German Missile Tech

[buba]

German is the first which develop Missile as weapon, after the war they had developed AAM,SSM,AShM and SAM. My question is Allied and Sovyet took advantage of this weapon ? Who gain much from this German technology?Allied or Sovyet?

[the Rocketman]

Buba

Both sides did take avantage of the German rocket development.
Allied did take much of the Highrank developers
Soviet did take the technics
Development of both sides was a race on who was first.

If you are intresten in the development on site is very good on the V-2
take a look at http://www.v2rocket.com/

Greetings

Bert

[T. A. Gardner]

For whatever reason, the German missile systems seem to have gotten alot more publicity than their Allied counterparts. For example the Germans developed, as you note, missiles for air-to-ar, air-to-surface and, surface-to-surface use among others. One reason the Germans pushed ahead with development and deployment of such weapons was they were losing the war. This was one more attempt to cast about for a solution that could change this outcome.
For the Allies, missile development could take (and did take) a more measured approach. Various systems were tried, tested but, few were actually used. A few US ones from the WW 2 and just post war period include:

JB-1, JB-2 (a V-1 copy that first flew 60 days after the first V-1 was launched on England), JB-3 Tiamat an AAM, JB-10 and BAT (a USN ASM deployed in small numbers in the last days of the war).

Early US post war programs included:

MX-770 Nativ, MX-771 Matador, MX-774 (vastly improved V-2), MX-775 Snark, MX-674 Tarzon, MX-606 Gapa / Condor, MX-570 Tiamat, MX-799 Firebird, MX-798 (eventually developed into Falcon). The US Navy likewise had a number of programs as did the US Army.

If anyone really benefited from the German research in rocketry and missiles it was the Soviets. German technology allowed them to make giant strides forward quickly post war where in the West the German technicians and engineers were really just one small cog in an already vast engineering effort.

[the Rocketman]

I don't agree with you about the influance of the German rocketry in the US program.

The US did launch more than 50 V2 in the years after the war and they did use the knowledge out of these launches more than the Russians in the race to space and in the wapon race.
By the end of the fourties all Germans were back from Russia, and the development was totaly Russian.
While the US did use there Paperclip people untill there retirement.
Even now some of them are acting as advisors.

The German rocket development was more developed and at a far more higher level than any othere country in the world.


Greetings,

Bert

[Lkefct]

I think one of hte suprising things is that the US had not developed a guided bomb. There is little or no need for a long range rocket for the US, like the V2. If the germans had a force of strategic bombers they would not have needed the V2. The guided bombs would have addressed the lack of accuracy that the US had from high altitude bombing. Hitting a movign targetr from 20,00 feet is almost impossible, Nordon bomb sight or not.

AA missles are a nice supliment to flak, but they are no replacement for interceptors. The US again had enough priority, they they have very little motivation to develop AA missles given teh reliance towards fighters.

The surface to surface is also of limited usefulness to the US. No country except mayb the USSR had more ground based artillery, or as many aircraft dedicated to support ground units. The US fire control is infintely superior tot the USSR. The US forward observers can direct obscene amounts of artillery on targets. Missles are nice to destroy a target with a single shot, but the alternative is to be able to direct a lot of rounds into the same area. That accomplishes the same thing. even if it is not as elegant a soulution as one shot, one kill like a missle does.

[T. A. Gardner]

I don't agree with you about the influance of the German rocketry in the US program.

The US did launch more than 50 V2 in the years after the war and they did use the knowledge out of these launches more than the Russians in the race to space and in the wapon race.
By the end of the fourties all Germans were back from Russia, and the development was totaly Russian.
While the US did use there Paperclip people untill there retirement.
Even now some of them are acting as advisors.

The German rocket development was more developed and at a far more higher level than any othere country in the world.


Greetings,

Bert

You may not agree but Von Braun and project Paperclip only effected a very miniscule portion of US post war missile development. Von Braun and the 300 or so other scientists, engineers and, technicians brought to the US worked for the US Army first at White Sands New Mexico and subsequently moved to Redstone Arsenal in Alabama.
They had no direct influence and only limited indirect influence on:

GALCIT (Guggenheim Aeronautics Laborotory California Institute of Technology) later the JPL. This group post war worked primarily for the USAF and had little connection to the US Army's projects at Redstone.

ORDCIT (Ordinance Department) later this group evolved into the Redstone aresenal group, the sole one Von Braun and company worked for directly most or all of the time.

US Navy, Pt. Mugu / China Lake. Completely independent of Paperclip. Primarily involved in tactical missile development. Developments like Bat, Bullpup and, Sidewinder were wholly developed without direct Paperclip input.

Contractors (a partial list):

Convair: The first post-war project was MX 774. This was an improved V-2. Charles Bossart and his development team essentially redesigned the V-2 airframe to imcrease its efficency. Reaction Motors (later Rocketdyne) redesigned the engine giving 17% greater efficency. The overall effect gave tripled range and doubled payload. Bossart's use of nitrogen to pressurize the fuel tanks and give structurial rigidity to the airframe was a unique innovation. The whole project owed nothing to Paperclip beyond Bossart having access to the V-2 design and missiles.

Martin Aviation: MX 771 Matador. A large vehicle launched cruise missile that had limited testing. Owed little or nothing to German research.

Northrop Aviation: Snark MX 775. Other than Northrop having several V-1's for testing Snark was a completely homegrown design.

MX 674 Tarzon by Bell aircraft: This combined a television guidance system with a Tallboy bomb. No German input here.

MX 776 Rascal, Bell Aircraft: No German input. A late war / post war development completely home grown. Follow-on Mastiff program likewise.

Univeristy of Michigan: MX 794 Wizard. This was an ongoing ABM study, an area not even considered by Von Braun during the war.

MX 570 Tiamat (JB 3) Hughs Aircraft: This was a wartime developed AAM that eventually evolved into Falcon. No German input.

North American: MX 770 Nativ and Navajo. This was an intercontinental cruise missile that was completely a North American design.

Von Braun did have input on Private, Corporal, Redstone and, to some degree, Saturn. Atlas used in the Gemini program was a Convair product outside Von Braun's influence.

The point is that in this field Paperclip and German wartime missile development had really very limited input in the West.

On wartime use of a guided air to surface missile, the US did deploy to Burma with the 36th Bombardment Group Azon. This was a guided bomb like Fritz X. There it was used against bridges along the Burma railway with reasonable success.

[gaussianum]

I've seen heaps of documentaries, and they all emphasize the importance of Von Braun's team on the space program

They do not take merit from the americans, since they state that the pioneering work was done by Goddard, if I'm not mistaken.

I think the germans were subcontracted to build, or test a rocket, don't know which one. Their cautious approach was deemed too laborious and time-consuming for the set deadlines, so they actually flew it before testing was complete.

I think the approach was that americans wanted (and rightly so) to build the missiles themselves, and learn most of the technical aspects themselves, and used Braun's team for consultancy, especially when things went wrong.

Needless to say, american rocket development went wrong quite a few times...

Best Regards

[the Rocketman]

Sorry Guys,

But I'ts my feeling that the discussion is drifting out of the specs of the question that Buba did ask.
Some answers are bent to national feelings, and not in to the historical reality.
So please keep the original question in mind before you place a answer in this.

With regards


Bert

[T. A. Gardner]

To answer buba's question directly, the Soviets benefited a great deal more directly from German rocketry research post war than did the Western Allies and the US in particular. This is simply because the US already had a fairly large and diversified program for research into this field in place whereas the Soviets did not. In the post war period the US initially used some German research to boost their already extant programs where such research helped. But, much of the development was original and not German in orgin.
For the Soviets it was simpler and quicker to go from the German research and developments milking these and the engineers / scientists they captured for all they were worth. As with many other contemporary Soviet programs once they had gotten all they could from the Germans they pushed them aside in typical xenophobic and paranoid fashion in favor of their own personnel.
It is interesting to note that the US made fairly rapid progress in the post war period towards much more powerful engines and developing more efficent fuels where the Soviets stuck for a number of years with basically the V-2 engine using WW 2 era developed fuels like LOX - alcohol or RFNA - gasoline or alcohol. The SS-6 ICBM used 32 of what were essentially cleaned up V-2 engines to propel it! Compare this to the US Atlas with a two engine booster stage and a single engine second stage.

[At ease]

I don't agree with you about the influance of the German rocketry in the US program.

The US did launch more than 50 V2 in the years after the war and they did use the knowledge out of these launches more than the Russians in the race to space and in the wapon race.
By the end of the fourties all Germans were back from Russia, and the development was totaly Russian.
While the US did use there Paperclip people untill there retirement.
Even now some of them are acting as advisors.

The German rocket development was more developed and at a far more higher level than any othere country in the world.


Greetings,

Bert

You may not agree but Von Braun and project Paperclip only effected a very miniscule portion of US post war missile development. Von Braun and the 300 or so other scientists, engineers and, technicians brought to the US worked for the US Army first at White Sands New Mexico and subsequently moved to Redstone Arsenal in Alabama.
They had no direct influence and only limited indirect influence on:

GALCIT (Guggenheim Aeronautics Laborotory California Institute of Technology) later the JPL. This group post war worked primarily for the USAF and had little connection to the US Army's projects at Redstone.

ORDCIT (Ordinance Department) later this group evolved into the Redstone aresenal group, the sole one Von Braun and company worked for directly most or all of the time.

US Navy, Pt. Mugu / China Lake. Completely independent of Paperclip. Primarily involved in tactical missile development. Developments like Bat, Bullpup and, Sidewinder were wholly developed without direct Paperclip input.

Contractors (a partial list):

Convair: The first post-war project was MX 774. This was an improved V-2. Charles Bossart and his development team essentially redesigned the V-2 airframe to imcrease its efficency. Reaction Motors (later Rocketdyne) redesigned the engine giving 17% greater efficency. The overall effect gave tripled range and doubled payload. Bossart's use of nitrogen to pressurize the fuel tanks and give structurial rigidity to the airframe was a unique innovation. The whole project owed nothing to Paperclip beyond Bossart having access to the V-2 design and missiles.

Martin Aviation: MX 771 Matador. A large vehicle launched cruise missile that had limited testing. Owed little or nothing to German research.

Northrop Aviation: Snark MX 775. Other than Northrop having several V-1's for testing Snark was a completely homegrown design.

MX 674 Tarzon by Bell aircraft: This combined a television guidance system with a Tallboy bomb. No German input here.

MX 776 Rascal, Bell Aircraft: No German input. A late war / post war development completely home grown. Follow-on Mastiff program likewise.

Univeristy of Michigan: MX 794 Wizard. This was an ongoing ABM study, an area not even considered by Von Braun during the war.

MX 570 Tiamat (JB 3) Hughs Aircraft: This was a wartime developed AAM that eventually evolved into Falcon. No German input.

North American: MX 770 Nativ and Navajo. This was an intercontinental cruise missile that was completely a North American design.

Von Braun did have input on Private, Corporal, Redstone and, to some degree, Saturn. Atlas used in the Gemini program was a Convair product outside Von Braun's influence.

The point is that in this field Paperclip and German wartime missile development had really very limited input in the West.

On wartime use of a guided air to surface missile, the US did deploy to Burma with the 36th Bombardment Group Azon. This was a guided bomb like Fritz X. There it was used against bridges along the Burma railway with reasonable success.

With the Artemis moon mission receiving some publicity recently and relying on previous Saturn launch vehicle developments, I was pleased to find
access to a copy of:

Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles
commissioned by NASA and written by Roger E. Bilstein

Serious aviation enthusiasts will be familiar with the works of Dr. Bilstein.


http://www.freebookspot.club/Comments?E ... _(NASA_SP)


For background:

Dr. Roger Bilstein completed the PhD degree at Ohio State University in 1965, and his dissertation analyzed the progress of aviation during the 1920s. His interest in aviation stemmed from boyhood fascination, especially the role of general aviation in western Nebraska, where he grew up.

As a university history professor, he taught history courses in twentieth century US history, but also offered courses in the history of technology and the history of aviation and space. During 1970-71, he was contracted by NASA to write the official history of the Apollo-Saturn launch vehicles, which won an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) history award. Among his eight books are "Flight in America" and "The American Aerospace Industry;" he also wrote several dozen articles as well as numerous encyclopedia entries on aviation and space. In 1977-78, he was a Visiting Scholar at the National Air and Space Museum (NASM); in 1992-93, he was named as the Charles Lindbergh Fellow at NASM.

https://airandspace.si.edu/support/wall ... e-bilstein

T.A. Gardner is well known on various forums, especially at Armchair General(when it was still operating) for downplaying the role of Werner von Braun and fellow German contributors to rocket development.

In the following passage, Dr. Bilstein makes very clear how highly von Braun and fellow Germans are regarded in relation to rocket guidance systems by quoting C. Stark Draper.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Stark_Draper

[.....]
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL

The Saturn rockets relied on inertial guidance, involving a rigid
member within the vehicle. This member, an integral element of the
guidance package, was oriented and held unchanging by means of gyro
units, gimbal systems, and servomechanisms. Additional equipment tied
into the inertial guidance unit contained all the data needed to sense the
distance traveled by the vehicle and the deviations from the desired path
and to control the vehicle in accordance with its computer memory. (15)
The guidance and control techniques applied in the Saturn program
involved many problems. Successful solutions were reached partly through
new research and development and partly through the use of proven
techniques and hardware adapted from existing systems. The Saturn
digital computer and the data adapter stand out as new developments.
The inertial platform, on the other hand, was a result of concepts and
hardware worked out in the late 1930s and early 1940s in Germany.
Inertial guidance rested on the technology of precision gyroscopes.
Gyroscope technology progressed considerably during World War I,
based on requirements for controlling the gunfire of long-range naval
guns at sea. During the 1920s and the 1930s, further development of
gyroscopic systems involved aircraft applications, which included rate-of-turn
indicators, the artificial horizon, and the directional gyro. Despite
the remarkable advances in aviation guidance instruments for navigation
and "blind flying," instrument precision and response rates were inadequate
for application in high-speed rocket vehicles. New developments
were required in gimbal systems, servomechanisms, electronics, computers,
and other equipment leading to inertial guidance systems for rockets
and missiles. An intensive effort to perfect such hardware occurred in the
late 1930s and during World War II, particularly through the work
accomplished in missile research by the von Braun team in Germany.
C. Stark Draper, a leading postwar specialist in the field of guidance and
control,, acknowledged the contributions of the von Braun team in no
uncertain terms. "Beyond doubt," he declared, credit for the realization
of inertial guidance belongs to the Peenemuende group of German
scientists who developed the V-2 ballistic rocket missile. (16)

In the A-4 missile (the V-2), a pair of gyros was used in a guidance
system known as the LEV-3; one free gyro controlled roll and yaw, one
controlled pitch, and a tilt program put the missile into the proper
angular attitude after its vertical launch. The LEV-3 employed a gyro-type
accelerometer as a propulsion cutoff system, the device being preset
to cut off the engines when the missile reached a predetermined velocity.
With this pair of two-degree-of-freedom gyros, the LEV-3 was a three-axis
stabilized platform (an inertial guidance concept), the result of very high
quality research and development in precision machinery, materials,
advanced theory, and innovative design concepts. Moreover, the whole
system was manufactured in quantity.(17)
The LEV-3 was a milestone in the art of guidance and control for
rockets; it established the basic design concepts for the inertial guidance
concepts that followed during V-2 development in wartime Germany (18).
One of the most significant developments occurred through the work of
Fritz Mueller, at Kreissel Geralte GMB. H. This was the SG-66, a
three-axis platform with advanced accelerometers and integrators. Boasting
much improved precision and accuracy, it was coming into production
for use in German missile systems when the war ended. After the von
Braun group moved to Huntsville, Mueller directed further refinements
of advanced V-2 guidance concepts developed at Peenemuende which
ultimately resulted in a far superior piece of equipment. The new variant
featured 'an air-bearing system for three single-degree-of-freedom gyros
integrated in a gimbal-ring structure; this yielded a three-axis stabilized
platform. Further work by other Peenemuende veterans and an analog
guidance computer devised with American researchers at the Redstone
Arsenal culminated in the ST-80, the stabilized platform, inertial guidance
system installed in the Army's 1954 Redstone missile. Prior to
launch', the intended flight profile was fed into the missile's computer
guidance program. During flight the ST-80 combined with the guidance
computer kept the missile on its preplanned trajectory with no external
guidance influences(19).
The ST-80 of the Redstone evolved into Jupiter's ST-90 (1937); both
were turned over to the Ford Instrument Company for manufacture.
When the Saturn I began to evolve, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency
(ABIVlA) guidelines called for the use of proven and available hardware
wherever possible. For example, the early Saturns incorporated the
ST-90 stabilized platform with an IBM computer, the ASC-15 model,
adapted from the equipment used on the uprated Titan II(20). At a later
date, as other vehicle test milestones were passed, a different guidance
and control unit was proposed. This new unit, the ST-124, was an
improved inertial guidance platform intended for the Saturn V's complex
and long-term orbital mission.
[.....]

pp 242-243.

Dr. Bilstein discussing some aspects of von Braun's management:

Managing Saturn

In 1962, pausing to look back over a career in which he played a key role,
as a leader in rocket research, Wernher von Braun noted two
key significant factors of success. First, the group of German rocket experts,
known as the von Braun team at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC), had been a "fluid, living organization," shaped by and responding
to external forces. Second, in three decades of consistent activity at the
forefront of rocket development, an activity conducted with a "singleness
of purpose, we have had only one long-range objective: the continuous
evolution of space flight," von Braun emphasized. "Ever since the days of
the young Rakentenflugplatz Reinickendorf in the outskirts of Berlin in
1930, we have been obsessed by a passionate desire to make this dream
come true." Despite the changes over the years in personnel, in geography,
in nationality, and in bureaucracies, von Braun continued, "many of
our methods have remained unchanged." l Many of these methods would
persist during the Apollo-Saturn program and carry over into other
phases of management at Marshall Space Flight Center.
No major Saturn component, whether engine, stage, or instrument
unit, evolved without numerous--and continuous---problems.
The persistence of various snarls is easily perceived by dipping at
random in von Braun's "Weekly Notes" or "Daily Journal" from 1961 through 1970.
Predicaments occurred everywhere and every day. Although complications in the
Saturn program lingered, it is apparent that the most annoying problems tapered
off during 1966. With increasing frequency, entries in the "Weekly Notes" and
"Daily Journal" reported tests "successfully accomplished," results "well below red line,"
and hardware with "component qualification complete. ''2
The rising note of technological optimism in the Saturn program
stemmed from the elaborate research, development, and test programs,
followed by carefully controlled fabrication and manufacturing guidelines instituted by
both NASA and contractors and managed by MSFC.

THE DIRECFOR OF MSFC
As Director of the new Marshall Space Flight Center in 1960, von
Braun faced some immediate managerial challenges. The core of the
staff had come from ABMA's Development Operations Division, which
he had directed fi)r the Army. But that division had been a research and
development group depending on other ABMA offices for ancillary
support and administrative services. After the transfer to NASA, the
MSFC director had to develop an administrative as well as technical staff,
in addition to providing procurement contracting, facilities engineering,
and other support services. The yon Braun team not only fl)und itself in
a civilian organization for the first time, but also the style of operations
had changed. There were new responsibilities for numerous projects, as
opposed to the ABMA experience of dealing with only one prime project
at a time. 3
In spite of the increased responsibilities under the MSFC organization,
management retained a distinctive in-house capability--what von Braun
liked to call the "dirty hands" philosophy. This attitude, resulting from
years of active work' as a research and development group in
Germany and from the Army arsenal concept of the ABMA days,
[.....]

pp 261/262

Throughout other parts of the book by Dr. Bilstein, von Braun, and his team, are mentioned numerous times.

From the index pages:

yonBraun, Werner, 10ill.,20ill.,38ill.,68
ill.,69,262ill.,277ill.,287, 373ill.;ABMA
research, 26,28,33-34, 37;all-upconcept
doubts, 348, 350-51; early career, 11,14-
15; Huntsville, influence on, 391-95; liquid
hydrogen fueldoubts, 44-46, 400;management policies, 62, 261-67,287,289-90,
293-94; MSFC director, 42,57,124, 245-
46, 355,357,359-61,391; Pegasus program
evaluation, 334,336, 337; Pregnant Guppy,
supportfor, 310- 11; schedule delay
handling, 157-58, 223-24, 227-29, 231,
364, 366
yonBraunteam, 14,38ill.,56,259, 261,
391; ABMAresearch, 18,23,27-28,31,
33;conservatism, 15,333-34, 349; contractor relations, 82,266; inertial guidance
development, 242, 244; NASA, transfer to

It is clear, from this book by Dr. Bilstein alone, that von Braun had a significant and very positive impact on the US space program both civil and military.

Incidentally, Werner von Braun was the initial recipient of the Robert H. Goddard Memorial Trophy in 1958.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dr._Rober ... ial_Trophy

I believe that this award would be some indication as to the level of esteem that he was regarded by the US space fraternity, despite the continued and biased outpourings by T.A. Gardner in many military history forums to the contrary.

I wish he would stop making himself look foolish.

It detracts from a balanced view of history.