Why did the german submarines fail?

[Kristian S.]

I want to know, why exactly the Germans lost the submarine war. So far I came to these conclusions:

After the Germans resumed the unrestricted submarine war in January 1917, the situation worsened for the Allies. During April of the same year, Walter H. Page, US ambassador in London at this time, stated that he was afraid to witness the defeat of the UK from this moment on.

But the war entry of America gave the impulse for the convoy system. New mines (MK H2) were developed to deny the subs the access to the open sea as well as water bomb launchers (from 1918 onwards). Another innovation was the airforce that was included in the countermeasures. Planes and airships were not only used for reconnaissance but also did attack themselve during the last year of the war. Together with the new developed ASDIC this measures became so successful, that the U-boats rarely dared to attack a convoy in 1918.

The german fleet command, whose influence did rise over that of the politics, unanimously approved the unrestricted submarine war. Since 1916 the performance and number of the German subs could be improved significantly. So even on the basis of the maritime law the number of sunken ships rose so high, that the Allies hardly were able to replace them. But the assumption of Admiral Holtzendorff that after the lifting of any restrictions the Allied losses would be unbearable, so the UK were driven out of the war within five months could not be confirmed. The number of sunken merchantmen did indeed reachded the predicted extend, but he also underestimated the ability of the USA and the UK to recover from these blows.

So basically the Germans made the mistake to underestimate their enemies. After they challenged the USA, they were not able the win the war anymore.

So what did I miss?

[Terry Duncan]

A good question that has a lot of answers, and could take ages to cover it all. There were a few major reasons, and lots of other factors that also helped.

1. There were never enough subs to perform the task, and not enough experienced sailors to man them by the time more subs were available.

2. The assumption that Britain could be starved out was based upon the idea Britain would find it impossible to introduce rationing.

3. The additional ships for escort that became available when the US entered the war.

4. The British admiralty confusing itself into thinking there were just too many merchant ships to be able to escort them all, and that merchant ships would never be able to sail in convoy due to indiscipline!

[Dave Bender]

The WWI German submarine force was not defeated. However there were not enough ocean going submarines to cripple Entente shipping. Especially during the first 2 years of the war. WWI German submarines were very effective relative to their numbers. Much more so then the American and German submarine campaigns during WWII.

[cormallen]

1 / "The WWI German submarine force was not defeated"

did they win then? No, then they must have lost, no? They weren't all sunk, granted, but they certainly failed to starve britain out and very definately caused a US entry at the very least earlier and that certainly helped ( a whole other can of worms/debate there) to lose germany the war...

2 / "Much more so then the American and German submarine campaigns during WWII"

They did very nicely until the convoy system picked up but were pretty much doomed to fail after that. Even in WW2, with french ports and airfield available the U boats (moderately closely?) failed... The US sub campaign only had the deeply badly organised and utterly out-matched japanese merchant marine to fight so that is not really a fair comparison on many many levels.

3 / "However there were not enough ocean going submarines to cripple Entente shipping. Especially during the first 2 years of the war."

Generally agreed BUT this is another 'side A changes what it does but side B does nothing in response' thing so building an extra 100 big and obviously oceanic commerce raiders in 1910-14, probably in lieu of some heroic but futile dreadnoughts, would likely trigger some sort of RN reaction... An extra 50-100 deap sea sloops plus convoy trials and its 1917 happens early with moot results? Maybe a better bet for germans perhaps but not an auto win strategy by any means!

alan



alan

[Terry Duncan]

The WWI German submarine force was not defeated.

Yes it was.

The reaction to a German mass submarine program in 1910 would be probably similar to the program Fisher put in place in 1914, about 400 escort ships and large orders for mines. Having said that, and submarines built much before 1912 would be too short ranged to achieve too much, so unless a rapid increase in size and capabilities in an untried weapon happened, its not going to get much funding! Fisher could have had a lot of aircraft carriers by 1914 if this reasoning is followed though - perhaps he would have had time to develop the Sea Fury for them by 1915?

[Mad Zeppelin]

Looking from the German side, the issue is more complex.
1. U-Boats were a new weapons system, no doctrine for sea war against merchant shipping existed. The idea pre-war was to use them in conjunction with the battle fleet against enemy war ships.
2. Tirpitz was fixated on his battle fleet and clearly neglected the submarines over that.
3. The number of available boats never was sufficient, but the navy command lied to the Reichstag and the Kaiser about this fact, stirring up false hopes and expectations that never were met.
4. The number of torpedos carried was too small, most U-Boat commanders thus preferred cruiser warfare, stopping and eventually sinking merchant vessels with their guns.
5. U-Boat cruiser warfare was very successful, but the navy command only believed in unconditional U-Boat warfare - and each time when one of their attempts to get it had failed, stopped the U-Boats altogether.
6. Unconditional U-Boat warfare always was seen as retaliation against the illegal British blockade, but one would have needed much more submarines to really try to impose a fullscale blockade of England. Not 3 boats in the Irish Sea were required at a time, but 25 - this was never achieved.
7. Every new weapon will eventually result in enemy counter measures. You can't hope to have an advantage forever. This was not considered in Germany when discussing the U-Boat question.
8. Even after the 1917 "golden time", the U-Boats did sink quite a number of ships, basically reverting to the numbers they had scored before (but incurring greater losses now). That wasn't enough, because with the entry of the USA the ship building capacity had multiplied. And whatever the U-Boats might achieve, the enemy was building more new ships than the Germans could ever hope to sink.

[Dave Bender]

The real problem.

The pre-WWI German Navy made no realistic plans for commerce interdiction using either submarines or surface ships. With a well thought out plan the ship construction priorities would change.

[cormallen]

Yes Dave,

And with a subatantial and obvious change in german naval priorities so would RN construction... and round we go again!?

I agree the german navy could have done better but they really needed to stop trying to win a naval war and concentrate on buying a bigger army so they win the ground war before those turnips start looking appealling..

alan

[phylo_roadking]

Alan - there's a thread on AHF somewhere (the Economy Section?) I contributed to about the British economic and naval Blockade on Germany.

You'd be suprised exactly HOW early the turnips feared for their safety...

[glenn239]

I want to know, why exactly the Germans lost the submarine war

.

As Dave Bender said, Germany did not lose the U-boat war, unless sinking 2.5 million tons of ships in the 9 months of 1918 is defined as defeat. Germany lost the war elsewhere, which ended the U-boat campaign along with it. You identify the entry of the United States into the conflict as decisive, and that is correct. The USA had the industrial capacity to launch more new tonnage than Germany could sink.

[Kristian S.]

Thanks to all for the input so far.

I want to know, why exactly the Germans lost the submarine war

.

As Dave Bender said, Germany did not lose the U-boat war, unless sinking 2.5 million tons of ships in the 9 months of 1918 is defined as defeat. Germany lost the war elsewhere, which ended the U-boat campaign along with it. You identify the entry of the United States into the conflict as decisive, and that is correct. The USA had the industrial capacity to launch more new tonnage than Germany could sink.

The point is that the u-boats were not able to have an impact on the outcome of the war. It's not so much about the US industrial capacity than the rapidly decline of the German successes.
The inflicted losses of the mechantman were less than 1% since convoy system was introduced. During November 1917 the submarines could only sink 260.000 tons. This was less than the half of the number of April 1917. So the average sinking rate of 1918 was only slightly above this.
Of the ships that transported 2 million US-troops to Europe not a single one was sunk. And only three were sunk empty on their trip back to the US.
Contrary to this the German losses rose significantly. On the peak of the success the subs did sink 70 ships for one loss. In July 1917 the ratio was already declined to 1:16.
During May 1918 the Germans had 55 subs at sea. The highest count ever reached. But in this month they also had the highest losses with 16 boats sunk.
Maybe defeat is not the fitting term, but equally the u-boats were not able to play a decisive role anymore in 1918. So they basically failed.

[phylo_roadking]

The point is that the u-boats were not able to have an impact on the outcome of the war....The inflicted losses of the mechantman were less than 1% since convoy system was introduced. During November 1917 the submarines could only sink 260.000 tons. This was less than the half of the number of April 1917.

I'd need to look back through my copies of Britain At War, but during 1917 a captured U-Boat crew was marched through London from one train station to another; on their trip through the city they were taken aback by the abundance of food - full butchers' shop windows, whole carcases, mountains of canned meats etc. ....things they themselves hadn't seen at home in Germany for a year or more. The captain recorded later that THIS was when he and his officers realised that "their" war was lost, they simply couldn't dent that anymore - while at the same time Germany was starting to starve...

[Terry Duncan]

As Dave Bender said, Germany did not lose the U-boat war, unless sinking 2.5 million tons of ships in the 9 months of 1918 is defined as defeat.

So, the failure to achieve the goal set for them and ensuring the US joined the already large array of nations against Germany was a victory? They did well in sinking a lot of ships, but as MZ said, it was not enough and even the figures the campaign was based upon were wrong - a far higher figure would have been correct.

If victory were based upon simple numbers, never the case in naval warfare, there is a case to say they came close, but still failed. Military failure is defeat. They did not control the sea, nor did they deny its use to their enemy, they didnt even manage to break the blockade. A brave failure, but a failure none the less.

[Kristian S.]

Btw: can anyone recommend good literature on this topic?
I just have the following:

"Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in WW I" by Paolo E. Coletta
"Die deutschen Unterseeboote im 1. und im 2. Weltkrieg" by Douglas Botting

[cormallen]

Aside from bizarre tortologies, where the U boats won the war but no one noticed, I am truely confused why the USW campaign was ever undertaken at all.
It promised to starve britain, if it went really-really well, but also promised to bring america in... at which point long term german victory becomes incredibly hard... unless the french implode - which may have been close but was largely unconnected to any british home front supply problems - so why on earth do it at all?! It really is another Pearl Harbour moment IMHO...
Far better to play nice with americans until the east front troops can come over and win the war. This last is of course far from easy but a less hurried (because the GIs aren't coming 'over here' this time) and more thought through 1918 offensive, mostly against the french (though this may imply too much hindsight? how well did the germans really know about the possible brittle nature of the french army? Is that exaggerated by 1918, most of the big mutinies were earlier IIRC?) perhaps could actually win for them... discuss...? Or, not...

alan