" Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme..."

[Terry Duncan]

Ludendorff too was quite open about the need for Germany to avoid any more battles like The Somme.

[Attrition]

I hope that Philpott has something to day about the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. Naturally Haig and his supporters since claim that this was a consequence of the battle; others say that it was a coincidence. My view is that the fortification of the H.L. replicated the fortifications that the British and French forced them out of in the second half of 1916, at such great cost. This being the case the rebuilding of the Somme front on ground easy to defend undermines the coincidence thesis - if the threat from the Entente was so low, why put so many resources into a new front line? We're told that it economised on troops so twelve divisions fewer were needed but doesn't that also apply to the Entente? Did the Germans gain much from freeing perhaps an equal number of Entente divisions from the front line?

Does anyone know how many square miles the Germans abandoned in early 1917?

[Terry Duncan]

Naturally Haig and his supporters since claim that this was a consequence of the battle; others say that it was a coincidence.

It is most probably a combination of the two. The battle confirmed to the Germans that they needed to shorten their lines and to better defensive positions, but while such things had been proposed before the battle, there would have been almost no chance of such a retreat without it.

[Attrition]

Given the unified Entente strategy for 1916 that makes sense. Comparing German and Entente strategy for that year leaves little doubt that it was the Central Powers' strategy that was in tatters by the end of the year. Ther Somme was a big contributor to the overstretching of the German army, which continued into 1917 but as part of a much bigger effort in the French sector, Italy and Russia.

[The_Enigma]

Is that because there wasn't the infrastructure, never mind the equipment or experience available to the British in mid-1916 that had been built by 1918?

Victory is yes or no, not why.

Victory or defeat is always why, you cannot provide a black and white answer without providng an explantion of how one got there. Not to mention victories or defeats are rarely black or white.

BTW very intresting thread.

[Attrition]

Is that because there wasn't the infrastructure, never mind the equipment or experience available to the British in mid-1916 that had been built by 1918?

Victory is yes or no, not why.

Victory or defeat is always why, you cannot provide a black and white answer without providng an explantion of how one got there. Not to mention victories or defeats are realy black or white.

Especially in a war of exhaustion.

BTW very intresting thread.

[monk2002uk]

There is no doubt that the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line was a direct result of the Battle of the Somme. It was definitely NOT a coincidence. I would recommend reading Jack Sheldon's forthcoming book on the German Army at Cambrai when it comes out in the near future. Jack has a whole section that deals with the German debates about whether to withdraw or not. It has a huge problem, because the withdrawal was an admission that the Entente had won a victory on the Somme. The German High Command knew this, and really really struggled to make the decision. But they had to.

Robert

[Attrition]

Interesting, I have his book on the Somme but found that it was a worm's eye view of the battle - nothing wrong with that except I'd wanted an operational-strategic analysis.

~~~~~Jack has a whole section that deals with the German debates about whether to withdraw or not.~~~~~

Just what the doctor ordered.

Apropos the retreat to the Hindenburg Line's relationship to the battle of the Somme; did the Germans put out peace feelers before or after the battle?

[glenn239]

Ludendorff too was quite open about the need for Germany to avoid any more battles like The Somme.

And what are the casualty rates between the Somme and the 1918 German offensives?

Comparing German and Entente strategy for that year leaves little doubt that it was the Central Powers' strategy that was in tatters by the end of the year.

By the end of 1916, the BEF had gained next to nothing at enormous cost, the Russians were finished, the French were approaching the brink of mutiny, the Italians were bloodied and stymied, and the CP had just won their greatest victory of the war in Rumania.

Victory or defeat is always why.

To make a case for victory one must have solid indicators in the form of casualty ratios, prisoners, material and equipment taken, or ground gained. The Somme had none of these, meaning it was not a British victory. The case for a British defeat was that the Germans were able to knock Russia and Rumania out of the war in 1916-1917, and the British efforts in Flanders could not prevent it.

[Terry Duncan]

And what are the casualty rates between the Somme and the 1918 German offensives?

How does this matter? What are the casualty rates between The Battle of the Frontiers and Amiens? How about Munda or Towton? Ludendorff made the comment and presumably had some reason to say such a thing.

By the end of 1916, the BEF had gained next to nothing at enormous cost, the Russians were finished, the French were approaching the brink of mutiny, the Italians were bloodied and stymied, and the CP had just won their greatest victory of the war in Rumania.

The British took ground at roughly equal losses, and would never be in a position to effect the eastern front. If Romania was the Central Powers greatest victory, perhaps they should have given up in 1916 as they were no closer to defeating the British or even the French who they would have to do so if they were to ever win the war.

To make a case for victory one must have solid indicators in the form of casualty ratios, prisoners, material and equipment taken, or ground gained. The Somme had none of these, meaning it was not a British victory.

The British army took ground, both they and the Germans lost a lot of men. Given they took ground even by your definition the British won.

[The_Enigma]

Victory or defeat is always why.

To make a case for victory one must have solid indicators in the form of casualty ratios, prisoners, material and equipment taken, or ground gained. The Somme had none of these, meaning it was not a British victory. The case for a British defeat was that the Germans were able to knock Russia and Rumania out of the war in 1916-1917, and the British efforts in Flanders could not prevent it.

I don’t see how public resentment of their government, their conduct of the war, political unrest and the rebellion of people seeking power in Imperial Russia can be laid at the feet of BEF on the Somme, i think that is clutching at straws to find a way to define a battle as a defeat to suit yourself.

As for industrised war i completely disagree with you, ground gained does not signify victory or defeat, even casualty ratios or the loss of equipment do not simply provide black and white answers.

For example during Operation Barbarossa the Soviets lost practically their entire tank fleet and large numbers of their aircraft, they lost huge swaves of land, huge numbers of dead, wounded and captured and therefore must have been "defeated"; however this was surely not the case.

Some things are not decided on the battlefield; if my understanding is correct the Somme was launched to drain German effort away from Verdun, which it did - causing strategic setback to the German Army. Apparently, from what i have read in this thread, the German high command, following this battle, realised they could never afford the luxury such attritional warfare ever again. Tactically the battle may have gained only a few miles, it may have cost large numbers of life’s but had strategic consequences in favour of the allies.

To go with another example, the British and Canadian forces suffered around 50,000 casualties in the various operations to capture the city of Caen during the Second World War. In the end the capture of the city was of little value however it had attracted the main German force to the Anglo-Canadian sector of the frontline and in the end allowed the Americans an easier time to breakout of the beachhead, while at the same time wearing down those German formations.

[Attrition]

My copy is en route but meanwhile Amazon has a review by someone who's read it! Apparently the Somme is analogous to Stalingrad.

[The_Enigma]

To draw on the analogy with Stalingrad and Kursk would show how irrelevent the below quoted question is.

And what are the casualty rates between the Somme and the 1918 German offensives?

Stalingrad and Kursk dictated that the war would not end well for Germany, how many casualties it inflicted or recieved following those critical points were mostly irrelevent to the outcome.

[Attrition]

Same as Russia 1941 - Germany inflicts stupendous defeats on the Red Army only to fail so badly that the USSR has the means to launch counter offensives all over the place.

[monk2002uk]

To make a case for victory one must have solid indicators in the form of casualty ratios, prisoners, material and equipment taken, or ground gained. The Somme had none of these, meaning it was not a British victory. The case for a British defeat was that the Germans were able to knock Russia and Rumania out of the war in 1916-1917, and the British efforts in Flanders could not prevent it.

Interesting that you define the Somme as a failure by linking it to the defeats of Russia and Romania. If I recall, Germany lost all the territory captured in France and Belgium, lost Alsace and Lorraine, and had some of its territory occupied. All heavy weapons, the navy, airforce, tank capabilities were stripped away, the Armistice was signed, and then the Versailles Treaty. Sounds like the Somme was a victory then, because you cut off the history timeline with the knocking out of Russia and Romania, neglecting that Germany got knocked out. Did you think that the Battle of the Somme should have knocked out Germany in 1916?

Robert