Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
MarkN wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 15:57
Clearly your opinion. Maths, physics and practical evidence suggest "
marginal" was significant enough to knock out a good number of German pantsers during 1941.
Well, yes, well done dear. But as the Official History says: "had it not been for the 25-pdr field artillery weapon the anti-tank position would have been serious indeed"
And that situation would have been infinitly more serious if the majority of front-line ATk troops had been sat around with "
thumbs stuck up their arses" with no gun at all during 1941. A situation that would have existed if the decision had been made to drop 2-pdr production in favour of 6-pdr in the summer of 1940 and/or were waiting for the 100 3" ex.HAA guns under conversion to arrive.
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
Maths and physics determine the range at which an ATk gunner can have confidence his shots will have a positive effect. Different combinations of guns and pantsers prodice different ranges. That is given. So, a British 2-pdr gunner has to be more patient that a German PaK 38 gunner. That is not in dispute. A well camouflaged 2-pdr sited on the ground - as opposed to sitting on a 3-tonner pretending to be a pantser - is unlikely to be seen by a pantser crew until well within effective 2-pdr range.
Against a British Cruiser or Honey the Pak38 can penetrate from a much greater range and variety of angles.
Neither British Cruisers or Stuarts were involved at El Duda.
Nevertheless, what counts is not just looking at the penetration tables, but also an understanding of the tactics employed. Yes the PaK38 was a more effective ATk gun than the 2-pdr. But since the German pantsers shouldn't be able to see a well-camouflaged 2-pdr until well after it has driven into the 2-pdr effective range, the comparison to the PaK38 is irrelevant.
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
It takes a really perverse mind to pretend that is not a massive advantage for the Germans.
It takes a really perverse mind to pretend that the world is flat, to time shift evidence and to ignore historical realities.
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
Oh and it takes seconds to turn a tank to face, at which point the 2-pdr gunners, unlike their German brethren, are SOL.
???
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
I have NEVER claimed it "was just the artillery of 33. Artillerie Regiment". Please do not accuse me of something that I have not written to cover up for your poor understanding.
the guns principally used to 'eliminate' the British ATk guns were not those of the Pz.IV, but the field guns of AR.33.
"Principally" then, thank you!
Yes. I used the word "
principally" in comparison to the efforts of the Pz.IV. A panser type that were not even trying to eliminate the ATk screen but to coerce it into giving away its position.
Are you really now going to focus on the use of the word principally to try and gain an internet warrior point?
Do you know how many Pz.IV were used against the El Duda position?
Do you know how many field guns of AR.33 were used against the El Duda position?
Do you know what effect each of the two weapons had?
Do you know how many 2-pdr ATk guns were in the El Duda position?
Do you know where in the position each was located?
Do you know how many were lost?
Do you know how each of them was lost?
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
If you want a better understanding of the events at El Duda, as detailed in the war diaries, you ought to get yourself along to Kew.
I may get round to it.
Please do. I look forward to a time when we can have a sensible and serious discussion on this topic. But I fear I may not have the patience to wait until you are 77.
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
In the meantime I'll take that as confirmation that the war diary does nothing to support your opinion that the A/Tk guns on El Duda were 'principally' neutralised by artillery.
I have already stated, and requoted earlier today, "
It is impossible to identify which casualty was a result of which German effort: AR.33, Pz.IV, Pz.II, infantry surge etc etc etc."
But go ahead, believe what you will and that my use of the word "
principally" in that sentence undoes all the historical realities that you are denying.
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
No, it was NOT doctrine. It was, however, normal practice. And that was part of the problem - as noted by Brigadier Watkins in his immediate post Op CRUSADER comments.
FSR Vol. II 1935, 60.5 "Tanks attacking as the main supporting arm <> The closer the infantry can follow the tanks onto the objective, the better; it can take full advantage of the confusion created by the tank attack and can take over the ground gained by the tanks without delay"
Sounds like the German tactics on El Duda.
'I' Tanks preceding infantry was still doctrine until 1944 in home forces.
I see you have cherry-picked in confirmation bias mode.... I understood this part of the debate in respect of all-arms not just armor-infantry. Where does field artillery come into doctrine? How does the doctrine apply to armoured divisions in the attack? And so on and on.
As I have already written in this thread, doctrine according to FSR (1929) seems to be the DS solution to what the Germans tried at El Duda. However, the RTC managed in the early 1930s to get doctrine changed such that by FSRII (1935), it had become more recognised that they, the RTC, would do more of the tasks inhouse: ATk defences to be taken out by the machine guns of light tanks rather than by field artillery etc. That change was part of the problem and, to a large degree, the source of much of the British failure on the battlefield where pantsers were involved.
The British could do everything that Germans did at El Duda, but chose not to. Not just a spur of the moment decision on the day, but through a process of cap-badge infighting over who does what and when.
Nevertheless, taking your quote and referring you back to a post I made much earlier in the thread. Brigadier Watkins post Op CRUSADER...
MarkN wrote: ↑30 Dec 2018 22:18
The second relates to infantry division and its supporting infantry tanks:
There is nothing new in all the above [MarkNote #1: preceeding long paragraph explaining how all the arms ought to be cooperating]. The only thing that is new is the fact that modern developments in German A/Tk defences have brought us to a stage when we can no longer afford merely to pay lip service to all the principles before the battle and then break them all as soon as the battle starts. The fault lies, of course, not with commanders or with Inf or other arms, but in the fact that they are never given a chance to train with tanks; in the whole period I have commanded this Bde [MarkNote #2: 18 months] I have only once had an opportunity to carry out exercises on the ground with troops.
Over 2 years into the war, the British are still not training their various cap-badges to work as one; each cap-badge trains alone to deliver a sequenced element of a brigade/divisional plan. Commanders pay "
lip service" to doctrine and ignore it in practice.
Was it really the size of a gun that meant the British were performing so poorly?
Gooner1 wrote: ↑17 Jan 2019 16:53
At El Duda, from a British war diary, "The tanks then advanced into the FDL area each accompanied by a strong section of infantry."
Just like British Infantry tanks then.
Not only did you cherry-pcik the words from FSRII (1935), you decided to cherry-pick from those words your own interpretation that bears little resemblance to historical reality.
