Why didn't Britain stay neutral?

[glenn239]

1) Grey's answer to Lichnowsky began, "I do not think that ...". It was his answer not the Cabinet's however much you obsess over the word "we".

Grey's quote on the matter in Twenty Five Years, has already been cited. It looked to me like you've never read Grey's book, yet somehow you have opinions on his thinking. Is that correct? Have you read Twenty Five Years?

When Grey answered Lichnowsky on 1 August, the pro-French faction in cabinet would not have agreed to pledge British neutrality on that condition. That may split the cabinet and the Liberal government falls. That's what Grey said on the matter later, and that's why it was impossible for him to say "yes" to Lichnowsky's 1 August inquiry.

3) 'No war' as in 'Britain not at war' was the determined ambition of a majority of the Cabinet up to, and including the 2 August. Not my imagination. Historical fact as recorded at the time and evidenced throughout the issue and decision-making.

The cabinet debate was to either go in on France's side or break up the Liberal government. The number of cabinet ministers willing to cause the fall of the government for neutrality was quite slim - as few as 1 or 2. Those willing to break up the cabinet instead of neutrality contained all the heavy hitters on the Liberal side, Asquith, Grey, and yes, even LG, IMO.

5) Grey did not get the 'all in for France' you claim he was after - and yet he didn't resign. Why? Coz he got what he wanted - the Cabinet stuck by the agreement that it had helped draft just 2 years earlier.

Grey had no reason to resign - cabinet delivered the naval pledge necessary to cover the French army's flank on 2 August. On the matters where cabinet did not agree - naval and army mobilization - these were done without cabinet consent and presented as a fait accompli.

6) It is clear that, at some point which cannot be precisely stated, Grey recognised war was inevitable. I suggest late on 29 July.
And having come to that understanding, it was obvious that Britain would/should fight on France's side rather than Germany's or find a third way. But, as you quote, it was to stand by France NOT stand by the Triple Entente. Again, the mental gymnastics prove to complex for you to handle.

As already covered at length, Grey preferred peace to war unless this came at the cost of the unity of the Triple Entente. In that instance, war was better. You talk of Grey's thinking but give the impression you know next to nothing about what he actually said of these matters. Here's a sample,

"One danger I saw so hideous that it must be avoided and guarded against at every word. It was that France and Russia might face the ordeal of war with Germany relying on our support; that this support might not be forthcoming...of course I could resign....but what good would my resignation be to them in their ordeal?"

Bold and underlined is mine. Grey was not some hobby historian with a pet theory sitting cozy 100 years from danger. He was a foreign minister aware of how powerful Germany was and how little margin for error the Entente had with such nonsense half-measures as you suggest. If it were war, it was to be the Triple Entente versus the Central Powers. If it were peace, only a peace that did not threaten the unity of the Triple Entente.

[Don71]

Im far away to claim Germany was a Sleepwalker or a victim of the July Crises. Empire Germany did a lot of stupid things before and during the Juli Crises. To me the Schliefen Plan is the biggest factor, why Germany is jointly responsible for the WWI, because he completely curtailed the political and military scope of the acting people and had no relation to political developments to respond to them. So it was a totaly stupid plan from a political viewpoint.

I don't think the Schlieffen Plan much mattered. Where Germany was responsible was deliberately moving to create the conditions for a full-blown crisis out of an otherwise solvable assassination.

But Empire Germany diidnt work to an european War or wanted or planed an european War.

No, but Berlin was aware that in its support of Austria, that contingency might arise.

Oh and you think the mobilization of the russian army didn't do the same.

Where is the argument that the terror of the panslawism with the murdered Franz Ferdinand, was an "normal" issue?
Where is the argument that Russia as Great Power is allowed in the name of panslawism to mobilize their army to protect Serbia, but A-U isn't allowed to react to a clear act of terrorism which was provoked clearly from Serbia?
With which argument has A-U less "rights" at the concert of the great powers then Russia?
Serbia was a neighbour to A-U and not to Russia and Empire Germany has disappointed A-U at 1912-13 at the two Balkan wars, a repeated non-support from Germany to A-U would most likely have led to a break between Germany and A-U, Germany's last loyal ally. In that regard, such an option for Berlin was not possible. Besides the terror of Serbia to A-U was in need of a clear stop signal after the assassination in Sarajewo
Also I can't see why the interests of russian panslawism at the Balkan should have had more "weight" and therefore the legitimation to go to war (mobolization of the russian army), then the integral interests of A-U which were affected with the murdered crown prince, who also represented one major political wing of the the A-U politicans, which were after the assassination out of balance.

The serbs provoked a reaction from A-U and also Germany was this time in the boat too, not the other way round!

Imagine what have happened if some irish nationalist has murdered the english crown prince and Empire Germany or France has intervented with an army mobilization to reactions from GB?!

[glenn239]

I didn't answer because nobody asked me. Whilst that wouldn't normally stop me, I think that the argument was more nuanced than either of the positions that you & MarkN have adopted so have kept out of the debate except to point out your error. In my opinion Grey's policy evolved as the crisis developed and it cannot easily be given a single comprehensive description.

Grey's pretty clear in Twenty Five Years that he had no intention of being foreign secretary in a neutral Britain with France at war.

Oh dear, I see that you're back to making up claims by others to create your strawmen. I never said that Grey would not resign if France was not supported only that it was not what he said in cabinet on 1 August which after all was your original claim.

In the discussion with Mark whether the resignation threat came on the 1st (as I originally recalled) or 2nd (as it appears to have been) is immaterial. The fact that it was made shows that Grey would break up the Liberal cabinet rather than permit a neutralist stance.

[Terry Duncan]

Im far away to claim Germany was a Sleepwalker or a victim of the July Crises. Empire Germany did a lot of stupid things before and during the Juli Crises. To me the Schliefen Plan is the biggest factor, why Germany is jointly responsible for the WWI, because he completely curtailed the political and military scope of the acting people and had no relation to political developments to respond to them. So it was a totaly stupid plan from a political viewpoint.

I don't think the Schlieffen Plan much mattered. Where Germany was responsible was deliberately moving to create the conditions for a full-blown crisis out of an otherwise solvable assassination.

But Empire Germany diidnt work to an european War or wanted or planed an european War.

No, but Berlin was aware that in its support of Austria, that contingency might arise.

Oh and you think the mobilization of the russian army didn't do the same.

Where is the argument that the terror of the panslawism with the murdered Franz Ferdinand, was an "normal" issue?
Where is the argument that Russia as Great Power is allowed in the name of panslawism to mobilize their army to protect Serbia, but A-U isn't allowed to react to a clear act of terrorism which was provoked clearly from Serbia?
With which argument has A-U less "rights" at the concert of the great powers then Russia?
Serbia was a neighbour to A-U and not to Russia and Empire Germany has disappointed A-U at 1912-13 at the two Balkan wars, a repeated non-support from Germany to A-U would most likely have led to a break between Germany and A-U, Germany's last loyal ally. In that regard, such an option for Berlin was not possible. Besides the terror of Serbia to A-U was in need of a clear stop signal after the assassination in Sarajewo
Also I can't see why the interests of russian panslawism at the Balkan should have had more "weight" and therefore the legitimation to go to war (mobolization of the russian army), then the integral interests of A-U which were affected with the murdered crown prince, who also represented one major political wing of the the A-U politicans, which were after the assassination out of balance.

The serbs provoked a reaction from A-U and also Germany was this time in the boat too, not the other way round!

Imagine what have happened if some irish nationalist has murdered the english crown prince and Empire Germany or France has intervented with an army mobilization to reactions from GB?!

The major problem here Don is that the Austrians had no evidence for involvement from the Serbian government, their own investigation said that such a policy was far from the Serbian governments thoughts, and the assassins were all Austrian citizens. The Austrians promised a dossier to all the great powers before they acted, but failed to delieve anything more than claims. The situation may well have been different if Austrian had provided evidence proving Serbia was to blame, but they did not such thing, and more importantly did nothing in the way of making a diplomatic effort to smooth the ground for some form of action with Russia? Sazonov proved willing to talk and to offer various solutions if Austria would have only accepted them.

The Germans having only one reliable ally is a good point, but if that ally is to jump into the fire deliberately, it doesnt make it any more sane for you to follow suit.

[glenn239]

It is interesting that you have felt the need to edit the quote from Grey to make it appear that it was referring to the enquiry from Lichnowsky on 1 August when in fact he was referring to the German response to his earlier request regarding respecting Belgian neutrality. Indeed the original paragraph in Twenty Five Years was not, as you have tried to make it appear, his taking a hard line approach but rather a description of the inability of the cabinet to agree a position as the latter part of that paragraph makes clear:

Grey's response to Lichnowsky on 1 August was in reply to Lichnowsky's inquiry of 1 August. His account in Twenty Five Years was that cabinet would not have made any agreement for neutrality on the basis of Belgium because there was a group in cabinet that would not agree to do so.

[glenn239]

According to Grey's account of their meeting of 3 August in Twenty Five Years, Lichnowsky claimed to have little knowledge of the German plans:

Perhaps, but irrelevant in any case. Lichnowsky was probing for possible neutrality terms from Britain and, had Grey indicated neutrality on the basis of Belgium were possible rather than not, Lichnowsky would have pursued the matter in Berlin immediately. Had the reply from Berlin been in the negative, this would be to the tremendous advantage of the British, for Germany would have invaded Belgium through a British offer of neutrality not to. Grey did not reply in the affirmative because, as he explained in Twenty Five Years, the Liberal cabinet could not had delivered terms of British neutrality - it would split.

Except of course that Grey's account was not, as you claimed, about Lichnowsky's unauthorised & hypothetical enquiry but Berlin's very real response to Grey's earlier enquiry about Belgium (which he did inform the cabinet about).

Grey's response of 'we', meaning cabinet, was to Lichnowsky's inquiry,

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

I see that you are adopting your usual tactic of altering your claims when they are shown to be wrong. Your original recollection concerned Grey's position on 1 August while Runciman's account relates to the following day. As shown by the above account of Lichnowsky's meeting with Grey on 3 August, circumstances caused positions to change very rapidly in 1914.

As before, Grey outlines in Twenty Five Years that his position was consistent - he would resign. He found the idea of a Franco-Russian war with Germany with Britain neutral personally "hideous". That Grey's resignation threat came on the 2nd and not the 1st as I recalled, is immaterial. Grey would have resigned, the resignation would have brought down the Liberal government, the replacement would have been a coalition with the Conservatives, the Conservatives would support France, and entry into the war would follow.

[glenn239]

It's neither. Britain fought for its own interest, against a Central power attack to the north-west (Belgium), but also to the south-east (Serbia), an attack on a continental scale which meant total change in the balance of power Britain wanted to see maintained. Belgium was the more obvious violation, and closer to home, hence it became the casus belli. But the bid for continental hegemony began in Serbia, with Belgium then dragged in. Hence Britain was in effect fighting on behalf of both those countries, though it was doing so in pursuit of its own interest, not theirs.

Had Russia not mobilized for Serbia, Britain would not have done so either.

[glenn239]

Oh and you think the mobilization of the russian army didn't do the same.

The Russian mobilization was absolutely decisive in changing a localised war to a continental war. The Austrians might have overreacted, but under the rules of 1914 they were within their rights to take a hard line. Italy had attacked the Ottoman Empire just three years prior for far less than Austria was asked to tolerate.

Where is the argument that the terror of the panslawism with the murdered Franz Ferdinand, was an "normal" issue?
Where is the argument that Russia as Great Power is allowed in the name of panslawism to mobilize their army to protect Serbia, but A-U isn't allowed to react to a clear act of terrorism which was provoked clearly from Serbia?

I said that Germany was aware these things could happen when they decided to back Austria. So were the Austrians - that's why they asked for the backing. It's not like the Franco-Russian reaction caught the Germans by surprise. They knew their enemies, that they were capable of spinning an Austro-Serbian war into a continental war, and that this was a strong chance.

Also I can't see why the interests of russian panslawism at the Balkan should have had more "weight" and therefore the legitimation to go to war (mobolization of the russian army), then the integral interests of A-U which were affected with the murdered crown prince, who also represented one major political wing of the the A-U politicans, which were after the assassination out of balance.

Russia was a dangerous and aggressive power. The issue was not whether Austria had rights, it's whether it had the guns to back it up.

[glenn239]

The major problem here Don is that the Austrians had no evidence for involvement from the Serbian government.

The British government today, as a I type, has no conclusive evidence of Russian involvement in the nerve gas attack in the UK. Yet, this might turn into a full blown crisis. That is because in the international arena, the standards of proof are not as absolute as in court.

BTW, may this all blow over, I'm sure we're all watching this with increasing concern.

[ljadw]

Austria would not refuse a proposal that would give it the possibility to get out of the present situation without damage for its ego and prestige in the Balkans and at home .

Austria was looking for a way out, if it succeeded, Germany would fail again, that's why Germany took the initiative and crossed the Rubicon .

Austria did exactly the opposite to what you say on 31st July when refusing the British proposal Bethmann had urged them to accept, stating that their war on Serbia was to continue and that Serbia must accept all terms of the Note, knowing Sazonov had said he was willing to accept everything except the two points that infringed on Serbian sovereignty. Maybe you would like to account for how the Austria you claim was looking for a way out managed to turn down the last proposal for a peaceful settlement, insisted on continuing its war, and ignored the advice coming from the Germans too?

That's your opinion, but not the opinion of the Russian ambassador in Vienna, besides his opinion is proved to be correct ,and yours to be wrong, by the fact that nothing, I repeat : nothing what AH did against Serbia, caused war between AH and Russia .

T

here were also NO moderation advices coming from Germany : it was the opposite: Germany pressured AH to attack Serbia, threatened her when she was delaying the attack and complaine after the war that the delay prevented Germany from winning the war .

On 16 July, BH told count Roedern(secretary of state for the Alsace ) : "I don't care about Serbia /Serbian complicity for Sarajevo (which did not exist ):all that matters is that AH attacks Serbia . (German aims in the first world war P 60 ).

If everyone in Germany wanted to localize the war, why did they extend the war on 1 August and on 3 August ?

AH OTOH always tried to localize the war : on 22 June 1926, Waldersee wrote to Jagow : "Man hatte in Wien immer noch den Wunsch um den Waffengang mit Russland herumzukommen.Das hat uns für die Kriegseröffnung furchtbar geschadet ."

Krieg der Illusionen P 727 .

"Vienna always wanted to prevent a war with Russia . That has hurt us seriously at the start of the war . "

And it is also not so that AH refused the British proposals: "Krieg der Illusionen P 727 ": At the proposal of Tisza,the Crown Council decided to to not to refuse the British proposal, but to accept him at 2 conditions: the war against Serbia should continue and the Russians should stop their mobilisation . (My translation ) .

[ljadw]

Im far away to claim Germany was a Sleepwalker or a victim of the July Crises. Empire Germany did a lot of stupid things before and during the Juli Crises. To me the Schliefen Plan is the biggest factor, why Germany is jointly responsible for the WWI, because he completely curtailed the political and military scope of the acting people and had no relation to political developments to respond to them. So it was a totaly stupid plan from a political viewpoint.

I don't think the Schlieffen Plan much mattered. Where Germany was responsible was deliberately moving to create the conditions for a full-blown crisis out of an otherwise solvable assassination.

But Empire Germany diidnt work to an european War or wanted or planed an european War.

No, but Berlin was aware that in its support of Austria, that contingency might arise.

Oh and you think the mobilization of the russian army didn't do the same.

Where is the argument that the terror of the panslawism with the murdered Franz Ferdinand, was an "normal" issue?
Where is the argument that Russia as Great Power is allowed in the name of panslawism to mobilize their army to protect Serbia, but A-U isn't allowed to react to a clear act of terrorism which was provoked clearly from Serbia?
With which argument has A-U less "rights" at the concert of the great powers then Russia?
Serbia was a neighbour to A-U and not to Russia and Empire Germany has disappointed A-U at 1912-13 at the two Balkan wars, a repeated non-support from Germany to A-U would most likely have led to a break between Germany and A-U, Germany's last loyal ally. In that regard, such an option for Berlin was not possible. Besides the terror of Serbia to A-U was in need of a clear stop signal after the assassination in Sarajewo
Also I can't see why the interests of russian panslawism at the Balkan should have had more "weight" and therefore the legitimation to go to war (mobolization of the russian army), then the integral interests of A-U which were affected with the murdered crown prince, who also represented one major political wing of the the A-U politicans, which were after the assassination out of balance.

The serbs provoked a reaction from A-U and also Germany was this time in the boat too, not the other way round!

Imagine what have happened if some irish nationalist has murdered the english crown prince and Empire Germany or France has intervented with an army mobilization to reactions from GB?!

The major problem here Don is that the Austrians had no evidence for involvement from the Serbian government, their own investigation said that such a policy was far from the Serbian governments thoughts, and the assassins were all Austrian citizens. The Austrians promised a dossier to all the great powers before they acted, but failed to delieve anything more than claims. The situation may well have been different if Austrian had provided evidence proving Serbia was to blame, but they did not such thing, and more importantly did nothing in the way of making a diplomatic effort to smooth the ground for some form of action with Russia? Sazonov proved willing to talk and to offer various solutions if Austria would have only accepted them.

The Germans having only one reliable ally is a good point, but if that ally is to jump into the fire deliberately, it doesnt make it any more sane for you to follow suit.

AH was pushed in the fire by Germany and the fire was set by Germany . And , AH was not a reliable ally of Germany:Germany did not want an ally, but a satellite .

[Terry Duncan]

That's your opinion, but not the opinion of the Russian ambassador in Vienna, besides his opinion is proved to be correct ,and yours to be wrong, by the fact that nothing, I repeat : nothing what AH did against Serbia, caused war between AH and Russia .

The following was sent from Berchtold to Szogyeny after the Council of Ministers meeting on the morning of 31st July;

I request Your Excellency to thank the Secretary of State very much for the communications made by Herr von Tschirschky and say to him that, in spite of the change in the situation since caused by the Russian mobi1iation and in full appreciation of the English endeavours on behalf of the preservation of the peace of the world, we are willingly prepared to examine more closely Sir E. Grey’s proposal to mediate between ourselves and Serbia. The premises of our acceptance, however, are of course that our military action against the Kingdom shall in the meantime take its course and that the English Cabinet shall prevail upon the Russian Government to arrest the mobilization of its troops directed against us, in which case we would naturally also at once revoke the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia necessitated by the Russian mobilization.

Please feel free to point out what part is my opinion rather than exactly what Berchtold said were Austria's conditions?

Franz-Joseph to Wilhelm II;

I hasten to thank you cordially and warmly for your friendly telegram. Immediately after your Ambassador yesterday handed my Government Sir Edward Grey’s mediation proposal, the official announcement arrived from my Ambassador at St. Petersburg that theTsar of Russia has ordered the mobilization of all military districts on my frontiers. Count Szogyeny informs me that you had told Tsar Nicholas in unmistakable terms to arrest Russian armaments because otherwise the whole responsibility for a world war would fall on his. shoulders. Conscious of my heavy responsibility for the future of my Empire, I have ordered the mobilization of all my armed forces. The action of my army against Serbia now proceeding can suffer no interruption from the threatening and challenging attitude of Russia. A fresh rescue of Serbia by Russian intervention would entail the most serious consequences for my lands and I, therefore, cannot possibly permit such intervention. I am conscious of the import of my decisions and have taken them trusting in divine justice and with confidence that your armed forces will take their stand with my Empire and the Triple Alliance in unchanging loyalty as an ally.

Again, it doesnt look too much like Austria is looking for a way out of any war.

[Terry Duncan]

AH was pushed in the fire by Germany and the fire was set by Germany . And , AH was not a reliable ally of Germany:Germany did not want an ally, but a satellite .

Absolute and utter rubbish. Austria did not need pushing, she had made her decision and refused to alter it. Germany considered Austria her only reliable ally, you can whine on that you do not consider this to be correct, and even quote Fromkin if you like, it will not change what was said and felt at the time. As to Germany wanting a satellite, I imagine getting some evidence to support the claim is not going to meet with much more success than any of the other requests for evidence, but nations tend to like allies that do as they would wish and in this Germany was no different.

[MarkN]

Towards the beginning of this thread, Terry Duncan warned me that English was not the first language for many posters. And very true it is too. Since then, I have tried to sympathize with and for those who seem to be struggling with the understanding of the English language, and take that into consideration when reading posts. Your profile says you are from Canada. A country that has had a large influx of immigrants over the years so I guess I should extend that sympathy and consideration to you too.

1) Grey's answer to Lichnowsky began, "I do not think that ...". It was his answer not the Cabinet's however much you obsess over the word "we".

Grey's quote on the matter in Twenty Five Years, has already been cited. It looked to me like you've never read Grey's book, yet somehow you have opinions on his thinking. Is that correct? Have you read Twenty Five Years?

I believe I was the one who first mentionned Grey's comments in 25 Years on this point to show how his post-war recollection didn't match the contemporary evidence recorded at the time. But you crack on with your impossible mental gymnastics misinterpreting evidence as you will to suit your theory.

From BD 448 in my book, some other number in your book I understand,

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"I replied that I could not say that ..."
"I did not think that we could give ..."
In the English language, these are words from the individual speaking on what he/she thinks/believes others may or may not agree to. They are NOT the official words of the collective.
You may choose to obsess on the word "we" as part of your mental gymnastics to misinterpret the evidence if you so wish. But you will just continue to look as daft as a brush.

When Grey answered Lichnowsky on 1 August, the pro-French faction in cabinet would not have agreed to pledge British neutrality on that condition. That may split the cabinet and the Liberal government falls. That's what Grey said on the matter later, and that's why it was impossible for him to say "yes" to Lichnowsky's 1 August inquiry.

1) Who were the "pro-French faction in cabinet"?
2) Did they number, on 1-2 August 1914, as many as the "no war" faction who could count upon 10-11 prepared to throw everybody under the Teutonic bus and another 3-4 who were willing to throw France under the Teutonic bus but prepared to stand by the 1839 Treaty?
3) Grey's hypothetical resignation (alone) would not have brought a downfall of the Government any more than Burns' actual and historical resignation. The 'fact' that you keep pushing that opinion of yours as some form of historical fact is just plain dishonest.

I gave up reading the rest of your post as it is clear that you have given up on serious reasoning and are just trying playing the damage limitation game by throwing out random nonsense.

[Max Payload]

And it is also not so that AH refused the British proposals: "Krieg der Illusionen P 727 ": At the proposal of Tisza,the Crown Council decided to to not to refuse the British proposal, but to accept him at 2 conditions: the war against Serbia should continue and the Russians should stop their mobilisation . (My translation ) .

Two conditions that were effectively a rejection of the British proposals for mediation aimed at preventing an escalation of military activity, because those conditions required that that AH be allowed to pursue its war against Serbia without outside interference.