How could the Schlieffen plan have succedded?

[monk2002uk]

Forgive me but success in combat was the only reason that the territories were restored. One of the problems that the German high command never grasped is that strategic success is not totally dependent on destruction of the enemy on the field of battle.

The war did not end on November 11th. The final conclusion of the war was brought about by military force, via the military occupation and the ongoing naval blockade. There were no major battles because the German army was defeated.

Robert

[Dave Bender]

1 to 500,000 Topographic Map of Lorraine
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... /MapII.jpg
There is a main rail line (at least twin track per the map legend) between Metz and Bar-le-Duc. It crosses the Meuse at Sampigny. Perfect for a main supply line if Germany decides to follow up the capture of Fort Camp des Romains (i.e. St. Mihael salient) with an offensive to capture Bar-le-Duc.

[Attrition]

Did Ze Plan! Fail?

[Baltasar]

Forgive me but success in combat was the only reason that the territories were restored.

There were no major battles because the German army was defeated.

Defeated by whom and during which action? After all, the 'Dolchstosslegende' points out that the defeat was being inflicted by rebellious sailors.

[Dave Bender]

The German Army conducted multiple operations during September 1914. Gen. Moltke's operation to seize Verdun failed. The other German Army operations succeeded.

[Terry Duncan]

The German Army conducted multiple operations during September 1914. Gen. Moltke's operation to seize Verdun failed. The other German Army operations succeeded.

Then the entire strategy was wrong from the start. If the other German operations were a success, the result was a dismal failure of the most extreme nature. It condemned Germany to a long war she had concluded could not be won, did not inflict any significant decisive defeat on the French army as hoped, brought Britain into the war from the outset, added Belgium to the list of enemies, and left the German army retreating. Seizing Verdun would not have cured the right wing's problems even if it had proven possible, and holding Verdun while the right wing is defeated is of little use to the Germans.

Time is the most crucial element for the entire campaign, unless a major defeat can be inflicted on the French army very fast by September, the need to redeploy troops to the east will prevent Germany achieving the results the initial strategy was intended to provide.

[Attrition]

How certain is it that the Germans were banking on a knock-out blow in 1914? No doubt had it happened they would have taken it but it seems to me that they thought it was unrealistic long before 1914. It seems much more likely to me that the Germans expected to capture a lot of resources in Belgium and northern France then exploit the defensive power of terrain and the German army to wear down the superior coalition until it was ready to make terms. A strategy of pessimism born of a crisis of falling expectations.

Looked at like that, the withdrawal of troops to the east looks less like a mistake and more like things going according to expectations, albeit disappointing ones.

[Terry Duncan]

How certain is it that the Germans were banking on a knock-out blow in 1914?

As you said, nice if they could get it. Zuber has done a lot of research that tends to show they wanted a decisive victory over the French army that would cripple the French army for a very long time, not to force France from the war. The need was to reduce the French army to a position it would be incapable of offensive action and allow the German army to deal with Russia with just a holding force in the west.

How it was to be achieved is open to debate, but all the planning staff seem to have felt the same need to avoid a long war from the time of Moltke the Elder onwards.

[Dave Bender]

Seizing Verdun would not have cured the right wing's problems

Verdun has nothing to do with the German right wing. The intent was to prevent France from launching another offensive into Germany via the Ardennes, using the Verdun fortress complex as a logistical hub. If the French Army gets ground up in the process that is icing on the cake.

Gen Falkenhayn's operations to cut the Verdun rail lines during late September 1914 accomplished the same thing but at a much lower cost.

[Attrition]

How certain is it that the Germans were banking on a knock-out blow in 1914?

As you said, nice if they could get it. Zuber has done a lot of research that tends to show they wanted a decisive victory over the French army that would cripple the French army for a very long time, not to force France from the war. The need was to reduce the French army to a position it would be incapable of offensive action and allow the German army to deal with Russia with just a holding force in the west.

How it was to be achieved is open to debate, but all the planning staff seem to have felt the same need to avoid a long war from the time of Moltke the Elder onwards.

"The need was to reduce the French army to a position it would be incapable of offensive action and allow the German army to deal with Russia with just a holding force in the west."

Hmmm, this also being what Falky set out to do to Russia in 1915. I'm rather taken with Foley and Lieber on the 'long war' school of thought though, which concludes that the 'short war illusion' is an illusion. I have the impression that old Moltke thought that a quick win eluded him in 1870 and that the conditions which stopped it were spreading in the years after.

[monk2002uk]

Defeated by whom and during which action? After all, the 'Dolchstosslegende' points out that the defeat was being inflicted by rebellious sailors.

There was no single action. The entire war destroyed the German army's ability to continue - the continual attrition, the cumulative effects of the naval blockade, the collapse of society, etc, etc. Die Vernichtung is not the only measure of enemy defeat. Although the returning German forces were hailed as heroes by many of the bystanders, this did not mean that they could continue fighting against the combined Allied forces.

As for die Dolchstoßlegende, there is an adage that describes an organisation that is not capable of learning from its mistakes:

"The enemy is out there."

Robert

[Terry Duncan]

Verdun has nothing to do with the German right wing.

If the right wing collapses it will not matter if the German army holds Verdun or not, the war is likely to be decided in the area retaining movement and open flanks, and taking Verdun is a lot different to breaking through there.

I'm rather taken with Foley and Lieber on the 'long war' school of thought though, which concludes that the 'short war illusion' is an illusion.

All the military predicted a long war was the most likely result of war in 1914, the German plan was maybe the only hope for a short war.

I have the impression that old Moltke thought that a quick win eluded him in 1870 and that the conditions which stopped it were spreading in the years after.

Moltke the Elder's plan looks to be viable even in 1914 if Germany is prepared to abandon the offensive and to defend in the west. The political arguement against this was that there could be no political solution with France whilst one might be found with Russia. Large national armies almost certainly make for long wars, as Moltke the Younger noted, where the war would run on until one alliance system or the other was entirely exhausted.

[Dave Bender]

German 1st and 2nd Armies moved east of Paris and protected the right flank per the 5 Sep 1914 OHL order. Why would the German right wing collapse? They weren't even hard pressed.

[Baltasar]

Defeated by whom and during which action? After all, the 'Dolchstosslegende' points out that the defeat was being inflicted by rebellious sailors.

There was no single action. The entire war destroyed the German army's ability to continue - the continual attrition, the cumulative effects of the naval blockade, the collapse of society, etc, etc. Die Vernichtung is not the only measure of enemy defeat. Although the returning German forces were hailed as heroes by many of the bystanders, this did not mean that they could continue fighting against the combined Allied forces.

As for die Dolchstoßlegende, there is an adage that describes an organisation that is not capable of learning from its mistakes:

"The enemy is out there."

Robert

Losing a war without a single enemy soldier on your own soil isn't exactly that crushing. What happens after the forces stopped fighting hasn't anythin to do with the war itself, ie the occupation of the Rhineland. In any case, the cease fire of Versailles did nothing to secure peace. As Ferdinand Foche himself said: This isn't peace, this is an armistace for 20 years.

The Entante actually lost in the wider scope. They lost most of their influence in the colonies, more men than the Central Powers, lost their economical leadership to the USA and helped to establish Communism in the east. The war was a very close run thing, the economical collapse only few years later was devastating, especially for the 'winners'.

[Terry Duncan]

German 1st and 2nd Armies moved east of Paris and protected the right flank per the 5 Sep 1914 OHL order. Why would the German right wing collapse? They weren't even hard pressed.

The need to retreat in some form of order arose, the 1st and 2nd Armies both having problems with their flanks and the enemy trying to do unfortunate things to them. With the order to retire it was still a close thing when they reached the Aisne, any deviation will see the flanked armies defeated and with less suitable ground to fall back upon. They did not retreat for fun, and Verdun will not effect the decision on this wing.

Losing a war without a single enemy soldier on your own soil isn't exactly that crushing.

It was crushing enough for the Germans to accept the armistice terms and not want to risk fighting on.

In any case, the cease fire of Versailles did nothing to secure peace.

If the terms of Versailles had been enforced rigidly, Germany would not have been able to start a second war. It was certainly a better settlement for Germany than the one she got in 1945.

The Entante actually lost in the wider scope. They lost most of their influence in the colonies, more men than the Central Powers, lost their economical leadership to the USA and helped to establish Communism in the east. The war was a very close run thing, the economical collapse only few years later was devastating, especially for the 'winners'

The Central Powers certainly lost, the Entente were not well off but they did emerge better off comparatively. It would have been better not to fight at all, but that decision was made by the Central Powers.