanker, Josefina Thordén was it not Finland who insisted on only allowing Finnish flagged vessels to eneter Petsamo?
(with a few notable exceptions)


Cheers
/John

[Seppo Koivisto]

How much oil did Finland import between September 1939 and April 1940 ?
What was Finlands import of oil during 1938 so we knew what was considered normal trade?
/John

From statistical yearbooks, import of gasoline (thousand tons):
1939: 148
1940: 69
1941: 64
1942: 59
Unfortunately 1938 statistics is less detailed and not comparable, but probably higher.

[Seppo Koivisto]

Calculated total import of oil products (raw oil, distillates, gasoline, kerosene, fuel oil, lubrication oil, vaseline) 1000 tons:
1937: 226
1938: 251
1939: 258
1940: 101
1941: 84
1942: 98