What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

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Don Juan
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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Don Juan » 29 Dec 2018 16:07

Mark - check your PM's!
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 29 Dec 2018 17:53

Don Juan wrote:
29 Dec 2018 16:07
Mark - check your PM's!
Thanks, but I've had WO 165/89 for some time - at least the pages I decided to photograph. :wink:

That particular document from the file is one of the write-ups that shapes my opinion: they recognised an issue existed based upon experience, and then chose to learn lessons that suited their existing attitude rather than winning battles. :roll:

You may like to have a read of this file too.

WO 201/527 - Armoured formations: tactical handling of armed forces

Check your PM. :wink:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 30 Dec 2018 22:18

A couple of brief excerpts from immediate post-Op CRUSADER formation reports showing commentary on the preparedness for combined-arms battle.

The first relates to the armoured division (cruiser tanks) and its supporting field artillery:
A: "If you want to win your battles, you must use your ruddy guns" - Rudyard Kipling
B: "HE at long ranges and AP shot up to the muzzle" - The Prime Minister

A: has been definitely proved and is most gratifying as in 1938/39 guns were considered unnecessary by a former Armd Div Commander in this country. No Armd Bde Commander would today care to embark on any project without them.

B: has definitely been carried out, but HE at long ranges does little damage to AFVs and the enemy has shown too great a respect for the 25-prs in that, if he can spot them, declining to come into really close ranges, except on a very few occasions. The guns of the 5 SA Bde undoubtably shot up to the muzzle.
Brigadier Scott-Cockburn dared to embark without them. More than once. Cost his formation dearly.

The second relates to infantry division and its supporting infantry tanks:
There is nothing new in all the above [MarkNote #1: preceeding long paragraph explaining how all the arms ought to be cooperating]. The only thing that is new is the fact that modern developments in German A/Tk defences have brought us to a stage when we can no longer afford merely to pay lip service to all the principles before the battle and then break them all as soon as the battle starts. The fault lies, of course, not with commanders or with Inf or other arms, but in the fact that they are never given a chance to train with tanks; in the whole period I have commanded this Bde [MarkNote #2: 18 months] I have only once had an opportunity to carry out exercises on the ground with troops.
Over 2 years into the war, the British are still not training their various cap-badges to work as one; each cap-badge trains alone to deliver a sequenced element of a brigade/divisional plan. Commanders pay "lip service" to doctrine and ignore it in practice.

Was it really the size of a gun that meant the British were performing so poorly?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 01 Jan 2019 19:09

OK. Back on 28 December you posted this and introduced the El Duda engangement as 'evidence' to support your various beliefs, claims and position.
Gooner1 wrote:
30 Nov 2018 15:14
MarkN wrote:
28 Nov 2018 19:00
The Germans deliberately lobbed shells from afar to locate any (hidden) A/Tk guns, first neutralised them with field guns or Pz.IV rounds and then advanced. The British ignored any enemy A/Tk guns - if they saw them - and pressed ahead regardless.
Notes from Theatres of War March '42:
"German tactics at El Duda. - in the armoured attack on El Duda, the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery. Then, just before dusk, the tanks moved forward with infantry close behind and overran the centre of the position."

Now why couldn't the British just do the same?
Now we have this...
Gooner1 wrote:
28 Dec 2018 14:28
I'm wondering if Urmel can confirm if this action at El Duda is the one against 1st Essex of 70th Division by 15th Panzer on 29th November?
The suspicious part of me would lead me to believe that you have been practising a fair degree of confirmation bias: using anything that you can find to 'evidence' a preconceived idea rather than analysing the evidence to draw a concluding idea.

Neverthless,
Gooner1 wrote:
28 Dec 2018 14:28
The Essex wouldn't have had the protection of that many anti-tank guns plus the Germans would have had the support of the rather formidable Boettcher Artillery Group.
Have you now managed to do some research on the engagement that you use to 'evidence' your various beliefs, claims and position? Have you started to form an undefrstanding of the events, the context and lessons that could be taken away?

- How many anti-tank guns were actually with the 1st Essex? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- Did the Boettcher KG support 15.Pz-Div in any way? How? When?
- Which 75mm guns did the Germans use to shell the British? Where they KwK37 on Pz.IV? How many of them were used? What results did they achieve? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- What time did the initial bombardment start? When did the main assault go in? Was it just before dusk?
- What forces did the British have for the engagement? Did it consist of any pantsers? Which type(s)? When and how where they engaged? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- Did the British have any supporting artillery? Which type(s)? How many guns? What results did they achieve - if any? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?

Then, having analysed all the above, how would the 3-inch ex. HAA gun reroled into an ATk weapon have helped? How many would you suggest are required to be effective? Where would they have come from? How many would be required in theatre to allow for some to be at El Duda on that day and time?
Gooner1 wrote:
28 Dec 2018 14:28
Happily the German presence at El Duda was a short one. A midnight counter-attack by 11 Matildas and 2/13th Australian retook all the positions that had been lost.
Good lord! How did they manage that without a 3-inch ex. HAA gun!?!

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Jan 2019 14:08

MarkN wrote:
29 Dec 2018 14:59
The German only received pantsers "on a '50-mm armour basis'" in 1942. Thus quite irrelevant to the discussion up to the end of 1941 and Op CRUSADER. When the Germans received their 50mm armoured pantsers, the British were receiving their 6-pdr ATk guns and some 76mm armed pantsers.
Are you being disingenuous or just a bit thick?

"The German Pzkw III used in France in 1940 had no more than 30 mm of armour anywhere. This was of machinable quality, not face-hardened. Before the end of the year reports of an increase in the armour on the front and turrets of German tanks were reaching England. In April 1941 details obtained from tanks captured in the Middle East showed that this increase had been achieved by bolting extra plates in front and rear. In the Pzkw III the extra plates (32 mm thick) on the front of the superstructure projected upwards to protect the turret joint and gave the front of the tank a total thickness of 62 mm. These extra plates were found to be face-hardened to such a degree that they could keep out a 2-pdr A.P. shot at any range except the closest. Unless a shot of this type succeeded in shattering the hardened face it scarcely made any impression on the inner armour.

This method of improving the protection was an interim measure, which could be carried out without seriously affecting the output from the factories. This was Model H. The next new Model, J, differed from Model H in several respects, and the armour was of 50-mm face-hardened plate. None of Model J reached Libya until the very end of 1941.

The extra plates on Model H were not easy to detect, and it is not known how many of the tanks in 'BATTLEAXE' carried them. But the shipping lists show that hardly any German tanks reached Libya between the end of June and 19th December 1941, and as considerable numbers of tanks with extra plates were identified as having taken part in 'CRUSADER' (November- December 1941) it seems that many of them must have come over with 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division or very soon after."

Or is that too much text for you to take in? :D

In short, the early Panzer IIIJ series had the 50mm armour, later production models also had additional plates added.

And, requoting that excellent post by DonJuan that your blinkered vision refuses to deal with:
What is so amazing about the 30 mm RHA side armour of the Panzer III, and the 20mm RHA side armour of the Panzer IV, that allows German tanks to perform such remarkable feats?
Your and DonJuans explanation for the lack of kills on the Panzers even when shooting at their sides being what exactly?

It's not my vision that is blinkered. I accept the facts that the 2-pdr was a poor panzer killer.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Jan 2019 14:13

MarkN wrote:
30 Dec 2018 22:18
Was it really the size of a gun that meant the British were performing so poorly?
One of the factors.

:roll:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Jan 2019 14:30

MarkN wrote:
01 Jan 2019 19:09
OK. Back on 28 December you posted this and introduced the El Duda engangement as 'evidence' to support your various beliefs, claims and position.

Now we have this...
The suspicious part of me would lead me to believe that you have been practising a fair degree of confirmation bias: using anything that you can find to 'evidence' a preconceived idea rather than analysing the evidence to draw a concluding idea.

Neverthless,
Have you now managed to do some research on the engagement that you use to 'evidence' your various beliefs, claims and position? Have you started to form an undefrstanding of the events, the context and lessons that could be taken away?

- How many anti-tank guns were actually with the 1st Essex? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- Did the Boettcher KG support 15.Pz-Div in any way? How? When?
- Which 75mm guns did the Germans use to shell the British? Where they KwK37 on Pz.IV? How many of them were used? What results did they achieve? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- What time did the initial bombardment start? When did the main assault go in? Was it just before dusk?
- What forces did the British have for the engagement? Did it consist of any pantsers? Which type(s)? When and how where they engaged? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- Did the British have any supporting artillery? Which type(s)? How many guns? What results did they achieve - if any? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?

Then, having analysed all the above, how would the 3-inch ex. HAA gun reroled into an ATk weapon have helped? How many would you suggest are required to be effective? Where would they have come from? How many would be required in theatre to allow for some to be at El Duda on that day and time?
Blimey what a barrage of questions! :lol: That is why I addressed the question to Urmel! :lol:
There was a later action at El Duda than the one against the 1st Essex but that was repulsed.

Just to answer the one question the 3-inch HAA guns would have helped by knocking out German tanks far beyond the range at which they "cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr"
Good lord! How did they manage that without a 3-inch ex. HAA gun!?!
It was night. The Germans had lost their bottle.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 02 Jan 2019 21:59

Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:30
MarkN wrote:
01 Jan 2019 19:09
OK. Back on 28 December you posted this and introduced the El Duda engangement as 'evidence' to support your various beliefs, claims and position.

Now we have this...
The suspicious part of me would lead me to believe that you have been practising a fair degree of confirmation bias: using anything that you can find to 'evidence' a preconceived idea rather than analysing the evidence to draw a concluding idea.

Neverthless,
Have you now managed to do some research on the engagement that you use to 'evidence' your various beliefs, claims and position? Have you started to form an undefrstanding of the events, the context and lessons that could be taken away?

- How many anti-tank guns were actually with the 1st Essex? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- Did the Boettcher KG support 15.Pz-Div in any way? How? When?
- Which 75mm guns did the Germans use to shell the British? Where they KwK37 on Pz.IV? How many of them were used? What results did they achieve? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- What time did the initial bombardment start? When did the main assault go in? Was it just before dusk?
- What forces did the British have for the engagement? Did it consist of any pantsers? Which type(s)? When and how where they engaged? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?
- Did the British have any supporting artillery? Which type(s)? How many guns? What results did they achieve - if any? Which units? What do their diaries say of the events?

Then, having analysed all the above, how would the 3-inch ex. HAA gun reroled into an ATk weapon have helped? How many would you suggest are required to be effective? Where would they have come from? How many would be required in theatre to allow for some to be at El Duda on that day and time?
Blimey what a barrage of questions! :lol: That is why I addressed the question to Urmel!
Not meant as a barrage of questions, more a reading list for you to catch up with the rest of us with your understanding. I know it will take you a wee while - until you're 77 wasn't it?
Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:30
There was a later action at El Duda than the one against the 1st Essex but that was repulsed.
The point I'm taking away from this is not that there were multiple engagements at El Duda but that you have repeatedly used a couple of sentences about an engagement to 'evidence' your opinions, beliefs and position - and the reality is you haven't got a clue even to which engagement it referred to let alone the details of the engagement. :roll:
Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:30
Just to answer the one question the 3-inch HAA guns would have helped by knocking out German tanks far beyond the range at which they "cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr"
The full trifecta. Your last post had a return to the flat earth theaory and the time shift theory, now we have a return of the handwave!
Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:30
Good lord! How did they manage that without a 3-inch ex. HAA gun!?!
It was night. The Germans had lost their bottle.
You don't have a scooby, do you?

Best do some reading up on the El Duda engagment to understand what happened, who did what, and whether a 3-inch ex. HAA gun would have made a difference - and what would be required for that to happen. In the real world, bits of equipment don't just suddenly appear ready for use.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 03 Jan 2019 15:30

MarkN wrote:
02 Jan 2019 21:59
Not meant as a barrage of questions, more a reading list for you to catch up with the rest of us with your understanding.
Catch up with us? Is that your schizophrenia kicking in again :lol:
The point I'm taking away from this is not that there were multiple engagements at El Duda but that you have repeatedly used a couple of sentences about an engagement to 'evidence' your opinions, beliefs and position - and the reality is you haven't got a clue even to which engagement it referred to let alone the details of the engagement. :roll:
You're the one obsessing about El Duda, drawing from your rather addled mind that eliminating an anti-tank gun screen should be a piece of piss for a few CS tanks to achieve. :roll:
No, the salient feature from the entry in 'Notes from Theatre of War' on that battle, is German tanks tough, British guns weak. Though practically every battle in the Desert up to that point had also revealed that!

It was night. The Germans had lost their bottle.
You don't have a scooby, do you?
?? German tanks of 8th Panzer Regt. were in a night battle against 11 Matildas of 32nd ATB during the middle of which the German tanks retreated leaving infantry of 115th Regiment to surrender or run away as best they could.
Best do some reading up on the El Duda engagment to understand what happened, who did what, and whether a 3-inch ex. HAA gun would have made a difference - and what would be required for that to happen. In the real world, bits of equipment don't just suddenly appear ready for use.
Image

En portee :roll:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 03 Jan 2019 17:42

Gooner1 wrote:
03 Jan 2019 15:30
MarkN wrote:
02 Jan 2019 21:59
Not meant as a barrage of questions, more a reading list for you to catch up with the rest of us with your understanding.
Catch up with us? Is that your schizophrenia kicking in again
I've just asked one of my other personalities and she says us refers to the world that has already gained 76 years of hindsight regarding the events of 1941 - whereas you claim you need a few more years to catch up. :lol:
Gooner1 wrote:
03 Jan 2019 15:30
The point I'm taking away from this is not that there were multiple engagements at El Duda but that you have repeatedly used a couple of sentences about an engagement to 'evidence' your opinions, beliefs and position - and the reality is you haven't got a clue even to which engagement it referred to let alone the details of the engagement.
You're the one obsessing about El Duda, drawing from your rather addled mind that eliminating an anti-tank gun screen should be a piece of piss for a few CS tanks to achieve.
Now you're making things up...

I've never said it was an easy task. That was your comment.

My point was, and still is, that the British had the equipment to do precisely what the Germans did at the engagement you refer to as evidence of your beliefs, opinions and position.
Gooner1 wrote:
03 Jan 2019 15:30
No, the salient feature from the entry in 'Notes from Theatre of War' on that battle, is German tanks tough, British guns weak.
I have no idea what document the 'Notes from Theatre of War' is that you are referring to. Therefore I have to take your word for it that the conclusions drawn in it are that "German tanks tough, British guns weak".

On the otherhand, I do have a tidy sum of primary documentation that provides me with an indepth understanding of the El Duda engagement on 29 November 1941. From both sides of the ring. And there is little, if anything, there to support that conclusion. There is zero there to support your conclusions. Indeed, the documentation suggests you have somewhat misinterpreted what happened on the day. For example, the guns of the Boettcher KG do not appear to have been involved at all, and the guns principally used to 'eliminate' the British ATk guns were not those of the Pz.IV, but the field guns of AR.33.

Your original question concerning the El Duda engagement was:
Gooner1 wrote:
30 Nov 2018 15:14
Now why couldn't the British just do the same?
If ypou make an effort to do an study and analysis of the engagment, you'll see that, by method and approach, it was an attack copied straight out of the British FSR (1929) handbook.
Gooner1 wrote:
03 Jan 2019 15:30
Though practically every battle in the Desert up to that point had also revealed that!
Not what the documentary evidence points to. Although I accept it is a common refrain by many trying to shift blame for their own failures or by post-war commentators and historians looking for simple excuses.

Evidence from operational analysis of engagments through 1941 suggest that the British were causing, in the round, about a similar level of damage to German pantsers as they were suffering upon their own. However, since the Germans repeatedly 'won the battlefield', they got to gather in their crocks and repair them whereas the British managed to lose the lot: whether battle damaged or broken down was neither here nor there.


PS.
The British had, at various times in 1940 and 1941, a number of mobile 3-inch HAA guns in the Middle East.
It's not that the British were too stupid to send them to the ME, they did.
It's not that the British were too stupid to try to turn them into ATk guns, they tried and gave up.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 03 Jan 2019 17:54

Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:08
MarkN wrote:
29 Dec 2018 14:59
The German only received pantsers "on a '50-mm armour basis'" in 1942. Thus quite irrelevant to the discussion up to the end of 1941 and Op CRUSADER. When the Germans received their 50mm armoured pantsers, the British were receiving their 6-pdr ATk guns and some 76mm armed pantsers.
Are you being disingenuous or just a bit thick?

"The German Pzkw III used in France in 1940 had no more than 30 mm of armour anywhere. This was of machinable quality, not face-hardened. Before the end of the year reports of an increase in the armour on the front and turrets of German tanks were reaching England. In April 1941 details obtained from tanks captured in the Middle East showed that this increase had been achieved by bolting extra plates in front and rear. In the Pzkw III the extra plates (32 mm thick) on the front of the superstructure projected upwards to protect the turret joint and gave the front of the tank a total thickness of 62 mm. These extra plates were found to be face-hardened to such a degree that they could keep out a 2-pdr A.P. shot at any range except the closest. Unless a shot of this type succeeded in shattering the hardened face it scarcely made any impression on the inner armour.

This method of improving the protection was an interim measure, which could be carried out without seriously affecting the output from the factories. This was Model H. The next new Model, J, differed from Model H in several respects, and the armour was of 50-mm face-hardened plate. None of Model J reached Libya until the very end of 1941.

The extra plates on Model H were not easy to detect, and it is not known how many of the tanks in 'BATTLEAXE' carried them. But the shipping lists show that hardly any German tanks reached Libya between the end of June and 19th December 1941, and as considerable numbers of tanks with extra plates were identified as having taken part in 'CRUSADER' (November- December 1941) it seems that many of them must have come over with 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division or very soon after."
Are YOU being disingenuous or just a bit thick?

I've underlined the relevant sentence.
Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:08
Or is that too much text for you to take in?
Me? No.

But clearly your attempt to divert and mislead got the better of you.

Now, I suggest you do an analysis of how many Pz.III and Pz.IV from Pz.Regt.5 and Pz.Regt.8 had the additional Zusatzpanzerung and how many had the same basic armour as seen in France in May and June 1940. Those were the pantsers faced throughout 1941 - which, of course, is the relevant timeframe including Op CRUSADER.

And don't forget, the shooting trials conducted within Tobruk on a Pz.IV with Zusatzpanzerung in May 1941 demonstrated the 2-pdr was able to defeat it.
Gooner1 wrote:
02 Jan 2019 14:08
Your and DonJuans explanation for the lack of kills on the Panzers even when shooting at their sides being what exactly?
Asked and answered on many occasions. Understood by all but those determined to deny. The Germans 'won the battlefield'. They got to patch up their crocks. A reality that occured during and immediatly post Op CRUSADER when the British 'won the battlefield' and got to patch up hundreds of their pantsers - many of which had been 'killed' - whilst the Germans lost almost everything.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Jan 2019 12:03

MarkN wrote:
03 Jan 2019 17:42
I've never said it was an easy task. That was your comment.
My point was, and still is, that the British had the equipment to do precisely what the Germans did at the engagement you refer to as evidence of your beliefs, opinions and position.

On the otherhand, I do have a tidy sum of primary documentation that provides me with an indepth understanding of the El Duda engagement on 29 November 1941. From both sides of the ring. And there is little, if anything, there to support that conclusion. There is zero there to support your conclusions. Indeed, the documentation suggests you have somewhat misinterpreted what happened on the day. For example, the guns of the Boettcher KG do not appear to have been involved at all, and the guns principally used to 'eliminate' the British ATk guns were not those of the Pz.IV, but the field guns of AR.33.
Arko 104 had certainly shelled 1st Essex earlier.

NZETC:
"A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, an ominous development which Brigadier Willison at once reported to Scobie, asking if 7 Armoured Division could do anything to help. Scobie could give no assurance of this and told him Ed Duda must be held at all costs. A few I tanks ventured forward, several of them were hit, the rest drew back to hull-down positions in the rear, and from then onwards 1 Essex felt very much alone."

And the result of a duel between British Cruisers and Pak 38s at 900 yards range would be what?

Lots of dead Cruisers and maybe, with luck, an anti-tank gun or two eliminated. :wink:
German tanks tough, British guns weak.
Not what the documentary evidence points to. Although I accept it is a common refrain by many trying to shift blame for their own failures or by post-war commentators and historians looking for simple excuses.
Absolutely what all the evidence points too. Proved by the facts of the strength of the armour, the weakness of the gun and its projectiles, the testimony of those who actually did the fighting, the conclusions of the Official History and just about every other decent history written on the period.
Evidence from operational analysis of engagments through 1941 suggest that the British were causing, in the round, about a similar level of damage to German pantsers as they were suffering upon their own.
I am sure the British tanks were hitting the German tanks as often as they were being hit in return. Its when it comes to the claim that they were causing a similar level of damage, that you descend into fantasy.
A damaged tank can range from one having a few vision blocks shot-off to one penetrated and burnt.
However, since the Germans repeatedly 'won the battlefield', they got to gather in their crocks and repair them whereas the British managed to lose the lot: whether battle damaged or broken down was neither here nor there.
And even when the British 'won the battlefield' German losses in tanks were still lower than the British losses would have been if positions reversed, such as at the Tobruk Easter battles.
PS.
The British had, at various times in 1940 and 1941, a number of mobile 3-inch HAA guns in the Middle East.
It's not that the British were too stupid to send them to the ME, they did.
It's not that the British were too stupid to try to turn them into ATk guns, they tried and gave up.
Unfortunately there was too much believing in the efficiency of the 2-pdr, based partly, no doubt, on the flawed tests undertaken (which, apparently are still fooling the simple today), that resulted in a lack of urgency to get a more powerful A/Tk weapon forward to the troops. By the time it was fully recognised by Eighth Army, the 6-pdr and the Grant tank were shortly to be available.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 04 Jan 2019 13:55

Gooner1 wrote:
04 Jan 2019 12:03
Arko 104 had certainly shelled 1st Essex earlier.
Shelling a position 3 or 4 days earlier is not the same as having "the support of the rather formidable Boettcher Artillery Group" for the attack itself, is it? Still, pleasing to see you're making an effort to do some reading and research to get the details right. Baby steps are better than nothing.
Gooner1 wrote:
04 Jan 2019 12:03
NZETC: "A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, an ominous development which Brigadier Willison at once reported to Scobie, asking if 7 Armoured Division could do anything to help. Scobie could give no assurance of this and told him Ed Duda must be held at all costs. A few I tanks ventured forward, several of them were hit, the rest drew back to hull-down positions in the rear, and from then onwards 1 Essex felt very much alone."

And the result of a duel between British Cruisers and Pak 38s at 900 yards range would be what?
Since British Cruiser tanks were not there, so what? Did you assume it was Cruiser pantsers at El Duda and have now realised the mistake?
Gooner1 wrote:
04 Jan 2019 12:03
Lots of dead Cruisers and maybe, with luck, an anti-tank gun or two eliminated.
I guess that is one possible outcome of the non-event. But being the outcome doesn't demonstrate that the reason for the outcome was the lack of a big gun. :roll:

Anyway, now that you've managed to google yourself to the NZ histories, why not analyse to what extent their narrative tallies with the 'Notes from Theatre of War' that you have repeatedly quoted to support your opinions, beliefs and position.

This is what the NZ narrative has to say for the event (the German attack part)...
German tanks were seen approaching Ed Duda from the west at 1 p.m. and lorried infantry from the south. After a brief delay 1 RHA and then a battery of 104 RHA engaged the enemy, but the rest of the garrison artillery was too far away. The four batteries of 6 Field Regiment could have thickened up the defensive fire very considerably had the groundwork for such co-operation been laid in the past two days; but 1 Essex had to do without this help. Even the I tanks at Ed Duda did not seem to the infantry to be doing much, and B Company of 1 Essex soon found itself facing fifteen German tanks about 300 yards to the west. A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, an ominous development which Brigadier Willison at once reported to Scobie, asking if 7 Armoured Division could do anything to help. Scobie could give no assurance of this and told him Ed Duda must be held at all costs. A few I tanks ventured forward, several of them were hit, the rest drew back to hull-down positions in the rear, and from then onwards 1 Essex felt very much alone.

The attack on Ed Duda might have been even heavier; but it was carried out with breathless haste which robbed 8 Panzer Regiment of much support. A boggy stretch of ground below Bir Bu Creimisa held up most of II Battalion of 115 Infantry Regiment and many of the supporting guns. Only three companies of infantry therefore took part in the final assault. This was nevertheless successful as far as it went and the tanks and infantry collected 150 prisoners. Only page 405 two companies of 1 Essex, however, were overrun and the Germans halted short of the rest of that unit. The three companies of 115 Regiment, some 300 men all told, split into two battle groups, one on each side of the By-pass road, and dug in at once. It was after 5 p.m. and already too late to carry the attack through to Belhamed.

At about this time Brigadier Willison ordered 2/13 Australian Battalion to counter-attack; but there was no sense in doing so in daylight against enemy tanks and the move was deferred until after dark. In 1 Essex, C Company, most of D, and a few of A and B Companies were still holding out. The German tanks were so near D Company that the men scarcely dared breathe; but the enemy seemed more interested in the ground to the north, where I tanks could be glimpsed from time to time. Four Matildas lay just behind C Company, excellently placed if the enemy came on but unable to engage the German tanks from where they were. Nor could they advance without offering the enemy easy targets.

When the light began to fail, some of the British tanks edged forward and the air was filled with tracers as the enemy engaged them. The Pzkw IIs came into their own in this twilight clash and their 20-millimetre automatic cannon blazed in deadly fashion at the Matildas, knocking out two them. The Matildas in the end gave ground and the panzers followed them slowly, ending up in brilliant moonlight at 6.35 p.m. on the edge of the Australian position. German infantry also spread out and some began digging in 200 yards from the headquarters of 1 Essex. To Colonel Nichols the position looked desperate.
Gooner1 wrote:
04 Jan 2019 12:03
German tanks tough, British guns weak.
Not what the documentary evidence points to. Although I accept it is a common refrain by many trying to shift blame for their own failures or by post-war commentators and historians looking for simple excuses.
Absolutely what all the evidence points too. Proved by the facts of the strength of the armour, the weakness of the gun and its projectiles, the testimony of those who actually did the fighting, the conclusions of the Official History and just about every other decent history written on the period.
So tell me, where in the NZ narrative to you see confirmation of...
"German tactics at El Duda. - in the armoured attack on El Duda, the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery. Then, just before dusk, the tanks moved forward with infantry close behind and overran the centre of the position."
Remember, your position is that a 3-inch ex. HAA gun reroled as an ATK gun could have dealt with the Pz.IVs which "... cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr." and thus made a material difference on the battlefield.
Gooner1 wrote:
04 Jan 2019 12:03
I am sure the British tanks were hitting the German tanks as often as they were being hit in return. Its when it comes to the claim that they were causing a similar level of damage, that you descend into fantasy.
A damaged tank can range from one having a few vision blocks shot-off to one penetrated and burnt.
...
And even when the British 'won the battlefield' German losses in tanks were still lower than the British losses would have been if positions reversed, such as at the Tobruk Easter battles.
Wibble, wibble...
Gooner1 wrote:
04 Jan 2019 12:03
PS.
The British had, at various times in 1940 and 1941, a number of mobile 3-inch HAA guns in the Middle East.
It's not that the British were too stupid to send them to the ME, they did.
It's not that the British were too stupid to try to turn them into ATk guns, they tried and gave up.
Unfortunately there was too much believing in the efficiency of the 2-pdr, based partly, no doubt, on the flawed tests undertaken (which, apparently are still fooling the simple today), that resulted in a lack of urgency to get a more powerful A/Tk weapon forward to the troops. By the time it was fully recognised by Eighth Army, the 6-pdr and the Grant tank were shortly to be available.
This started with a decent comment, and then descended in deluded farce. Yes, the British Army - the user - institutionally believed the 2-pdr was still up to the job through to the Gazala battles. But none of the tests were "flawed" as you claim and that the only people fooled today are the simple folk who play the flat-earth argument. But yes, the lack of urgency was indeed predicated by the belief that the 2-pdr was still up to the job AND the knowledge that the 6-pdr was on the way shortly. When the German pantsers showed up with their 50mm standard armor, the 6-pdr was there to have a pop.

Gooner1
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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Jan 2019 14:55

MarkN wrote:
03 Jan 2019 17:54
Are you being disingenuous or just a bit thick?
Copying my lines again. Well they say imitation is the sincerest form of flattery :thumbsup:
I've underlined the relevant sentence.
Or is that too much text for you to take in?
Me? No.
Clearly so. :D

""Firing trials were then held against the Crusader II, which was found to give much less protection than had been expected of a tank on a '50-mm armour basis'"

Bolded for you benefit.
Now, I suggest you do an analysis of how many Pz.III and Pz.IV from Pz.Regt.5 and Pz.Regt.8 had the additional Zusatzpanzerung and how many had the same basic armour as seen in France in May and June 1940. Those were the pantsers faced throughout 1941 - which, of course, is the relevant timeframe including Op CRUSADER.
If you have precise numbers then please post them. Otherwise don't waste my time, the answer to how many PzIIIs and IVs were uparmoured by Crusader is most of them.
And that would be a max. of 62mm armour, not 50mm.
And don't forget, the shooting trials conducted within Tobruk on a Pz.IV with Zusatzpanzerung in May 1941 demonstrated the 2-pdr was able to defeat it.
Just the sort of tests likely to mislead as I referred to. What was the condition of the tank, what was the condition of the plate, was it a fair hit on an uncracked plate, what was the likely post penetration effect of the hit on the tank?
"Your and DonJuans explanation for the lack of kills on the Panzers even when shooting at their sides being what exactly? Asked and answered on many occasions.
Tobruk, Easter battle.

Gooner1
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Posts: 2169
Joined: 06 Jan 2006 12:24
Location: London

Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 04 Jan 2019 15:10

MarkN wrote:
04 Jan 2019 13:55

So tell me, where in the NZ narrative to you see confirmation of...
"German tactics at El Duda. - in the armoured attack on El Duda, the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery. Then, just before dusk, the tanks moved forward with infantry close behind and overran the centre of the position."
This bit, already quoted: "A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, "
Remember, your position is that a 3-inch ex. HAA gun reroled as an ATK gun could have dealt with the Pz.IVs which "... cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr." and thus made a material difference on the battlefield.
This bit, already quoted: "A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, "

:D
When the German pantsers showed up with their 50mm standard armor, the 6-pdr was there to have a pop.
The Mark IIIJs soon had an additional 20mm bolted on too. For your benefit that would make 70mm max. armour. :milwink:

And since you clearly don't remember tests against the previous model H"s "extra plates proved to have great power of resistance. The fact that they were face-hardened was not realized by the British until March 1942, when trials of the Grant’s 75-mm gun were being carried out against a captured Pzkw III. The discovery led to further tests. The plates were found to break up the 2-pdr uncapped shot at all ranges, and gave protection against the 6-pdr and the Grant’s 75-mm at anything over 500 yards. It was some consolation that after one or two hits the securing bolts (or more probably, studs) began to split or shear off."

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