The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#166

Post by Terry Duncan » 14 Feb 2012, 00:14

Either cite the principle or document which confirms your unsupported allegation that the Russian general mobilization was ordered in consequence of Austria's declaration of war upon Serbia, or stop making such assertions and accept mine which are supported by documents (such as K.D. 421 cited above).
KD 421 in no way supports anything about the Russian mobilization, I suggest you go back and read it as it only concerns a last minute attempt to avoid war and doesnt even mention cause and effect concerning Russian actions.
Either cite the principle or document which confirms your unsupported allegation that the Russian general mobilization was ordered in consequence of Austria's declaration of war upon Serbia
You have made much of the original Russia decisions to authorise the mobilizations on 24th/25th July, something they did not seek to put into action until after news of the Austrian declaration of war. The timings have been discussed earlier in this thread. In the later afternoon of the 28th, Sazonov learns of the Austrian declaration of war, and goes to Yanushkevitch and asks for the two mobilization orders to be drawn up only at that point. Then amidst the Willi-Nicky telegrams and Sazonov is talking with Szarpary where he warns Austrian Ambassador Szápáry that 'Russian interests were identical with those of Serbia' he ends the meeting somewhat angrily when he’s informed of the Austrian shelling of Belgrade. Then between 20:00 and 21:40 we have the Tzar moving between partial and full mobilization, finally ordering partial mobilization against Austria at midnight. No scholar today disputes this series of events.

If you wish to show Russia was acting because of other factors, please do so, but not with the comments of somebody you have branded a liar in their own memoir!

Now, please show the fate of Sazonov's proposal mentioned in KD.421 - it would not have been something I would have introduced if trying to support your claims, but now you have done so please show us what happened to Sazonov's proposal?

Now, let us look to events in Russia as detailed in albertini The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol II - a book you claim to have yet seem to know nothing of what is contained in it despite it being accepted as the best of the accounts detailed by people able to interview the characters involved in the actual events;
The Tsar read out to him a telegram just arrived from Wilhelm. It had crossed with the Tsar’s own telegram to Wilhelm which had been sent on to the latter by the Chancellor at 1.45 p.m. on the 29th. Drafted in English by Stumm and corrected in many places by the Kaiser it ran:
It is with the greatest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Servia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agitation that has been going on in Servia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime, to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Servians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You will doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me [sic], have a common interest, as well as all sovereigns, to insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment. In this case politics play no part at all.

On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that ‘may still arise.

Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin Willy.
The first part of the telegram resorts to an easily discernible artifice intended to cover up the real nature of the Austro-Russian conflict. The second part lacks all semblance of truth. Up till the 28th Germany had done nothing but urge Austria to reject all compromise and attack Serbia. If, on the evening of the 28th, a change of policy took shape at Berlin, there was not the slightest sign of it in the language used by Pourtalès. His last communication contained an open threat untempered by any promise from the Chancellor of exercising restraint on Austria. This explains why the Kaiser’s appeals made no impression on Sazonov who took occasion to inform the Tsar of the German threat, pointing out that it was out of keeping with the spirit of the Kaiser’s telegram. The Tsar decided to appeal once more to Wilhelm and at 8.30 p.m. telegraphed him as follows:
Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship.
In addition to saying that he would telegraph to the Kaiser, the Tsar gave Sazonov permission to discuss the question of mobilization with the Minister for War and the Chief of General Staff. This discussion took place in Janushkevich’s office and Schilling records that Danilov, General Monkevitz, and Basili, Assistant to the Chief of the Foreign Minister’s Chancery, were present in an adjoining room in readiness to carry out the decisions taken at the conference.
These decisions were awaited with some trepidation, since all concerned knew how important in respect of our military preparedness even a partial mobilization would be if it were ordered, and still more a general mobilization, as, in the first case, a partial mobilization would render difficult a general mobilization, if such should prove necessary subsequently. After examining the situation from all points, both the Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff decided that in view of the small probability of avoiding a war with Germany it was indispensable to prepare for it in every way in good time, and that therefore the risk could not be accepted of delaying a general mobilization later by effecting a partial mobilization now. The conclusion arrived at at this conference was at once reported by telephone to the Tsar, who authorized the taking of steps accordingly. This information was received with enthusiasm by the small circle of those acquainted with what was in progress.
This entry shows that up to that moment no decision had been taken as to whether to resort to partial or to general mobilization and that the decision was reached towards 8 p.m. at that very conference.

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#167

Post by glenn239 » 14 Feb 2012, 20:45

The Austrians did shell Belgrade, as noted above...
If you have information, post a summary of this attack, with damages and casualties please, or a link to a site with these details. It's not enough to say 'shelling of Belgrade'. We need the specific details.
Therefore Russia has a good point in your estimation.
“If the Austrians were indiscriminately and heavily shelling Belgrade”. I yet see no evidence this was the case.
But the distortions over sabotaged peace talks, promises that were never made, incidents that didn’t happen, show no such intent by the Central Powers to deflect their responsibility for war?
If the Entente distorted mobilization chronology, then the Entente itself felt this question had weight in the matter of responsibility.
Nor was there as of 4th August 1914.
The difference between a mobilization uncalled (1912) and one that is in motion, but not yet completed (1914). Note that by 4 August Prussia had been subjected to cavalry raids, so at least some regiments were up on the border.


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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#168

Post by Terry Duncan » 14 Feb 2012, 21:56

If you have information, post a summary of this attack, with damages and casualties please, or a link to a site with these details. It's not enough to say 'shelling of Belgrade'. We need the specific details.
The same could be said for your claim that the fort was the target and that Belgrade wasnt hit. There are actually a couple of pictures of buildings in Belgrade that were hit, though where to find them is another matter. I will look, though it was years ago that I last saw them. As the term 'shelling of Belgrade' is common through almost every narrative, are you calling all of them into question and thereby implying everyone noting this is wrong?
If the Entente distorted mobilization chronology, then the Entente itself felt this question had weight in the matter of responsibility.
As has been said many times, it was a serious escalation of the crisis, but it was still short of war. Both the Entente and Central Powers published things to justify their position and to remove any hint of fault from their actions, though nobody here other than Peter is suggesting we look to those for an appraisal of events. The Germans and Austrians hid that they conspired at war and that they refused all attempts at moderation, maybe because they figured that showed their responsibility?
The difference between a mobilization uncalled (1912) and one that is in motion, but not yet completed (1914).
This does not quite make sense. An uncalled mobilization that did happen verses one that has not started yet. Please tell me why the one that has yet to start is a reason to abandon all talks days before it comes into effect, whilst the other that actually had taken place was not even grounds for a warning?
Note that by 4 August Prussia had been subjected to cavalry raids, so at least some regiments were up on the border.
Yes, the very same 'light border troops' you mentioned earlier as always being on the border. The Kaiser even noted that these raids had made further negotiation impossible as they had damaged German property, as though the declaration of war and German breaking off of diplomacy had not already done this! This was all referenced on THC when Peter demanded to see it, though I cant find it at present.

However, it appears at least you are not disputing that Russia mobilized because of the declaration of war by Austria and the shelling of Belgrade. Perhaps if you were to point out where you stood on these latest ideas of Peters we could move the discussions on?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#169

Post by peterhof » 14 Feb 2012, 22:24

Terry Duncan wrote:However, it appears at least you are not disputing that Russia mobilized because of the declaration of war by Austria and the shelling of Belgrade. Perhaps if you were to point out where you stood on these latest ideas of Peters we could move the discussions on?
These are not my "latest ideas" but based upon Sasonov's own written 'formula' given to Pourtales on July 30th which stated the conditions under which Russia would stop mobilizing. Neither the Austrian DOW nor the shelling of Belgrade were mentioned. Nor were they mentioned in any other discussions about the order for general mobilization. This includes the final discussion between Sasonov and the Czar on July 30 when the only reasons given were the false allegation of Austrian mobilization and the equally false anticipation of an attack by Austria or Germany.
Last edited by peterhof on 14 Feb 2012, 22:38, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#170

Post by Terry Duncan » 14 Feb 2012, 22:29

These are not my "latest ideas" but based upon Sasonov's own written 'formula' given to Pourtales on July 30th which stated the conditions under which Russia would stop mobilizing. Neither the Austrian DOW nor the shelling of Belgrade were mentioned.
As I pointed out, the proposal by Sazonov on 30th July did not mention anything about the reasons Russia had mobilized, they dealt with a last minute proposal that was hoped would allow a peaceful settlement. Now, have you got any further into telling everyone what happened to this proposal?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#171

Post by peterhof » 14 Feb 2012, 22:44

This last "proposal" by Sasonov was the most ridiculous in a last-minute avalanche of ridiculous proposals by Sasonov of which even the British were suspicious. Sasonov's "proposals" had zero chance of being accepted by Austria as he well knew. They were intended instead to confuse and deflect the verdict of history.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#172

Post by Terry Duncan » 14 Feb 2012, 22:55

This last "proposal" by Sasonov was the most ridiculous in a last-minute avalanche of ridiculous proposals by Sasonov of which even the British were suspicious.
Your opinion on the proposal is really not important compared to those in charge at the time. From memory the British accepted the proposal as valid.
Sasonov's "proposals" had zero chance of being accepted by Austria as he well knew.
I cannot recall anyone saying that to Sazonov's face in 1914. So, tell us what happened to the proposal? What did Berchtold say about it?
They were intended instead to confuse and deflect the verdict of history.
Would that come into the same category as all German actions after Bethmann famously said 'all that remains is to put Russia in the wrong'? Again, your opinion matters little. Tell us what happened to Sazonov's proposal, the last proposal that could solve the crisis without war?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#173

Post by peterhof » 14 Feb 2012, 23:28

Terry Duncan wrote:Tell us what happened to Sazonov's proposal, the last proposal that could solve the crisis without war?
It withered on the vine like the last three or four of Sasonov's disingenuous "proposals." This last one was particularly absurd as it "proposed" that Austria gut the heart of her Note by deleting the demand for an investigation [ points 5 & 6] in which Austria would participate.

Fay writes (on p. 354, Vol 2): "Sasonov . . . put forth in rapid succession so many suggestions that they became bewildering . . . " At the British Foreign Office Sir Arthur Nicolson complained on July 27:

"This is confusing. In three consecutive days M. Sasonov has made one suggestion and two proposals all differing from each other . . . One really does not know where one is with M. Sasonov, and I told Count Benckendorff so this afternoon." (B.D., 198, 203)


Perhaps Sir Arthur should have taken a look at this Russian Military Protocol as it goes a long way toward explaining Sasonov's large pile of "proposals.":

“Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshalling of our troops without beginning hostilities, in order that our opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may still be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by clever, pretended diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days, they absolutely must be taken!”

Russian Military Protocol, November 8, 1912
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#174

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 Feb 2012, 00:02

It withered on the vine like the last three or four of Sasonov's disingenuous "proposals."
You still seem to be avoiding the issue. What did Berchtold say when the Germans passed the proposal on to him? Maybe you can tell us what the Bethmann said of the proposal?
Fay writes ...
His opinon of the proposal. What does he record actually happened to this last proposal?
Perhaps Sir Arthur should have taken a look at this Russian Military Protocol:
Perhaps you need to read it too.
Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities
Therefore there was still a chance to avoid war. Nowhere in the quote does it say that all control has passed from the government to the military, so if the government is satisfied it is still possible to avoid war. Austria, Russia had both mobilized prior to 1914 without going to war, and in the July Crisis Belgium and The Netherlands both mobilized whilst having no plans on attacking anyone.

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#175

Post by Jon Clarke » 15 Feb 2012, 00:51

If you have information, post a summary of this attack, with damages and casualties please, or a link to a site with these details. It is not enough to say 'shelling of Belgrade'. We need the specific details

​As I suspect you well know, most accounts of the July Crisis simply record that the Austrians bombarded Belgrade with little in the way of details. I did find the following extract from Strachan's The First World War, Volume 3:

The guns mounted in the fortress of Semlin fired across the Danube, and from the river itself monitors of the Austro-Hungarian navy lobbed shells into the Serb capital. The hospital was hit. 'Windows were shattered to smithereens', Dr Slavka Mihajlovic reported, 'and broken glass covered many floors. Patients started screaming. Some got out of their beds, pale and bewildered. Then there was another explosion, and another one, and then silence again. So it was true! The war had started.'.

​This fits in my admittedly vague recollection of reading somewhere that the Austrians had fired at the fortress but 'stray' shells had hit the hospital..As far as I can recall there were no casualties. The initial reports reaching St Petersburg were probably simply that the Austrians were bombarding Belgrade which would explain Sazonov's reaction. It is also true to say that the bombardment of Belgrade had absolutely no military value.

The difference between a mobilization uncalled (1912)...

​The German assessments of the Russian mobilization measures in 1912/13 are detailed in Terence Zuber's The Real German War Plan, 1904-14 pages 116-117. Zuber starts his description by stating:

It was clear to the Germans on 21 November [1912] that the Russians were conducting a gradual undeclared mobilization.

​and later writes that:

On 18 February [1913] the Germans estimated that when the Russian army announced mobilisation, it would in fact have already mobilised (this was underlined in pencil in the original document), and Russian mobilisation meant the beginning of Russian hostilities.

​Now unless I fell asleep during the history lessons covering the Russo-German war of 1912-13, it would appear that in 1912/13 the German military did not regard Russian military measures over a period of three months as a cause for war even though by their own assessment these measures effectively amounted to mobilization in all but name.

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#176

Post by peterhof » 15 Feb 2012, 00:56

“Mobilization does not necessarily mean the immediate beginning of hostilities because it may be of advantage to complete the marshalling of our troops without beginning hostilities, in order that our opponent may not be entirely deprived of the hope that war may still be avoided. Our military measures will then have to be masked by clever, pretended diplomatic negotiations in order to lull the fears of the enemy as completely as possible. If by such measures we can gain a few days, they absolutely must be taken!”

Russian Military Protocol, November 8, 1912

The part in red is your truncated version whose purpose it is to change the meaning and context of the quote - a deception which you are fond of ascribing to others.
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#177

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 Feb 2012, 01:17

Not at all. Nowhere in your repeated quote does it say war is inevitable, or that the military are now dictating events.

Now stop evading and tell us all the details of what happened to Sazonov's final proposal to avoid war?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#178

Post by peterhof » 15 Feb 2012, 01:34


Jon Clarke wrote:Now unless I fell asleep during the history lessons covering the Russo-German war of 1912-13, it would appear that in 1912/13 the German military did not regard Russian military measures over a period of three months as a cause for war even though by their own assessment these measures effectively amounted to mobilization in all but name.
You may well have been asleep during the history lessons covering the Russo-German war of 1914 - 18. In that instance, It could also be said that "the German military did not regard Russian military measures" since July 25 "as a cause for war even though by their own assessment these measures effectively amounted to mobilization in all but name." But Bethmann - remember? - insisted upon waiting for the actual name - general mobilization - of which he was notified on July 31st.

You may also have been asleep when the Russian issuer of general mobilization in 1914 defined it as "sending thousands upon thousands of men to their death."
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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#179

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 Feb 2012, 04:28

Jon,

It is good to see you posting, you have been missed, and not only for your patience in reposting the same refutations for Peter to mostly ignore!

Peterhof,

You seem to have trouble admitting Bethmann did very little about Sazonov's proposal, despite it being almost certain that war would result if this last opportunity was allowed to pass. How about posting what Bethmann wrote on Pourtales communication?

You surely know these things - they have been discussed with you several times previously - so why pretend that you dont or that they didnt happen?

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Re: The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

#180

Post by peterhof » 15 Feb 2012, 04:54

Terry Duncan wrote:You seem to have trouble admitting Bethmann did very little about Sazonov's proposal, despite it being almost certain that war would result if this last opportunity was allowed to pass.
You seem to have trouble admitting that Sasonov submitted a "proposal" which he knew had no chance of even being considered by either Germany or Austria, and is therefore evidence of his bad faith. It has been pointed out to you more than once that immediately after giving Pourtales this ridiculous "formula," Sasonov departed for Peterhof and obtained authorization for general mobilization without so much as waiting for a response. Did you perhaps expect Bethmann to do something in the space of 10 minutes? The "last opportunity" that was guaranteed to prevent war was to NOT order general mobilization.
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