What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

[MarkN]

Uh, no. The assumption that there were good reasons not to use HAA is one that you held as recently as a few posts ago - " Shortage of HAA guns is a killer blow".

Multiple evidence - by more than one poster - has been presented in this thread to indicate the belief in Cairo and London that there was a significant deficiancy in HAA guns held against requirement (codified or perceived).

Not having enough HAA guns to do HAA work is a "killer blow" when considering the decision why HAA guns were not sent into the desert with front line units and jock columns to plink tanks. Being a "killer blow" is a way of saying it is obvious for us 80 years later to understand the decision made: right or wrong, good or bad, agree or disagree.

Unfortunately, the "killer blow" is merely historical evidence and thus has nowhere near enough credibility to slay the myths and falsehoods longingly perpetuated on the internet that hundreds and thousands of HAA guns were sitting idle in various warehouses or flogged off to the Russians etc etc.

I fear that your killer blow, like an ill aimed armoured strike in the desert lands in thin air.

Sure, there were people in London and Cairo who would argue that there weren't enough HAA for the HAA missions, but that misses the point, and ignores some truths of organisational behavior.

No, it does not miss the point. Far from it.

Decisionmakers in London and Cairo made decisions according to their perceptions and perspectives at that time. Their perceptions, as evidenced across a gamut of written evidence, is that HAA was in desperately short supply. In parallel, there were repeated reports and briefings that the 2-pdr was still effective up to and including the CRUSADER battle. In otherwords, there was no perceived need to put HAA guns into the very front line, and a perception that they were in desperatly short numbers to do their primary role.

As far as understanding why the decisions made were made, the significant shortage of HAA guns is a "killer blow" - especially when set against the false claims of there being hundreds or thousands surplus to HAA requirements which seems to both drive and dog this issue.

The key issue was whether HAA deployed in the anti tank role was more use OVERALL than its value in air defence. There was no great air threat to the ports or bases in Egypt or Palestine. The Luftwaffe and RA lacked the capability. Rommel's Panzers threatened Egypt n ot Kesselring's aircraft.

I understand your point. But this part of the issue is quite separate. This part does not help us understand why the decisions were made, it is an attempt to judge whether those decisions were good or bad, right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, etc, etc.

I have not made a judgement along such lines as l don't believe any analysis we did now will have the level of credibility to claim any sort of definition. It would be an analysis full of what, if, perhaps and maybes (unhelpful woulda, coulda, shoulda?) and every reader attaching different values according to their own preconceptions.

At the start of WW2 the Royal Artillery was split between AA and field artillery. Of course AA Gunners would fight to retain control of AA assets. The stovepipe structure meant that their only concern was air defence. In mid war the Gunners restriuctured to mrege the two commands, which suggets that this was recognised at the time as a BAD THING.

I understand this too. I am sure it played its part within the whole. However, there are reams of evidence indicating that HAA guns, from the very outset, were deemed to have had an auxillary ATk capability/role. In October 1941, this very point was emphasized in an aide memoire written by GHQ ME and distributed within theatre.

But that role was, for the most part, neutered by their actual operational deployment. You can't plink a pantsers if it's not in range. And that is where the other reasons kick in: lack of tactical/field mobility and time into/out of firing. Now, did that come about because of petty internal RA organizational jealousies or was it a deeper issue? I suspect the latter had greater influence.

My only judgement of value is that l feel it a mistake not to have at least experimented a bit to get some tangeable, practical understanding of the workings of a section or two HAA guns working in the front line or with a jock column. Perhaps they did do just that. But l have not seen any evidence to that end. Nevertheless, such a proposal ran counter to their core belief that mobility was king in the desert.

[Gooner1]

Not having enough HAA guns to do HAA work is a "killer blow" when considering the decision why HAA guns were not sent into the desert with front line units and jock columns to plink tanks. Being a "killer blow" is a way of saying it is obvious for us 80 years later to understand the decision made: right or wrong, good or bad, agree or disagree.

Not having enough HAA guns to do HAA work might have legs - if it wasn't complete baloney.

May I remind you of the OH again "The principal targets for the enemy [airforce] at this time were Tobruk, the British desert railway, the airfields - especially Fuka and Gambut - and troops in the forward area. During March the Germans had been concentrating their air forces in Sicily for neutralizing Malta, and for this purpose they withdrew units from Greece and Crete, and left Fliegerfuehrer Afrika to make do with what he had. During April there were a few attacks on Alexandria and towards the end of the month on the Suez Canal - the first since February. The night-fighters took a heavy toll and it is probable that they shot down most, if not all, of the 4 Heinkels 7 Ju.88 lost during those few weeks."

Indeed, the only place there wasn't enough HAA guns is clearly with the forward troops, they not having any HAA guns!

But this is from the pre-Gazala period and you want to shift the goalposts back to the pre-Crusader period. Fair enough. Then there was actually 'much anxiety' in Middle East Command about the potential threat to Alexandria and the Canal area by (the fifty or so) enemy long-range bombers. Nevertheless they took the 'risk' to send some HAA batteries from the defence of Alex and the Canal to protect DAF airfields.

[MarkN]

Not having enough HAA guns to do HAA work is a "killer blow" when considering the decision why HAA guns were not sent into the desert with front line units and jock columns to plink tanks. Being a "killer blow" is a way of saying it is obvious for us 80 years later to understand the decision made: right or wrong, good or bad, agree or disagree.

Not having enough HAA guns to do HAA work might have legs - if it wasn't complete baloney.

May I remind you of the OH again "The principal targets for the enemy [airforce] at this time were Tobruk, the British desert railway, the airfields - especially Fuka and Gambut - and troops in the forward area. During March the Germans had been concentrating their air forces in Sicily for neutralizing Malta, and for this purpose they withdrew units from Greece and Crete, and left Fliegerfuehrer Afrika to make do with what he had. During April there were a few attacks on Alexandria and towards the end of the month on the Suez Canal - the first since February. The night-fighters took a heavy toll and it is probable that they shot down most, if not all, of the 4 Heinkels 7 Ju.88 lost during those few weeks."

May l remind you that the OH is writing about what happened with the benefit of hindsight. The decisionmakers at the time sited their HAA guns based upon the protection of potential targets of the Axis airforces.

Indeed, the only place there wasn't enough HAA guns is clearly with the forward troops, they not having any HAA guns!

The forward most troops had LAA guns. Guns probably better suited to dealing with the tactical aviation they were likely to encounter than HAA guns.

But this is from the pre-Gazala period and you want to shift the goalposts back to the pre-Crusader period. Fair enough.

Nope. Talk about any period you want. Just be precise as to which period you are talking about. No conflation.

The aide memoire l was referring to was writen and distributed in October 1941 and is based upon experiences learned up to that point in time. I am being clear and transparent as to what it refers to. Nothing more.

Heavy AA
(a) The normal tactical role of Heavy AA will be the fulfilment of a series of temporary static tasks (usually behind the battle zone).
...
(d) ln the siting of Heavy AA guns their primary role should always be given first consideration, but the ATk aspect must never be overlooked especially in areas where Field Artillery may be thin.

HAA guns, units and subunits always had an ATk aspect to their mission. There was no conspiracy to prevent them plinking pantsers.

The reasons why they were not routinely to be found in range of pantsers plinking effort have been stated many times in this thread already.

Have we moved past the discussion on why they were not plinking pantsers more often, or still quibbling over that? Are we now to turn exclusively to a discussion to judge whether the decisions made were good or bad, right or wrong, wise or daft, etc etc?

Then there was actually 'much anxiety' in Middle East Command about the potential threat to Alexandria and the Canal area by (the fifty or so) enemy long-range bombers. Nevertheless they took the 'risk' to send some HAA batteries from the defence of Alex and the Canal to protect DAF airfields.

:roll:

[Michael Kenny]

Guns that unwieldy in the front line are going to suffer losses. In retreat they would not fare well. How would the losses from such defeats impact on the numbers of 3.7 guns available for any task? Were there enough guns to offset the expected attrition?

[Gooner1]

May l remind you that the OH is writing about what happened with the benefit of hindsight. The decisionmakers at the time sited their HAA guns based upon the protection of potential targets of the Axis airforces.

How many months of Alex and the Canal not being bombed does it take before someone thinks "I say, why don't we move these guns to where the enemy is bombing?"
Middle East Command was guilty of poor, pedestrian, non-decision making.

The forward most troops had LAA guns. Guns probably better suited to dealing with the tactical aviation they were likely to encounter than HAA guns.

The same could be said about defending the DAFs airfield yet they typically had at least a battery of HAA.

Nope. Talk about any period you want. Just be precise as to which period you are talking about. No conflation.

The aide memoire l was referring to was writen and distributed in October 1941 and is based upon experiences learned up to that point in time. I am being clear and transparent as to what it refers to. Nothing more.

The quotes you posted with the 'killer blow' of "They were also in demand for their primary function of A.A. defence" was from Notes From Theatres of War No. 10 Cyrenaica and Western Desert January/June 1942 and published by the War Office in October 1942.

The problem with moving it forward to the Gazala battles is that all the excuses made for their non-use in Crusader disappear. 'Critically short supply'? Nope. The belief that the 2-pdr was still an effective gun - Nope. Anxiety over air-raids on Alex and the Canal, not really. Lack of sights for the 3.7" gun, not any longer. Poor mobility - there is a defensive battle to win first. Ignorance over German use of AA in A/Tk role - not even since Battleaxe.

[Gooner1]

Guns that unwieldy in the front line are going to suffer losses. In retreat they would not fare well. How would the losses from such defeats impact on the numbers of 3.7 guns available for any task? Were there enough guns to offset the expected attrition?

The first thing to do would be to ask London for more of them! Its what Rommel did, and production was buoyant, something like 50 3.7" guns per week. If Middle East Command had the brains they could have asked London for the HAA regiments that had already been trained/were training in the anti-tank role.

[Michael Kenny]

If Middle East Command had the brains they could have asked London for the HAA regiments that had already been trained/were training in the anti-tank role.

I think they would have had the brains to realise a barn-door does not an anti-tank gun make. Using the 3.7 to defend against tanks that overrun the front and reach their position is not the same as an adnance into captured ground and a quick 'dig-in' to repel the counter-attack. In Normandy Pickert refused to allow his 88s to be used as front-line AT because he realised the danger of such tactics.
How would a 3.7 AT battery work? Would it be stripped of all its AA machinery or would it be required to haul it around in the front line?

[Gooner1]

I think they would have had the brains to realise a barn-door does not an anti-tank gun make. Using the 3.7 to defend against tanks that overrun the front and reach their position is not the same as an adnance into captured ground and a quick 'dig-in' to repel the counter-attack. In Normandy Pickert refused to allow his 88s to be used as front-line AT because he realised the danger of such tactics.
How would a 3.7 AT battery work? Would it be stripped of all its AA machinery or would it be required to haul it around in the front line?

Dunno, why not try using the gun as best as possible considering its potentials but also its limitations?

In a static position it could be dug into to its muzzle, making its size and lack of mobility irrelevant. In more open warfare make sure to keep other of your forces - tanks and/or anti-tank guns - in front of them?
German tanks overrunning the front was an all too common occurrence during the period under discussion.

[Michael Kenny]

Dunno, why not try using the gun as best as possible considering its potentials but also its limitations?

The Germans had AT guns as well. Their AT guns were nowhere as large and as the 88.

In a static position it could be dug into to its muzzle, making its size and lack of mobility irrelevant.

Mobility is critical in the AT role because once an AT gun gives away it position it can be eliminated fairly easily by a variety of weapons. It the defending barn-door AT guns beat off the attack that might ensure their survival but if the enemy break through you are in deep trouble.
How deep a hole do you have to dig to get a 3.7 in to its muzzle? Is every AT battery going to be given its own bulldozer?

German tanks overrunning the front was an all too common occurrence during the period under discussion.

Bad news for dug-in barn-doors.

[Gooner1]

Bad news for dug-in barn-doors.

Meh, so long as it takes a few with them.

[MarkN]

Swopping the order of your posts deliberately to highlight a significant lack if coherence.

The problem with moving it forward to the Gazala battles is that all the excuses made for their non-use in Crusader disappear. 'Critically short supply'? Nope. The belief that the 2-pdr was still an effective gun - Nope. Anxiety over air-raids on Alex and the Canal, not really. Lack of sights for the 3.7" gun, not any longer. Poor mobility - there is a defensive battle to win first. Ignorance over German use of AA in A/Tk role - not even since Battleaxe.

And yet...

The quotes you posted with the 'killer blow' of "They were also in demand for their primary function of A.A. defence" was from Notes From Theatres of War No. 10 Cyrenaica and Western Desert January/June 1942 and published by the War Office in October 1942.

Correct.

The excuses you write of in the first paragraph as not applying to Gazala battles are the very ones written up after - and referring to - the Gazala battles. Here is the paragraph from Notes From Theatres of War No. 10 again:

4. Use of AA guns in an anti-tank role
Only two minor actions have occured between anti-aircraft guns and tanks in the recent operations. In one, some 3.7-in guns had a shoot at tanks with inconclusive results; and in the other, German tanks were taken on at 1,500 yds range, and one was knocked out. These guns are not used regularly against tanks because of their lack of mobility and of suitable sights, and because of the time taken to bring them into action. They were also in demand for their primary function of AA defence.

[MarkN]

I think they would have had the brains to realise a barn-door does not an anti-tank gun make. Using the 3.7 to defend against tanks that overrun the front and reach their position is not the same as an adnance into captured ground and a quick 'dig-in' to repel the counter-attack. In Normandy Pickert refused to allow his 88s to be used as front-line AT because he realised the danger of such tactics.
How would a 3.7 AT battery work? Would it be stripped of all its AA machinery or would it be required to haul it around in the front line?

Dunno, why not try using the gun as best as possible considering its potentials but also its limitations?

Which seems to be exactly what the decision makers in London and Cairo did: (scarce) HAA guns providing HAA protection.

[Tom from Cornwall]

The problem with moving it forward to the Gazala battles is that all the excuses made for their non-use in Crusader disappear. 'Critically short supply'? Nope. The belief that the 2-pdr was still an effective gun - Nope. Anxiety over air-raids on Alex and the Canal, not really. Lack of sights for the 3.7" gun, not any longer. Poor mobility - there is a defensive battle to win first.

Except, of course, the British were also expecting to attack first in the spring of 1942.

There may well have been a belief that the 6-pdr would redress the panzer/anti-tank gun balance somewhat.

The first thing to do would be to ask London for more of them! Its what Rommel did, and production was buoyant, something like 50 3.7" guns per week. If Middle East Command had the brains they could have asked London for the HAA regiments that had already been trained/were training in the anti-tank role.

And you have evidence that they didn't request more AA guns? So production was buoyant in the spring of 1942 - great. You might want to read about events to the east of Suez in 1942 and wonder where all the AA guns being sent to India, Ceylon, etc were originally planned to be disembarked.

You might also want to check what the priority was for shipping space from the UK to the Middle East in the spring of 1942? Guns, tanks, personnel, food, ammunition, uniforms, army forms and typewriters, and of course tea.

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

The first thing to do would be to ask London for more of them! Its what Rommel did, ...

Really?

When did Rommel ask for more 88mm?
How many did he get?
When did they arrive at the front?

Is this a handwaved claim or a sourced fact?

[Tom from Cornwall]

For transfer of AA guns to Far East in the spring of 1942, a good place to start is the excellent information that Rob Stuart ferreted out and posted here:

viewtopic.php?f=114&t=193834&p=1761268& ... o#p1761268

Regards

Tom