Cyprus Regiment

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Phylo,

A simple "thanks" for supplying you with the source you asked for would have been sufficient!

I don't quite see your point about the POWs only being in one German unit's hands for only one day, especially as their incomplete count does not contradict your own statistics!

Thank you for the Australian figures of 36 killed, 25 wounded and 3,806 Palestinian and Cypriot Pioneers. It would appear that they amounted to about a third of Commonwealth POW losses. Now, unless you are suggesting that a third of the 60,000+ Commonwealth troops committed to Greece were Cypriots and Palestinians, I think we have, between us, established my earlier point that their losses were disproportional. Your assistance in this is much appreciated.

I am delighted for Brighadier A. S. Allen that he was Australian. However, unless he was the commander who actually
made the decision, or was the CO of the pioneers, this is irrelevant to my point. Was he either?

Commanders, plural, yes. There is a chain of command involving numerous individuals. If Parrington or any of his linear superiors, or the naval commanders, were not British, then I have no problem extending responsibility to any Commonwealth officers involved as well. I am not flag waving here, just trying to find out what happened and why. Do you have anyone in mind who would undermine the proposition that "For whatever reason, there seems little doubt that Cypriot and Palestinian pioneers were left behind in Greece in disproportional numbers. That this was so, was undoubtedly due to differential decisions made by British commanders."?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Andy H]

Hi

There is some patchy information here:- http://www.cyprusveterans.com.cy/index.php
and I'm sure if anyone is really interested then they could contact them.

Also found this snippet:-

Among these POWs were 120 Palestinian soldiers.
Most of them, about 110, belonged to Pioneer Corps Company 606 which had
been evacuated from Greece with the first troops taken off

http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Micr ... 206220.pdf
CO of 606 was Maj R L T Murray

Good info in the thread people, lets keep it on track and above all civil

Regards

Andy

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Andy,

Thanks for the links.

The Yad Vashem link was where I drew the Bundesarchiv source for Phylo, and doubtless where he went for his reply.

The Cypriot link is well presented and they seeem well organized. It includes the following: "During the retreat of the Allied Forces from Greece and Crete, the Cyprus Regiment lost some 2.500 men, most of whom were taken prisoners of war."

Cheers,

Sid.

[phylo_roadking]

A simple "thanks" for supplying you with the source you asked for would have been sufficient!

The Yad Vashem link was where I drew the Bundesarchiv source for Phylo, and doubtless where he went for his reply.

Actually, I had the link for some days, I referenced it in discussion with David Hughes by PM on the 24th. I wanted to see where you were sourcing the numbers from.

I don't quite see your point about the POWs only being in one German unit's hands for only one day, especially as their incomplete count does not contradict your own statistics!

According to a German report, of the 8,000 Commonwealth prisoners taken in the Peloponese, the following had been identified:

Because, as I noted, the report compiled on the 29th doesn't include OTHER Cypriots/Palestinians (in fact, any/all other troops) "in the Peloponnese" captured and later brought to Kalamata or Corinth - only those taken prisoner on the 28th/29th in Kalamata.

Thank you for the Australian figures of 36 killed, 25 wounded and 3,806 Palestinian and Cypriot Pioneers. It would appear that they amounted to about a third of Commonwealth POW losses. Now, unless you are suggesting that a third of the 60,000+ Commonwealth troops committed to Greece were Cypriots and Palestinians, I think we have, between us, established my earlier point that their losses were disproportional. Your assistance in this is much appreciated.

No, you are STILL patently refusing to compare "like for like" as I suggested you do some time ago now - as in comparing the number of Cypriot/Palestinian Pioneers sent to Greece with the number of Commonwealth "rear echelon" troops.

am delighted for Brighadier A. S. Allen that he was Australian. However, unless he was the commander who actually
made the decision, or was the CO of the pioneers, this is irrelevant to my point. Was he either?

Commanders, plural, yes. There is a chain of command involving numerous individuals. If Parrington or any of his linear superiors, or the naval commanders, were not British, then I have no problem extending responsibility to any Commonwealth officers involved as well. I am not flag waving here, just trying to find out what happened and why. Do you have anyone in mind who would undermine the proposition that "For whatever reason, there seems little doubt that Cypriot and Palestinian pioneers were left behind in Greece in disproportional numbers. That this was so, was undoubtedly due to differential decisions made by British commanders."?

There was no "differential" decision made on what troops to abandon. The ONLY decision was what troops to embark first.

You seem intent on ignoring the fact that the Australian Official History CLEARLY states why the remaining ~8,000 troops of ALL types were not recovered from the beach at Kalamata...where they had been marched to by Leonard Parrington that evening in FULL anticipation of being evacuated, and with a large RN evacuation flotilla due to arrive.

Why are you ignoring it?

[phylo_roadking]

To reiterate - from Playfair...

At Monemvasia the troops were quickly embarked, largely because ten landing craft slipped from H.M.S. Glenearn, when she was bombed the day before, had, with admirable foresight, been diverted there. With the last boatload went Admiral Baillie-Grohman and General Freyberg. At Kithera too all went well, but at Kalamata there was a sad disappointment. Brigadier L. Parrington found himself in command of about 800 men of the New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion, some 380 Australians and about 300 of the 4th Hussars. 6,000 others were from administrative units, mostly unarmed and in various states of disorganization. At about 6 p.m. Brigadier Parrington's patrols reported that they had been 25 miles north of the town and had seen no enemy. But at 8 p.m., as the move to the embarkation points was beginning, a German column crashed into the town and made for the quays. Here by ill chance the naval embarkation officer and his signalman were captured, and the vital link with the approaching ships was cut. Several British, Australian; and New Zealand officers led counter-attacks and a most confused affray began. By about 1 a.m. the town had been cleared and loo Germans killed or wounded. For his gallantry in this action Sergeant J. D. Hinton of the New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion won the Victoria Cross.

H.M.S. Hero had been sent ahead of the force led by H.M.A.S. Perth to gain touch with the shore, and at 8.45 p.m. was three miles off the harbour. Fighting was clearly going on and a signal was flashed from the shore 'Boche in harbour'. This was passed to the Perth and the First Lieutenant of the Hero went ashore to get further information. At 9.30 p.m. he reported that embarkation was possible from the beach and the Hero passed the news on to the Perth. A wireless defect delayed this signal until 10.11 p.m. Meanwhile the Perth, ten miles off shore, had received the first signal, had seen tracer fire on shore and had heard explosions. Her Captain reluctantly decided that the number of men that could be taken off in these circumstances was too small to warrant the risk to the ships and at 9.29 p.m. the force withdrew. The Hero embarked as many men as she could with her two whalers and at 1 a.m. the Kandahar, Kingston and Kimberley arrived and did the same. In all some 300 men were taken on board before the ships had to sail.

On shore no one knew the reason why the main naval force had withdrawn. A rumour spread that it was owing to enemy ships being at sea. In any case, Brigadier Parrington was in a most unenviable position. He was unable to protect the harbour against artillery fire, and was short of rifle ammunition and food. He decided that resistance was useless and at 5.30 a.m. on the 29th he surrendered. Of the 7,000 men captured in this way about 2,000 were Palestinians and Cypriots.

This unfortunate event did not prevent the Navy from sending in ships on the two following nights and taking off a few more men from the beaches near Kalamata and about 700 from the island of Milos. This ended the organized part of the operation, although for months small numbers of escapers continued to make their way out by all sorts of means.

On D3 of Operation Demon, Phoebe's flotilla embarked 8,650 men at Kalamata; on D5, the next night of evacuations from Kalamata...as described above...only 332 (Playfair p.105) It should have been entirely possible to remove Parrington's entire remaining force from the beaches on D5 going by the example of D3 - but for the exigencies of war.

No "differential decision" on who to abandon; except for that lucky 332...EVERY man on the beach at Kalamata was in the same boat (sic!) that night.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Phylo,

I am still unclear what your position is on the following: Were, or were not, the Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers lost in disproportional numbers in Greece? I am convinced by both sets of figures available that this was the case. Do you agree? If not, why not?

Once we have got over this basic hurdle, perhaps you can then tell us whether they were lost in disproportional numbers compared with other rear echelon troops. I am here presuming that, as you keep raising the issue, you have something substantive to tell us. If so, please just lay it before us. For myself, I don't, or I would have done so. Over to you.

I did not at any point say that, "There was (a) "differential" decision made on what troops to abandon." I therefore don't have to defend your proposition here.

You write, "The ONLY decision was what troops to embark first." I would suggest that this is a differential decision. Furthermore, it would appear to have been one made by British commanders.

I would note that you are talking about only one beach. It was not the only embarkation point for Commonwealth troops from Greece and, in fact, the overwhelming majority of Commonwealth combat troops had already been evacuated. Differential decisions as to who to evacuate, when and from where had already been made. As a result of these, it appears that the vast majority of ANZAC and British forces had already been evacuated.

I am not ignoring anything. There is no reason for me to address matters with which I am not in disagreement. If I did, this would become an even more tedious thread.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Andy H]

Hi Sid & Phylo

I'm asking you both to please keep any discourse topic related and not wonder off into the weeds of who said what, when and where in relation to each other. As it does become tiring to read and follow, whilst alienating other members from joining in. The validity of someone's argument is open to opinion and rebuttal, but that's where it should end.

All three of us have been around long enough on this and other forums, to know each others strengths weakness's and where/what buttons to press to garner a response. Your both intelligent and knowledgeable individuals in your own areas, let others see the strengths of your argument from the facts you bring, and lets not get mired in a my conkers are bigger than your conkers type of debate.

If ever we three ever get the dubious honour to meet, then you two owe me several rounds (of beer that is)

Regards

Andy H

[Sid Guttridge]

Error.

[phylo_roadking]

I am still unclear what your position is on the following: Were, or were not, the Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers lost in disproportional numbers in Greece? I am convinced by both sets of figures available that this was the case. Do you agree? If not, why not?

Sid, the issue as raised by you was one of guilt/culpability and/or scandal and ulterior motives for this happening...

Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were left behind during the evacuation in disproportionate numbers.

I have always wondered whether this was because they were regarded as more expenable than British or Dominion troops.

There is the faint whiff of a possible scandal in this, but I have nothing more than circumstantial evidence for it.

There was undoubtedly a political calculation in the withdrawal. Churchill said that had the entire force been British, he would have been more inclined to stand and fight. However, as two of the three major formations were from Australia and New Zealand they were not as expendable because of the political implications if they were lost. He got most of the manpower of his three major formations out, but not that of Cypriot and Palestinian labour units.

There is a subtext here. It is just a matter of what it may consist.

...though we can see where you began to change your position -

Nobody, as far as I am aware, is suggesting that the fact that a disproportional share of those left behind in Greece were Palestinian and Cypriot pioneers was intended or manipulative.

But the fact remains that they were left behind and somebody in the British camp was presumably culpable.

Do you now at least accept...

I am not flag waving here, just trying to find out what happened and why.

...that you DO now know what happened, and while there may be blame to be attributed for the final evacuation at Kalamata not being carried out, there was no guilt/culpability? As in no possible scandal or faint whiff of it, no ulterior political/imperial motives, for the pioneers having been left behind?

[phylo_roadking]

In relation to Playfair's account...

On shore no one knew the reason why the main naval force had withdrawn. A rumour spread that it was owing to enemy ships being at sea.

...there's a hint that that opinion MAY also have been held at sea From the deck log of HMAS Perth, the flotilla flagship (naval-history.net)...

28th - Took part in evacuation of allied troops at Kalamata with HMS PHOEBE, HM Destroyers DECOY, HASTY, KANDAHAR, KIMBERLEY and KINGSTON. Withdrew when fires ashore silhouetted ships and forced to leave many soldiers behind.

..given that they'd only be silhoutted against fires on shore from seaward...

Looking at Craig Thomas' "Crete 1941: The Battle At Sea", there's some more detail available on Operation DEMON, from the POV of DEMON returning troops from Greece to Crete. He notes that were WAS some concern at Axis submarines operating in the area, one having been detected and attacked on the night of the 28th by the Allied vessels carrying out the evacuation from Monemvasia...although postwar there was no evidence of German or Italian submarines operating in the area.

He further says this -

In Suda Bay, Pridham-Wippell believed that about 7,000 troops awaited rescue from Kalamata where the mole and the quay would facilitate a speedy embarkation. Accordingly he desatched a considerable force of HM ships with the expectation that the total force ashore could be lifted in the one night's operation. This force which was designated Force B was under the command of Captain Sir Philip Bowyer-Smith, a Royal naval officer commanding the Australian cruiser Perth....

In his Report a few days later Bowyer-Smith wrote: "As soon as I saw these explosions ("big explosions" onshore - my note from Thomas' account) I realised that during the embarkation Force B would be in an extremely hazardous tactical position in the event of attack from seaward. Ships would be silhouetted against explosions and fires on shore, which would be embayed and unable to scater, and there was no covering force in the offing. Taranto was only twelve hours steaming away and with the information the enemy obviously had, such an attack was far from improbable."

It is evident that Bowyer-Smith had made a rapid appreciation of the situation and had quickly decided to abandon the operation. The factors which led him to this course of action are numerous, as he indicated in his Report. He was influenced by the belief that enemy submarines were in the viciniyt. he was more strongly influenced by the threat of surfacer attack from seaward. He was apprehensive in case the secrecy of the operation had been disclosed. He considered that the time at his disposal was insufficient to embark the estimated numbers from open beaches without the aid of landing craft. (LCAs had been used at Monemvasia and left there after an attempt to destroy them with shellfire wasn't effective - my note) He was influenced too by the enormity of possible failure: "The forces under my command", he reported, "constituted a substantial part of the light forces of the Mediterranean Fleet whose loss would be in the nature of a calamity, particularly in view of recent cruiser losses."

Bowyer-Smith considered the choices open to him: firstly, to withdraw the whole force: secondly, to commit the whole force to the embarkation: thirdly, to withdraw the cruisers and leave the destroyers. Weighing all these thoughts carefully, he concluded that "either all must stay or all must go. Reluctantly I decided that the number that could be got away did not warrant the substantial risk to an important force."

Accordingly, at 2129 Bowyer-Smith, who had made a cautious approach to within six miles of Kalamata, now reversed course and increased speed to 29 knots to get clear of the embarkation area. Bowyer-Smith ordered the Hero (by now detached inshore as described previously - my note) to rejoin the Force.

Thomas does note that Ernie Cunningham wasn't very impressed with Bowyer-Smith's decision or subsequent Report; referencing p.356 of Cunningham's postwar "A Sailor's Odyssey", he notes that Cunningham called the decision "unfortunate", and notes that Bowyer-Smith was overly concerned with intervention by RM surface craft although there was scant evidence for such a fear. On the contrary the "safe" assumption would have been that the Italians wouldn't have ventured another night action after Matapan indicated the RN possessed radar for night actions. fear of attack by submarines or MTBs would have had more credence, but this fear rated no mention in Bowyer-Smith's Report.

He also notes that it's "suprising" that Bowyer-Smith didn't attempt to obtain more information from Commander Biggs, the Hero's First Lieutenant onshore who at least had SOME grasp on what was going on. Given that his messages to Bowyer-Smith lacked much of the information the Force B commander required for an evaluated decision...Bowyer-Smith didn't ask for any clarification or additional information

One forum discussion I've seen indicates that Cunnignham sent Bowyer-Smith a signal that he was "very disappointed"; whether directly related or not - when Bowyer-Smith was replaced as Perth's captain in September 1941 by Hector Waller - he never held a sea command again.

[Sid Guttridge]

I am still unclear what your position is on the following: Were, or were not, the Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers lost in disproportional numbers in Greece? I am convinced by both sets of figures available that this was the case. Do you agree? If not, why not?

It is necessary that you answer this in order to establish that we are discussing what we both agree was a real phenomenon.

My position on this is clear and is set out above. What is yours?

Only once we are agreed that we are dealing with a real phenomenon (that Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were lost in disproportional numbers in Greece) is there any reason to apportion "guilt/culpability and/or scandal and ulterior motives" for this.

Alternatively, if you can demonstrate that Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were not lost in disproportional numbers in Greece, then all these questions become redundant.

Cheers,

Sid

[phylo_roadking]

I am still unclear what your position is on the following: Were, or were not, the Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers lost in disproportional numbers in Greece? I am convinced by both sets of figures available that this was the case. Do you agree? If not, why not?

It is necessary that you answer this in order to establish that we are discussing what we both agree was a real phenomenon.

My position on this is clear and is set out above. What is yours?

Disproportional to other nationalities left behind at Kalamata? Yes.

Do YOU now accept that this wasn't intentional or planned? That there was every intention for these men to be evacuated?

Disproportional to other Commonwealth rear echelon troops sent to Greece OR lost in Greece?

Not for me to establish. I suggested that you establish those numbers some time ago now rather than continuing to pontificate and allege wrongdoing without data.

Do YOU now at least accept...

I am not flag waving here, just trying to find out what happened and why.

...that you DO now know what happened, and while there may be "blame" to be attributed for the final evacuation at Kalamata not being carried out, there was no "guilt"/culpability? As in no possible scandal or faint whiff of it, no ulterior political/imperial motives, as to the nationalities of those left behind in such numbers?

[phylo_roadking]

Now that you've edited your last post in reaction to mine -

Only once we are agreed that we are dealing with a real phenomenon (that Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were lost in disproportional numbers in Greece) is there any reason to apportion "guilt/culpability and/or scandal and ulterior motives" for this.

You are the one who initially alleged it...

Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were left behind during the evacuation in disproportionate numbers.

I have always wondered whether this was because they were regarded as more expenable than British or Dominion troops.

There is the faint whiff of a possible scandal in this, but I have nothing more than circumstantial evidence for it.

Now that you have been shown that this is NOT why they were present in disproportionate numbers at Kalamata on D5 of Operation DEMON, and that there was in fact every intention of evacuating them on that night, are you prepared to withdraw your allegation of possible scandal with regards to them being there because they were regarded as more expendable because of their nationality?

[Sid Guttridge]

Dear Phylo,

Of course I haven't edited my post in reaction to yours.

Indeed, you couldn't possibly know that even if I had! For that to be so, you would have to observe me read your subsequent posts between 1710 and 1716, and I am pretty sure you weren't looking over my shoulder!

But now that you have raised the accusation, I think you had better substantiate it. Well?

Cheers,

Sid.

[phylo_roadking]

Of course I haven't edited my post in reaction to yours.

Indeed, you couldn't possibly know that even if I had!

But now that you have raised the accusation, I think you had better substantiate it. Well?

Why, certainly!

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1765975

by Sid Guttridge on 27 Jan 2013 18:03

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1765979

by phylo_roadking on 27 Jan 2013 18:10

I am still unclear what your position is on the following: Were, or were not, the Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers lost in disproportional numbers in Greece? I am convinced by both sets of figures available that this was the case. Do you agree? If not, why not?

It is necessary that you answer this in order to establish that we are discussing what we both agree was a real phenomenon.

My position on this is clear and is set out above. What is yours?

Cheers,

Sid

...but then - back to post 1765975 http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1765975

Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 27 Jan 2013 18:16, edited 1 time in total.

...during which time these extra two paragraphs appeared.

Only once we are agreed that we are dealing with a real phenomenon (that Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were lost in disproportional numbers in Greece) is there any reason to apportion "guilt/culpability and/or scandal and ulterior motives" for this.

Alternatively, if you can demonstrate that Cypriot and Palestinian Pioneers were not lost in disproportional numbers in Greece, then all these questions become redundant.

While not a fan of Windows Vista, there are occasionally some uses to having several AHF tabs on several windows open at the same time - not all of them always refreshed to the latest edit of a post.

Now...

....that you have been shown that this is NOT why the Cypriot and Palestinian pioneers were present in disproportionate numbers at Kalamata on D5 of Operation DEMON, and that there was in fact every intention of evacuating them on that night, are you prepared to withdraw your allegation of possible scandal with regards to them being there because they were regarded as more expendable because of their nationality?