How could the Schlieffen plan have succedded?

[Terry Duncan]

Sure, the Central Powers and the Central Powers alone wanted a war...

I have not said that. The decision to go to war by Austria set in motion a chain of events that ensured all led to war. This decision was purely up to Austria, nothing forced her to take the step or for Germany to support her.

The Franco-Russian alliance was in no small part due to neither nation wishing to find itself kept in isolation as Bismarck had with France. The feeling in France from 1871-1892 is not really different to that of Germany feeling encircled in 1904-1914.

The Anglo-French Entente solved problems for Britain on a global scale, any agreement with Germany could not ensure the same thing. Britain did look to Germany first - Chamberlain - but the interests of the two nations were not the same, Britain would not fight Russia over a German issue and Germany would not want to fight France and Russia over a British colonial issue. There is also the poisonous effect of Tirpitz, the Navy League and the Naval Laws directly naming Britain as its target and future enemy.

As to what could be changed to make things successful in 1914, I think September is too late and that things earlier have to be considered to stand any chance of Germany winning. Entering war on the worst terms and uniting your enemies was a bad start, having generals who disliked each other in command of adjacent armies was another major problem.

[glenn239]

Sure, the Central Powers and the Central Powers alone wanted a war...

My understanding is that the Entente proved so reluctant to fight for Serbia that the disgusted Germans sent emissaries to the Entente capitals, kicked their doors down, and wrote their mobilization orders for them!

Britain certainly had a choice in entering the war since it wasn't invaded.

Russia had a choice by way of accepting the Kaiser’s mediation, accepting the Austrian declarations of late July at face value and negotiating on the basis of the note, or by limiting its military option to sending an expeditionary unit to Serbia via the Danube or Salonika (French forces).

France had a choice 20-23 July by way of Poincare warning the Russians privately not to escalate matters instead of egging them on to war with declarations of French fidelity. (Which, BTW, did not extend to Poincare lifting a finger to help the Tzar later when he was getting his brains blown out by revolutionaries.)

then the surrounding of Verdun would help immensely.

Of course it would. On a related note, Dave’s pattern is to overestimate the power of Germany on the offensive in WW1 and to discount the immense difficulties posed by assaulting prepared positions.

[Dave Bender]

Was there an infantry attack anywhere in Europe in 1914 (strategically speaking) that didn't cause high losses to both sides?

Official WWI Casualty Statistics.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=69350
As you can see the German Army sustained far fewer casualties then their French opponents during the massive offensive operations of August and September 1914.

[Attrition]

From a smaller base.

[Baltasar]

The peace terms of 1871 were anything but moderate in intent.

They lost: Alsace-Lorraine and had to pay indemnities. Yes, I see that's harsh...

The need to do a deal before any other country intervened weighed on the NGC (Prussia & Co) just as much as it did on Japan in 1905. France in 1870 was no threat to Britain where Germany was.

Who should've intervened and how?

The Germans dumped the Russians in the 1890's for the same reason that Hitler did in 1941 - they were too big for their boots. Had the alliance continued Germany would inevitably been superseded. This made the French-Russian rapprochement inevitable.

Hitler dumped Stalin because he was his ideological enemy, that was not the case before or during WWI. Russia was still regarded a third-rate military power and their economic wasn't rated any higher. How would Germany think of them as 'too big for their boots'?

"No war is ever a good thing. The slaughter of millions can't be made up by so called 'progress' somewhere else in the world."

Poetic justice.

Same as your 'on the whole the Great War was a good thing'.

[Baltasar]

From a smaller base.

7 German armies versus 5 French armies + BEF + Belgian forces. Smaller base where exactly?

[Terry Duncan]

Russia was still regarded a third-rate military power and their economic wasn't rated any higher. How would Germany think of them as 'too big for their boots'?

The German military were seriously worried by the recovery of the Russian military, Moltke's 'war the sooner the better for us' is because of this, and the Great Program approved and actioned just before the actual war started made any war impossible for Germany to win in the opinion of the GGS. Moltke and Bethmann both considered the main threat to Germany was coming from Russia and that the threat was getting worse.

[Dave Bender]

main threat to Germany was coming from Russia and that the threat was getting worse.

The Franco Russian Military Alliance Convention makes this a moot point. France + Russia must be considered a single enemy for military planning purposes.

[Attrition]

David 'Bland' Stevenson goes on at great length at how the Russian defeat in 1905 altered the balance of power in Western Europe and how upset the Germans were with the rapidity of Russia's recovery. French loans, a booming economy and the reorganisation of the Russian mobilisation plan so as to mobilise in the interior and use the new railways to deploy made the German eastern option (Russia first then France) impractical. The big spending decisions after 1909 were financed out of growth when German finances were being stretched.

[Attrition]

From a smaller base.

7 German armies versus 5 French armies + BEF + Belgian forces. Smaller base where exactly?

Try a head count. Then add the effect of the eastern front as a time limiter.

[Dave Bender]

France & Allies
http://orbat.com/site/history/historica ... y1914.html
4 infantry divisions. BEF.
6 infantry divisions. Belgium.
64 infantry divisions. France.
.....14 divisions. 1st Army.
.....12 divisions. 2nd Army.
.....10 divisions. 3rd Army.
.....9 divisions. 4th Army.
.....16 divisions. 5th Army.
.....3 divisions. War Ministry Reserve.
----------------------------------------------------
74 infantry divisions total in France and Belgium.

German Forces in France and Belgium.
http://home.comcast.net/~jcviser/index.htm/page_9.htm
12 infantry divisions. 1.AOK
12 infantry divisions. 2.AOK
8 infantry divisions. 3.AOK
10 infantry divisions. 4.AOK
10 Infantry divisions. 5.AOK
10 infantry divisions. 6.AOK
6 infantry divisions. 7.AOK.
------------------------------------------------
68 infantry divisions total.
German total does not include Landwehr brigades attached to the field armies.

[Terry Duncan]

The Franco Russian Military Alliance Convention makes this a moot point. France + Russia must be considered a single enemy for military planning purposes.

In that case all wars will end in two fronts despite there being nothing in the Franco-Russian alliance terms about ANY war either nation starts, only one where Germany of another member of the Triple Alliance is the aggressor. It does not apply to a war either France or Russia starts. So if Russia declares war upon Germany for any reason, Germany regardless of French actions will attack her western neighbour and ensure the worst case scenario comes into being. Absolute insanity. The complete lack of suitable plans for war is what led Germany to the mess she found herself in at the end of the July Crisis, advocating that Germany must react in such a war irrespective of others actual actions will lead all possible wars to German defeat in a long war she does not have the strength to win.

[Dave Bender]

what led Germany to the mess she found herself in

Not matching the military spending levels of France and Russia for the decade prior to WWI. Otherwise Germany would have 10 field armies instead of the historical 8.

[Attrition]

Finding the money would have made the government more dependent on the Reichstag and possibly broken the 1% rule.

[Terry Duncan]

Not matching the military spending levels of France and Russia for the decade prior to WWI. Otherwise Germany would have 10 field armies instead of the historical 8.

As Attrition has noted, the only way to do this was to recast the foundation of the state, something the Prussians were keen to avoid as they felt the other states may not want the Prussian Kaiser as the leader anymore! It also ignores that if the army of Germany increases to such numbers the Russians and French will address with thier own increases. All it may achieve is the shelving of Plan XVII for a fully defensive plan as the French had until at least 1911, which in turn rules out any grand encirclement.