The Crowe Memorandum

[Jon Clarke]

Your observation is irrelevent. The poster Dave made a statement about the Crowe memorandum that, from the initial cursory checking I did, does not bear relation to what Crowe actually believed.

Actually if you'd bothered to read Dave's post properly you would have known that he said nothing of Crowe's views on the naval competition, something that he pointed out to you in a subsequent post but which you seem to have overlooked in your haste to create a strawman argument. It is also odd that you should try to link my post with your attempted rebuttal, not least because my 'observation' was not in response to it but rather Peter's attempt to use Crowe's views as evidence that the British were unconcerned by the German naval programme.

Grey had no intention of carrying through with making a formula along the lines of his original offer. 

Marschall was asking for Grey to commit to a formula in exchange for nothing when a few months previously it supposed to be made in exchange for a naval agreement. It was therefore hardly surprising that Grey should avoid giving such a commitment. Britain had nothing to gain from his doing so and much to lose in terms of relations with her Entente partners.

Curiously, I seem to recall that Massie’s narrative here is highly misleading, not only omitting the fact that Grey was no longer willing to pursue a formula, but even neglecting to mention that an ambassador “Marschall” existed. 

Once again your memory is faulty. Massie refers to Marschall replacing Metternich on page 817 and then Lichnowsky replacing him on page 843. As I have already pointed out, few historians make much, if any, mention of the discussion with Grey so Massie is hardly unique in omitting it. The reality is that it was a minor incident which you have chosen to distort in order to cast aspersions against Grey.

Shall I go back and check Massie to see if my memory has failed me? I shall...

Amazing! You make a claim and then decide to check to see if it is correct. Why didn't you check your facts before making the claim in the first place? As far as I am aware, that is generally regarded the correct way to do things. You however seem to work on the premise that if you throw enough mud, some of it will stick. Odd how this only seems to happen when you are discussing the British. :roll:

[Jon Clarke]

Why would you imagine that Asquith sent his note to Marschall?

Yet another strawman argument.

(Yes, you may continue to say Asquith didn't tell Grey to stop, but that is what he did).

And I most certainly will continue to say so because I am right. You are simply twisting things to try and suit your argument (with little success I might add!).

In terms of ‘promising continuation’, you are welcome to go in your own direction on that score.

Your original, somewhat silly, claim was that 'Curious how he [Asquith] intervened to scuttle what was a promising continuation to talks'. How could Asquith have possibly intervened in April to scuttle a one-off discussion which would not take place for three months and which he could not have possibly known anything about when writing his note?

Not too interested in delving off-topic, having just asked Terry to axe off-topic posts. Free to suppose in your own mind the matter does not have quite a number of unresolved questions to it, and feel free to post irrelevant opinions of as many authors as you'd like who also don't have the answers to those questions.

So let's get this straight. You make an unsubstantiated claim about that the French intervention ' seems to have occurred under mysterious circumstances' and when I provide evidence to show that this was not the case, you claim that it is irrelevant? Not only that, you then try and avoid discussing it on the basis that it is off-topic even though you introduced it in the first place! This reluctance to go off-topic doesn't seem to have stopped you making not only this claim but also the one against Grey, neither of which has anything to do with Crowe's memorandum. I can only assume that it more to do with the fact that you don't want to admit that you are wrong.

[Terry Duncan]

Just to clarify, I have no objection to the odd off topic comment in a thread. What I do not really want is for topic after topic to be diverted into discussions about an entirely different subject. For example, a thread on a document produced the best part of a decade prior to 1914 does not need to see yet another lengthy discussion over Russian mobilization. I am sure people are capable of exercising common sense on the matter for the most part, and it is only in the case of persistant off topic posting that I will remove posts and even then only after asking for it to cease.

[glenn239]

Actually if you'd bothered to read Dave's post properly you would have known that he said nothing of Crowe's views on the naval competition,

Dave stated,

The Crowe Memorandum of 1907 was written and delivered at a time when Germany's naval building program was going full tilt. This building program, which began in 1901 just after the Kaiser's open support of the Boors, was never seen as anything but a direct threat by the Kaiser and Tirpitz to the hedgemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea..

Where in Dave’s post does he give Crowe’s real opinion of the German naval program, one of patient contempt? Are you saying that Dave isn't talking about Crowe or his memo in a discussion about the Crowe memorandum? Alternatively, where in the Crowe memorandum does Crowe state that he viewed the naval program as a direct threat to the hegemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea?

[glenn239]

So let's get this straight. You make an unsubstantiated claim about that the French intervention ' seems to have occurred under mysterious circumstances' and when I provide evidence to show that this was not the case, you claim that it is irrelevant?

You continue to misunderstand the problem, continuing along your original line which I advised was irrelevant. That Bertie approached the French is not the question that I refer to as being never being cleared up. The question that AFAIK is still outstanding is who told Bertie to go to the French, and why did they tell him to do this? Did Asquith tell Bertie to approach Poincare? Did Nicholson or Crowe suggest it? What is the origins of this move, and who was involved? Your quote states what we all already know - Bertie approached the French. But it answers nothing on why he did so and in accordance to whose instructions or advice. You might suggest, as a theory, that Bertie acted alone. If so, that's nice.

And I most certainly will continue to say so because I am right.

We're wasting thread bandwidth. Asquith’s letter to Grey was intended to cause him to desist, worded politely. You’re welcome to disagree with the conclusion.

Your original, somewhat silly, claim was that 'Curious how he [Asquith] intervened to scuttle what was a promising continuation to talks'. How could Asquith have possibly intervened in April to scuttle a one-off discussion which would not take place for three months and which he could not have possibly known anything about when writing his note?

You tend to have a habit of finding silly any observation on history that is not born singing ‘God Save the Queen’.

In terms of Asquith’s personal responsibility to scuttling a promising continuation to talks, who would you blame for the termination of efforts, if not the Prime Minster of Great Britain that sent the note to the foreign office calling Grey’s attention to the fact that these talks were no longer desired by him?

Amazing! You make a claim and then decide to check to see if it is correct. Why didn't you check your facts before making the claim in the first place?

Because I had access to the internet before I had access to Massie, of course. Your record on where Marschall appears in Massie is noted, but the report on Massie's editorial cut is still pending.

I have already pointed out, few historians make much, if any, mention of the discussion with Grey so Massie is hardly unique in omitting it. The reality is that it was a minor incident which you have chosen to distort in order to cast aspersions against Grey.

I just stated that Grey acted in good faith and did not anticipate when originally offering a formula early in 1912 that Asquith would tell him to desist later in 1912. This statement you seem to have been wholely unable to absorb, for you then post some nonsense about ‘aspersion’ against Grey. What aspersions against Grey do you refer to? Surely you meant an allegation of aspersions against Asquith, and not Grey?

Peter - criticism of the Kaiser's actions is historically valid fact. Criticism of Asquith's actions is an 'aspersion'. Got it? :^)

[Terry Duncan]

Peter - criticism of the Kaiser's actions is historically valid fact. Criticism of Asquith's actions is an 'aspersion'. Got it? :^)

There seems to be ample documentation, some even from the KaIser's own handwritten records, to support the former claims with some degree of validity. So far I have seen very little provided here to support the claim being made against Asquith. Of course, you are welcome to put forward some supporting evidence at any time, though it would be best if the dates of events were taken into account if you wish to refute what Jon has said.

[favedave]

quote="glenn239"]

Actually if you'd bothered to read Dave's post properly you would have known that he said nothing of Crowe's views on the naval competition,

Dave stated,

The Crowe Memorandum of 1907 was written and delivered at a time when Germany's naval building program was going full tilt. This building program, which began in 1901 just after the Kaiser's open support of the Boors, was never seen as anything but a direct threat by the Kaiser and Tirpitz to the hedgemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea..

Where in Dave’s post does he give Crowe’s real opinion of the German naval program, one of patient contempt? Are you saying that Dave isn't talking about Crowe or his memo in a discussion about the Crowe memorandum? Alternatively, where in the Crowe memorandum does Crowe state that he viewed the naval program as a direct threat to the hegemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea?[/quote]

Glen,

My comment: ''.... was never seen as anything but a direct threat by the Kaiser and Tirpitz to the hedgemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea," was definately stating an opinion which in 1907 was shared by virtually everbody in the Court, the Cabinet, the Admiralty, the Home Office, the Foreign Office (including Crowe), the Parliament, and the people of Great Britain. In fact it is the point of Massie's entire book, Dreadnought. The contempt Crowe had for it was also shared by virtually everyone from the King to the news boys on Fleet Street. As for his formula for dealing with it, building 2 to 1, that was exactly what was going on at the time because Parliament was voting the money regularly to make it so.

[glenn239]

Asquith was not responsible for telling Grey to desist on a political formula when the letter where he does so is right in the British Documents? That's an interesting opinion.

Anyways, I had a chance to review Massie. Some quick points -

Massie mentions that Metternich did not think Grey's proposed formula was good enough, but Massie does not make a peep about Marschall's later thinking it was valuable and should be pursued.

Massie mentions nothing of ambassador Marschall's harmony of views with Tirpitz, which is readily available in Tiripitz's own book, but rather withholds this information. Lichnowsky's opposition is, of course, mentioned.

Massie notes Asquith's letter in his narrative right at the moment that negotiations were shut down. Talks had continued, 'but' on April 10th...

Massie mentions nothing of Grey's unwillingness after April 1912 to pursue the political formula he had originally offered.

Massie, of course, mentions not a peep of the Chancellor's neutrality formula which called for only conditional British neutrality, instead leaving the reader with the impression the German had only ever demanded unconditional neutrality.

The sum of these various editorial decisions places the British in better light than the historical records suggests they deserved. Whether Massie intended this or arrived there by accident being immaterial.

[glenn239]

My comment: ''.... was never seen as anything but a direct threat by the Kaiser and Tirpitz to the hedgemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea," was definately stating an opinion which in 1907 was shared by virtually everbody in the Court, the Cabinet, the Admiralty, the Home Office, the Foreign Office (including Crowe),

That’s nice Dave. Now go through Crowe’s memo and show me where he states the German fleet was a threat to the naval hegemony of Great Britain. You made the statement, now you show me where Crowe said it.

[peterhof]

Peter - criticism of the Kaiser's actions is historically valid fact. Criticism of Asquith's actions is an 'aspersion'. Got it?

Yes, I "got it" a long time ago. The Kaiser's "marginalia" - especially with regard to both Moroccan crises and the July crisis - proves him to be a perceptive observer who worked to preserve the peace. Nonetheless, even the most venal criticism of him is immediately and unconditionally accepted as gospel whilst criticism of British statesmen like the Grey/Crowe/Nicolson is instantly met with demands for "proof" and "support" and the usual threats to "lock" or "move" or "delete" the post. " Read this quickly before it suffers one of these fates or is marginalized as "off-topic."
Did you notice? "off-topic" rarely applies to any post favoring Britain or hostile to Germany.

[favedave]

Glenn, the following paragraphs are lifted from the version of the 1907 Crowe memo you posted. While Crowe doesn't use the words hedgemony, threat, or North Sea, it is fairly obvious that he regards Germany's naval program as a threat specifically to the Royal Navy and the British Empire and British interests throughout the world.

So long, then, as Germany competes for an intellectual and moral leadership of the world in reliance on her own national advantages and energies England can but admire, applaud, and join in the race. If, on the other hand, Germany believes that greater relative preponderance of material power, wider extent of territory, Inviolable frontiers, and supremacy at sea are the necessary and preliminary possessions without which any aspirations to such leadership must end in failure, then England must expect that Germany will surely seek to diminish the power of any rivals, to enhance her own by extending her dominion, to hinder the co-operation of other States, and ultimately to break up and supplant the British Empire.

The spirit in which this more than conciliatory attitude was appreciated at Berlin became clear when immediately afterwards the German Chancellor openly boasted in the Reichstag that he had compelled England by the display of German firmness to abandon her absolutely unjust claim to interference, with the unquestioned rights of neutrals, and when the Emperor subsequently appealed to his nation to hasten on the building of an overwhelming German fleet, since the want of superior naval strength alone had on this occasion prevented Germany from a still more drastic, vindication of Germany’s interests.

It might be deduced that the, antagonism is too deeply rooted in the relative position of the two countries to allow of its being bridged over by the kind of temporary expedients to which England has so long and so patiently resorted. On this view of the case it would have to be, assumed that Germany is deliberately following a policy which is essentially opposed to vital British interests, and that an armed conflict cannot in the long run be averted, except by England either sacrificing those interests, with the result that she would lose her position as an independent Great Power, or making herself too strong to give Germany the chance of succeeding in a war. This is the opinion of those who, see in the whole, trend of Germany’s policy conclusive evidence that she is consciously aiming at the establishment of a German hegemony, at first in Europe, and eventually in the world.

After all that has been said in the preceding paragraphs, it would be idle to deny that this may be the correct interpretation of the facts. There is this further seemingly corroborative evidence that such a conception of world-policy offers perhaps the only quite consistent explanation of the tenacity with which Germany pursues the construction of a powerful navy with the avowed object of creating slowly, but surely, a weapon fit to overawe any possible enemy, however formidable at sea.

A German maritime supremacy must be acknowledged to be incompatible with the existence of the British Empire, and even if that Empire disappeared, the union of the greatest military with the greatest naval Power in one State would compel the world to combine for the riddance of such an incubus.

Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendency,
threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England;

Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers, leaving it to an uncertain future to decide whether the occurrence of great changes in the world may not someday assign to Germany a larger share of direct political action over regions not now a part of her dominions, without that violation of the established rights of other countries which would be involved in any such action under existing political conditions.

In either case Germany would clearly be wise to build as powerful a navy as she can afford."

The above alternatives seem to exhaust the possibilities of explaining the given facts. The choice offered is a narrow one, nor easy to make with any close approach to certainty. It will, however, be seen, on reflection, that there is no actual necessity for a British Government to determine definitely which of the two theories of German policy it will’ accept. For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi-independent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into the first, or conscious, design scheme. Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should come to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously constitute as formidable a menace to the rest of the world.

I rest my case.

[Terry Duncan]

The Kaiser's "marginalia" - especially with regard to both Moroccan crises and the July crisis - proves him to be a perceptive observer who worked to preserve the peace.

Would this 'worked to preserve the peace' include the times he advocated war?

Nonetheless, even the most venal criticism of him is immediately and unconditionally accepted as gospel

Given the criticism of him on this site and almost all others to my knowledge has sprung from simply posting his own words, mostly from his celebrated marginalia, is there any particular reason you think the Kaiser's own words should not be accepted as gospel when quoting him on a subject?

criticism of British statesmen like the Grey/Crowe/Nicolson is instantly met with demands for "proof" and "support"

Possibly because when making the claim against somebody the burden of proof is upon you. If you wish to post outlandish claims that are not supported by the general historical records or consensus of historians, then you must expect to be requested to support your claims. Fiction has no part on an historical forum and neither do ill thought out conspiracy theories, if you wish to post either I can only suggest you do so somewhere else.

the usual threats to "lock" or "move" or "delete" the post. "

I suggest you aquaint yourself with the rules of the forum with regards to the burden of proof when making a claim and the need to provide supporting evidence when asked by other members. If you fail to adhere to these standards your posts will indeed meet the mentioned fates. Even discounting myself from events I believe at least three other moderators have also pointed out exactly the same rules to you, and at least one has done so repeatedly.

Read this quickly before it suffers one of these fates or is marginalized as "off-topic." Did you notice? "off-topic" rarely applies to any post favoring Britain or hostile to Germany.

As you make approximately 80% of the off topic posts, ironically in topics you have started, it should be no wonder to you that others are asked to confine themselves to the topic of the thread less than you are. It has nothing to do with favouring any side, only an attempt to make you adhere to the rules of the site. If you feel unwilling to follow them I am sure other arrangements can be made.

[peterhof]

I rest my case.

Does this mean no more cut-and-paste from Crowe's noxious "memorandum?" Hurray and hallelujah! Let's lock the thread and move on.

[Jon Clarke]

You continue to misunderstand the problem, continuing along your original line which I advised was irrelevant. That Bertie approached the French is not the question that I refer to as being never being cleared up. The question that AFAIK is still outstanding is who told Bertie to go to the French, and why did they tell him to do this?

All that says to me is that you have yet again made a claim without bothering to do any research. If you had, you would have known that the general consensus amongst historians is that Bertie acted on his own initiative although I did read one account that speculated (note the term!) that Nicolson may have suggested he do so. As Bertie had been against the talks with the Germans from the start and had even travelled to London on at least one occasion to dissuade Grey from allowing them to continue, it is likely that the historical consensus is correct. In short therefore the answer to your question is nobody.

Did Asquith tell Bertie to approach Poincare? Did Nicholson or Crowe suggest it? What is the origins of this move, and who was involved? Your quote states what we all already know - Bertie approached the French. But it answers nothing on why he did so and in accordance to whose instructions or advice. You might suggest, as a theory, that Bertie acted alone. If so, that's nice. 

You obviously have the British Documents for this period, so I would hazard a guess that the absence of any quotes from them on this matter means that there is nothing in there that could support such a theory. Once again you appear to be treating the absence of any evidence to support a theory as evidence in itself that the theory is correct. That approach may be good enough for conspiracy theorists but from my point of view (and I suspect many others) it's a pretty poor basis for a discussion.

Asquith’s letter to Grey was intended to cause him to desist, worded politely. You’re welcome to disagree with the conclusion.

In your opinion, one that you haven't provided a single piece of evidence to support. Care to quote the relevant part from the British Documents where Grey tells Metternich & Goschen that he's been ordered to stop the negotiations?

You tend to have a habit of finding silly any observation on history that is not born singing ‘God Save the Queen’.

No I tend to have a habit of finding observations 'silly' when they are based on nothing but a determination to cast the 'other side' in the worst possible light. Provide evidence to support your claims and I'll treat them seriously.

In terms of Asquith’s personal responsibility to scuttling a promising continuation to talks, who would you blame for the termination of efforts, if not the Prime Minster of Great Britain that sent the note to the foreign office calling Grey’s attention to the fact that these talks were no longer desired by him?

Asquith didn't say that though he? That's merely your interpretation of it. The note was dated 10 April which just happened to be the same day that Metternich formally informed Grey that it had been decided to proceed with the naval law as it stood, thereby effectively ending the negotiations regardless of the Asquith note. It's probably a moot point whether Grey spoke to Metternich before or after receiving Asquith's note.

Because I had access to the internet before I had access to Massie, of course. Your record on where Marschall appears in Massie is noted, but the report on Massie's editorial cut is still pending.

That shouldn't have prevented you from checking your claim before posting - a preview edition of Dreadnought is available on Googlebooks. Most people would have waited until they could have checked before posting but then I suppose that you were too intent on criticizing Massie to worry about accuracy.

What aspersions against Grey do you refer to?

Your original posts contained a number of claims against Grey which have been shown to be incorrect. For example:

Did you know that the Haldane mission actually ended in the summer of 1912 with the new German ambassador, Marschall, requesting that Grey stand in the House and make his offered statement of March 1912, with Grey refusing point blank to do what he had previously offered to do?

Or

AFAIK, Massie mentioned nothing of Marschall’s request that Grey should rise in the house make the statement he had earlier offered to make, nor did he mention Grey’s refusal to do so. Massie's argument, naturally, would lose a great deal of force if he were to tell the reader that Grey reneged on his offer.

Negotiations arising from the Haldane Mission ended on 10 April 1912. To claim that Marschall's brief conversation with Grey was part of those negotiations is a nonsense. Moreover Marschall clearly did not ask Grey to stand in the House and make a statement, nor did Grey refuse 'point blank' to do so. You however have alleged that both these things happened thereby throwing mud at Grey - the phrase that 'Grey reneged on his offer' is clearly not intended to be complementary and infers that he was acting somehow underhandedly. As you have the British Documents for this period, why did you post something that you must have known to be false unless it was to throw mud?

[Jon Clarke]

​

Massie mentions that Metternich did not think Grey's proposed formula was good enough, but Massie does not make a peep about Marschall's later thinking it was valuable and should be pursued.

​
​So what. As I have pointed out, few historians mention it. A quick check of the books on my 'shelf' shows that the conversation is not mentioned by Albertini, Barnes, Berghahn, Charmley, Fay, Ferguson, Fromkin, Joll, Kennedy, Lafore, Lowes Dickinson, Lutz, McCullough, Marder, Steiner, Strachan, Turner, Williamson to name but a few.
​
​

Massie mentions nothing of ambassador Marschall's harmony of views with Tirpitz, which is readily available in Tiripitz's own book, but rather withholds this information. Lichnowsky's opposition is, of course, mentioned.

​
​Tirpitz says that Marschall shared his views but do we have anything else to show that was the case? AFAIK Marschall left no documents setting out his views so we are left with second hand accounts - not all of which agree with Tirpitz's. A number of people have documented Marschall's strong desire to establish friendly relations with Britain after his appointment, something that he would have known would be very difficult had he really shared Tirpitz's views. For example, Sir Edwin Pears (who knew him from Constantinople) wrote that Marschall had told him in London that:
​
​I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England, because, as you know, for years I have considered it a misfortune to the world that our two countries are not really in harmony. I consider that I am here as a man with a mission, my mission being to bring about a real understanding between the two nations.
​
​The lack of coverage to Marschall's brief stay of six weeks is hardly surprising. In contrast Lichnowsky was ambassador for the eighteen months immediately prior to the war. It is hardly surprising therefore that the majority of historians concentrate on Lichnowsky's tenure and pay scant attention to Marschall's brief stay in Britain.
​
​

Massie notes Asquith's letter in his narrative right at the moment that negotiations were shut down. Talks had continued, 'but' on April 10th...

​
​As I have already pointed out, this was also the day that Metternich had formally advised Grey that the naval law would be proceeded with. Metternich had already reported on 29 March that Grey had told him that:
​
​Any advance [by Germany] beyond the existing naval law would preclude the English Government at this moment from entering into a political agreement with us.
​
​So Metternich's news on 10 April ended the negotiations regardless of any interpretation of what Asquith's note actually meant.
​
​

The sum of these various editorial decisions places the British in better light than the historical records suggests they deserved. Whether Massie intended this or arrived there by accident being immaterial.

​
​More mud slinging. In all honesty, I cannot see why you have suddenly chosen to attack Massie's integrity in this manner. As far as I can recall you have never bee overly critical of Barnes even though his errors and omissions are a damned sight more serious than Massie's.