Paratroops and panic Belgium 1940

[daveh]

Paratroops:
On 26 3 40 G.Q.G published
Instruction relative a la Defense contre les parachutistes enemis

The information within was based on a study of the documents seized in the Mechelen crash of 10 1 40 and from Belgian intelligence. The Mechelen documents showed that the capture of bridges over the Meuse south of Namur was planned. The instruction identified the role of parachutists as
Sabotage
Espionage
Creating panic.

Parachute drops were expected to be in small groups or as individuals and to be in the rear of the Front line. It was noted that uniforms of the Belgian Army, the Belgian Gendarmerie or any Belgian public utility might be worn.

This information was given down to company level and to all local gendarmerie brigades together with a sign stating

Beware of paratroopers and saboteurs

which were to be plastered on walls. The same notice was broadcast by radio and published in the press. Le Soir published a long article on 6th April 1940 paraphrasing the G.Q.G instructions and finishing with the admonition for everyone, civil or military, to be constantly on the alert.

The actions of Quisling and his supporters and the hiding of German troops and supplies in merchant vessels during the attack on Norway added to the air of nervousness.

Civilians were asked to report any sightings of paratroopers and sabateurs to the authorities.
On May 10 1940 the Germans did use paratroopers in Belgium but these were on the Front Line to capture bridges over the R. Meuse and eliminate Eben Emael as a threat to the captured bridges.
However paratroopers were also reported in many other areas including Namur, Brabant, Flanders, near Antwerp and Brussels. Some of these sightings were due to the German use of dummy paratroopers, straw figures dressed in ex czech uniforms and often fitted with firecrackers designed to go off on hitting the ground. These dummies were dropped singly or in small groups over an extensive area stretching from the Albert canal to PFL-Mons-Charleroi and Namur. A total of c.400 dummies were dropped, many by the Ju 52/3ms that had towed the gliders used in the attacks on the bridges and Eben Emael.

As had been planned the G.Q.G responded by using units of 1st Light Regiment, T13 companies of PFN and PFL and units of 3rd lancer regiment to sweep the reported areas. Rear area units established improvised road blocks and held any suspicious people they found. The continued encouragement to be on the alert led to a number of incidents e.g.

1) Individuals carrying guns being held - in fact farmers and hunters taking their guns to hand them in as the government requested.
2) Parachutes - Allied air crew who had parachuted from crippled aircraft
3) Allied troops in unrecognised uniforms including e.g. sport kit.
a) The provost of the 13th DI joining his unit is reported as a suspect.
b) At the 6th ID (Ile CA), the 10th Company of the 1st Grenadiers encircles and captures gendarmes of the Divisional Provost.
c) In the region of Wavre St. Catherine, the grenadiers open fire on May 14 on a
column of the first Carabinieri, mistaking them for German paratroopers, causing losses.
d) Major General Ernest Graff, Divisional Commander of Infantry, 6th I.D. held by men of the 22nd Genie and threatened by civilians at Lier. Only released when recognised by a senior policeman he had served with in WW1.

Panic:

To add to the problems of paratroop sightings were reports of fifth columnists many in disguises such as the famous nuns. These suspicions were passed along the chain of command increasing the burden on communications and the number of men were to check out such reports.

Having asked the public to be constantly vigilant and report anything suspicious the Government from May 15 started to publish headlines in newspapers saying

Calm down please.

This was backed up by a radio roadcast by the Prime Minister stating that no paratroopers had landed in or near Brussels.
However by now news of the extensive landings by paratroops in various parts of The Netherlands was being reported and this lead to further reports of paratroop landings. The G.Q.G. response was to order its officers to stop talking about paratroops.

The series of retreats, Albert Canal - the KW line -R. Scheldt when much of the Army felt it had not been defeated led to a feeling of betrayal and suspicion. Memories/legends of 1914 arose once more. This was partly due to the fact that on the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of WW1, in August 1939, many papers published articles on the legends of 1914 which included a department store in Liege owned by Germans having hidden German army uniforms. These stories were repeated in 1940 adding to the general level of paranoia. As a result liaison officers from G,Q.G. were often delayed and/or arrested. By 20th May G.Q.G. orders to ignore 5th columnist and paratroop reports had calmed Army units down.

The large numbers of refugees fleeing Belgium were viewed with suspicion by French Army units on the border, especially those speaking Flemish.

Afinal example of what the atmosphere of distrust could feed on in May 1940. A Belgian company had started a natiowide advertising campaign for its Chicory. As part of this a large number of enamel signs with a bright red and white motif were mounted on shops, houses and walls and were o be found in towns and along many, including secondary, roads. All innocent enough it would seem however:

1) On the back of some of these signs sketch maps were found - they indicated where the sign was to be placed.
2) Signs were found along the roads designated for use by units of Groupemont K – and most other roads to.
3) Wrriting in German on the back of the sign and Germanic style words on the front – found in German speaking areas. The word on the front was the name of the company who put the signs up. The details on the back were instructions on how to mount the sign without damaging it.
Discovering this took time and in the end it was ordered that all the signs be taken down or be defaced. Some 34,000 signs were taken down by both military and civilians.

The use of a small number of paratroopers against bridges near Eben Emael and in the attack on Eben Emael itself was not planned for. Neither was the use of gliders.
The use of dummy paratroopers led to a heavy burden on the communications system as the reports of actual, dummy and imaginary paratroopers multiplied and spread. Front line troops were held back to search for the supposed paratroops with these forces including all Belgium's ACG-1 tanks, a number of T13s as well as motorised units.
The fear of paratroopers declined in the Army after about a week due to lack of further provale landings and a firm stance ordered by G.Q.G.

Less could be done about the problem of 5th columnists and spies. A cobination of stories from WW1, rumour and the early encourageent by the government for civilains to beware of saateurs and be alert for suspicious people led to a general auru of nervousness. This heightened as the Belgian Army retreated and led to a search for someone to blame...even if that someone was a nun with a slight moustache or a German speaker fleeing through a French speaking area.