The Russian General Mobilization of 1914

[Terry Duncan]

You no doubt remember that Berchtold's advisers had promised on July 30 that Berchtold would place Bethmann's telegrams before Emperor Franz Josef, and that he [Berchtold] would reply the next day after conferring with Tisza.

Let me recall events so far, Bethmann first attempted to contact Berchtold on 28th July - after delaying the Kaiser's proposal of 27th until after Austria had already declared war - and still had no reply by the end of the 30th July, only a rather stange claim that Berchtold would have to consult Tisza when he could have simply talked to Franz-Joseph if he had so desired. None of this was ever reported to Sazonov, so the stupid repetion that Russia acted to avoid something about who's timing she knew nothing about, or if she were simply being stalled by Austria and Germany as had happened from the outset of the July Crisis, really offers nothing factual. Then again, you do rely on Fay, who like all others you rely on wrote before the 1930's - even the updated version isnt half way through the 1930's - and were writing without full access to the facts we know today. Having said that, many were available at the time, but people like Fay and to a far greater extent Barnes decided to ignore them.

Russia ordered general mobilization later that same day - just hours after Bethmann told the Prussian Council of Ministers:

"The declaration of 'Threatening Danger of War' meant mobilization, and this, under our conditions - mobilization towards both sides - meant war." (p 524)

Just after? You mean Bethmann was already talking war before Russia mobilized, surely this destroys your contention it was only the full mobilization that led Germany to act? However, as you feel the need to bring up the matter of what Bethmann told various parts of the German government, let me bring up this from Albertini The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol III;

He had summoned the Ministers of State to today’s meeting to give them a survey of the present political situation, as far as this was possible. The situation varied from hour to hour and was still doubtful in view of the uncertain factors in developments. His Majesty had tried to get an understanding between the Vienna and St. Petersburg Governments. The Vienna Government, after the Serbian rejection of its terms, had made a declaration at St. Petersburg that it had no territorial aims and did not wish to infringe the integrity of the Serbian State [a statement which had never been made by Berchtold.]

So Bethmann starts off by telling a lie, claiming Berchtold did not wish to infringe on Serbian state integrity, a look a the note shows there were many such infringement, from limiting the Serbian press to involvement in the judicial process. More to the point, Bethmann claims Berchtold even went as far as to notify St Petersburg of this. Then again, I suppose it was hard to admit Berchtold was dragging him to war and refusing to listen to him as then it wouldnt be possible to sell the defensive war story.

Therefore the Vienna Government proposed by a temporary occupation to take a gage for its demands and for the good behaviour of the Serbian Government. This dimarche, made yesterday, had as yet received no answer. [Was the Chancellor ashamed to say that the dimarche had been made as early as the evening of the 28th?]

So here it is clear Bethmann deceived the German people, altering the date of his communication so as not to admit Berchtold was simply ignoring him, knowing Bethmann would have to support him if Austria caused a greater war that the one she had already started. Now for the part you showed only the briefest element of;

Parallel with these negotiations with Vienna an exchange of telegrams had been carried on between His Majesty and the Tsar. . . . The telegrams had crossed, and a further exchange had been rendered difficult by the intervening of Russian mobilization. . . . Germany and England had taken all steps to avoid a European war. . . . His Majesty approved that, before further decisions, the above-mentioned dimarebe at Vienna should be brought to a conclusion. As regards military measures: proclamation of imminent danger of war meant mobilization, and this in our circumstances —mobilization on both fronts—meant war. One could not fittingly carry on political and military actions at the same time. Probably today in Vienna the decision would be taken in the matter of the German and English proposals.

Now we can see Bethmann mentions talks with Russia had been made difficult by the Russian mobilization, but not impossible, but that the decision for war was taken entirely within Germany, for reasons only applying to Germany, and not because Russia was about to attack Germany. And his final note, that a decision would be taken in Vienna about the proposals he had sent, needs to be seen as something less that hopeful, as Berchtold had refused the proposals mid-morning on 31st July anyhow.

"Russia's responsibility lay also in the secret preparatory military measures which she was making at the same time that she was carrying on diplomatic negotiations These alarmed Germany and Austria."

But Russia is not supposed to be alarmed when Germany and Austria undertake their own similar measures, not to mention Austria actually declaring war on Serbia?

Those clever Russians don't miss a trick, do they?

What? You mean a protocol written in 1912 says that it will be helpful to gain a few days if possible? Are you trying to suggest the Russians must be stupid and should not be able to draw such sensible conclusions? During the 1st and 2nd Balkan War, Germany observed Russia conduct a 'secret mobilization' where she had 400,000 extra men under arms for months by using such measures, yet it didnt cause war despite these being the German estimates of what Russia had done. In 1914 Germany went to war hours after learning such a move had been put into place and before any mobilization order could bring troops to their depots.

Now of course if you condemn the Russian 'stealth' mobilization methods, you also condemn the German 'stealth' ultimatum that never once mentioned war as the result of non-compliance with its one-sided terms?

Apparently, Fay has not grasped your central point that the noble Russians were simply protecting the poor Serbs.

I have never said anything about noble Russians, they were no more or less noble that any of the Great Powers. Never mind, it was as good as your other attempts at building strawman arguments.

This can only be understood by those who were equally noble in protecting the poor Belgians two days later.

Maybe you should take this opportunity to tell everyone here, especially the Belgian members and readers, what Belgium had done to bring war upon herself? Maybe you should also tell everyone why Britain should not be allowed to go to war and help them?

[favedave]

Given Russia's known position viz-a-vie Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the reigning monarchs' of Austria-Hungary and Imperial Russia understandable attitudes towards regicide and assassins, why weren't Franz Josef's first discussions with Tsar Nicholas in the first weeks of July? Or even the second week of July after receiving the Kaiser's assurance of support in what ever action the Dual Monarchy chose to execute? Wilhelm had his own agenda (often forgotten or overlooked) for giving Austria-Hungary his unconditional military support on the 6th of July. He needed the Balkan Peninsula pacified immediately. The three Balkan wars of 1912-1913 had delayed completion of his pet project the Berlin to Baghdad rail route by at least a year. Wilhelm also didn't believe that Nicholas II had the gumption to defy him with the threat of war with the most powerful military on earth behind his demands. But Franz Josef, who had presided over Austria when it was forced to become "The Dual Monarchy" after the war with Prussia in 1866, should have had no love of Germany which could overcome his need to have Russia stand aside while he justifiably punished the slavs who murdered his heir. Unless he was bound and determined to end the existance of Serbia once and for all.
These discussions of what Berchtold, or Bethmann, or Sazonov said or did, or didn't do ignores the plain fact that they were acting on the direct orders of their autocratic rulers. They could only council, not decide. Berchtold's need to inform the Emperor or consult with Tisza is a fabrication designed to shield the monarch if things should go terribly wrong. Likewise so are Bethmann's last minute pleas to moderate Austria after the war was underway with a request to "halt in Belgrade."

Nicholas too shares in this responsibilty. Not for mobilizing either partially or fully on the 30th of July, but for not reaching out to Franz Josef on his bereavement in the first week of July with his unconditional support to bring the perpetrators to justice. That would have been the right thing to do and it would have short circuited the plan to grind Serbia into the dust.

But it is readily apparent that the three rulers and their general staffs had other plans afoot.
+

[glenn239]

Given Russia's known position viz-a-vie Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the reigning monarchs' of Austria-Hungary and Imperial Russia understandable attitudes towards regicide and assassins, why weren't Franz Josef's first discussions with Tsar Nicholas in the first weeks of July?

Because the Austrians viewed Russia in a similar way to how Israel views Iran. Back in 1913 the Austrians, via Franz Joseph writing to the Tzar, had attempted to open a dialogue with an emissary, (whose name escapes me at the moment, but I could cough it up). I seem to recall that the Russians basically told him to go stuff it.

Nicholas too shares in this responsibilty. Not for mobilizing either partially or fully on the 30th of July

No, Nicholas’ responsibility was for mobilizing, which was, and remains, a gesture that can be interpreted as an act of war. Picture Iran mustering 40 divisions across a new ally Iraq to the Israeli border. You think Israel isn’t going to launch an attack long beforehand? Impossible! The Israelis would smash the Iranians long before they were in position, and the Iranians would be at fault for the provocation.

[favedave]

Franz Josef had already gone to war with Serbia for 2 days when Nicholas mobilized...If it had been an act of war, i.e. shelling across the border into Austro-Hungarian territory, it would have been not been open to interpretation in 2012.
The situation in 1913 is not analogus to the situation in in 1914. The heir to the thrown of the dual monarchy was not murdered. This assassination provided the opportunity to settle the differences between Russia and Austria-Hungary over Serbia, or at least defer them for another time. But that was definitely not in Franz Josef's mind.

[Terry Duncan]

Lets see, Austria didnt like Serbia or Russia, Russia didnt like Germany or Austria, Teuton didnt like Slav, Magyar's didnt like Slav's or Germans, Germans didnt like the French who were only too happy to return the dislike. It was into this series of dislikes that one nation, supported by another, decided it would attempt to fight a 'limited war' even when there were no rational reasons to suppose a war could be limited, and certainly not when people had been predicted the general war for a decade.

[peterhof]

Lets see, Austria didnt like Serbia or Russia, Russia didnt like Germany or Austria, Teuton didnt like Slav, Magyar's didnt like Slav's or Germans, Germans didnt like the French who were only too happy to return the dislike. It was into this series of dislikes that one nation, supported by another, decided it would attempt to fight a 'limited war' even when there were no rational reasons to suppose a war could be limited, and certainly not when people had been predicted the general war for a decade.

There was every reason "to suppose a war could be limited." In fact, there was a very recent example in 1909 when belated German support for Austria defused a European war which threatened as a result of Russian plans to intervene in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. It worked in 1909, why should it not work again in 1914? When Russia persisted in her intervention despite Germany's unconditional support of Austria, Germany immediately changed from unconditional support to leaning upon Austria and pressuring her to negotiate. Germany chastised Austria:

"I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government and its unparalleled procedure towards the various Governments with increasing astonishment. In St. Petersburg it declares its territorial disinterestedness; us it leaves wholly in the dark as to its programme; Rome it puts off with empty phrases about the question of compensation; in London, Count Mensdorff (the Austrian ambassador) hands out part of Serbia to Bulgaria and Albania and places himself in contradiction with Vienna’s solemn declaration at St. Petersburg. From these contradictions I must conclude that the telegram disavowing Hoyos {who, on July 5/6 at Berlin, had spoken unofficially of Austria’s partitioning of Serbia} was intended for the gallery, and that the Austrian Government is harboring plans which it sees fit to conceal from us, in order to assure itself in all events of German support and to avoid the refusal which might result from a frank statement.”

Germany even went so far as to threaten Austria with abandonment:

" . . . "we must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness.”

What more could Germany have done? Why didn't France and England make any similar attempt to moderate Russia? At the very least, why didn't France and England caution Russia about general mobilization?

[Terry Duncan]

There was every reason "to suppose a war could be limited."

No there was not. Nice to see you used this excuse to skip commenting on Bethmann's dishonesty to his own government!

In fact, there was a very recent example in 1909 when belated German support for Austria defused a European war which threatened as a result of Russian plans to intervene in a dispute between Austria and Serbia.

Actually it was because Arenthal double-crossed Isvolsky over a deal the pair struck, and Germany did not 'diffuse' the situation, she threatened Russia with war in order to allow Austria to get her way. This was the very policy Bulow warned Bethmann not to repeat when he took office, telling him that Russia would not back down to such a threat a second time. He proved to be exactly right, as in 1914 Russia did not have to back down and her allies were not given time to change Russia's stance by the German declaration of war. Your attempts to hide well known incidents or pretend they were of a quite different nature to what they were serve only to make you look either ill informed or dishonest.

Germany even went so far as to threaten Austria with abandonment:

" . . . "we must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice. Please say this to Count Berchtold at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness.”

An abondonment that even you admitted was impossible in 1914;

by peterhof on 26 Nov 2011 02:55

What does Germany do when Austria refuses the German suggestion and Russia mobilizes fully and declares war on Austria?

Germany declares war on Russia.

So Bethmann was threatening Austria with nothing even by your standards, it was simply hot air and bluster and what is more, Berchtold knew it and played Bethmann and Germany for it all the way to war.

What more could Germany have done?

Not helped to start a war in the first place, and certainly not one based upon the lunatic idea that one nation would set aside its own interests and see them trampled when such an idea was anathema to Austria and Germany.

At the very least, why didn't France and England caution Russia about general mobilization?

We have gone over this dozens of times, so asking again seems to indicate you really do not bother to read anything anyone else posts. From the time the western powers learnt of the Russian mobilization and had confirmation there was really no time to do much at all as Germany had issued an ultimatum that Russia could not comply with. To expect Russia to take a cuatious approach after Austria had been at war with Serbia for several days, whilst the Central Powers had obviously engineered the entire situation, is to imagine a situation where everyone must give way each time Austria or Germany threaten war. This time they were taken up on the offer. This does not mean the Entente policy was any better as such, but the decision to take the risk and start a war rested entirely with the Central Powers.

[peterhof]

When Kaiser Wilhelm was informed that Aehrenthal had annexed Bosnia/Herzegovina, he was angered that Austria had failed to consult her alliance partner, Germany, in such a far-reaching step. Accordingly, he refused to support Austria at first. When this refusal emboldened Russia to intervene, Bulow insisted that Germany proclaim her support for Austria without further delay. This was done and defused the crisis. Bulow then advised the Kaiser that in any future such disputes, Germany should declare her support for Austria at once so as to discourage Russian intervention and prevent a wider war.

The idea that Germany threatened Russia with war was a false rumour spread by Nicolson in order to discredit Germany. In fact, Germany advised that Isvolsky accept the annexation, and that if he did not do so, Germany would disscociate herself from any ensuing consequences. Grey agreed and said that the British policy would be the same. When the crisis was over, Czar Nicholas thanked Germany for offering Russia a graceful exit from the crisis.

The rest of your "reply" is unworthy of further comment.

[Terry Duncan]

When this refusal emboldened Russia to intervene,

The land grab for Bosnia-Hertzegovina was part of a package Arenthal had agreed with Isvolsky, so the claim Russia was 'emboldened to intervene' is a rather desperate one.

In fact, Germany advised that Isvolsky accept the annexation, and that if he did not do so, Germany would disscociate herself from any ensuing consequences.

Germany said it would stand by Austria and allow her to make the decision for peace or war aginst Russia and that Germany would support Austria in either option. Lets see Albertini on this matter;

First the message sent by the Tzar before Bulow decided to opt for threatening Russia;

You know that I have always stood by sich an understanding and that it was Aehrenthal who upset it by his adventurous policy. I now once more appeal to you in the strong hope that you may still withhold him from further fatal errors. Any final estrangement between Russia and Austria is sure to evolve also on our relations with Germany. And I need not repeat how deeply such a result would grieve me. I am as strongly convinced as you that Russia and Germany must be as closely united as possible and form a strong hold for the maintenance of peace and monarchical institutions. God help us both to bring the present crisis to a rapid and peaceful solution.

Albertini comments the following;

But this telegram reached Berlin too late to influence Bülow who, determined to win a great diplomatic victory even at the cost of irreparable damage to the relations between his country and Russia, had, on 21 March, telegraphed to Pourtalès expressing his satisfaction at the Russian recognition of the friendly spirit of his proposal, but continuing:

So, despite Russia wanting a reasonable solution, Bulow opted for a 'victory' that would poison Russo-German relations for years to come;

Please tell M. Izvolsky that we are prepared to propose to the Austro-Hungarian Government an appeal for the Powers’ consent to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin in connexion with the Austro-Turkish
agreement already brought to their knowledge. But before making such a proposal to Austria-Hungary, we must be certain that Russia will return an affirmative answer to the Austrian note and declare, unreservedly, her agreement to the abrogation of Article 25. Your Excellency will make clear to M. lavoisky that we expect a definite answer: Yes or No; any evasive, involved, or vague answer would have to be regarded by us as a refusal. We would then withdraw and let things take their course; the responsibility for all further eventualities would fall entirely on M. Izvolsky after our making a last, sincere effort to be of service to M. Izvolsky in clearing up the situation in a manner acceptable to him. . . . The question of the conference has nothing to do with our démarche; as to its needfulness and usefulness, it will be for the Powers in discussion to decide. An appeal to them in the present concrete question would necessarily be regarded by us as an attempt at evasion and thus as a refusal of our proposal.

Albertini goes on to comment;

This German démarche has passed into history as a German ultimatum to Russia. An ultimatum in the literal sense it hardly was, but in substance it was one; and such is the view of many, even German, historians.

A threat to allow Austria to decide if Austria wanted a war of Austria and Germany against an unprepared Russia was clearly a threat for war. The 'author' of the communication, Kiderlen-Wachter seems to have had the following to say about the matter when talking to Take Jonescu;

‘I knew the Russians were not ready for war, that they could not in any case go to war, and I wanted to make what capital I could out of this knowledge. I wanted to show that Germany which had been in Russian leading strings since 1815, was now free of them. Never would Schoen and Company have ventured to do what I did on my own responsibility.’

Isvolsky commented the following at the time of receiving the threat;

The tone of the German communication was too peremptory.... It might develop into an attack by Germany and Austria on Russia. . . France could not be relied upon, and England limited her support to diplomatic measures.

So very clearly it was seen as a threat for Germany and Austria to attack Russia, something Russia was still all too aware of in 1914. As Bulow said, Russia would not back down a second time when treated the same way.

The rest of your "reply" is unworthy of further comment.

So in other words you have no answers, rather like you are still avoiding the uncomfortable fact that Bethmann lied several times to his own government about his policy and how Germany was now being dragged to war. Maybe it is time to switch subjects again and hope people forget the questions you will not even confront yet alone answer.

[peterhof]

The idea that Germany "humiliated" and "threatened" Russia with war in 1909 is just another item on the long list of attempts to smear and libel Germany.

Professor Fay explains p. 388:

“On March 14, 1909, Germany offered mediation to Russia: Germany would request Austria to invite the Powers to give their formal sanction by an exchange of notes to the Austro-Turkish agreement, involving the nullification of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, provided Russia promised beforehand to give her sanction when invited by Austria to do so.”

This offer had the advantage of a real solution of the crisis, but most of all:

“It avoided humiliating Russia by a direct rejection of the Conference idea which Isvolsky had been steadily demanding for months. It let Isvolsky easily out of the embarrassing blind alley into which he had strayed. Isvolsky appreciated the proposal and was inclined to accept it. He ‘recognized the conciliatory spirit . . . of this effort of Germany to bring about a relaxation of the tension.’ But he still hesitated to give a definite answer, as he continued to cling to the hope of a Conference and the avoidance of another diplomatic defeat.”

On March 21, 1909, Bulow telegraphed Pourtales:

"Say to M. Isvolsky that we learn with satisfaction that he recognizes the friendly spirit of our proposal and seems inclined to accept it . . . and that we expect an answer - yes or no; we must regard any evasive, conditional, or unclear answer as a refusal. We should then draw back and let things take their course. The responsibility for further events would then fall exclusively on M. Isvolsky, after we had made a last sincere effort to help him clear up the situation in a way he could accept."

England was fully on board and appreciative of German efforts:

“Sir Edward Grey had meanwhile come forward with a similar mediation formula and told Austria in language almost identical with that of Bulow to Russia, that, ‘If this fails, he would draw back and let things take their course.” (Metternich to Bulow, Mar. 22, 1909; G.P., XXVI, 701) The very next day, a grateful Isvolsky gave the necessary, formal affirmative answer. Czar Nicholas had already telegraphed the Kaiser that he was heartily pleased that Germany's proposal had made a peaceful compromise possible."

And finally:

"Such were the events which soon became distorted into the legend that Germany had threatened Russia with force and humiliated her with an ultimatum. The legend was exploited in the Russian Press, spread in England by Sir Arthur Nicolson, and used by Isvolsky as a means of saving his face before his critics in Russia. But it was not an ultimatum. It was an attempt on Germany's part to bridge the gulf between Austria and Russia and prevent an outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria. Sir Edward Grey had meanwhile come forward with a similar mediation formula and told Austria in language almost identical with that of Bulow to Russia, that, "If this fails, he would draw back and let things take their course."

On the occasion of the 2nd Moroccan Crisis (1911), the bumbling, ambitious Isvolsky made one final attempt to achieve Russian dominance over the Straits. When this failed, he became reconciled to the idea of "European complications" to gain Russia's sacred foreign policy objective. With this in mind, he requested Russian money to support the 1912 candidacy of Raymond Poincare . . . With this final piece of the puzzle in place, all that was needed was "some damned foolish thing in the Balkans" to excuse a Russian general mobilization.

[Terry Duncan]

Fay wrote before Albertini and the holes in his work were apparent even before 1930.

"Such were the events which soon became distorted into the legend that Germany had threatened Russia with force and humiliated her with an ultimatum.

Actually it is not a legend, we have been over this enough times to not bother repeating things though all I need to say is that Glenn is in perfect agreement with me on this matter, as are all modern historians. Your reliance on outdated works known to be flawed is laughable as you seem to think there has been no new information come to light since the 1920's!

[peterhof]

The gratitude of Czar Nicholas for the German proposal, as well as the concurrence of Grey, is a matter of public record. Fay is not wrong about this as he cites historical documents.

"This German démarche has passed into history as a German ultimatum to Russia. An ultimatum in the literal sense it hardly was, but in substance it was one; and such is the view of many, even German, historians."

This is the sort of nonsensical contradiction we get from journalists with no formal historical training such as Albertini. Germany's proposal was just that - a proposal. If Russia rejects it, Germany will withdraw. This is an "ultimatum?" If so, Grey was guilty as well because he fully concurred.

[Terry Duncan]

The gratitude of Czar Nicholas for the German proposal, as well as the concurrence of Grey, is a matter of public record.

The Tzar was grateful that Germany did not force war on him over the issue, Britain and France were not supporting Russia and also happy there was no war. The record of the Russian government is also a matter of record, though you apparently did not read it when I posted it earlier, as they concluded they had been threatened with war. Indeed Bulow thought the same way, hence his comment to Bethmann about never attempting to repeat the policy because Russia would not back down a second time. Never mind, escape reality by looking to see what Fay wrote in the later 1920's if it helps you.

Any comments about Bethmann telling lies to his own government yet?

[glenn239]

Fay wrote before Albertini and the holes in his work were apparent even before 1930

Any argument to the effect that Albertini was a fairer judge than Fay is unconvincing. Albertini is a tremendously useful source, but also very biased.

The gratitude of Czar Nicholas for the German proposal, as well as the concurrence of Grey, is a matter of public record.

That seems a more useful method to resolve your dispute with Terry. Look up Grey’s reaction to the German note and see what it says.

[peterhof]

In summary:

In recognition of the close effect of the Annexationist Crisis upon the outbreak of war in 1914, Fay spends no fewer than four chapters and 38 pages on the subject:

-The Buchlau Bargain of September, 1908. (Vol 2, pp. 368-378

-The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909. (pp. 378-385)

-Germany's Solution of the Crisis (pp. 385-393)

-The Consequences of the Bosniam Crisis (pp.393-406)

In noting the difference between the Kaiser's and Bulow's reaction, Fay notes that "The Kaiser did not learn of Austria's intention until the very day of the annexation" and quotes the Kaiser's margin notes:

"Vienna will be charged with duplicity and not unjustly. She has duped us in a most unheard-of fashion! My personal feelings as an ally have been most seriously wounded. With a policy of this kind Austria will drive us into a dangerous opposition to Russia."

Fay writes that "He [the Kaiser] was afraid that if Germany did not take a stand against the Annexation, everyone would believe that it had taken place with his approval. His Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron Marschall, favored disowning it, even at the risk of forfeiting the alliance with Austria."

But . . .

"Bulow, however, differed from his master. Convinced that Germany must support Austria in the Balkans, lest otherwise the Triple Alliance would be weakened, he believed that Germany must uphold Austria in the step which she had taken . . . The Kaiser finally accepted Bulow's point of view; but he regretted that 'Aehrenthal's frightful stupidity has brought us into this dilemma, so that we are not able to support and protect our friends, the Turks, when our ally has outraged them.' Bulow thereupon informed Vienna, that, 'In case difficulties or complications arise, our ally can count upon us.'"

This was the advice and caution - to support Austria in most circumstances - which Bulow gave the Kaiser just before he was succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg.

On the German solution of the crisis, Fay comments:

"Germany's effort to find a solution, which would sanction Austria's fait accompli, and at the same time offer Isvolsky a line of retreat from a position which Russians more sensible than he realized was untenable, was twisted into a 'threat of force' or 'ultimatum.' It was represented as a brutal German attempt to humiliate Russia and drive a wedge into the Triple Entente by forcing Russia to abandon the Entente with England in favor of some new agreement between the three Eastern Emperors. It was set down as a new evidence of the brutality of Germany's diplomatic methods." Fay then details how this false legend was spread by Nicolson and Isvolsky himself as noted in my post above.

About the English position, Fay writes:

"Sir Edward Grey had meanwhile come forward with a similar [to Germany's] mediation formula and told Austria in language almost identical with that of Bulow to Russia, that, 'if this fails, he would draw back and let things take their course.'" (Metternich to Bulow, Mar 22, 1909; G.P., XXVI, 701)

The sheer stupidity of Isvolsky's amateurish bungling is simply beyond belief. He agrees with Aehrenthal on an arrangement of far-reaching consequences without any effort at preparing the diplomatic ground, or even so much as making inquiries at Paris, Berlin, or London. Then he unconsciously presents Aehrenthal with an ace up his sleeve: the threat to make public the bargaining at Buchlau which would have revealed to Russia and the world the emptiness of Russian rhetoric and posturing on behalf of Serbia. But did Isvolsky learn his lesson? Far from it. Fay writes:

"To the Serbians Isvolsky continued to give secret encouragement, urging them to prepare for a happier future in which they could count upon Russian support to achieve their Jugo-Slav ambitions. He never really accepted the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a final settlement, but regarded it, and encouraged the Serbians to regard it, as a Serbian Alsace-Lorraine. For the liberation of these provinces all Serbs, both in Serbia and Austria-Hungary, should continue to make secret preparations . . . All of theses contemplated the possibility of changes in the Balkans which might ultimately lead to that triumph of Slavdom over Germandom which the Tsar and his Ministers had assured the Serbians was 'inevitable.'"

This "triumph of Slavdom over Germandom which the Tsar and his Ministers had assured the Serbians was 'inevitable'" was the diplomatic camouflage behind which Russia would reach for the Straits. This - and Anglo-French support - led Russia to roll the dice on July 30th.