By 'shortage of HAA guns' you mean "They were also in demand for their primary function of AA defence" listed last in the reasons? That "also" is a real killer blow.MarkN wrote: ↑05 Dec 2019 23:41The paragraph l posted earlier (my underlining)...As far as GHQ ME was concerned, there were officially four reasons why the guns were not used routinely as ATk guns. Sights is a technical matter that can readily be solved once the need is identified. Shortage of HAA guns is a killer blow only diminished by a Gooner1 handwave. Mobility and time to fire are, l believe, key to understanding too. Mobile does not always mean mobile. How long does a mobile column have to set up their guns and to pack away when told to bug out?4. Use of AA guns in an anti-tank role
Only two minor actions have occured between anti-aircraft guns and tanks in the recent operations. In one, some 3.7-in guns had a shoot at tanks with inconclusive results; and in the other, German tanks were taken on at 1,500 yds range, and one was knocked out. These guns are not used regularly against tanks because of their lack of mobility and of suitable sights, and because of the time taken to bring them into action. They were also in demand for their primary function of AA defence.
And since when did 88s in German service at the front abandon AA defence as a function?
Sights might be a technical matter readily resolved but for optimum efficiency in a multi-role function the units would need practice in firing at ground targets, training in the co-operation with other arms and in rapid moves and deployment. You know, what certain HAA regiments in the UK had already been doing for over a year.
Also since when were German 88s limited to only a mobile role? Indeed they first came to inescapable prominence in a purely static role at Halfaya Pass.