Post
by monk2002uk » 14 Nov 2004 10:06
Logistical supply was a problem for the Germans. Bloem, in his book 'The Advance from Mons 1914', describes how supplies of food virtually failed completely. Artillery ammunition was becoming a major problem, though there does not appear to have been a problem with small arms ammunition. He describes the physical effects, both in terms of fatigue and the wearing out of the boots. The prospect of capturing Paris, however, acted as a great stimulant.
Logistics was only one of many factors that coincided with the undoing of the Schlieffen Plan. The plan called for the outflanking of the French Army. Much is made of the wheel inside Paris, rather than around the outskirts as called for by Schlieffen. It is not the fact that von Kluck chose to come inside Paris that is important per se. It is the fact that he came inside the left flank of the French Army, wherever that might be located. This points to a major failing in intelligence. From what I can tell, the formation of the French Sixth Army was hinted at through intelligence reports but von Kluck chose to ignore the evidence. Certainly, his cavalry divisions had failed to do their job on several occasions so the large body of troops that were forming was not detected in a systematic way. Ludendorff, in his account 'The General Staff and Its Problems', lays part of the blame on the failure to increase the number of reconnaisance aircraft before the war. As with General French, however, the problem appears to lie with how the intelligence was interpreted, rather than how little was gathered.
The railways proved to be the undoing of many attacks. The ability to move reinforcements quickly by rail was decisive in countering the Schlieffen Plan.
To get round the newly extended French left flank, assuming it was detected, required superiority of troop numbers. Several factors had contributed to a reduction in attacking strength (and therefore width of attack) on the German right flank. The need to invest Mauberge was one example, as was the effects of the Belgian resistance and the Russian penetration into East Prussia. Von Kluck had been closing the gap with the German Second Army when the flank attack by the French Sixth Army caused him to have to divert troops to counter the threat. The gap between the German First and Second Armies widened to the extent the the BEF and elements of the French Fifth Army could drive between them. At this point, Col Hentsch steps into the picture, but if it had not been him, someone else would have triggered the retreat.
Lastly, but not completely, the interception of German radio messages by the French 2e Bureau, via the receiving station on the Eiffel Tower, gave the Entente forces an important edge in the intelligence phase of the campaign. I think we have yet to see all that this source contributed but there are certainly hints about its importance in Edward Spear's book 'Liaison 1914'.
So, for what it is worth, I do not think that logistical supply was a major, or even a decisive, factor in the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.
Robert