KD 421 in no way supports anything about the Russian mobilization, I suggest you go back and read it as it only concerns a last minute attempt to avoid war and doesnt even mention cause and effect concerning Russian actions.Either cite the principle or document which confirms your unsupported allegation that the Russian general mobilization was ordered in consequence of Austria's declaration of war upon Serbia, or stop making such assertions and accept mine which are supported by documents (such as K.D. 421 cited above).
You have made much of the original Russia decisions to authorise the mobilizations on 24th/25th July, something they did not seek to put into action until after news of the Austrian declaration of war. The timings have been discussed earlier in this thread. In the later afternoon of the 28th, Sazonov learns of the Austrian declaration of war, and goes to Yanushkevitch and asks for the two mobilization orders to be drawn up only at that point. Then amidst the Willi-Nicky telegrams and Sazonov is talking with Szarpary where he warns Austrian Ambassador Szápáry that 'Russian interests were identical with those of Serbia' he ends the meeting somewhat angrily when he’s informed of the Austrian shelling of Belgrade. Then between 20:00 and 21:40 we have the Tzar moving between partial and full mobilization, finally ordering partial mobilization against Austria at midnight. No scholar today disputes this series of events.Either cite the principle or document which confirms your unsupported allegation that the Russian general mobilization was ordered in consequence of Austria's declaration of war upon Serbia
If you wish to show Russia was acting because of other factors, please do so, but not with the comments of somebody you have branded a liar in their own memoir!
Now, please show the fate of Sazonov's proposal mentioned in KD.421 - it would not have been something I would have introduced if trying to support your claims, but now you have done so please show us what happened to Sazonov's proposal?
Now, let us look to events in Russia as detailed in albertini The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol II - a book you claim to have yet seem to know nothing of what is contained in it despite it being accepted as the best of the accounts detailed by people able to interview the characters involved in the actual events;
The Tsar read out to him a telegram just arrived from Wilhelm. It had crossed with the Tsar’s own telegram to Wilhelm which had been sent on to the latter by the Chancellor at 1.45 p.m. on the 29th. Drafted in English by Stumm and corrected in many places by the Kaiser it ran:
The first part of the telegram resorts to an easily discernible artifice intended to cover up the real nature of the Austro-Russian conflict. The second part lacks all semblance of truth. Up till the 28th Germany had done nothing but urge Austria to reject all compromise and attack Serbia. If, on the evening of the 28th, a change of policy took shape at Berlin, there was not the slightest sign of it in the language used by Pourtalès. His last communication contained an open threat untempered by any promise from the Chancellor of exercising restraint on Austria. This explains why the Kaiser’s appeals made no impression on Sazonov who took occasion to inform the Tsar of the German threat, pointing out that it was out of keeping with the spirit of the Kaiser’s telegram. The Tsar decided to appeal once more to Wilhelm and at 8.30 p.m. telegraphed him as follows:It is with the greatest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Servia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Servia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime, to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Servians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me [sic], have a common interest, as well as all sovereigns, to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics play no part at all.
On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that ‘may still arise.
Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin Willy.
In addition to saying that he would telegraph to the Kaiser, the Tsar gave Sazonov permission to discuss the question of mobilization with the Minister for War and the Chief of General Staff. This discussion took place in Janushkevich’s office and Schilling records that Danilov, General Monkevitz, and Basili, Assistant to the Chief of the Foreign Minister’s Chancery, were present in an adjoining room in readiness to carry out the decisions taken at the conference.Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship.
This entry shows that up to that moment no decision had been taken as to whether to resort to partial or to general mobilization and that the decision was reached towards 8 p.m. at that very conference.These decisions were awaited with some trepidation, since all concerned knew how important in respect of our military preparedness even a partial mobilization would be if it were ordered, and still more a general mobilization, as, in the first case, a partial mobilization would render difficult a general mobilization, if such should prove necessary subsequently. After examining the situation from all points, both the Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff decided that in view of the small probability of avoiding a war with Germany it was indispensable to prepare for it in every way in good time, and that therefore the risk could not be accepted of delaying a general mobilization later by effecting a partial mobilization now. The conclusion arrived at at this conference was at once reported by telephone to the Tsar, who authorized the taking of steps accordingly. This information was received with enthusiasm by the small circle of those acquainted with what was in progress.