What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by LineDoggie » 18 Nov 2018 07:52

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 18 Nov 2018 14:12

Don Juan wrote:
18 Nov 2018 00:36
I've started picking up some info that suggests that the 5cm Pak 38 was quite a bit less powerful than the British suggested it was. Which has me thinking that the emphasis on being out-ranged by enemy tanks was rather exaggerated.
I suspect the limited supply of PzGr.40 had an impact on when the German Pz.Jager had greater success and when less so.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 18 Nov 2018 14:25

Urmel wrote:
18 Nov 2018 03:10
Gooner1 wrote:
15 Nov 2018 17:52
Even without a purpose designed/converted carriage it could have been useful in the Desert.

How? Serious question. By the time the Empire forces began to understand the value of integrating various arms (which I would put sometime after July 1942) they started to have 6-pdrs in sufficient numbers, which arguably are the better option for Panzer killing.
Over 70 years of agenda driven post-war navel-gazing have turned this subject into a farce. As can be seen by all the myths created to somehow prove the voracity of the agenda and paraded in this very thread. Historical facts have become inconvenient and undesirable.

Not only has the reality that the ineffectiveness of the 2-pdr only became a 'serious' issue after the 6-pdr had already entered service been lost (as an inconvenient truth I suspect), but also that the complaints were not coming principally from the RA ATk gunners, but from RAC tank crews. It was from their complaints after being comprehensively and repeatedly beaten during the Gazala battles that the issue truely reared its head.

Satisfying their complaints could not be rectified by sticking a 3.7" HAA gun into a Crusader turret. :lol:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Don Juan » 18 Nov 2018 17:34

MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 14:12
I suspect the limited supply of PzGr.40 had an impact on when the German Pz.Jager had greater success and when less so.
I don't think that the PzGr.40 was accurate enough to be too much of a danger tbh. The British themselves only thought it was suitable for giving the coup-de-grace to Matildas at 200 yards, and of course they tended to talk up German weapons.

Liddell-Hart obtained some figures from the Germans post-war that suggested that the 5cm Pak 38 was less impressive than alleged by ME - I'll see if I can dig these out. More pertinently, the Directorate of Artillery at the Ministry of Supply did their own trials with the gun which were apparently underwhelming. These would have been conducted under the aegis of EMC Clarke, so would have been about as reliable as you could possibly get. I don't have these, sadly, but at least I know they exist (or existed).

My own theory is that British tanks that thought that they were being outranged by distant tanks were actually being hit by much closer anti-tank guns. The most vulnerable portion of the Crusader was the nominally 40mm thick front nose plate, which could be holed even by the 2 pounder at 1400 yards (iirc), but really I find it difficult to believe that this very small, narrow plate was continually being hit from 1000+ yards on fast moving Crusaders. Much more likely I think is that it was being hit from less than 500 yards by concealed AT guns.
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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 18 Nov 2018 18:00

Don Juan wrote:
18 Nov 2018 17:34
My own theory is that British tanks that thought that they were being outranged by distant tanks were actually being hit by much closer anti-tank guns. The most vulnerable portion of the Crusader was the nominally 40mm thick front nose plate, which could be holed even by the 2 pounder at 1400 yards (iirc), but really I find it difficult to believe that this very small, narrow plate was continually being hit from 1000+ yards on fast moving Crusaders. Much more likely I think is that it was being hit from less than 500 yards by concealed AT guns.
Don Juan my dear chap, somebody at last who is prepared to look at and consider historical evidence and realities rather than hand wave allegations and myths to promote an agenda. :D

The 2-pdr gun was not the problem, it was the user.

The 'superiority' of the German guns (and armor) were grossly overexaggerated - and 88mm myths created - as they provided camouflage for their own doctrinal deficiencies and tactical incompetence. Post war, a series of authors (and now legions of internet warriors), have twisted reality into an xbox crap shoot. No interest in historical facts at all.

Yes, the British had fallen behind on the penetration v protection development front - on both sides. But the British tankie was throughout the early stages of WW2 at a significant disadvantage due to the doctrine and tactics he was taught and expected to implement. Similarly, ATk gunners were expected to use mobility instead of placement to stop the pantsers. Sticking a 2-pdr on the back of truck to allow it hit-&-run performance denied the gunners a chance to place their guns and defend a line.

When do you think this was written and issued?
Image

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Don Juan » 18 Nov 2018 18:13

MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:00

When do you think this was written and issued?
Image
If it's from the RA, I would guess that it is quite late in the day - early '43?

I would be very grateful for a copy of the whole document, if you would be so generous.
"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 18 Nov 2018 18:30

Don Juan wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:13
MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:00
When do you think this was written and issued?
Image
If it's from the RA, I would guess that it is quite late in the day - early '43?

I would be very grateful for a copy of the whole document, if you would be so generous.
Bit too late.

January 1942 from a Lessons from Op CRUSADER report. HQ RA 1ArmdDiv to subordinate units.

January 1942.
1 ArmdDiv is THE front-line formation defending the civilized world from the Axis uncivilized horde.
6-pdr already in production. By the end of the following month (February 1942) there were over 60 in the ME.
The number of HAA guns in the ME is still less than 50% of requirement.
Where is the incentive/need to place precious 3.7" HAA guns into the hands of front-line formations as ATk guns?

Check your PM inbox. :thumbsup:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Don Juan » 18 Nov 2018 19:24

Thanks very much, Mark!

Here's some of the figures that Liddell-Hart gathered. I believe this table was derived from the Official History, with pencil corrections by L-H. Note that the penetration of the 5cm KwK 39 is no better than the 2 pounder, and is in fact very slightly inferior. This was not a particularly fearsome long range gun.

Table 1.jpg

This is from a letter to one of his researchers, Colonel Cooper. I think these values (in metres) correspond to the British figures given in yards.

Table 2.jpg

Here is the accumulated data on the 5cm Pak 38:

Table 3.jpg

I have to say that I haven't gone through any of these figures in detail, but the impression I get is that that 5cm guns were not the class apart from the 2 pounder as is generally portrayed.
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"The demonstration, as a demonstration, was a failure. The sunshield would not fit the tank. Altogether it was rather typically Middle Easty."
- 7th Armoured Brigade War Diary, 30th August 1941

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Damper » 18 Nov 2018 20:12

MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:00
as they provided camouflage for their own doctrinal deficiencies and tactical incompetence. Post war, a series of authors (and now legions of internet warriors), have twisted reality into an xbox crap shoot. No interest in historical facts at all.

Yes, the British had fallen behind on the penetration v protection development front - on both sides. But the British tankie was throughout the early stages of WW2 at a significant disadvantage due to the doctrine and tactics he was taught and expected to implement. Similarly, ATk gunners were expected to use mobility instead of placement to stop the pantsers. Sticking a 2-pdr on the back of truck to allow it hit-&-run performance denied the gunners a chance to place their guns and defend a line.
Image
What do you think caused British doctrine to lag behind? For all their faults British Tanks had three man turrets, Radio sets, a decent AP gun in the 2 Pounder and provision for HE to be fired in the 3" CS tanks.

I mean the technology and equipment was there to support a revised doctrine? Changes could have been made from something as simple as issuing more HE rounds to the 3" CS tanks, to something more involved as mounting 3" anti aircraft guns onto some sort of bodged carriage.

Use of the 18 pounder in the AT role has been mentioned, did that involve them changing the gun laying mechanism to allow the number 1 to aim and fire it by himself, something that would have been of assistance in the AT role, did they issue AP ammunition for it?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 18 Nov 2018 20:43

Don Juan wrote:
18 Nov 2018 19:24
Thanks very much, Mark!
Plezur!
Don Juan wrote:
18 Nov 2018 19:24
... but the impression I get is that that 5cm guns were not the class apart from the 2 pounder as is generally portrayed.
They weren't. And that's the key historical point to take away from this discussion. The difference in 'results' achieved are not based upon the hitting power of the gun itself, but upon how the guns was used.

PS. Thanks for the LH reading matter. :thumbsup:

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 18 Nov 2018 21:01

Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:00
as they provided camouflage for their own doctrinal deficiencies and tactical incompetence. Post war, a series of authors (and now legions of internet warriors), have twisted reality into an xbox crap shoot. No interest in historical facts at all.

Yes, the British had fallen behind on the penetration v protection development front - on both sides. But the British tankie was throughout the early stages of WW2 at a significant disadvantage due to the doctrine and tactics he was taught and expected to implement. Similarly, ATk gunners were expected to use mobility instead of placement to stop the pantsers. Sticking a 2-pdr on the back of truck to allow it hit-&-run performance denied the gunners a chance to place their guns and defend a line. Image
What do you think caused British doctrine to lag behind?
An inability to accept that the doctrine they had was not up to the job. An institutional delusion that failure was always somebody else's fault: the French, the Belgians, the Greeks, meddling politicians in London and on and on.
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
For all their faults British Tanks had three man turrets, ...
Which meant no room for a bigger gun. :lol:
Was that a doctinal error too?
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
Radio sets,
And?
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
a decent AP gun in the 2 Pounder
As a gun, the 2-pdr was still effective enough to do the job into late 1942, early 1943.
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
... and provision for HE to be fired in the 3" CS tanks.
I mean the technology and equipment was there to support a revised doctrine? Changes could have been made from something as simple as issuing more HE rounds to the 3" CS tanks, ...
Which CS tanks are you thinking about? If you haven't got any, what are you going to fire your HE out of? And even with your CS tanks lobbing a bit of HE, how does that help?
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
... to something more involved as mounting 3" anti aircraft guns onto some sort of bodged carriage.
Now we're going round in circles. Again! Which 3" HAA guns?
Moreover, what is the point in wasting time and effort sticking old WW1 designed AA weapons onto "bodged carriages"? As you have just mentionned, there was already a gun in use that could do the job. The user couldn't do the job. What makes you think your ex 3" HAA on bodged carriages are going to be used any better? How are you going to get the user to change his doctrine and tactics to fit these new beasts into the frontline when he refuses to accept his doctrine and tactics need changing.
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
Use of the 18 pounder in the AT role has been mentioned, did that involve them changing the gun laying mechanism to allow the number 1 to aim and fire it by himself, something that would have been of assistance in the AT role,
No idea.
Damper wrote:
18 Nov 2018 20:12
... did they issue AP ammunition for it?
Yes.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 19 Nov 2018 14:37

MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:00
The 2-pdr gun was not the problem, it was the user.
Oh, not this canard again. I thought the Official History should have laid this to bed ages ago.
"7. The performance of a projectile against armour plate is only half the story. To compare the effectiveness of the tank and anti-tank guns on both sides it would be necessary to study the complete specification of the armour, which on any given tank varied in thickness and slope from place to place. Moreover armour plates differed in quality and hardness, and there were different systems of attaching and joining them. All these matters had an effect on the power of resistance to penetration and damage. It is therefore impossible to generalize, but a few broad comparisons may be made as a general indication of the vulnerability of the tanks on both sides. The most heavily armoured of all was the British Matilda, with 78 mm in front of the hull, almost as much round the turret, and 65 mm on the sides of the hull. The thickest armour on the older cruisers was 30 mm; on the Crusader I (or cruiser Mark VI) it was 40 mm in front of the turret; in Crusader II this became 50 mm.

The German Pzkw III used in France in 1940 had no more than 30 mm of armour anywhere. This was of machinable quality, not face-hardened. Before the end of the year reports of an increase in the armour on the front and turrets of German tanks were reaching England. In April 1941 details obtained from tanks captured in the Middle East showed that this increase had been achieved by bolting extra plates in front and rear. In the Pzkw III the extra plates (32 mm thick) on the front of the superstructure projected upwards to protect the turret joint and gave the front of the tank a total thickness of 62 mm. These extra plates were found to be face-hardened to such a degree that they could keep out a 2-pdr A.P. shot at any range except the closest. Unless a shot of this type succeeded in shattering the hardened face it scarcely made any impression on the inner armour.

This method of improving the protection was an interim measure, which could be carried out without seriously affecting the output from the factories. This was Model H. The next new Model, J, differed from Model H in several respects, and the armour was of 50-mm face-hardened plate. None of Model J reached Libya until the very end of 1941.

The extra plates on Model H were not easy to detect, and it is not known how many of the tanks in 'BATTLEAXE' carried them. But the shipping lists show that hardly any German tanks reached Libya between the end of June and 19th December 1941, and as considerable numbers of tanks with extra plates were identified as having taken part in 'CRUSADER' (November-December 1941) it seems that many of them must have come over with 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division or very soon after.

Apart from these developments various alterations were made locally from time to time. But as the introduction of a new or altered model did not mean that the older tanks immediately disappeared, there were often several different types in use together. Adding this complication to the one already mentioned of the different natures of German tank and anti-tank gun ammunition, it is plainly impossible to assess accurately the technical odds in any particular encounter. At the time it was natural to generalize from the observed results, and the fact that these were often contradictory probably accounts for the wide divergence of opinion that has been recorded of the relative performance of the British and German weapons and armour.
Vol.II
"[the Germans] also increased the protection on their Pzkw III and IV medium tanks by adding plates of face-hardened steel at certain places. All Pzkw IIIs which came to North Africa had the larger gun but not all had the extra plates. It is not possible to tell what proportion of up-armoured tanks fought during 'Crusader', but subsequent examination of the battlefield suggested that there had been a considerable number.
The extra plates proved to have great power of resistance. The fact that they were face-hardened was not realized by the British until March 1942, when trials of the Grant's 75mm gun were being carried out against a captured Pzkw III. The discovery led to further tests. The plates were found to break up the 2-pdr uncapped shot at all ranges, and gave protection against the 6-pdr and the Grant's 75mm at anything over 500 yards. It was some consolation that after one or two hits the securing bolts (or more properly, studs) began to split or shear off."
Vol.III

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 19 Nov 2018 15:38

Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2018 14:37
MarkN wrote:
18 Nov 2018 18:00
The 2-pdr gun was not the problem, it was the user.
Oh, not this canard again. I thought the Official History should have laid this to bed ages ago.
"7. The performance of a projectile against armour plate is only half the story. To compare the effectiveness of the tank and anti-tank guns on both sides it would be necessary to study the complete specification of the armour, which on any given tank varied in thickness and slope from place to place. Moreover armour plates differed in quality and hardness, and there were different systems of attaching and joining them. All these matters had an effect on the power of resistance to penetration and damage. It is therefore impossible to generalize, but a few broad comparisons may be made as a general indication of the vulnerability of the tanks on both sides. The most heavily armoured of all was the British Matilda, with 78 mm in front of the hull, almost as much round the turret, and 65 mm on the sides of the hull. The thickest armour on the older cruisers was 30 mm; on the Crusader I (or cruiser Mark VI) it was 40 mm in front of the turret; in Crusader II this became 50 mm.

The German Pzkw III used in France in 1940 had no more than 30 mm of armour anywhere. This was of machinable quality, not face-hardened. Before the end of the year reports of an increase in the armour on the front and turrets of German tanks were reaching England. In April 1941 details obtained from tanks captured in the Middle East showed that this increase had been achieved by bolting extra plates in front and rear. In the Pzkw III the extra plates (32 mm thick) on the front of the superstructure projected upwards to protect the turret joint and gave the front of the tank a total thickness of 62 mm. These extra plates were found to be face-hardened to such a degree that they could keep out a 2-pdr A.P. shot at any range except the closest. Unless a shot of this type succeeded in shattering the hardened face it scarcely made any impression on the inner armour.

This method of improving the protection was an interim measure, which could be carried out without seriously affecting the output from the factories. This was Model H. The next new Model, J, differed from Model H in several respects, and the armour was of 50-mm face-hardened plate. None of Model J reached Libya until the very end of 1941.

The extra plates on Model H were not easy to detect, and it is not known how many of the tanks in 'BATTLEAXE' carried them. But the shipping lists show that hardly any German tanks reached Libya between the end of June and 19th December 1941, and as considerable numbers of tanks with extra plates were identified as having taken part in 'CRUSADER' (November-December 1941) it seems that many of them must have come over with 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division or very soon after.

Apart from these developments various alterations were made locally from time to time. But as the introduction of a new or altered model did not mean that the older tanks immediately disappeared, there were often several different types in use together. Adding this complication to the one already mentioned of the different natures of German tank and anti-tank gun ammunition, it is plainly impossible to assess accurately the technical odds in any particular encounter. At the time it was natural to generalize from the observed results, and the fact that these were often contradictory probably accounts for the wide divergence of opinion that has been recorded of the relative performance of the British and German weapons and armour.
Vol.II
"[the Germans] also increased the protection on their Pzkw III and IV medium tanks by adding plates of face-hardened steel at certain places. All Pzkw IIIs which came to North Africa had the larger gun but not all had the extra plates. It is not possible to tell what proportion of up-armoured tanks fought during 'Crusader', but subsequent examination of the battlefield suggested that there had been a considerable number.
The extra plates proved to have great power of resistance. The fact that they were face-hardened was not realized by the British until March 1942, when trials of the Grant's 75mm gun were being carried out against a captured Pzkw III. The discovery led to further tests. The plates were found to break up the 2-pdr uncapped shot at all ranges, and gave protection against the 6-pdr and the Grant's 75mm at anything over 500 yards. It was some consolation that after one or two hits the securing bolts (or more properly, studs) began to split or shear off."
Vol.III
A wall of words which only gets to suggesting a problem at the end - referring to March 1942. A problem for the 6-pdr as well as the 2-pdr.

So where is the institutional concern to push thinking that HAA guns had to be reroled as ATk to make up for the deficiency of the 2-pdr prior to the introduction of the 6-pdr? That's what this thread is about, isn't it?

The 2-pdr, as a gun, was just as effective in 1942 as it was in 1938. It's effectiveness only changed when new ammunition was provided. What changed during that period was, as highlighted above, the amount and type of armor the German tanks carried. But the German pantser was not wrapped entirely all over with this face-hardened plate, was it? It was only placed in a few key locations. And results in 1940* were no better than in 1941 or 1942.

British tankies in particular, and RA ATk to a lesser extent, were opening fire far too soon - often whilst on the move. They placed mobility to get away above combat result. Hit and run was the bible, defend a line was heresy. If 'mobility' is king in British thinking, to the extent that 2-pdr are placed on the back of trucks, you are not going to get 3" or 3.7" HAA guns into the front line. For that to happen, and if there are any available, the British Army had to institutionally upend it's entire tactical way of thinking. The problem was the user: doctrinally (we've built the best HAA gun possible, not a HAA/ATk compromise lashup), tactically (mobility is everything), and the trigger puller (fire at the right distance at the right spot).


*
Consider this. On 12 June 1940, General Fortune, GOC 51st Infantry Division, surrendered to General Rommel, GOC 7th Panzer Division at St. Valery-en-Caux. A recent TV documentary desperately wants the viewer to believe that (poor) Highlanders were badly served by their masters - blame it on the politicians!!!! The viewer is indulged with veterans saying they had nothing bigger than a Boys ATk rifle to battle the pantsers...cue lengthy discussion and demonstration of the the Boys ATk rifle and its capabilities.
Now do some fact checking....
Ignoring the French contribution under 51st Infantry Division command (which included a few small tanks), and ignoring the over establishment allocation of Field and Medium Artillery, the 51st Infantry Division had under command on 5 June (Fall Rot start date and beginning of 51st Infantry Division's problems) 141 x 2-pdr specially designed ATk guns by my calculation. Of which 28 were inside Cruiser Mk.IV pantsers. How many German pantsers did those 141 x 2-pdr guns remove from the battlefield? I don't know the precise answer, but I suspect it might not be many over zero. Whatever the exact number was/is, do we assume the reason for the low number was because the 2-pdr was an ineffective weapon or beacuse it was not used in a way that allowed it to be operationally effective?

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by Gooner1 » 19 Nov 2018 16:13

MarkN wrote:
19 Nov 2018 15:38
A wall of words which only gets to suggesting a problem at the end - referring to March 1942. A problem for the 6-pdr as well as the 2-pdr.
Clearly you prefer writing them than reading them.

This bit is important: "The extra plates on Model H were not easy to detect, and it is not known how many of the tanks in 'BATTLEAXE' carried them. But the shipping lists show that hardly any German tanks reached Libya between the end of June and 19th December 1941, and as considerable numbers of tanks with extra plates were identified as having taken part in 'CRUSADER' (November-December 1941) it seems that many of them must have come over with 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division or very soon after."

So uparmoured Panzers were a problem from the very start of their involvment in the Desert campaign.

The AP shot shatter problem existed even earlier.
The 2-pdr, as a gun, was just as effective in 1942 as it was in 1938.
Design work for the 2-pdrs successor was begun in 1938. About the same time that it became clear that the Infantry Tank Mk.II would in effect be immune to its own gun type. The Bartholomew report assumed, correctly, that the 2-pdr would not be effective much longer and recommended the 6-pdr was put into production.

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Re: What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

Post by MarkN » 19 Nov 2018 16:32

Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2018 16:13
This bit is important: "The extra plates on Model H were not easy to detect, and it is not known how many of the tanks in 'BATTLEAXE' carried them. But the shipping lists show that hardly any German tanks reached Libya between the end of June and 19th December 1941, and as considerable numbers of tanks with extra plates were identified as having taken part in 'CRUSADER' (November-December 1941) it seems that many of them must have come over with 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division or very soon after."

So uparmoured Panzers were a problem from the very start of their involvment in the Desert campaign.
Doesn't change anything I posted. It reinforces it.

The 'plates' were first inspected on 14 April 1941 in Tobruk. From that point on, the uparmoring was known.

The 1942 'awakening' was partly due to the failure at Gazala, and partly due (in the same timeframe) of reading up captured documents which showed that the pantsers being used in November/December 1941 were very same ones that supposedly had been knocked out during April-October!!!!

RAC tankies, in particular, had been massively overclaiming. During Battleaxe, 4 and 7RTR alone overclaimed by almost 100 pantsers. How is any grownup decision-maker supposed to recognise that the 2-pdr is not doing the job on the battlefield when the user is saying it is! The user was firing too early and not doing the extent of damage that he claimed. There is a write up in one of the RA ATk WDs were the ATk battery had carefully positioned itself on the ground in front of Fort Capuzzo (to defend the line) and were carefully waiting for the attacking pantsers to come within effective range. Before they got there, a swarm of Mathildas passed through their line, opened-fire at the pantsers at an excessive range and watched the pantsers turn away!

The 2-pdr remained an effective gun when used within its limits through to 1942 and beyond. However, by 1942, there were more effective guns out there which did a better job.
Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2018 16:13
The AP shot shatter problem existed even earlier.
Of course it did. But it was less likely to shatter if it hit the pantser at a closer distance and in a less protected area.
Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2018 16:13
Design work for the 2-pdrs successor was begun in 1938. About the same time that it became clear that the Infantry Tank Mk.II would in effect be immune to its own gun type. The Bartholomew report assumed, correctly, that the 2-pdr would not be effective much longer and recommended the 6-pdr was put into production.
And?

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