Totally poor generalship in WWI

[ChristopherPerrien]

I have always wondered why Haig and Joffre we alllowed to keep the commands of the British and French armies for years while managing only to kill more of their own soldiers than Germans though the use of totally stupid tactics and strategies. The same can be said for just about all of the lower ranking general officers too.

I suspect that both France and Britian were actually both military-run governments during the war., and it would seem no one questioned them
except for that guy won the battle of Ombderman(sp?) in the Sudaan
(I can't remember his name)

To me the name Joffre should be anathema in France about like Hitler is in Israel.

[Gwynn Compton]

I believe France's government was effectively replaced by a military administration following the outbreak of hostilities.

Gwynn

[Anthony EJW]

I have always wondered why Haig and Joffre we alllowed to keep the commands of the British and French armies for years while managing only to kill more of their own soldiers than Germans though the use of totally stupid tactics and strategies. The same can be said for just about all of the lower ranking general officers too.

Joffre was replaced. Britain's army lost less men than either their prime opponent or principle ally.

Allied casualties tended to be heavier because they were the ones doing most of the attacking- the Germany could suffer just as badly, such as at the Kindermond. Could I have some examples of "totally stupid tactics and strategies" and some valid alternatives?

I suspect that both France and Britian were actually both military-run governments during the war., and it would seem no one questioned them
except for that guy won the battle of Ombderman(sp?) in the Sudaan
(I can't remember his name)

I don't know about France, but Britain remained under civilian control during the war. Germany effectively became a military dicatorship under Ludendorff.

To me the name Joffre should be anathema in France about like Hitler is in Israel.

Yeah, I can see how a mass murder is just as bad as a poor commander. :roll:

[dead-cat]

Allied casualties tended to be heavier because they were the ones doing most of the attacking- the Germany could suffer just as badly, such as at the Kindermond. Could I have some examples of "totally stupid tactics and strategies" and some valid alternatives?

could be debatable, but i think the start of the Somme offensive would pretty much qualify.
a valid alternative would be a very short preliminary bombardment of trenches (mainly to take out what's possible in terms of machine guns) so that the enemy doesn't have a week or so to prepare the reinforcements. and most important: to stop attacks which don't make any sense. if a strongpoint can't be taken, abandon it. i think this is pretty much how the stormtrooper tactics from 1917 were supposed to work. none of those is casualty-free of course. you can't destroy all rear enemy artillery positions, you can never cut all the barbed wire and you can never take out all machine guns. so where it doesn't work stop it. from this point of view, Nivelle, Falkenhayn and Haig (to name a few) are pretty close to being criminals because they all kept losing a few thousend men/day just for prestige.

However, i wish people would stop comparing an attempted industrialized extermination of an entire (defensless) race to battlefield casualties. It'd make a rational discussion of events much easier.

[Anthony EJW]

could be debatable, but i think the start of the Somme offensive would pretty much qualify.
a valid alternative would be a very short preliminary bombardment of trenches (mainly to take out what's possible in terms of machine guns) so that the enemy doesn't have a week or so to prepare the reinforcements.

There were many mistakes made during the planning and conduct of the Somme, many to do with the sheer inexperience of the British army at this point, most of all expecting too much from what they had. However, the limits of the artillery of 1916 should be remembered- beside a serious dud rate, the artillery of 1916 was not as accurate as it would be in 1918, or indeed 1917. Short preliminary bombardments were inpractical against heavy defences, as the artillery had to the range their targets. Also, much of the technological inventions needed weren't fully developed, nor where needed parst of the 'weapons systems' fully developed - such as the 106 grazing fuse or sound ranging.

Effective 'hurricane barrages' were only really practicable from late 1917 onwards- many successful assaults were made with extensive prelimiary barrages. For example, Vimy Ridge, or the battles during Third Ypres on the few days that there was good weather.

and most important: to stop attacks which don't make any sense. if a strongpoint can't be taken, abandon it.

The problem with this is that the entire front was a strongpoint. There was no flanks to turn, no weak point to exploit, just endless miles of trenches and bunkers, defended by interlocking machine guns and artillery. And invariablely, the most important positions were the most heavily defended ones. Sometimes strongpoints just have to be taken, and this wasn't unique to WW1- look at the Normandy fighting around Caen, Kursk, etc

i think this is pretty much how the stormtrooper tactics from 1917 were supposed to work. none of those is casualty-free of course. you can't destroy all rear enemy artillery positions, you can never cut all the barbed wire and you can never take out all machine guns. so where it doesn't work stop it.

As Griffith points out, 'infiltration' attacks are possible only where the enemy defences are crumbling or incomplete; and this situation really only existed on the Western Front in 1918.

The tactics and technology of WW1 evolved throughout the war- the intricate attacks of 1918 were only possible because of weapons and techniques developed from the previous years. It would not have been possible to launch an such an attack in 1916. This isn't to excuse all mistakes made during the war, many with bloody and tragic consequences, but if the generals are to be blamed with their failures they should also be credited with preciding over the creation of the tactics of modern war.

from this point of view, Nivelle, Falkenhayn and Haig (to name a few) are pretty close to being criminals because they all kept losing a few thousend men/day just for prestige.

It is easy to critizise commanders for not discontinuing battles with hindsight, but it was rather less clear at the time. In many cases, attacks were not just continued for prestige. What would the French and Russians have said if the British had turned around after the First Day of the Somme and said "One day of this is quite enough" ?

Obviously, some battles should have been closed down earlier than they should have, such as Passcendale. But this can only be said with definite hindsight. With the case of Passcendale, the British could not have known that the weather that year would be the worse in a generation- but they did know that stopping the attack before they had secured the ridge would have meant abandoning all the gains they had made at such high a cost. Again, at the time it was not such an obvious and easy decision, nor was it a mere matter of prestige.

[Benoit Douville]

ChristopherPerrien,

I totally agree with you. Haig and Joffre were really bad commander. They were sending man in front of machine gun and they didn't care about human losses. That was the tragedy of World War I. The commander of World War I were the most incompetent of all time, especially on the Allied side. Also, how about the battle of Galipoli, another stupid decision by the Allies. So human sacrifices for nothing. I am surprised that just a few groups of soldiers revolted(It happenned in the French Army) against those commander.

Regards

[Andy]

Joffre did a great job during the BAttle of the Marne.

[ChristopherPerrien]

I think the Germans managed to beat themselves at the first Marne by leaving there flank hanging in midair. And if I remember it was Gen. Petain who used the Paris taxis to rush men towards this "hole". Petain was actually one of the few "compentent" generals the allies had.

Given the opposition of the allied high commands towards any "new" tactics like "tanks " its a wonder they did not manage to lose the war.

I don't cut the german's much slack either with their tactics but at least they recognized the problem that "napoleonic" line attacks don't work against trenches and MG's. They tried new weapons like gas (although they flubbed that) and new tactics developed by Bruchmuller and Von Hutier.

As far as hindsight, this is laughable if you lose 100,000 men in a day you should pretty much "know" that something ain't workin, unless you are an idiot who can't lose his job.

I have no respect for Joffre or Haig and I don't see how any veteran or soldier could. It is quite obvious that they had no respect for their own soldier's except as cannon fodder.

[Anthony EJW]

I think the Germans managed to beat themselves at the first Marne by leaving there flank hanging in midair. And if I remember it was Gen. Petain who used the Paris taxis to rush men towards this "hole". Petain was actually one of the few "compentent" generals the allies had.

Much more important was the massive move of troops from the Franco-German border by train to the Marne battlefront. Joffre masterminded that.

Given the opposition of the allied high commands towards any "new" tactics like "tanks " its a wonder they did not manage to lose the war.

On the very same day that the tank made its appearance Haig asked for an additional 1000 from the war office. The French high command, on seeing the design for the St Chamnond tank (i.e. without seeing a single working model) ordered 400 of them.

So much for opposition towards the tank.

I don't cut the german's much slack either with their tactics but at least they recognized the problem that "napoleonic" line attacks don't work against trenches and MG's. They tried new weapons like gas (although they flubbed that) and new tactics developed by Bruchmuller and Von Hutier.

The Allies had gas as well.

Additionally, I sugest you look up SS143 Training manual of February 1917. Griffith analysises it depth in his "Battle Tactics of the Western Front". I take it you would consider the tactics of infantry fire and movement by squads, supression by machine guns and rifle grenades, etc all to be quite unnapolionic?

On Bruchmuller and Von Hutier's tactics, the British attack at Cambrai made use of exactally that kind of Hurricane style barrage. (And made use of about 350 tanks as well.)

As far as hindsight, this is laughable if you lose 100,000 men in a day you should pretty much "know" that something ain't workin, unless you are an idiot who can't lose his job.

Name one day in teh war that anyone lost 100,000 men.

I have no respect for Joffre or Haig and I don't see how any veteran or soldier could. It is quite obvious that they had no respect for their own soldier's except as cannon fodder.

"Let sleeping dogs lie. The generals ar all dead now and it is noticable how most critics waited until they were dead before tearing them to pieces. I believe that our generals were the best and did their job to the best of their ability. After all we did win the war, didn't we?"

Sergeant Wilson ( of the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers), Cheerful Sacrifice.

[ChristopherPerrien]

The Allies won by sheer attrition. I cannot condone attrition as an "effective" way of winning a war. Obviously the Germans did not think they actually lost the war, this was one of Hitler's main propaganda points.
As you might be able to see the tactics of attrition do not make an effective war or an effective "peace" for that matter. This is my main statement toward allied "Generalship" in WWI.

The 10000 was a slight overstatment, I believe there was 80000 killed on the first day of the Somme, it could be as low as 40000. But even 10000 I would consider as excessive casualties and definitely rethink "my" strategy. There have been people who rate generals by their ability to be "immune" to taking casualties/losing men, if you follow this criteria many generals from WWI are surely outstanding. I rate generals in a different way. example- Julius Caesar managed to win a battle in Spain with "0" casualities. All others kinda get rated below this standard and near the bottom you end up in WWI.

AS to tanks they were committed piecemeal at first, counter to the ideas
of their founder "Swinton" and some great opportunities were lost, they were also used in appaling terrain ( yes I know the whole front was appaling terrain , but these generals we are talking about never knew what the terrain was because they nevered went to the front. Guess they did not want to get their boots muddy. Don't you love officers like that).

The "Von Hutier " tactics developed by the Germans would have eliminated trench warfare if the war had lasted longer, helped along by the " in progess" adoption of proper armour tactics by the Allies.

Yes gas was use by the allies, in fact the allies developed the best weapon for releasing gas, the Stokes and the Livens projectors.

As to allied infantry tactics, I don't think the allied generals or many officers ever understood what Von Hutier a.k.a. infiltration tactics actually were. This was a big reason that French British and American Infantry units were quite often outfought by outnimbered German infantry units
in the next war, WWII. Bruchmuller was an artillery general who developed your "hurricane" barrage, Actually he had a much better tactic known as "bunkreuse"(sp?) which was a shelling of rear area and enemy artillery units with a mix of Green and Blue Cross agents. This was used at the same time.

As to sleeping dogs as least these "generals" have marked graves, not like many of their men, " In Flander's fields........"

ps Nice debate, have a good day!

[Anthony EJW]

The Allies won by sheer attrition. I cannot condone attrition as an "effective" way of winning a war. Obviously the Germans did not think they actually lost the war, this was one of Hitler's main propaganda points.

The German army certainly thought it was beaten by late 1918- that was why they accepted Versailles, they knew there wasn't a damn they could do about it.

As you might be able to see the tactics of attrition do not make an effective war or an effective "peace" for that matter. This is my main statement toward allied "Generalship" in WWI.

The tactics of attrition seem to have produced a very effective peace in 1945 and 1865.

The 10000 was a slight overstatment, I believe there was 80000 killed on the first day of the Somme, it could be as low as 40000.

Total British casaulites FDofS: 57,000
Total killed: 20,000

But even 10000 I would consider as excessive casualties and definitely rethink "my" strategy.

Total British casualties for the entire Somme campaign were 420,000. That is, nearly 14% of total loses occured on one day, in a battle that lasted 141.

By the end of the battle of the Somme total Allied casualties stood at 620,000. German casualties are much less certain, but where at least 450,000. Richard Holmes argues that "it is hard to place them lower than 600,000." Going from a 5-1 casualty ratio to nearly 1-1 by the end of the campaign- despite the fact that it was the Allies who were doing the attacking. To me, this would indicate that the Allies learned, and learned damn fast.

[quote[There have been people who rate generals by their ability to be "immune" to taking casualties/losing men, if you follow this criteria many generals from WWI are surely outstanding. I rate generals in a different way. example- Julius Caesar managed to win a battle in Spain with "0" casualities. All others kinda get rated below this standard and near the bottom you end up in WWI.[/quote]

If you rate it by men lost, then WW2 without doubt produced the worst generals. Germany lost more men in WW2 than France and Britain combined did in WW1.

AS to tanks they were committed piecemeal at first, counter to the ideas
of their founder "Swinton" and some great opportunities were lost, they were also used in appaling terrain

They were commited piecemeal beacuse that was all that could be commited. At their debute on the Somme the total tank force of the British army was 47. The first time a mass of tanks was available- Cambrai- they were used en mass.

( yes I know the whole front was appaling terrain , but these generals we are talking about never knew what the terrain was because they nevered went to the front. Guess they did not want to get their boots muddy. Don't you love officers like that).

The British army alone lost 78 generals KIA during WW1. In additon, over 200 were wounded during the war. At the battle of Loos alone 8 generals were killed, wounded or taken prisoner.

The generals did go to the front, and did so regualarly- high commanders had liason officers to tell them exactally what was going on.

The "Von Hutier " tactics developed by the Germans would have eliminated trench warfare if the war had lasted longer, helped along by the " in progess" adoption of proper armour tactics by the Allies.

Plenty of battles since WW1 have featured trench warfare, the most famous probably being Kursk.

Yes gas was use by the allies, in fact the allies developed the best weapon for releasing gas, the Stokes and the Livens projectors.

All of which was a well regarded development by the generals.

As to allied infantry tactics, I don't think the allied generals or many officers ever understood what Von Hutier a.k.a. infiltration tactics actually were.

Actually, I would say that it was ultimately the Allies who had better offensive tactics in WW1. In 1918 the Germans showed they could punch through an over extended defender suffering seveare shortages in manpower, guns and preperation time- but they were rather less successful against stronger positions around Ypres. Compare the the comparitive ease with which Rawlingon's army smashed their way through the Hindenberg Line later that year, in a few hours making the position totally untenable for the Germans.

This was a big reason that French British and American Infantry units were quite often outfought by outnimbered German infantry units
in the next war, WWII.

The converse also applies.

The German army in WW2 certainly had better combined arms doctrine- in particular, cooperation with anti-tank guns, which made a great difference. However, infantry tactics themselves don't seem to have been particually better than the Allies.

Bruchmuller was an artillery general who developed your "hurricane" barrage, Actually he had a much better tactic known as "bunkreuse"(sp?) which was a shelling of rear area and enemy artillery units with a mix of Green and Blue Cross agents. This was used at the same time.

The Hurricane barrage used at Cambrai predated Bruchmuller's debute on the Western Front. Further, British forces had been using gas to neutralise rear area and artillery units far before Cambrai.

As to sleeping dogs as least these "generals" have marked graves, not like many of their men, " In Flander's fields........"

I wonder how many of the Russian and German soldiers of WW2 have marked graves?

[ChristopherPerrien]

WWII was abigger war comparing losses doesn't matter.

Swinton wanted at 300 tanks to attack, they sent in 47 or 57 because they were grasping at straws to win a battle because they were desperate, public opnion was starting to question the great tactics that were getting so many British killed.

One of Haig's cheif of staff broke down and cried when he saw the terrain that they had sent men into, so obviously him or anyone of a higher rank never saw pachensdale(sp?).

Joffre drove the French Army to mutiny although it was under his successor that it actually occured.

Remenber it was the German generals and that famous "Stab in the back"
that caused Germany to surrender, the Geman Army was never defeated
I hate quoting Hitler. a.k.a The cause of WWII

Attrition was not used in WWII.

"In Flander's field's.................."

[ChristopherPerrien]

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.
We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie,
In Flanders fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields. ~ John McCrae

[Anthony EJW]

WWII was abigger war comparing losses doesn't matter.

WW1 was also a world war. Why is comparing loses with between WW1 and other battles acceptable, but not WW2?

Swinton wanted at 300 tanks to attack,

Pity he wasn't able to deliver them on time.

they sent in 47 or 57 because they were grasping at straws to win a battle because they were desperate, public opnion was starting to question the great tactics that were getting so many British killed.

Also the great tactics that were killing so many Germans. Are you saying a 1 to 1 casualty ratio against a dug in German army indicated really bad tactics?

One of Haig's cheif of staff broke down and cried when he saw the terrain that they had sent men into, so obviously him or anyone of a higher rank never saw pachensdale(sp?).

Myth. This fallacy seems to have been started by Liddle Hart and used in Lloyd George's War Memoirs.

In a post-WW2 interview, Brigadier-General John Davidson, head of operations staff at GHQ at the time of the Battle of Passchendaele, stated that the weeping staff officer was himself... and that he had held his hands to his face to show he was dumb to enquiries and not to hide tears.

The same officer also wrote a letter to Sir Edmonds, the Officical Historian, in July, 1938, in which he included the following information:

"There is one point - D.H. is always supposed not to have known or to have been misinformed as to the conditions (physical) in the front. This really is bunkum- not only did he get reports from his own general staff, but he talked to numerous Regimental Officers and saw and discussed affairs regularly with Btn. Commanders, Brigade and Divisional Commmanders as well as Corps and Army Commanders."

Quoted in Bloody Red Tabs, Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks

Joffre drove the French Army to mutiny although it was under his successor that it actually occured.

Joffre also saved France in 1914 by keeping his cool and getting men to where they needed to be. The mutinies were not just due to Joffre, but a number of complaints, such as very poor leave.

Remenber it was the German generals and that famous "Stab in the back"
that caused Germany to surrender, the Geman Army was never defeated
I hate quoting Hitler. a.k.a The cause of WWII

So why are you quoting him then? I hope you don't think he is the authoritive matter on this subject?

The German army most certainly was defeated.

“Every road was littered with broken down motor trucks, guns, machine-guns and trench mortars. Great stacks of supplies and military stores of all kinds were abandoned. Every railway line was blocked with loaded trucks which the Germans had been unable to remove. The sixty miles of railway in the valley of the Meuse between Dinant and Mezieres was filled from end to end with a continuous line of German freight trains carrying guns, ammunition, engineering equipment, and other paraphernalia. On the Belgian canals alone over eight hundred fully charged military barges were found.”

Quoted in Maurice: “The Last Four Months”

Field-Marshal Prince Rupprecht related in a latter to Prince Max on 18 October that the condition of the German army was appalling. The troops, he said were exhausted, and their numbers had now dwindled to the point where a division could only be reckoned as equivalent to one or two battalions ‘and in certain cases as only equivalent to two or three companies.’

Rupperecht also stated that in 1918, “I do not believe that there is any possibility of holding out over December… our situation is already exceedingly dangerous, and… under certain circumstances a catastrophe can occur overnight. Ludendorff does not realize the whole seriousness of the situation. Whatever happens, we must obtain peace before the enemy breaks in Germany; if he does, woe on us!”

Quoted in Official History, 1918, v, pp327-8

Attrition was not used in WWII.

For a start, I suggest reading on the fighting around Caen, Mt Cassino or Stalingrad.

[Phil C]

The British casualties for the first day on the Somme range from 57 to 60,000 depending on sources. Hindsight is a great tool when discussing tactics, the British army of 1916 was inexperiened made up mainly of volunteer pals battalions and the high command valued their enthusiasm but not their proffesionalism. The Generals bought up during the colonial era were also inexperienced in trench warfare or rather offensive trench warfare. As the Somme was Britains first main offensive during the war and was bought about partially because of French pressure as a result of the ongoing battle of Verdun many mistakes were made.

Information from trench raids was ignored, Battalion commanders werent given enough autonomy, and denied the opportunity to use initiative they died in droves just like their men, it was a tragic waste of life but lessons were learned, which is about the only good thing to come out of the sorry debacle.

Haig and Rawlinson were out of touch and considering their responsibilities that in my opinion is at best poor Generalship and at worst criminal.