From 'Ball of Fire, The Fifth Indian Division in the Second World War' http://www.ourstory.info/library/4-ww2/Ball/fire08.html
In the Gazala battle after the failure of Operation Aberdeen
"The rest of Ten Brigade with the motor battalion of the 22nd Armoured Brigade and Truscott's 4th Field Regiment, stayed in their positions on Dahar El Aslagh, to hold the ridge. Here they awaited the enemy's next move, with orders to hold on to the last. To dig in the guns was impossible.
That morning, June 6, Ten Brigade, unprotected by armour, was attacked on Dahar El Aslagh. At seven o'clock heavy shelling started, and sixty tanks slowly approached the 4/10th Baluch, making use of the ground, hull down. They halted beyond effective anti-tank range, and all our six-pounders were knocked out of action without being able to retaliate with success. The 4th Field Regiment was slowly destroyed. Our guns were obliged to use their ammunition sparingly. Should they fire shells at too great a range for accuracy, or wait till the German tanks came near enough to hit with effect? If the guns did wait, they were exposed to terrible fire, for their positions were exposed. One by one, slowly, systematically, the field guns were blown up.
By half-past nine only two 25-pounders were still firing. The Baluch carriers had been overrun. At the same time the leading company commander telephoned to Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Sundius-Smith and said, "The tanks are coming through now." Ten minutes later the Colonel ordered another company to retire to the box at B.180. His battalion headquarters was taken by the first group of tanks that roared across the position. With no opposition but small-arms fire, they came forward, and sat over our slit trenches, their guns trained at point-blank range, while dismounted lorried infantry gestured "Get out---or else. . ." And so our infantry were mopped up, still fighting, but with their ammunition exhausted or very low. It was this battle that Brigadier Boucher had heard when walking over the Desert that morning towards eventual capture. Only scattered remnants of Ten Brigade escaped to tell the tale and to fight another day."
What do we learn from this?
How would the dynamics of the battle have changed with a battery of anti-tank trained and equipped HAA guns positioned 500-1000 yards behind the 6-pdrs?