What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

[Gooner1]

The British Artillery weren't just motoring about the desert with their thumbs stuck up their arses.

"On November 22 the main attack began. Omar Nuovo

Oh Jesus. So when I roll this out as an example how things can be done you p*ss all over it, but when it suits you, you roll it out.

Also, despite all your expertise, you seem to be unaware that this was an I-tank attack with the tanks subordinated to an infantry brigade. It does nothing to address the point Sheldrake and others have been making repeatedly.

But of course you know that, and you are at this stage to the Commonwealth section of this forum nothing but a common troll and time waster.

Seriously, what fucking point are you trying to make?

[Gooner1]

So what you're saying, in a roundabout way, that the British gunners were too quick to reveal themselves by firing too early whilst the Germans had the 'nerve' to wait longer. I believe there is quite a bit of commentary along those lines in the diaries.
That is the difference.

Yeah, sure. There is no difference in the penetrative ability of the Pak38 and the 2-pdr and the Cruiser tanks are as well armoured as the Panzers.

In the context of comparing to El Duda, the question is why is the tank regiment being engaged before the enemy ATk screen has been knocked out?

At El Duda the British anti-tank guns were eliminated by the Panzers.

[Gooner1]

Re 2 The point about concentration of artillery fire is that the battle is not a series of regimental duels. In the example you have given an armoured regiment supported by a lone artillery battery - which could provide two fire units to take on individual anti tank guns. The problem is that good anti-tank defences did not have one or two anti tank guns. Anti-tank guns were deployed in fours, sixes and twelves to cover killing zones.
Cunning commanders and staff deployed their forces so that at the point of main effort maybe two regiments will be fighting, but with the support of ALL of the divisional artillery. In the post WW2 British army, a battlegroup attack would normally call on the whole regiment of three or four batteries.

Post-Gazala the artillery had realised that it had allowed itself to become too decentralized. One other problem was that the 25-pdr had so often been deployed in the anti-tank role making it difficult to then lend its weight elsewhere.

Still, concentrating your artillery supporting a part of your forces will mean that another part going without. Keith Douglas wrote how his regiment came under anti-tank gun fire and 'their' artillery was unable to respond as they were supporting an infantry advance somewhere else.

Re 3. The six 3" CS in the crusaders tanks were nothing like as useful as a troop of 25 pounders. With a maximum range of 1,800 they lacked the range to provide over-watch. The 3" howitzer is an area weapon. Christopherson may have had a lucky hit, the PEr even at 1,500m is far greater than the size of the target. Even if grouped together as a battery of six their feeble range limits the the area that they can provide supporting fire. CS tanks range of 1,800m = C. 10 square kilometers that can be targeted. A troop of 25 Pounder can hit targets within 320 square km.

The muzzle velocity of the 3-inch howitzer was about half that of the 7.5cm L/24.

[MarkN]

So what you're saying, in a roundabout way, that the British gunners were too quick to reveal themselves by firing too early whilst the Germans had the 'nerve' to wait longer. I believe there is quite a bit of commentary along those lines in the diaries.
That is the difference.

Yeah, sure. There is no difference in the penetrative ability of the Pak38 and the 2-pdr and the Cruiser tanks are as well armoured as the Panzers.

You've just written, "When the German anti-tank gunners decided to reveal themselves through firing, the probable result is the British tanks with holes in them (and probably burning)." The British could have done just the same. All they had to do was wait until the German pantsers were within effective range.

In the context of comparing to El Duda, the question is why is the tank regiment being engaged before the enemy ATk screen has been knocked out?

At El Duda the British anti-tank guns were eliminated by the Panzers.

Are you just throwing out lines to deflect and annoy?

Let me remind YOU of the evidence that YOU produced. I've underlinned the part to direct your attention.

The Germans deliberately lobbed shells from afar to locate any (hidden) A/Tk guns, first neutralised them with field guns or Pz.IV rounds and then advanced. The British ignored any enemy A/Tk guns - if they saw them - and pressed ahead regardless.

Notes from Theatres of War March '42:
"German tactics at El Duda. - in the armoured attack on El Duda, the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery. Then, just before dusk, the tanks moved forward with infantry close behind and overran the centre of the position."

According to your evidence, the Pz.IV stood off and fired shells to get the ATK screen to identify itself. Then, when satisfied that all had been located, the field artillery opened up to eleminate the ATk screen follwed by the actual Pz.II and Pz.III charge to mop up anything left standing.

British can do that too. In fact, you recently pointed out how the British field arty did just that at one of the Omars. The difference was, they only chose to do that after they'd sent the pantsers forward to be chewed up.

[Gooner1]

The British could have done just the same. All they had to do was wait until the German pantsers were within effective range.

Which against the front of the uparmoured Panzers is 0 yards.

Are you just throwing out lines to deflect and annoy?

Are you blind to the lines that go against your idées fixes?

"the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery.

According to your evidence, the Pz.IV stood off and fired shells to get the ATK screen to identify itself. Then, when satisfied that all had been located, the field artillery opened up to eleminate the ATk screen follwed by the actual Pz.II and Pz.III charge to mop up anything left standing.

So the answer to my own question is a Yes, then.

Both the New Zealand and Australian official histories state it was the gun tanks that neutralised the 2-pdrs (and the pits and sangars of the infantry).

British can do that too. In fact, you recently pointed out how the British field arty did just that at one of the Omars. The difference was, they only chose to do that after they'd sent the pantsers forward to be chewed up.

1. The effective range of the 88 is rather greater than that of the 2-pdr.
2. The 88 proved time and again capable of killing large numbers of opposing tanks quickly.
3. Neutralising a gun before it has been located is difficult.

[MarkN]

The British could have done just the same. All they had to do was wait until the German pantsers were within effective range.

Which against the front of the uparmoured Panzers is 0 yards.

But up to 1,000 yds or so against the sides and rear. Back to your flat earth again....

You wrote...

At El Duda the British anti-tank guns were eliminated by the Panzers.

I reminded you that it was not just panzers that did this according to the evidence that you presented: "...they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery."

"the German tanks cruised about very slowly outside the effective range of the 2-pr., continuously shelling the position with their 75mm guns. They gradually goaded our anti-tank guns to fire, and, when satisfied that all had been located, they knocked them out quickly with fire from gun tanks and supporting artillery.

According to your evidence, the Pz.IV stood off and fired shells to get the ATK screen to identify itself. Then, when satisfied that all had been located, the field artillery opened up to eleminate the ATk screen follwed by the actual Pz.II and Pz.III charge to mop up anything left standing.

So the answer to my own question is a Yes, then.

Nope, the answer is that you are blind to the lines that go against your idées fixes. According to the evidence that you present, it was pantsers and field artillery. According to the war diary of the British ATk itself, it was a bit different to that, but who cares about historical realities when an idées fixe needs to be pushed?

British can do that too. In fact, you recently pointed out how the British field arty did just that at one of the Omars. The difference was, they only chose to do that after they'd sent the pantsers forward to be chewed up.

1. The effective range of the 88 is rather greater than that of the 2-pdr.

Its is. A point not in dispute. However, how many 88mm were involved at El Duda on 29 November 1941? What effect did they have on the action?

2. The 88 proved time and again capable of killing large numbers of opposing tanks quickly.

When placed in fixed stutzpunkt and charged by British pantsers ignoring their own doctrine, the 88mm proved a vicious weapon. But that did not occur that frequently in Egypt/Libya during 1941 and would have been avoided completely if the British attacked with more savvy. I can think of two occasions off the top of my head. How many can you think of?

When manouvering with the Panzer divisions, they effected significantly less damage on the battlefield than the myth would have us all believe.

3. Neutralising a gun before it has been located is difficult.

It is indeed. And that is why, when you wrote...

When the German anti-tank gunners decided to reveal themselves through firing, the probable result is the British tanks with holes in them (and probably burning).
That is the difference.

... the key difference is in the ability of the Germans NOT to reveal themselves too early.

[Gooner1]

But up to 1,000 yds or so against the sides and rear. Back to your flat earth again....

The British 2-pdrs may actually have only opened up against the sides of the German tanks at El Duda, but, except in the event of a perfectly perpendicular strike, their ability to penetrate is still going to be marginal.

Can't really rely on the enemy to make that elementary tactical error of advancing in reverse can they?

The problem remains the same. Weak British guns, tough German tanks.

According to the evidence that you present, it was pantsers and field artillery. According to the war diary of the British ATk itself,

One source says tanks and artillery, two others say just tanks. You earlier claimed it was just the artillery of 33. Artillerie Regiment.
I see you have now availed yourself of the war diary of the anti-tank unit involved (149th Anti-Tank RA?), good. I won't hold my breath whilst you post any relevant extracts.

Its is. A point not in dispute. However, how many 88mm were involved at El Duda on 29 November 1941? What effect did they have on the action?

The British did not have any 88s at El Duda.
FWIW Brigadier Willison of 32ATB saw the Germans deploy some with their tanks. In the counter-attack one 88mm complete with crew was captured.
The British lost a bunch (8?) Matildas defending El Duda.

When placed in fixed stutzpunkt and charged by British pantsers ignoring their own doctrine, the 88mm proved a vicious weapon. But that did not occur that frequently in Egypt/Libya during 1941 and would have been avoided completely if the British attacked with more savvy. I can think of two occasions off the top of my head. How many can you think of?

'I' tanks preceding infantry in the attack was very much doctrine at the time. The dismissive comment that the Matildas 'charged' is unduly stupid.
Which attacks on defensive positions with infantry, artillery, 88s and mines which completely avoided tank casualties were you thinking of?

The correct solution on how to tackle a well defended Pak front was of course by an infantry attack at night.
Rommel never thought of this solution. In part because he never needed too.

... the key difference is in the ability of the Germans NOT to reveal themselves too early.

And nothing at all to do with the weakness of British guns and the toughness of German tanks.
You cling to that fantasy.

[Urmel]

The British Artillery weren't just motoring about the desert with their thumbs stuck up their arses.

"On November 22 the main attack began. Omar Nuovo

Oh Jesus. So when I roll this out as an example how things can be done you p*ss all over it, but when it suits you, you roll it out.

Also, despite all your expertise, you seem to be unaware that this was an I-tank attack with the tanks subordinated to an infantry brigade. It does nothing to address the point Sheldrake and others have been making repeatedly.

But of course you know that, and you are at this stage to the Commonwealth section of this forum nothing but a common troll and time waster.

Seriously, what fucking point are you trying to make?

I feel like Father Ted explaining to Father Dougal the difference between 'near' and 'far away'.

The fucking point I'm trying to make is that the fucking cruiser tanks fucking motored about ignoring their fucking support arms, so giving them fucking 3" AA guns would have changed fuck all, because they would also have fucking ignored them.

Your fucking example is about fucking I-tanks, who did not have that fucked-up habit.

Are we fucking clear now?

[MarkN]

But up to 1,000 yds or so against the sides and rear. Back to your flat earth again....

The British 2-pdrs may actually have only opened up against the sides of the German tanks at El Duda, ...

Hallelujah!!! The earth is not flat after all. Baby steps.

... but, except in the event of a perfectly perpendicular strike, their ability to penetrate is still going to be marginal.

Clearly your opinion. Maths, physics and practical evidence suggest "marginal" was significant enough to knock out a good number of German pantsers during 1941.

Can't really rely on the enemy to make that elementary tactical error of advancing in reverse can they?

Is a bit daft. But then, no less daft that Scott-Cockburn promoting a tactic of "looping" in and out of smoke that presented the sides and rear to enemy ATk gunners. A tactic seemingly endorsed by Norrie.

The problem remains the same. Weak British guns, tough German tanks.

Maths and physics determine the range at which an ATk gunner can have confidence his shots will have a positive effect. Different combinations of guns and pantsers prodice different ranges. That is given. So, a British 2-pdr gunner has to be more patient that a German PaK 38 gunner. That is not in dispute. A well camouflaged 2-pdr sited on the ground - as opposed to sitting on a 3-tonner pretending to be a pantser - is unlikely to be seen by a pantser crew until well within effective 2-pdr range.

According to the evidence that you present, it was pantsers and field artillery. According to the war diary of the British ATk itself,

One source says tanks and artillery, two others say just tanks. You earlier claimed it was just the artillery of 33. Artillerie Regiment.

I have NEVER claimed it "was just the artillery of 33. Artillerie Regiment". Please do not accuse me of something that I have not written to cover up for your poor understanding.

I have written:

and the guns principally used to 'eliminate' the British ATk guns were not those of the Pz.IV, but the field guns of AR.33.

It is impossible to identify which casualty was a result of which German effort: AR.33, Pz.IV, Pz.II, infantry surge etc etc etc.

And others similar.

I see you have now availed yourself of the war diary of the anti-tank unit involved (149th Anti-Tank RA?), good. I won't hold my breath whilst you post any relevant extracts.

Don't hold your breath. Remember, I'm not in the slightest bit interested in proving you wrong or doing your research for you. If you want to keep posting nonsense here based upon your idee fixe, so be it. If you want a better understanding of the events at El Duda, as detailed in the war diaries, you ought to get yourself along to Kew.

Its is. A point not in dispute. However, how many 88mm were involved at El Duda on 29 November 1941? What effect did they have on the action?

FWIW Brigadier Willison of 32ATB saw the Germans deploy some with their tanks. In the counter-attack one 88mm complete with crew was captured.

No mention of 88mm in 32ATBde war diary. Nor the 1Essex war diary. Nor the diaries of either 1RTR, 4RTR or 7RTR. And not in 2/13InfBtn either. But you've found a mention somewhere so it must be true. Nevertheless, even if they were there, their effect on the battlefield was clearly somewhat underwhelming to the particpants.

'I' tanks preceding infantry in the attack was very much doctrine at the time. The dismissive comment that the Matildas 'charged' is unduly stupid.

No, it was NOT doctrine. It was, however, normal practice. And that was part of the problem - as noted by Brigadier Watkins in his immediate post Op CRUSADER comments.

Infantry Mk.II pantsers didn't move very quickly anywhere. But when attacking a defended position they were encouraged to move as fast as possible - ie. charging. Indeed, the war diaries note at El Duda one crew removed the speed governors from the engine for a counter-attack and it was "seen driving into action like a fast Crusier". Sound like charging to me - albeit at a Mathilda waddle pace.

Which attacks on defensive positions with infantry, artillery, 88s and mines which completely avoided tank casualties were you thinking of?

I wasn't thinking of any. Do stop making things up.

The correct solution on how to tackle a well defended Pak front was of course by an infantry attack at night. Rommel never thought of this solution. In part because he never needed too.

That's because they sent infantry in during the day.

At El Duda, from a British war diary, "The tanks then advanced into the FDL area each accompanied by a strong section of infantry." Whether already knock out or not, be it by Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV or AR.33 field gun, the 2-pdr ATk guns were lost when the pantsers and infantry jointly overran parts of the 1Essex position. It is not clear from any of the British war diaries exactly when the 2-pdrs were silenced.

[Gooner1]

The fucking point I'm trying to make is that the fucking cruiser tanks fucking motored about ignoring their fucking support arms, so giving them fucking 3" AA guns would have changed fuck all, because they would also have fucking ignored them.

Thanks for making your fucking opinion clear

[Gooner1]

Clearly your opinion. Maths, physics and practical evidence suggest "marginal" was significant enough to knock out a good number of German pantsers during 1941.

Well, yes, well done dear. But as the Official History says: "had it not been for the 25-pdr field artillery weapon the anti-tank position would have been serious indeed"

Maths and physics determine the range at which an ATk gunner can have confidence his shots will have a positive effect. Different combinations of guns and pantsers prodice different ranges. That is given. So, a British 2-pdr gunner has to be more patient that a German PaK 38 gunner. That is not in dispute. A well camouflaged 2-pdr sited on the ground - as opposed to sitting on a 3-tonner pretending to be a pantser - is unlikely to be seen by a pantser crew until well within effective 2-pdr range.

Against a British Cruiser or Honey the Pak38 can penetrate from a much greater range and variety of angles.
It takes a really perverse mind to pretend that is not a massive advantage for the Germans.

Oh and it takes seconds to turn a tank to face, at which point the 2-pdr gunners, unlike their German brethren, are SOL.

I have NEVER claimed it "was just the artillery of 33. Artillerie Regiment". Please do not accuse me of something that I have not written to cover up for your poor understanding.
the guns principally used to 'eliminate' the British ATk guns were not those of the Pz.IV, but the field guns of AR.33.

"Principally" then, thank you!

If you want a better understanding of the events at El Duda, as detailed in the war diaries, you ought to get yourself along to Kew.

I may get round to it. In the meantime I'll take that as confirmation that the war diary does nothing to support your opinion that the A/Tk guns on El Duda were 'principally' neutralised by artillery.

No, it was NOT doctrine. It was, however, normal practice. And that was part of the problem - as noted by Brigadier Watkins in his immediate post Op CRUSADER comments.

FSR Vol. II 1935, 60.5 "Tanks attacking as the main supporting arm <> The closer the infantry can follow the tanks onto the objective, the better; it can take full advantage of the confusion created by the tank attack and can take over the ground gained by the tanks without delay"
Sounds like the German tactics on El Duda.
'I' Tanks preceding infantry was still doctrine until 1944 in home forces.

Which attacks on defensive positions with infantry, artillery, 88s and mines which completely avoided tank casualties were you thinking of?
"I wasn't thinking of any. Do stop making things up."

Oh right, so you don't have an easy solution to the taking of strongly defended boxes. Fair enough.

That's because they sent infantry in during the day.

When? They were actually pretty poor at taking positions where the British & Co. had the time to get well settled in - despite the German superiority in armaments.

At El Duda, from a British war diary, "The tanks then advanced into the FDL area each accompanied by a strong section of infantry."

Just like British Infantry tanks then.

[MarkN]

The fucking point I'm trying to make is that the fucking cruiser tanks fucking motored about ignoring their fucking support arms, so giving them fucking 3" AA guns would have changed fuck all, because they would also have fucking ignored them.

Thanks for making your fucking opinion clear

Indeed it is Urmel's opinion. Since former 3" HAA guns were not placed into formations as ATk guns, it is impossible to know whate effect they would or would not have had on the battlefield. However, at least Urmel's opinion is derived from historical reality. On the otherhand, your opinion seems to be derived soley from the belief that your own handwaved statements have both credibility and relevance.

[Gooner1]

[Indeed it is Urmel's opinion. Since former 3" HAA guns were not placed into formations as ATk guns, it is impossible to know whate effect they would or would not have had on the battlefield. However, at least Urmel's opinion is derived from historical reality. On the otherhand, your opinion seems to be derived soley from the belief that your own handwaved statements have both credibility and relevance.

[MarkN]

Clearly your opinion. Maths, physics and practical evidence suggest "marginal" was significant enough to knock out a good number of German pantsers during 1941.

Well, yes, well done dear. But as the Official History says: "had it not been for the 25-pdr field artillery weapon the anti-tank position would have been serious indeed"

And that situation would have been infinitly more serious if the majority of front-line ATk troops had been sat around with "thumbs stuck up their arses" with no gun at all during 1941. A situation that would have existed if the decision had been made to drop 2-pdr production in favour of 6-pdr in the summer of 1940 and/or were waiting for the 100 3" ex.HAA guns under conversion to arrive.

Maths and physics determine the range at which an ATk gunner can have confidence his shots will have a positive effect. Different combinations of guns and pantsers prodice different ranges. That is given. So, a British 2-pdr gunner has to be more patient that a German PaK 38 gunner. That is not in dispute. A well camouflaged 2-pdr sited on the ground - as opposed to sitting on a 3-tonner pretending to be a pantser - is unlikely to be seen by a pantser crew until well within effective 2-pdr range.

Against a British Cruiser or Honey the Pak38 can penetrate from a much greater range and variety of angles.

Neither British Cruisers or Stuarts were involved at El Duda.

Nevertheless, what counts is not just looking at the penetration tables, but also an understanding of the tactics employed. Yes the PaK38 was a more effective ATk gun than the 2-pdr. But since the German pantsers shouldn't be able to see a well-camouflaged 2-pdr until well after it has driven into the 2-pdr effective range, the comparison to the PaK38 is irrelevant.

It takes a really perverse mind to pretend that is not a massive advantage for the Germans.

It takes a really perverse mind to pretend that the world is flat, to time shift evidence and to ignore historical realities.

Oh and it takes seconds to turn a tank to face, at which point the 2-pdr gunners, unlike their German brethren, are SOL.

???

I have NEVER claimed it "was just the artillery of 33. Artillerie Regiment". Please do not accuse me of something that I have not written to cover up for your poor understanding.
the guns principally used to 'eliminate' the British ATk guns were not those of the Pz.IV, but the field guns of AR.33.

"Principally" then, thank you!

Yes. I used the word "principally" in comparison to the efforts of the Pz.IV. A panser type that were not even trying to eliminate the ATk screen but to coerce it into giving away its position.

Are you really now going to focus on the use of the word principally to try and gain an internet warrior point?

Do you know how many Pz.IV were used against the El Duda position?
Do you know how many field guns of AR.33 were used against the El Duda position?
Do you know what effect each of the two weapons had?

Do you know how many 2-pdr ATk guns were in the El Duda position?
Do you know where in the position each was located?
Do you know how many were lost?
Do you know how each of them was lost?

If you want a better understanding of the events at El Duda, as detailed in the war diaries, you ought to get yourself along to Kew.

I may get round to it.

Please do. I look forward to a time when we can have a sensible and serious discussion on this topic. But I fear I may not have the patience to wait until you are 77.

In the meantime I'll take that as confirmation that the war diary does nothing to support your opinion that the A/Tk guns on El Duda were 'principally' neutralised by artillery.

I have already stated, and requoted earlier today, "It is impossible to identify which casualty was a result of which German effort: AR.33, Pz.IV, Pz.II, infantry surge etc etc etc."

But go ahead, believe what you will and that my use of the word "principally" in that sentence undoes all the historical realities that you are denying.

No, it was NOT doctrine. It was, however, normal practice. And that was part of the problem - as noted by Brigadier Watkins in his immediate post Op CRUSADER comments.

FSR Vol. II 1935, 60.5 "Tanks attacking as the main supporting arm <> The closer the infantry can follow the tanks onto the objective, the better; it can take full advantage of the confusion created by the tank attack and can take over the ground gained by the tanks without delay"
Sounds like the German tactics on El Duda.
'I' Tanks preceding infantry was still doctrine until 1944 in home forces.

I see you have cherry-picked in confirmation bias mode.... I understood this part of the debate in respect of all-arms not just armor-infantry. Where does field artillery come into doctrine? How does the doctrine apply to armoured divisions in the attack? And so on and on.

As I have already written in this thread, doctrine according to FSR (1929) seems to be the DS solution to what the Germans tried at El Duda. However, the RTC managed in the early 1930s to get doctrine changed such that by FSRII (1935), it had become more recognised that they, the RTC, would do more of the tasks inhouse: ATk defences to be taken out by the machine guns of light tanks rather than by field artillery etc. That change was part of the problem and, to a large degree, the source of much of the British failure on the battlefield where pantsers were involved.

The British could do everything that Germans did at El Duda, but chose not to. Not just a spur of the moment decision on the day, but through a process of cap-badge infighting over who does what and when.

Nevertheless, taking your quote and referring you back to a post I made much earlier in the thread. Brigadier Watkins post Op CRUSADER...

The second relates to infantry division and its supporting infantry tanks:

There is nothing new in all the above [MarkNote #1: preceeding long paragraph explaining how all the arms ought to be cooperating]. The only thing that is new is the fact that modern developments in German A/Tk defences have brought us to a stage when we can no longer afford merely to pay lip service to all the principles before the battle and then break them all as soon as the battle starts. The fault lies, of course, not with commanders or with Inf or other arms, but in the fact that they are never given a chance to train with tanks; in the whole period I have commanded this Bde [MarkNote #2: 18 months] I have only once had an opportunity to carry out exercises on the ground with troops.

Over 2 years into the war, the British are still not training their various cap-badges to work as one; each cap-badge trains alone to deliver a sequenced element of a brigade/divisional plan. Commanders pay "lip service" to doctrine and ignore it in practice.

Was it really the size of a gun that meant the British were performing so poorly?

At El Duda, from a British war diary, "The tanks then advanced into the FDL area each accompanied by a strong section of infantry."

Just like British Infantry tanks then.

Not only did you cherry-pcik the words from FSRII (1935), you decided to cherry-pick from those words your own interpretation that bears little resemblance to historical reality.

[Gooner1]

And that situation would have been infinitly more serious if the majority of front-line ATk troops had been sat around with "thumbs stuck up their arses" with no gun at all during 1941. A situation that would have existed if the decision had been made to drop 2-pdr production in favour of 6-pdr in the summer of 1940 and/or were waiting for the 100 3" ex.HAA guns under conversion to arrive.

No-one, I believe, suggested completely transferring 2-pdr production. More a case of switching some production, the estimated trade-off of which was 600 2-pdrs lost for 100 6-pdrs produced. Total 2-pdr production for the year from August 1940 was 3,685.
The ironic thing is that the 6-pdr anti-tank gun only took about half as many manhours to build as the 2-pdr anti-tank gun, so any 'lost' production would have soon been made up.
The 3-inch guns would have cost next to nothing to have been made available.

Yes the PaK38 was a more effective ATk gun than the 2-pdr.

Hurrah! What was that 'baby steps'?

But since the German pantsers shouldn't be able to see a well-camouflaged 2-pdr until well after it has driven into the 2-pdr effective range, the comparison to the PaK38 is irrelevant.

Oh dear! Crawling backwards again.

It takes a really perverse mind to pretend that the world is flat, to time shift evidence and to ignore historical realities.

Yes, so why do you do it?

Yes. I used the word "principally" in comparison to the efforts of the Pz.IV. A panser type that were not even trying to eliminate the ATk screen but to coerce it into giving away its position.
Are you really now going to focus on the use of the word principally to try and gain an internet warrior point?

The word principally was key to your beliefs. Your belief the British could have done what the Germans did at El Duda depends on the artillery being easily able to take out enemy anti-tank guns therefore the British are stupid in not doing the same.

Do you know how many Pz.IV were used against the El Duda position?
Do you know how many field guns of AR.33 were used against the El Duda position?
Do you know what effect each of the two weapons had?

Do you know how many 2-pdr ATk guns were in the El Duda position?
Do you know where in the position each was located?
Do you know how many were lost?
Do you know how each of them was lost?

Insipid attempt to muddy the waters when the facts of the engagement - like so many during Crusader - are clear; tough German tanks, weak British guns.

Nevertheless, taking your quote and referring you back to a post I made much earlier in the thread. Brigadier Watkins post Op CRUSADER...
Over 2 years into the war, the British are still not training their various cap-badges to work as one; each cap-badge trains alone to deliver a sequenced element of a brigade/divisional plan. Commanders pay "lip service" to doctrine and ignore it in practice.

Brig. Watkins definitely seemed a bit upset about Brigadier Inglis's intended 'undoctrinal' use of 44 RTR in the NZ link up with the Tobruk breakout, at Duda:

"Watkins tried all he knew to dissuade me. His final argument was: “We can’t navigate these things shutdown at night”, to which my reply was, “My infantry have got to walk from the feet up, so surely your people can keep their damned lids open and look out the top.” I also said; “This is the way I propose the tanks will go.” (referring to the plan I had already made), “and they’re going to Duda whatever you say; but, if you can think of a better way, put it up to me and I’ll consider it.” After a measurable silence he said, “Well, if they’ve got to go, I suppose that way is as good as any.” The story in the Tank book I referred to is that Boomer persuaded General Freyberg and, apparently with great difficulty, myself to use the tanks; and one would gather that the whole thing was a tank party. There were in fact two main reasons why I insisted on the tanks going: –

I thought that if they rolled over the enemy positions in the dark before the infantry arrived they would horrify and shake the Jerrie’s usefully. Their orders were to go at their own speed independently of 19 Battalion and not to fire (because they’d hit nothing in the dark and the flashes of their guns would only mark them out to the German A/T guns) and to start firing green flares as they approached El Duda so that our troops there would know who they were.
But mainly I wanted them at Duda in daylight next day so that 19 Battalion could have proper support if they were counter-attacked by enemy armour.

In fact the tanks (less one Matilda and two light tanks – the Battalion HQ which moved with Hartnell) went in this fashion. 19 Battalion following at a considerable interval as the tanks drew away from them did a great deal of slaughter. The German fire was so badly directed that 19 battalion suffered no casualties at all, and the Germans make no fight of it at all at close quarters."

https://rommelsriposte.com/tag/brigadier-watkins/

Not only did you cherry-pcik the words from FSRII (1935), you decided to cherry-pick from those words your own interpretation that bears little resemblance to historical reality.

Of course, I cherrypicked the words. Are you really going to argue that 'I' tanks leading and infantry following 'bears little resemblance to historical reality'?