The Crowe Memorandum

[glenn239]

We know that when any proposal touched on reducing the number of capital units in the HSF the response was that such a proposal was impossible because of the Naval Laws.

AFAIK, the proposals generally focused on drawing down new construction, not on retiring older, obsolete vessels. Tirpitz’s primary objections in the Haldane negotiations looked to me to be centered around maintaining future German building tempo, not in preserving old battleships commissioned in 1900 or 1899. So I see more natural potential to naval negotiations looking to scrap older ships than in one aiming to draw down new construction.

[glenn239]

You are relying on expanding greatly on anything Crowe actually says and taking it to the most extreme situation possible

I don’t think Dave’s interpretation, that the 2nd Naval Law being some sort of hegemonic threat to Britain, flies. IMO, Crowe believes no such thing.

It would be of real advantage if the determination not to bar Germany’s legitimate and peaceful expansion, nor her schemes of naval development, were made as patent and pronounced as authoritative as possible, provided care were taken at the same time to make it quite clear that this benevolent attitude will give way to determined opposition at the first sign of British or allied interests being adversely affected.

Read that carefully. Crowe says he doesn’t care at all about the Naval Laws provided they do not come hand and hand with an aggressive policy designed to cow Russia and France into an alliance with Germany.

Crowe is clearly stating 'Germany maritime supremecy' and nothing about combined fleets....

Crowe’s memorandum is all about relations with Germany and whether Germany may attain a continental political hegemony aimed at Great Britain. ‘German’ maritime supremacy in the same fashion as today we describe ‘American’ naval supremacy, even though the western naval forces to any venture are composed of the ships of many navies. Crowe writes of his core fear,

It would, therefore, be but natural that the power of a State supreme at sea should inspire universal jealousy and fear, and be ever exposed to the danger of being overthrown by a general combination of the world.

‘Against such a combination no single nation could in the long run stand....

‘A general combination of the world’ means Germany’s political hegemony to be applied in opposition to the empire of Britain. That must be the navies of Europe arrayed as one against the British Empire. For how else do you propose German political hegemony translate itself into a threat against a sea power?

It’s any threat to the Entente, not the German fleet, that Crowe identifies as intolerable,

In the presence of such a possibility it may well be asked whether it would be right, or even prudent, for England to incur any sacrifices or see other, friendly, nations sacrificed merely in order to assist Germany in building up step by step the fabric of a universal preponderance,

“Universal preponderance”. Crowe doesn’t care about Germany’s fleet program, for Britain can outbuild Germany 2:1. Crowe fears a political union which will allow Germany to then wrest maritime supremacy from Britain, presumably in the same way Napoleon attempted it in 1805 – the union of the continental fleets against Britain.

You are free to believe whatever you wish if it helps you. Too many contemporary British figures, from 'Jacky Fisher' to 'Wully Robertson,' cited the 2nd German Naval Law as a significant step that identified Germany as a distinct hostile threat for it to a modern misconception...

And if either of these men were in charge of British foreign policy you would have a better point.

[Terry Duncan]

Tirpitz’s primary objections in the Haldane negotiations looked to me to be centered around maintaining future German building tempo, not in preserving old battleships commissioned in 1900 or 1899.

Not per se, but the Naval Laws did set the life span for German capital units (20 and then 25 years) with the intent of achieving a fleet of three divisions of eight ships and a fleet flagship. Germany cannot attain this if the old ships are disposed of early.

I don’t think Dave’s interpretation, that the 2nd Naval Law being some sort of hegemonic threat to Britain, flies.

It was a threat. It might not have been a peculiarly immediate threat but it was certainly a potential threat in any future war, and that is without Tirpitz helpfully telling people that he was building his fleet to fight the RN!

Read that carefully.

I did, three times to make sure.

Crowe says he doesn’t care at all about the Naval Laws provided they do not come hand and hand with an aggressive policy designed to cow Russia and France into an alliance with Germany.

Crowe clearly says no such thing. He does however say that Britain should build at a ratio of 2 - 1 against German building from now on. That indicates he feels a need to outbuild Germany by a considerable margin, and such a ratio would be difficult to justify unless he thought Germany was a threat.

For how else do you propose German political hegemony translate itself into a threat against a sea power?

If the German fleet has already achieved superiority over the British navy, combined with what was already possibly the most powerful army in Europe, she does not need to have hegemony over Europe, only enough power to keep the others from acting. It does not require the other fleets or armies, only for the German fleet to achieve local superiority.

Crowe fears a political union which will allow Germany to then wrest maritime supremacy from Britain, presumably in the same way Napoleon attempted it in 1805 – the union of the continental fleets against Britain.

By the phrase;

other, friendly, nations sacrificed merely in order to assist Germany in building up step by step the fabric of a universal preponderance

Crowe clearly refers to friendly nations not supported against German aggression that will then be forced to do Germany's bidding. The term 'sacrificed' does not imply the nations Crowe is thinking of will be willingly taking the German side.

And if either of these men were in charge of British foreign policy you would have a better point.

Military personel identifying a military threat. I presume you imagine the British government were totally ignorant of Tirpitz' many statements over the proposed purpose for his navy, that the vocal demands of the German Naval League
were unnoticed, or that the British ministers did not follow the same thoughts as the military people? Churchill clearly noted that the German navy had 'ceased' to be a cause of friction between Britain and Germany, clearly indicating that prior to this it had indeed been a cause of friction. Numerous historians have noted this, it appears you feel otherwise, so I am not sure there is any point in my trying to persuade you.

[glenn239]

Not per se, but the Naval Laws did set the life span for German capital units (20 and then 25 years) with the intent of achieving a fleet of three divisions of eight ships and a fleet flagship. Germany cannot attain this if the old ships are disposed of early.

Agreed, but Tirpitz was also pinched on the manpower front by 1912 and I don’t think he held any illusions about the fighting value of the older ships. I still say a deal on older vessels was much more possible than one on new construction. After all, why would Britain want to axe the magnificent QE class, when ships like the Lord Nelsons, and even older, could go instead?

Crowe clearly says no such thing

I disagree. I read the memo and everything says Crowe views the threat of German naval supremacy within the context of a continental coalition. He’s sanguine about Germany on its own.

Crowe clearly refers to friendly nations not supported against German aggression that will then be forced to do Germany's bidding.

Yes, Crowe leaves open the possibility the political union of Europe will be done by way of coercion, and he identifies this as something intolerable to Great Britain – as a threat to its harmonious relations with its European partners.

Having a day to mull it, my initial impression of just how badly balanced Crowe’s analysis was really hits home. The man was obsessed with the bugbear of German domination and completely overlooked the fact that Britain’s closer association with France and Russia would naturally provoke from all quarters an increased friction in Europe. That more Powers than Germany might have agendas that entailed risking the peace of Europe for national gain.

Military personel identifying a military threat.

Fischer was a borderline lunatic and I would be shocked if he had influence over the likes of Grey. Furthermore, I don't even recall him saying that the German fleet was a hegemonic threat - I was more under the impression that he thought the RN would sink the whole lot in the first fleet clash. With respect to the balance of power on land, I believe you’ll find Grey was much more concerned with maintaining Franco-Russian unity, in order that France and the BEF would never find themselves alone.

[Terry Duncan]

Having a day to mull it, my initial impression of just how badly balanced Crowe’s analysis was really hits home.

Yet we have still to see a single piece of evidence offered to show where Crowe was offering badly balanced advice, or even that he was not offering the perspective as available to those in Britain from the information available to them.

Fischer was a borderline lunatic and I would be shocked if he had influence over the likes of Grey.

Whilst Fisher was probably not very influential at all towards Grey, he was clearly far from a boderline lunatic even if you claim visionaries are often inclined to be thought of as heading in that direction. Lets not forget too that it was nnot even Grey that started the initiatives for the Entente's.

I was more under the impression that he thought the RN would sink the whole lot in the first fleet clash.

He also recognised the importance of blockade. Sadly we know all too little of exactly what Fisher would have done given his own personal choice, but his programme upon entering office in the war was one of pretty much stark realism even if it is not fully understood by many even today.

[favedave]

If we go back to the statements made by Fisher and Tirpitz after the launch of Dreadnought in 1906, it is easy to see why Crowe and most in the British government thought of the 2nd Naval Law as a direct threat to the hedgemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea. Dreadnought is launched and Fisher publically declares that every other capital ship in the world is obsolete. This includes any which slipped down the ways in Britain and Germany just before Dreadnought. Tirpitz's reaction is that Germany can simply start building their own 'Dreadnoughts' at a pace which could match Britain's, thereby establishing parity between the German Navy and the Royal Navy. The problem was that Britain had the entire world to cover, not just home waters. Nor was there any reason to believe that Germany's shipyards could not build these capital ships just as fast as Britain's yards. In 1907 the solution already arrived at was that Britain was going to build on a ratio of 2 to 1, however many German ships were laid down. The Naval Scare of 08 and 09 was very real to the people of Britain.
The Haldane mission in 1912 was a last attempt to get Germany to slow down construction, since maintaining the 2 to 1 ratio was effectively bankrupting the peacetime British Government. The Kaiser refused. But counting that he would, Fisher ordered the redeployment of the entire Royal Navy worldwide in order to bring to home waters all of the post-Dreadnought ships in the fleet. This necessitated turning over primary responsibility for protecting the Empire's sealanes and possessions to allied navies. Japan guarded Asia, the United States the Western Hemisphere, and France the Mediterreanean. This redeployment of the Royal Navy was not taken lightly. In any case, the German Army forced the Kaiser to curtail Germany's Naval building programs since the Army needed the money to complete its programs.

[peterhof]

I think we can all agree: the Crowe Memorandum says a lot more about the Grey-Crowe-Nicolson triumvirate in the British Foreign Office than it does about Germany.

[Terry Duncan]

I think we can all agree: the Crowe Memorandum says a lot more about the Grey-Crowe-Nicolson triumvirate in the British Foreign Office than it does about Germany.

It would not look like many would agree with your comment. You also appear to be unaware that Nicholson was not even at the Foreign Office until over three years after the Crowe Memorandum was written, and have managed to also ignore that almost every past event described in it took place before Grey arrived at the Foreign Office as he had been there only one year by the time the Memo was presented.

[glenn239]

it is easy to see why Crowe and most in the British government thought of the 2nd Naval Law as a direct threat to the hedgemony of the Royal Navy in the North Sea.

At no time during the 20th Century am I aware of there being any moment the British government thought that Germany could out-build Great Britain in a 1 on 1 race. At all times it was understood that Great Britain could - easily - outbuild Germany. The only exception to this rule that I'm aware of was the fear of secret German construction, circa 1909. But that was fear of German sneakiness, not fear of German industrial power. And the solution to that was to lay down and build simultaneously an unprecedented number of dreadnoughts.

The Haldane mission in 1912 was a last attempt to get Germany to slow down construction...

The Germans offered to slow construction. The British did not demand it.

since maintaining the 2 to 1 ratio was effectively bankrupting the peacetime British Government.

The British found it inconvienient to have to build quicker than they wished. But to say that the British would be bankrupt by the naval race is impossible. The British were nowhere near at their breaking point. Not even close.