Hi,
I found it in OH 1917 II p 8, which mentions the French army taking a rest after the spring offensive, while the British took over and possibly a joint offensive later in the year, possibly decisive
Thanks for this and the following quote from the OH - as for how well the French under Joffre or Nivelle would have understood what it meant to "rest" their troops, I found these extracts from Petain's report of 29 May 1917 in Barnett (pp.244-246) interesting:
… It is difficult to determine how far one particular cause is significant rather than another. It is therefore necessary to place them in two different categories: those which emanate from life itself at the front, those that are due to outside influences.
Against the first, the General -in-Chief is armed up to a certain point. He is unarmed in the case of the others, and only the government can act effectively here.
Concerning life at the front, one finds, at the base of the troops’ indiscipline, general weariness, the question of leave, drunkenness and, it is necessary to acknowledge it, the faults of the command during the recent offensive.
As an accessory to this, one can point out a weakening in the repression of crimes and military offences.
The orders for the great offensive … had obviously aroused exaggerated hopes. It was repeated that our troops would reach Laon on the first day.
These promises were broadcast as far as the soldier in the ranks … In fact, we have progressed little despite very severe losses, the destruction counted on has been totally insufficient, the struggle has been very hard, and having begun on April 16, is not finished today.
All that period of orders and counter-orders which followed till the end of the month has been disastrous. The troops put in the line on April 19 received successively information that they would attack on the 23rd, then the 25th, then the 29th, at last May 3 and 5. Successive counter-orders of this kind are depressing in the extreme for those carrying them out. To prepare to attack is to face the probability of death. One deliberately accepts this idea once. But when they see the awful moment postponed again and again the bravest and the steadiest become demoralized. In the end, physical resistance and nervous tension alike have their limits. The troops who attacked on May 5 were at the end of their tether, having been in the front line for seventeen days under intense and continuous fire.
… one must lay down as an absolute rule that a man coming back from hard fighting (Somme, Verdun, Aisne) will not rest properly if he is exposed to shelling and even the sound of gun-fire. It is utopian to believe that troops can recover physically and morally from their emotions and from exhaustion in an area under bombardment, or if they know that they are likely to be sent suddenly back into the line.
It follows that … it is necessary to send troops relieved from the front to complete rest in the rear.
On the other hand, one must oppose the very distinct tendency shown in certain units and even among their commanders, to demand as a right prolonged rest after any period of fighting.
Barnett, never one to underplay his material, described this report as 'Wellingtonian in its brutally cold and candid good sense' and that the remarks show 'perhaps the essence of Pétain’s quality as a soldier: his profound understanding of what war meant to those who have to fight it, his compassion, his knowledge of the possible, and his ability to express these things so lucidly'.
Regards
Tom