Books on Logistics

[jessebowes]

Hey, i'm writing a university essay which is focusing on the importance of logistics on the eastern front during WWII. Do you guys have any recommendations?
Thanks, I appreciate any responses!

[Sheldrake]

Here are some starters.

Groundbreaking as a military study of ;logistics, but a little dated and flawed. Martin Van Crefeld - Supplying War

This might be what you are looking for. The kindle version is cheap as chips. Lots of numbers and some challenging conclusions https://www.amazon.co.uk/Enduring-Whirl ... 1910777757

Williamson Murray Strategy for Defeat looks at the Luftwaffe https://www.amazon.co.uk/Strategy-Defea ... 0898757975

But these are secondary sources. The US ETHINT series has transcripts of interviews with zee Germans.You university should have some way to get access these. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/FMS/FMS-2.html They are on fold3 an ancestry subscription gives you access. These are is listed under "Supply." Not all are specifically eastern front, but you should find something you can use.

Airborne operations DA Pam No. 20-232, pp. 27-28, 65
Airlift; aerial delivery containers DA Pam No. 20-201, pp. 60-62, 64
Armed Forces, joint supply organization to save waste and duplication of effort MS # P-013m, pp. 22, 23
Captured materiel, utilization by Germany MS # P-103
Consumption and attrition rates of Army Group Center, Russia, 1941 MS # P-190
Field training school for supply troops MS # D-284
Forests and swamps, Supply of forces in MS # P-052, pp. 26, 34, 55, 56, App.. p. 25
Frostbite in the German Army MS # P-062 (Ger)
Gasoline for armored units MS # A-872, par. 29
German army group operations on the Eastern Front, 1941-45 MS # P-114a-c
German oil, nickel, rubber supplies, 1944 MS # C-065
German supply troops MS # T-8, Vol. 24
Germany and her Allies, coordination of effort MS # P-108
Horses, German use on the Eastern Front MS # P-090
Improvisation MS # T-21, pp. 51-64
Integrated armored army, supply MS # P-053
Liaison between Second Air Fleet and Army Group South MS # D-039
Logistical Group Center, Russia, 1941 MS # T-8, Vol. 5
Logistics during 1he advance into Russia, 1941 MS # T-8, Vol. 6
Logistics problems of Army Group A during its defensive withdrawal, Jan 1943-Dec 1944 MS # T-8, Vol. 19
Military essays of Gen Blumentritt MS # C-096
Modern infantry, Supply for MS # P-0S5
Partisans, Supply of, 1941-45 MS # P-125
Private property, use in peacetime maneuvers MS # P-073
Protection of supply lines for Army Group Center, 1941-43 MS # D-102
Protection of supply lines in the southern Ukraine MS # D-157
Protection of supply routes against air attack, Italy, 1944-45 MS # D-191
Rail and road net, importance to operations in Russia MS # T-7
Rail transportation, direction to army groups by OKH MS # T-8, Vol. 26
Rear area security in Russia MS # T-19
Rear area security in White Russia, 1943 MS # D-224 (Ger)
Relationship of political and economic factors to military operations (Blumentritt) MS # B-654
Russia, airlift to Demjansk, 15 Feb to 19 May 1942 MS # D-262
Russia, duties of an army level G-4, 1941 MS # P-201
Russia, functions of the field agencies of OKH Chief of Supply and Administration, 1941 MS # T-8, Vol. 2
Russia, German supply system in, 1941 MS # T-8, Vol. 1
Russia, strategy of the 1942 offensive MS # T-14 (Ger)
Russian warfare, peculiarities MS # T-22
Stalingrad airlift, Nov 1942-Feb 1943 MS # T-15, App. 7
Strategy in the East, 1941-42 MS # T-6

[Cult Icon]

Enduring the Whirlwind 1941-1943

War Diaries of Halder and Bock

[ljadw]

Many of the sources in English are obsolete, it is better to look at sources in German who are easily available , and are essential for the understanding of the failure of Barbarossa :

some examples about the German railways (railways were the deciding factor in logistics )

Die Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug (essential)

Schienenstrang nach Stalingrad

Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg

And on the winter of 41/42 : Winterkleidung oder Munition (on Geschichtsforum de .)

[South]

Good afternoon Jesse ,

Welcome to AHF.

Ref: "any recommendations";

You've received some quality leads already.

For icing on the report "cake", consider a head note....attributed to Gen Omar N. Bradley.... the now famous

"Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics".


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[Paul Lakowski]

Many of the sources in English are obsolete, it is better to look at sources in German who are easily available , and are essential for the understanding of the failure of Barbarossa :

some examples about the German railways (railways were the deciding factor in logistics )

Die Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug (essential)

Schienenstrang nach Stalingrad

Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg

And on the winter of 41/42 : Winterkleidung oder Munition (on Geschichtsforum de .)

......and if they are not translated into English what good are they?

[MLW]

There is this period document produced by the US military.

[ljadw]

Many of the sources in English are obsolete, it is better to look at sources in German who are easily available , and are essential for the understanding of the failure of Barbarossa :

some examples about the German railways (railways were the deciding factor in logistics )

Die Reichsbahn im Ostfeldzug (essential)

Schienenstrang nach Stalingrad

Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg

And on the winter of 41/42 : Winterkleidung oder Munition (on Geschichtsforum de .)

......and if they are not translated into English what good are they?

You could start by learning German .

[ljadw]

"Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics".


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

I like to warn for this sentence, because it is a potentially dangerous clincher .

[ljadw]

US and UK did not activily participate in the war between Germany and the SU, thus, their opinion/information about this war is not that important , especially as their sources are shaky .

Would anyone advice German sources about US logistical problems in the war against Japan ? I don't think so. Thus ,what is the reliability of US wartime sources about German logistics in the East ?

[ljadw]

I wish Jessebowes a lot of luck, because he will need it , as for the Soviet side only a gap exist : almost nothing is available .

And the danger is ,that he will (have to ) concentrate on the German side , which will give a wrong picture .

[South]

Good morning Ljadw,

True, when taken out of context the quote "Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics", has risks to it. When properly used, the quote is correct.

......

Lend-Lease is a shaky record ?

Infrastructure does offer some relevance. The Trans Siberian Railroad received some technical help from the US and the notes were available.

The Li-2, the Soviet version of the American DC-3, generated some basic records.

The rest, the daily material such as POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants), ammo, medical supplies, food, truck, rail locomotives, aircraft spares, have little records, but there were "guesstimates".

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[ljadw]

"Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics " is a questionable clincher : it should be : amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk strategy and logistics . "


The clincher is also dangerous, because he gives the impression that to win, only better logistics are needed, which is wrong, because it negates the presence of the enemy .

Front generals always have the tendency to blame the logistic responsibles for their failures,and always negate the presence of the enemy .

About LL : this was not giving US a reliable picture of the Soviet production and transport system, capacity and problems ;for this US were dependent on the goodwill of the Soviet authorities,and given the Soviet paranoia (they did not trust each other, thus why should they trust American capitalists?),it is obvious that this goodwill was conspiciously absent .

As before and after WWII, the SU was ,during WWII, terra incognita .

For the German side, it was not better . During WWII US informations about German logistics in the East did not exist .Besides, why should US need such informations ?

And after the war, US were dependent on unreliable informations from German POWs,who a ) tried to impose their biased convictions on their jailers or b ) were writing what their jailers wanted to read . And, there is also the fact that the informations from the German POWs about Russian logistics were very incomplete and unreliable .

It was not much different on Soviet side : the efficiency of the Soviet spy organisations has been much inflated ,for obvious reasons .

The same for the US spy organisations, also for obvious reasons .

[South]

Good morning Ljadw,

Agree with your specifics re the quote. Please review my "when used correctly".

Agree with your Lend Lease comment that a reliable picture was not available for exacting US analysis. The US political establishment made a "trade off" in knowing they would not get quality information but would have the Soviet Red Army engaged on the Eastern front.

Throughout the Soviet Union's existence, information was limited to the Atlantic Alliance. Yet, information was not 100% absent. There were "listening posts" such as international conferences, happenings in places like West Berlin, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Helsinki, Finland, Hong Kong,BCC, Havana, Cuba. I forgot where Naval Officer Yevgeni Ivanov was assigned so here I'll just use London, UK.

You presented the summary statement I also use: "why should US need such information?". Before, during and after WWII, the US/Atlantic Alliance had, for example, the Aeroflot route map, grain purchases info on the world market, etc, Without or without information on military supply inventories on the Eastern front.......only the results mattered. Not too much new under the Sun.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[ljadw]

The postwar CIA informations about the SU turned out to be unreliable : constantly the CIA inflated the Soviet strength figures (remember the unexistent missile gap),was this caused by incompetence or was it intentionally ? Maybe it was a mixture of both .See : Asssessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War A Failure of Intelligence ? (Mark Trachtenberg )

The GRU estimates were not better .

The GRU estimates about the Wehrmacht strength in 1941 were even ludicrous:it was assumed that the Germans and Finland,Romania and Hungary could attack with 233 divisions, 10500 tanks and 13900 aircraft .