Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

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peterhof
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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#76

Post by peterhof » 18 Oct 2011, 22:35

Terry,

When I wrote: "The words of Sasonov and the Czar confirm this." The context makes it clear that I was talking about the words spoken by Sasonov and the Czar ON JULY 30th which made the meaning of the Russian mobilization perfectly clear.

You chose to respond with:


"Sazonov's words to the Austrian ambassador make it perfectly clear who was causing the chian of events leading to war;

I know what it is. You mean to make war on Serbia. . . . You are setting fire to Europe. It is a great responsibility that you are assuming, you will see the impression that it will make here and in London and Paris and perhaps elsewhere. It will be regarded as an unjustifiable aggression. . . Why was Serbia given no chance to speak and why the form of an ultimatum? The monarchic idea has got nothing to do with it. . . . The fact is you mean war and you have burnt your bridges. . . . One sees how peace loving you are, seeing that you set fire to Europe."

Thereby wrongly implying that I was referring to these words. You engaged in this frustrating stratagem frequently on the old HC boards - albeit not so much on this forum with the exception of the example cited above. But if your elevation to 'moderator' has spurred you to greater effort, so much the better.


Then I wrote: "Germany gave Russia twelve hours to suspend."


You responded: "Moltke's own estimate was that it would take Russia at least 48 hours to cease the mobilization, so a 12 hour limit looks to have been set to create an excuse, as supported by the two declarations of war - Russia had not answered, or Russia had given an unsatisfactory answer!"

But Germany was simply demanding that Russia state her willingness to suspend mobilization. A one-sentence telegram would have sufficed.



Finally, you wrote: "No, Germany had decided to abandon negotiation and seek war.

I do not blame Germany for taking action, I think she was too quick to declare war and could have mobilized and used those three extra days to try for a peaceful settlement if sufficient will to do so had been present, but that does not mean her judgement was sound. Russia was certainly acting badly, and for a cause few would consider fully justified, but so was Austria, and it was Austrian action that started the descent to war and Austrian intransigence that destroyed the last hopes for peace. France could have tried to talk restraint to Russia early in the crisis, but if we criticise France for this then the same must be applied to Germany and Austria who also did not practice any talk of restraint until it was far too late. You are the one trying to create some fantasy where one alliance was entirely blameless, and the facts do not support this - unless you act like Barnes and doctor them heavily first!"

What utter rubbish! Germany supported Austria for the express purpose of avoiding a wider war. France supported Russia for the express purpose of INITIATING a wider war. After the Russian partial mobilization, German policy turned on a dime and leaned heavily on Austria - again for the purpose of avoiding a wider war.
Russia, having been informed that her partial mobilization was acceptable but warned that she should refrain from further mobilization measures, ordered general mobilization. She took this fatal step despite the fact that:

-Bethmann-Hollweg was leaning heavily upon Austria to negotiate.
-Russia was in no military danger from Austria or Germany
-Russia had been warned that general mobilization would trigger a German DOW
-Russia was fully aware that she was starting a European war as shown by the actual admissions from Sasonov and the Czar on July 30th, cited by Baron Schilling
-Sasonov had ealier admitted on the same day - July 30th - that this mobilization would mean war by his statement to Paleoloque and Buchanan:

"If Austria rejects this proposal, preparations for a general mobilization will be proceeded with, and European war will be inevitable. For strategical reasons Russia can hardly postpone converting partial into general mobilization, now that she knows Germany is preparing, and excitement in the country has reached such a pitch that she cannot hold back if Austria refuses to make concessions." (Buchanan to Grey, July 30th, 1:15 P.M.; received 3:15 P.M., B.D.)

Did Sasonov imagine that Austria would make concessions in the hour before asking Nicholas to grant permission for general mobilization?


About Strachan: Three different books with the same title and author. Talk about confusing!


Like Strachan, you have also repeatedly referred to earlier mobilizations by the Powers which did not lead to war, while neglecting to mention that these were partial mobilizations - very different from general mobilizations.

This leaves the question of Germany supposedly deciding on mobilization before knowing the Russian position. This is utterly false.


Moltke's actual quote is : "In contrast to the mobilizations and demobilizations which have been customary in Russia, Germany's mobilization would unconditionally lead to war."

Yes, Bethmann agreed with Falkenhayn and Moltke that a decision would be made at noon on July 31st, but the telegram from Pourtales (announcing Russian general mobilization) arrived twenty minutes earlier at 11:40. This puts the lie to your assertion that the German decision was made five minutes before being informed of the Russian mobilization. Fay gives a detailed account of this crucial day (July 31st) in his chapter, Bethmann and Moltke, and concludes:

"In other words, Moltke himself admits that Bethmann was unwilling to agree to a decision until Germany had conclusive and absolute evidence of the Russian general mobilization which was suspected and which in fact had been ordered some twelve hours earlier."


Did you notice:

Just as on the old HC boards, the WW1 threads on this forum, no matter what the particular topic, seem always to return to Russia's general mobilization like the swallows returning to Capistrano. The very good reason for this is that the Russian general mobilization meant war. Even if we can argue about the generic meaning of mobilization, there can be no doubt about the meaning of the Russian mobilization of 1914. This is because we have the people who ordered it and those who executed it (Dobrorolski) supplying the exact, unmistakable meaning in their own words.
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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#77

Post by Terry Duncan » 18 Oct 2011, 23:36

Thereby wrongly implying that I was referring to these words.
Not really. You repeat the same phrase over and over like a demented parrot so it is impossible for anyone to not know the one sentence you refer to. I pointed out that Sazonov had made it perfectly clear why Russia was acting.
You engaged in this frustrating stratagem frequently on the old HC boards
If you mean pointing out that Austrian actions were what caused Russian actions then you are correct, and I will continue to do so unless you can provide evidence to show Russia planned to mobilize irrespective of Austrian actions.
But Germany was simply demanding that Russia state her willingness to suspend mobilization. A one-sentence telegram would have sufficed.
That is not what the ultimatum said. The ultimatum gave Russia 12 hours to cease, you are putting an interpretation onto how a Russian answer might have been interpretted. It could just as easily have been answered with the 'Russia has not given a satisfactory reply' declaration of war due to Russia not complying with the conditions laid out in the ultimatum.
What utter rubbish! Germany supported Austria for the express purpose of avoiding a wider war.
Only if you accept telling other nations they must put aside their own interests is a sensible or acceptable policy to the other nations concerned. If Russia had asked Germany to stand aside whilst she crushed Austria would you consider that a reasonable policy designed to avoid a wider war?
After the Russian partial mobilization, German policy turned on a dime and leaned heavily on Austria - again for the purpose of avoiding a wider war.
Bethmann sent several very ineffective telegrams and Berchtold ignored him, as has been pointed out so many times it seems pointless going into further detail.
Russia, having been informed that her partial mobilization was acceptable but warned that she should refrain from further mobilization measures, ordered general mobilization.
Jagow told Russia some strange things, partial mobilization is ok - actually it would cause Austria to mobilize and therefore invoke the casus foederis with Germany exactly as Moltke's memo pointed out - then he said it was not ok, he also said that if Russia actually tried to use any force against Austria it would mean war - the let the cannon do the talking comment - no matter what Austria did or didnt do. Effectively he was doing nothing except telling Russia she must not interfere at all or it is war.
About Strachan: Three different books with the same title and author. Talk about confusing!
Maybe, but surely not after it has been pointed out to you three times!
Like Strachan, you have also repeatedly referred to earlier mobilizations by the Powers which did not lead to war, while neglecting to mention that these were partial mobilizations - very different from general mobilizations.
Nowhere was there a distinction for partial or full mobilization within the various treaties. Are you saying it would have been ok if Russia had only partially mobilized and then gone to war with Austria?
This leaves the question of Germany supposedly deciding on mobilization before knowing the Russian position. This is utterly false.
No it is not. Jon and I have provided you with the relevent sections of the book by Strachan, so unless you plan to actually introduce anything to show that the man usually accepted by his peers as the foremost expert on WWI is actually wrong, it is pointless simply repeating that you dont like him publishing the truth.
Did you notice:

Just as on the old HC boards, the WW1 threads on this forum, no matter what the particular topic, seem always to return to Russia's general mobilization like the swallows returning to Capistrano.
Hardly surprising as you invaded every topic there with the same subject, as well as posting so many on it anyhow, and are following much the same pattern here. Would you like me to post the numerous replies to this comment when you posted it on THC also?
This is because we have the people who ordered it and those who executed it (Dobrorolski) supplying the exact, unmistakable meaning in their own words.
Actually Dobrorolski did not execute the mobilization, he was responsible for the detail of the planning of mobilization, not what it mean, and not what to do after it was ordered. Danilov was superior to him and this too has been gone over many times. Lets look at something else Dobrorolski said, from the same source you use, but for some reason you never quote this segment;
While it was still possible to doubt whether the Franco-Russian Alliance could be regarded as unshakeable, given the two totally different forms of government no doubt could arise as to the unity and solidity of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Their treaty of alliance was regularly renewed and officially published. Only 6 years before, the head of the Triple Alliance had solemnly assured Austria-Hungary, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia, that the faithful knight in shining armour would do his duty.

What purpose then would a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary only serve? A threat, not supported by a convincing display of force, must tempt them to disregard it. A partial mobilisation must result in precisely the opposite result of that intended.


So, lets see you refute Strachan and maybe tell us if you think Dobrorolski is correct?


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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#78

Post by peterhof » 19 Oct 2011, 01:36

Danilov had written much of the Russian mobilization plan, but Dobrorolski was responsible for its proper execution.

I have read your response twice. I gather that you agree that Germany gave the order for Kriegsgefahrzustand (Threatening Danger of War) AFTER receiving Pourtales' official notification of Russian general mobilization (at 11:40 A.M., July 31st) and that no German decision had been made before this - Strachan's nonsense to the contrary notwithstanding.

I might add that the French decision was made before the Austrian position was known. Quoting Alfred Fabre-Luce in his La Victoire :

"There is, then, no possible doubt about the attitude taken by Poincaré at St. Petersburg between the 20th and the 23d of July. Without any knowledge whatever of the Austrian demands or of the policy of Germany in the circumstances, he assumed a position of energetic opposition to the Central Powers, gave this opposition a very specific character, and never modified it in the slightest degree to the very end.
From that time on there was a very slight chance indeed of averting war; and, moreover, Poincaré had given Russia carte blanche to initiate hostilities any time she wished to do so, as we know from the fact that two days after Poincaré’s departure from St. Petersburg, Paléologue, following his instructions, promised Sasonov, without any reservations after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum, that France would fulfill all the obligations of the alliance. Further, Viviani, who accompanied Poincaré, declared to Nekludof at Stockholm on July 25th that 'if it is a war for Russia, it will be, most certainly, a war for France also
.'”


The Russian decision was made during Poincare's visit and finalized immediately upon Poincare's departure as confirmed by Dobrorolski:

War was already decided upon [Ministerial Council, July 25th] and the whole flood of telegrams between the Governments of Germany and Russia represented merely the stage setting of an historical drama.”
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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#79

Post by Terry Duncan » 19 Oct 2011, 04:50

Danilov had written much of the Russian mobilization plan, but Dobrorolski was responsible for its proper execution.
Dobrorolski only had any authority over the actual act of mobilization, but not anything about what happened next. You only quote a relatively minor functionary because nobody in authority says anything close to what you get from Barnes twisted translation - the author that even a propaganda department distanced themselves from!
I gather that you agree that Germany gave the order for Kriegsgefahrzustand (Threatening Danger of War) AFTER receiving Pourtales' official notification of Russian general mobilization
The order was issued after yes, it had already been decided to act even if it had not become clear what was happening in Russia.
no German decision had been made before this - Strachan's nonsense to the contrary notwithstanding.
Strachan is far better qualified than you to judge facts, and Barnes - who edited and distorted facts to fit his theories - and Fabre-Luce - who despised Poincare to say the least - are hardly reputable sources as we have pointed out to you many times previously. He also has the benefit of being able to see all the documents found over almost 100 years - Falkenhayn's diaries were only discovered in the 1990's for example - whilst you rely almst exclusively on propaganda writers and political opponents writing to an agenda. You have offered nothing to counter Strachan's timeline of events, and shown little more than France would stick by Russia if their was awar - hardly a surprise, and no different to all the other allies who stuck together in a crisis.
The Russian decision was made during Poincare's visit and finalized immediately upon Poincare's departure as confirmed by Dobrorolski:
So I presume you will have no problem in offering a detailed piece of evidence to support this comment?

You are not even addressing the evidence presented by Strachan, and Jon posted a lot more from his books that I would bother with as you never bother to actually consider what others have posted, simply re-pasting exactly the same posts you smothered THC in. Lets look at the key points from Strachan;
The emphasis on speed of mobilization, the interaction of war plans, and Germany’s central geographical position meant that a chain reaction became possible. But the interlocking sequence of mobilizations can be exaggerated; Serbia decided to mobilize ahead of Austria-Hungary; Austria-Hungary settled for general mobilization before Russia’s position was known; Russia’s move to mobilization preceded Germany’s and yet Germany’s decision was made before it was aware of the Russian position; Britain responded to Germany before it had decided to honour any commitment to France. The imperative of the alliance system was not one of altruism. But of brutal self-interest: Germany needed Austria-Hungary; France’s military position was dependant on Russian support; British diplomacy was unsustainable if it allowed the Entente to shatter.
In retrospect Russian prevarication over the pattern of its mobilization had little effect on the outcome of the July crisis. The crucial decisions, given the nature of Germany's war plan, were taken on 24 July. Any military preparations by Russia, even if designed to counter Austria-Hungary alone, would have been sufficient to prompt German mobilization. This is obviously true if Germany is seen as an aggressive power, already committed to European war, and certainly not disposed to pass up the opportunity of having its eastern frontier protected by Austrian operations against the Russians and so being freed to concentrate in the west. But it is also applicable in the context of a more reactive interpretation, of Germany’s self-imposed image as the tragic victim: the sense of being in a corner, the preoccupation with time which not only the mobilization timetable but also the political management of the crisis generated, combined with the fear of Russia and the obligation to Austria Hungary to make Russia’s partial mobilization as intolerable to Germany as general mobilization.
On 30 July Moltke's respect for Bethmann's wish to await the Russian response had - as his message to Conrad testified - evaporated. That evening he got the chancellor to agree that a decision on general mobilization would be made by noon on 31 July. Moltke was quite clear that the Tsar's equivocation over general or partial mobilization could make no difference to the German decision. Five minutes before their self-imposed deadline, Moltke and Bethman Hollweg heard that the Russians had finally decided on general mobilization.
We can also include one last part of Jon's posts for you too;
When, for example, Berchtold told Shebeko during the afternoon of 30 July that it had been decided to order Austrian general mobilization, he stated that :

Considering the circumstance however, that Russia was evidently mobilising against us, we too had to extend our mobilisation, while 1 expressly mentioned, that these measures, it goes without saying, constituted no hostile move against Russia and were merely lo be considered as the necessary counter-move lo the Russian mobilisation.

If mobilization meant war, Berchtold could hardly describe it as constituting 'no hostile act' nor would Shebeko have reported to Sazonov that the conversation 'bore the most friendly manner'.
I would like you to to actually address the points made, not simply say that Strachan has 'wrong headed ideas' or to try and counter with passages from books written prior to all facts being known. The purpose of the forum is to discuss things, and although this has never seemed to occur to you, to actually consider new evidence when it is presented. I would prefer it if you were to actually answer points raised by others with either comparable evidence or with reasoned discussion. Please try to consider what I have posted in these last two posts and then respond with something that addresses the points raised.

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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#80

Post by glenn239 » 19 Oct 2011, 18:34

MajorT -

Here is the wording of Hitler's from the Hossbach document,

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England being at war with Italy would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

Assuming Hitler is wrong and it results in World War, it would be impossible to state that either France, Britain or Italy were responsible for it, even though these Powers had already started a war amongst one another. Responsibility would fully be Germany's, as the third man in, butting their noses into a situation that was none of their business.

As it pertains to 1914, the question is not whether Austria decided on war with Serbia - Great Powers had wars all the time back then without world wars arising. The question is whether Russia's military intervention in such a war represented valid Russian security interests or the type of exploitative meddling Hitler was pondering in 1937.

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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#81

Post by Terry Duncan » 19 Oct 2011, 20:37

As it pertains to 1914, the question is not whether Austria decided on war with Serbia - Great Powers had wars all the time back then without world wars arising.
There had been no Great Power war in the age of national armies of millions of men, so this statement fail. to take that into account.
The question is whether Russia's military intervention in such a war represented valid Russian security interests
No, it represented a direct challenge to Russian influence and to Russian national interests. No nation that can prevent it will allow its interests to be trampled in the manner Austria and Germany were attempting in 1914. Vietnam certainly didnt represent a valid threat to US security interests, yet the US fought a war there. Security interests are not the only interests of a state, the US even had a central American government overthrown for daring to nationalize US company's property!

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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#82

Post by peterhof » 19 Oct 2011, 23:15

It is gratifying to see this thread - like so many others - coming home to . . . the Russian general mobilization.

It simply cannot be denied - despite the best efforts of the Ententinistas - that the Russian general mobilization meant war, not only by precedent of other Powers, but by the explicit admission of those who ordered it and executed it. It was known from the start that Austria would not turn tail and swallow a humiliating diplomatic defeat that would have permanently banished her from the European table. When Austria delivered the Note to Serbia, she notified the Powers at the same time:

"We cannot allow the demands which we have addressed to Servia, and which contain nothing that would not be considered natural between two neighbours, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises." (ARB, Vol 1, p 111)

The fact is that Russia had never cared one whit for Serbian nationalist aspirations. Her concern was, and had always been, with Constantinople and the Straits. The quarrel was between Austria and Serbia and would have remained so had Russia refrained from that fatal mobilization which was secretly encouraged by France and not discouraged by England. Austria had repeatedly given assurances, both to Russia and France, that Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity would be respected. On these points, Lord Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, unburdened himself in a somewhat testy diary entry dated July 26, 1914:

"It seems incredible that the Russian Government should plunge Europe into war in order to make themselves the protector of the Servians. Unless the Austrian Government had proofs of the complicity of Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke they could not have addressed to the Servian Government the stringent terms which the Austrian Note contained. Russia comes forward as the protectress of Servia; by what title except on the exploded pretensions that she is, by right, the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish!"

But the next day, July 27th, Sasonov realized Lord Bertie's worst fears:

"If there is any question of exercising a moderating influence on St. Petersburg, we reject it in advance." (Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, New York Edition, Huebsch, p. 17)

On July 31st, Emperor Franz Josef telegraphed Kaiser Wilhelm:

"The action my army is involved in at this moment against Servia cannot be interrupted by the threatening and insolent attitude of Russia. A renewed rescue of Servia by Russian intervention would have the most serious consequences for my country and I can therefore in no case admit of such an intervention.
I am fully aware of the importance of my decisions and have made them, confiding in the justice of God, with the absolute certainty that your army, as an unfailingly true ally, will stand by my country and the Triple Alliance."
(ARB, Vol III, pp. 44-45)


Please note again the very salient observation of Lord Bertie:

"Russia comes forward as the protectress of Servia; by what title except on the exploded pretensions that she is, by right, the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish!"

Indeed! In 1908, Russia traded away the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And in 1911, Russia had offered Turkey protection against the Balkan League implying the use of Russian soldiers against Serbia - all in return for concessions on the Straits of Constantinople. Despite this, the Ententinistas continue to cling stubbornly to the sordid, discredited picture of the noble, upstanding Russians wanting to protect their little Slavic brothers, just as they cling to the equally disgusting notion of the noble Brits rushing gallantly to the defense of a "defenseless little country." YUK!


It has been suggested - improbably - that German efforts to restrain Austria were "too late." Russia could simply not have waited another day for the results of German pressure on Austria. Nosirreee! Russia had to start the War right away. It is forgotten that Serbia had delayed her investigation of the Sarajevo murders, even after insistent and repeated inquiries from Vienna. Furthermore, on the 31st, Austria had signaled her readiness to modify the Note.

On the war-guilt compass, the Russian mobilization is true north. Had Russia delayed her fatal mobilization - even for a week - the War would have been prevented. But this was not what the Triple Entente wanted. The Triple Entente wanted war.
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Re: Who Really Murdered the Archduke Franz Ferdinand?

#83

Post by David Thompson » 20 Oct 2011, 04:19

At this point, the discussion has wandered far away from the topic question, and posters are starting to repeat themselves over and over again on off-topic issues, so this thread is closed.

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