Issues with Danny S. Parker's Hitler's Warrior Joachim Peiper bio

[Michael Kenny]

Along with these 30s the total holding figures of Panthers of SS-1 pz rgt will be over 100, how could they receive tanks more than their available crews?

You lose 30 tanks you receive 30 replacements.
As in 90-30+30= 90 and not 120.
You need to understand that though you might drag every wrecked tank back to the workshops and mark it down as 'In repair' it does not actually mean it got repaired.

I did say you need to know the dates the replacements arrived at the unit but that is beside the point.
Having 140 tanks in repair on a single day means something hit the unit very hard indeed. .

[jacobstuart]

Along with these 30s the total holding figures of Panthers of SS-1 pz rgt will be over 100, how could they receive tanks more than their available crews?

You lose 30 tanks you receive 30 replacements.
As in 90-30+30= 90 and not 120.
You need to understand that though you might drag every wrecked tank back to the workshops and mark it down as 'In repair' it does not actually mean it got repaired.

I did say you need to know the dates the replacements arrived at the unit but that is beside the point.
Having 140 tanks in repair on a single day means something hit the unit very hard indeed. .

I afraid i don't agree with your claim.

Let's take a look at your source first.
If these 30s were newly sent, the total holding figures will become 106. That's unreasonable even when the LAH was under full-strength since it had only 93 Panthers (22 for each four companies and 5 for HQ) in its authorized strength, let along after seeing weeks of actions in the eastern front, the crews could be in short. Think about it.

Besides, according to NARA source there were only 76 Panthers under all conditions held by LAH in December 10.

as for the Tigers, if the 10s is the "newly arrival", or the "reinforcement" as you'd mentioned, they had never reached the LAH.

Lastly, i'm just saying under comparison with the situation of one WH elite unit in the same time, same area and same campaign with his unit, his perform wasn't look that bad, was it?

[Michael Kenny]

Besides, according to NARA source there were only 76 Panthers under all conditions held by LAH in December 10.

On Dec 10 there were only 7 Panthers able to fight. That is 89 Panther less than they started with just over a month before.
That means 20 have already been written off and 71 were in the workshops.
No one knows how many of the 71 were repaired and went back into service but given the low numbers for 1st SS in the weeks after this date it can not have been that many.
1st SS were issued 44 Panthers and 20 Pz IV replacements in Dec '43-Jan '44.

Lastly, i'm just saying under comparison with the situation of one WH elite unit in the same time, same area and same campaign with his unit, his perform wasn't look that bad, was it?

1st Pz numbers are not as well documented as 1st SS so we only know that both Divisions were severely handled by the Russians.
1st SS started with 216 tanks and in less than a month later had shrunk to 20-30 runners.

[jacobstuart]

On Dec 10 there were only 7 Panthers able to fight. That is 89 Panther less than they started with just over a month before.
That means 20 have already been written off and 71 were in the workshops.

Peiper took over SS-Pz Rgt 1 in Nov. 20 after the death of Schoenberger, and he didn't lead his new Rgt into first action until Nov. 22, after the II./SS-Pz Rgt 1 reported 25 Pz IVs available for combat when it finished recovering its own tanks broken down south of Brusilov in the preceding days.
See Agte p. 249.

so, compare with its full-strength status of +90 Pz IVs, the II./SS-Pz Rgt 1, and even the whole Rgt, was apparently already under poor availability rate before Peiper took over the command. Should we also shift this responsibility onto him since Schoenberger was dead?

1st SS were issued 44 Panthers and 20 Pz IV replacements in Dec '43-Jan '44.

source pls.

[Michael Kenny]

source pls.

Fire Brigades, Kamen Nevenkin. Page 796.

[Michael Kenny]

Nov 20 1943 197 tanks with the Unit
Dec 1 1943 153 tanks with the Unit
Dec 10 1943 169 tanks with the Unit
Dec 30 1943 144 tanks with the Unit.
That means up to 53 tanks were total losses Nov 20-Dec 30.
To this must be added an unknown number of the 144 tanks 'in repair' that did not get repaired.

[Harro]

Isn't this basically the same discussion: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... &start=435

If I look at his previous posts it seems to me that the sole reason for "jacobstuart"s presence in these forums to keep his attacks on Westemeier and Parker going - to keep trying to distort the facts in defense of his hero Peiper.

[Cult Icon]

I don't really buy Parker's description either as panzers fighting their way through AT guns was typical fighting there.

Maybe a mod can fold these elements into the JP tactics thread

[jacobstuart]

Besides, according to NARA source there were only 76 Panthers under all conditions held by LAH in December 10.

1st SS were issued 44 Panthers and 20 Pz IV replacements in Dec '43-Jan '44.

No newly arrivals been recorded during Dec '43 under watch of XXXXVIII Pz Kps in NARA T-314.

The statistics of M.Wood & J.Dugdale will lead to a double calculate.
Had the 3*30 in red actually arrived the front on schedule, the pz rgt would been over-equipped at least twice. It doesn't make sense regarding the personnel loss as well as the absence of leaping growth of pz availability during that period. Imo it makes sense that 3*30 represented actually one batch of 30 as remark which been promised to be delivered to LAH but only 10-12 of them duly received in early January 1944. the rest might follow.

[Michael Kenny]

Had the 3*30 in red actually arrived the front on schedule, the pz rgt would been over-equipped at least twice. It doesn't make sense regarding the personnel loss as well as the absence of leaping growth of pz availability during that period. Imo it makes sense that 3*30 represented actually one batch of 30 as remark which been promised to be delivered to LAH but only 10-12 of them duly received in early January 1944. the rest might follow.

You set up your own straw man of 3 x 30 =90 tanks and then solve the problem by defaulting back to that which is obvious to everyone else.

It is the same 30 tanks in all 3 entries.

[Harro]

I don't really buy Parker's description either as panzers fighting their way through AT guns was typical fighting there.

Maybe a mod can fold these elements into the JP tactics thread

The point is that Peiper's attack was a stubborn repeated headlong attack without reconnaissance. Nothing typical about that.

[Travelswithhermes]

Oh my, a lot of recent replies had nothing pertinent to do with my original post.

[Harro]

This one does

Okay, in that case which chapters?

[Travelswithhermes]

This one does

Okay, in that case which chapters?

Haha, got me there Harro! I'll try to get those chapter numbers for you this week.

[DParker]

Sorry readers aren't happy sometimes with my writing. Yes, I do like to ponder what is on the mind of people I study.

Is it best to assume historical figures have no thoughts? I like understanding people as living, moving and thinking human beings rather than airless historical cardboard cut outs.

Here are the two offending instances mentioned:
The moon cast an eerie glow over the scene as he gazed across the wooden balcony rails with his back to the gurgling river. His thoughts wandered. His wife was away. Although his friends in Germany called regularly, he was alone. (This is page 270)

All of these things other than "his thoughts wandered" are factual. I went to the place in Traves myself and sat at night on the balcony and listened to the river. I studied the phase of the moon that Bastille eve night and reckoned (as did the Dijon Police) on how it would have illuminated the scene. It was a fact that he as alone and in a phone call from Benno Müller he told Müller that he was thinking of that fact. My opinion: when people are alone and waiting, they are seldom without thought. I don't really describe in this passage what Peiper's thoughts might be, but I do alert the reader to the likelihood. Moreover, in an interview, Müller's wife told me her husband mentioned hearing a note of worry in Peiper's voice when they hung up the phone that night.

Another:
Peiper also emoted a note of caution: “I am not a ‘war junkie’ looking for and desiring war.” So why did he leave Himmler’s services? Would he come back? 16 No, but he did have second thoughts. (This is page 87)

Peiper wrote "I am not a war junkie" in a transcribed, and translated letter to Hedwig Potthast. There is no supposition there; I reproduced the translated text verbatim. He DID have second thoughts when he left Himmler's company. How do we know? Because his wife, Sigurd, described his misgivings in detail in a letter to Potthast reproduced bottom page 109 and top of page 110.

On all the questions about my emphasis of the relationship between Peiper and Potthast, if you read carefully you see that I don't make the mind up for the reader. I outline the possibilities. You can do it yourself. I only focused on his relationship there because the letters were so compelling. Further, after the war, my interviews with Judith Van der Heide were remarkable relative to their insight. As a writer, would one ignore such perspectives? Or is it that readers just would rather no know?

So while I won't defend my writing style, I maintain that when I ponder the thoughts of my subject, most often, I have very good reason. Otherwise, we'll just have to agree to disagree on how to present Peiper's story.

There are other accounts to read for those disappointed. While these books are far from perfect, they are what I can manage with my best effort to understand another man and another time.

That, it turns out, is difficult enough.