Mobile Warfare in the West 1914.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a brief account of open warfare........................

FIFTY-SIX DAYS OF OPEN WARFARE
["Betrachtung über 56 Tage Bewegungskrieg". Ausbildungsfrage. Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 September 1933.] Abstracted by Major A. Vollmer.

EVENTS.

In the first days of August 1914 the advance of the Fourth Army led through Luxemburg and South Belgium to the Meuse. The 21st Infantry Division belonged to the Fourth Army; this division included the 1st Nassau Infantry Regiment No. 87, whose operations are here presented. The completion of the mobilization of this regiment was followed on 6 August by the transport of its battalions through Bingen and Kreuznach to the vicinity of Trier. From here the advance began via Saarburg near Trier and Luxemburg on Arlon.

FROM ARLON TO THE MARNE.

1st-8th Day.-Early on 12 August, after a 25 km. night march, ArIon, the first Belgian city, was occupied without fighting. For the main body of the regiment the days from 13 August to 19 August were devoted to rest and training.

9th-10th Day.-At noon, on 20 August, after a march of six hours, and after the order for a halt had been issued, reports were received of the advance of enemy forces from the west, which demanded the employment of the regiment near Neufchateau in the direction of Longlier. The enemy was repulsed after a rapid advance. Certain units of the regiment distinguished themselves in the assault on the railroad station at Neufchateau. After the combat the regiment went into bivouac at and near Neuvilliers. On 21 August the regiment continued to march. Duration of combat on 20 August: 6 hours. Length of march on 20 August and 21 August: 50 km.

11th Day.-At 7:00 AM, 22 August, the regiment assembled west of Neuvilliers and then commenced the advance, acting as right flank guard of the division. A report of an advance of an enemy column on Ochamps forced the regiment to go into an assembly position preparatory to attack. An early enemy attack was brought to a halt by our counterattack and the enemy was forced to withdraw. Ochamps and the heights nearby to the west were captured. Many machine guns and prisoners fell into our hands. The regiment bivouacked on the battlefield. Duration of attack: 4 hours.

12th Day.-After several hours of marching on 23 August, the main body of the regiment was attacked by the citizens and stragglers while marching through Herbeumont, while the advance guard had an encounter with an enemy cyclist detachment, at the south-exit of the village. The combat ended in the destruction of the village. Duration of combat: 1 hour. Length of march: 18 km.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more........................

FIFTY-SIX DAYS OF OPEN WARFARE
["Betrachtung über 56 Tage Bewegungskrieg". Ausbildungsfrage. Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 September 1933.] Abstracted by Major A. Vollmer.

FROM ARLON TO THE MARNE.

13th-16th Day,-After crossing the French border the regiment emerged for combat from the woods southwest of Florenville on 24 August. Without having made contact with the enemy but under heavy enemy artillery fire the heights of Matton were taken towards evening. The advance continued in approach formation to 27 August in the direction of the heights of the Meuse, having skirmishes now and then. Length of march, from 24 to 27 August: 20 km.

17th-18th Day.-After crossing the Meuse the regiment started its advance early on 28 August on Autrecourt, where it ran into a superior enemy force. After a long and severe fire fight the regiment attacked, suffering heavy casualties. We reached the heights south of Raucourt and forced the enemy to withdraw. Our losses were: 5 officers and 116 men killed; 9 officers and 387 men wounded. On 29 August we drove the enemy from a position in the vicinity of Raucourt. We rested until 4:00 PM, 30 August, when we started on a 20 km. night march in a southerly direction. Duration of combat: 12 hours.

19th-25th Day.-We continued to advance south for the next four days without having made contact with the enemy. On the evening of 3 September, after an exhausting march, the town of St. Jean-sur-Tourbe was Captured. Before retreating the enemy set fire to the town. We marched again on 4 and 5 September. Duration of combat: 2 hours. Length of march, from 30 August to 5 September: 120 km.

26th-31st Day.-From Heiltz Ie Marupt the regiment advanced to the attack on 6 September. The enemy had prepared the village of Pargny for defense. This village was located behind a triple stream obstacle. After an artillery preparation a crossing of the three streams was forced on 7, September and Pargny occupied by us. By night attacks, up to 10 September, we were able to take the heights between Pargny and Marupt-Ie-Montoy. Early on 11 September, we received orders to withdraw. Duration of combat: 6 days.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more........................

FIFTY-SIX DAYS OF OPEN WARFARE
["Betrachtung über 56 Tage Bewegungskrieg". Ausbildungsfrage. Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 September 1933.] Abstracted by Major A. Vollmer.

FROM THE MARNE TO RHEIMS.

31st-36th Day.-After evacuating the positions on 11 September, the withdrawal began initially along the previous routes of advance. After three days' march the regiment was sent west on Rheims for employment on a new battle front. After a night march, Loivre, near Rheims, was reached at noon on 16 September. Length of march, from 11 to 16 September: 135 km.

37th-40th Day.-After the regiment had worked its way under enemy artillery fire to the embankment of the railroad line: Rheims-Laon, it received the order to cross the canal and clear the castle park of Loivre at Rheims of the enemy. With effective support of our own artillery this mission was accomplished early on 19 September. On 20 September the regiment was relieved and sent to the north for employment on the right wing of the army. Duration of combat: 4 days.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more........................

FIFTY-SIX DAYS OF OPEN WARFARE
["Betrachtung über 56 Tage Bewegungskrieg". Ausbildungsfrage. Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 September 1933.] Abstracted by Major A. Vollmer.

FROM RHEIMS TO ROYE.

41st-44th Day-We marched, from 21 September to 24 September, via Laon-Le Fere-Guiscard-on Solente. Length of march: 120 km.

45th-49th Day.-On 25 September the regiment attacked Solente. This place was taken and a position on the west edge was held until 26 September. On 27 September, Windmühlenberg, between Solente and Champien, was taken by assault. During the night, 28-29 September, we executed a night attack against Champien, but were unsuccessful. , On 29 September, Champien was taken after the arrival of reinforcements, and the enemy was forced to withdraw. Duration of combat: 5 days.

50th-56th Day.-On the evening of 30 September we occupied Roye without combat. On 1 October the further advance of the regiment was held up by strong enemy forces which had prepared for defense in ViIIers-Ies-Roye. Our attacks on 2 and 3 October were unsuccessful. The village was taken after a night attack on 4 October. After the enemy had been forced to withdraw to the west, a defensive position was prepared by 6 October along the line: Damery - Andechny. Trench warfare had commenced. Duration of combat: 6 days.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Phaing]

Had there been more Armored Cars, and more importantly- large numbers of Trucks mobilized for the Infantry and Artillery.... would this Mobile phase have lasted longer?
Or would it have lead to the same positions and stalemate more quickly?

[joerookery]

It might have been a nice thought but the Germans were up to their eyeballs trying to keep some mechanization – and very little there was – in the logistics world. There is a nice discussion of trucks, numbers and deployment in chapter 15 of "The Great War Dawning."

[Phaing]

I was thinking more for the Allies, sorry, force of habit.
What the French did with the Taxis is famous but it was a one-shot thing. Could the Germans have been contained in Belgium if someone had thought of that sooner and on a larger scale?

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more........................

FIFTY-SIX DAYS OF OPEN WARFARE
["Betrachtung über 56 Tage Bewegungskrieg". Ausbildungsfrage. Militär-Wochenblatt, 18 September 1933.] Abstracted by Major A. Vollmer.

CONCLUSIONS.

Day or night attacks: We had 29 attacks, 3 of which were night attacks. The first night attack on the Marne was successful. It came as a surprise to the enemy. The second night attack was at Champien and was ordered only because day attacks had failed here. Due to inadequate instructions of the leaders of the lower echelons, and the absence of the element of surprise, and eventually the mixing of units during the attack, this attack was unsuccessful. The third night attack was against Villers-Ies-Roye after this village had been attacked unsuccessfully twice previously during the daytime. This night attack was successful.

Extent of casualties: At the conclusion of open warfare the regiment has suffered the severe loss of 45 officers and 1300 men. The companies were led by noncommissioned officers, battalions by lieutenants, the regiment by a captain assigned from a neighboring regiment. The organization of large companies of 4 officers and 250 men had not justified itself. Companies of this strength were employed in a combat form which was too concentrated and consequently led to excessive casualties. A strength of 1 company commander, 3 platoon commanders, and about 100 rifle and light machinegun men seems suitable in the future.

March performances, day or night marches: During the period of 56 days we had 21 days of marching, 29 days during which combat occurred and 8 days of rest. Total march distance: 500 km. All marches were performed without difficulty during very hot weather. Daily marches averaged from 20 to 25 km. When no combat occurred this was increased to 30 km. Out of 21 marches only 3 were night marches. Troops remain fresher in daytime marches.

Performance: There were three bivouacs. During the operations the attackers spent the night in rifle pits or cellars of the villages on the battlefields. Subsistence through field kitchens was, with the exception of a few days, regularly available. Infantry ammunition was sufficient. Cooperation with artillery was satisfactory. Knowledge of the effect of enemy weapons resulted in appropriate combat formations.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; an interesting article dealing with the the supply services and combat actions.................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

The operations of the German First Army in the early phases of the World War have been the subject of much writing, but little attention has been given to what took place in the supply service. When it is considered that the supply services of the First Army included 10,000 vehicles and 25,000 horses, it is readily seen that the daily movements of such a mass require narration and comment by themselves.

Colonel Jochim, Quartermaster General of the German First Army, has thus written a useful work, in describing the supply accomplishments behind the corps of the German First Army during the decisive days from the 5th to the 13th of September 1914.

By regulation, the supply services of the German troops were the responsibility of the army corps; these had at their disposal to insure supply:

Combat trains; marching with the troops
Regimental trains, marching behind the divisions
Columns of munitions and trains, divided, for the march: in a first and second echelon; for combat: in an echelon of combat, a first echelon and a second echelon.

Munitions and supplies were brought by columns allotted to the depot services to the refilling points where the columns of the second echelon were supplied. By an exchange of columns between the different echelons, munitions and supplies arrived at the combat echelon, which organized a distributing point for the columns or vehicles from the front. All of these columns thus constituted mobile depots of munitions and food.

The length of the columns will give an idea of the importance of the supply services: while the troops of an active German army corps, marching on a single road, formed a column 19 miles in Iength, the regimental trams and the first and second echelons of the army corps had a length of 17 miles. It is obvious that in all of its movements, the First Army had to pay equal attention to its combatant troops and its supply columns.

On 4 September, the First Army which, in compliance with instructions from the high command, had obliqued towards the southeast to cut off the French from Paris, had reached and even passed the Marne with its cavalry and four of its corps, while the IV Reserve Corps followed, west of the Ourcq, assuring the security of the flank from the direction of Paris.

The supply head of the First Army, initially at Dusseldorf, had been advanced little by little, and was installed on 5 September at Chauny, about 61 miles from the front. The parks and the convoys had followed the rapid advance of the First Army as well as they were able and were on the lines of communication of their respective corps about 25 miles in their rear.

On 5 September, the commander of the First Army intended to continue the pursuit to the south, but an order from the supreme command directed it to wheel between the Marne and the Oise on Paris, while the Second Army was to make an analogous movement between the Marne and the Seine. The IV Reserve Corps received the order to halt and the army commander prepared the change of front of his four other corps for the morning of the 6th. To execute the order of the high command, the army commander had to reverse his front, until then facing south, to the rear around his right wing. During this maneuver the troops had to pass through the zone of the supply services and the grave problem of General von Kluck is to execute this movement after having the supply services evacuate this zone without provoking disorder or interfering with the normal supply of his troops. He decided to bring the four army corps which were south of the Marne to the new front by a flank march behind the IV Reserve Corps, the latter remaining in place; on the new front the four army corps would thus be in the same order from west to east as before. It was sufficient to oblique the parks and convoys to the right and then west, to clear the region through which the troops were to move. At the same time this would bring them behind their respective army corps on the new front. The orders were issued for this to be done on the morning of 6 September.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more.................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

Late in the night, the IV Reserve Corps announced that it had been attacked by superior forces and was forced to give way. The army commander then ordered the II Corps, the nearest to the IV Reserve Corps, to go immediately to the assistance of the former. Instead of being on the right wing of the new front, as intended, the II Corps would thus be on the left wing-the first breach in the plan of the army commander. But he believed that after having reinforced the IV Reserve Corps he would be able methodically to complete the change of front as planned. The movement commenced with the supply services which were to clear to permit the passage of the army corps. The second supply echelons were then on the Marne. The army had directed that, until further orders, the movements of the parks and convoys would be regulated by the general staff of the army and that as soon as the army was unscrambled the corps lines of communication with the supply head at Chauny would be reestablished.

To avoid disorder and perturbation in supply during the change of front, they undertook the direction of all the services of the rear, which normally were a function of the corps. To insure that everything was executed in accordance with the plan, the general staff officers were charged with directing and controlling the movements of the troops and convoys, especially during the passage of defiles.

During the day of 6 September, the army commander became aware of the gravity of the situation of the II and IV Reserve Corps on the Ourcq; consequently, be accelerated the march of the IV Corps (active) to make it reach the Ourcq during the morning of 7 September. At the same time the last two corps remaining on the southern front were attacked strongly and had to cover the right flank of the Second Army, which was also attacked; they were unable to reach the battlefield of the Ourcq until the evening, and even -in part during the night, of the 8th, after forced marches of 36 to 43 miles. As soon as it was found that the original plan could not be applied as a consequence of the unforeseen changes in the situation, the army had ordered the regimental trains immediately to withdraw, the parks and convoys toward the north, well in the rear, so as to disengage the roads for the passage of the last two corps of the army.

On the front of the Ourcq the corps were mingled since divisions and even brigades had been forced to intervene at the most seriously menaced localities in the order of their arrival. It was thus physically impossible to assure the supply of the corps by their organic columns and convoys, which had been withdrawn far in the rear toward the north. The army therefore placed automobile columns from the depot services at the disposition of the corps and gave the necessary orders to advance the munitions columns from the depots.

The change of front between the Oise and the Marne, as prescribed, has thus been executed but not in accordance with the intentions of the army commander, for the intervention of the French Sixth Army had upset not only the plan for the change of front of the corps, but also that established for the displacement of the parks and convoys.

On the evening of the 8th, the First Army commander gave his orders for the attack for the next day. It was to commence by a turning movement of the right wing. The regimental trains and the supply echelons continued their march to the rear to reform and to take their places in the rear of their respective corps. This movement was executed in the midst of friction and confusion of every nature, for in spite of the orders of the army, the corps had not taken all the necessary measures and certain echelons acted contrary to the orders given.

It was in this situation and in the course of the attack of the right wing of his army, that toward noon the army commander learned from Lieutenant Colonel Rentsch that the Second Army was falling back. It had received orders to retreat. This order was urgent; it was necessary at the same time to break off combat and get the parks and convoys behind the newly prescribed front. By good fortune for the First Army, most of its supply echelons were in a region situated on the east flank of the zone which the troops would have to traverse in their retreat.

The parks and convoys received the order to withdraw behind the Aisne and one division of cavalry was assigned for the protection of the lines of communication of the army toward the north. Taking into consideration the disorder which would be caused in the rear by this unexpected retreat, the army again ordered that the automobile columns of the depot services be placed at the disposition of the corps; besides supplies for the 10th were arranged for by having munitions and supplies brought to Soissons and the motor columns of the depots were advanced.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[joerookery]

Raul,

the army again ordered that the automobile columns of the depot services be placed at the disposition of the corps

I don't get this. Try though I may I cannot connect the dots with railroad heads and convoys. Bergman I thought was pretty clear in his analysis. But I do not understand this motorized stuff. Distance from the railhead and turnaround time I thought was quite key.

railheads by Joe Robinson, on Flickr

[joerookery]

The following motor transport formations had been assigned to the First Army upon mobilization:

• Commander of motor transport formations (Kommandeur der Kraftfahrtruppen) had his own staff. This command was an anomaly. Usually it was called ammunition columns battalion (Etappenmunitionskolonnen-Abteilung) only responsible for supplying ammunition. With the First Army this responsibility was extended to the entire range of supplies. The commander was Captain Petter, who originally came from the motor transport battalion (Kraftfahr-Bataillon) and acted as an instructor at the Military-Technical Academy before mobilization. The commander acted as the technical adviser on motor transport issues to the army commander and to the Etappeninspektion.
• Communications zone motor transport park (Etappen-Kraftwagenpark), included an initial supply of gasoline and oil for one week. It was originally intended to always have a week’s supply of gas and oil available. This required one full railroad train of 300 tons load capacity. To send the prescribed new supply each week created great difficulties and, as a rule, was not possible. The stereotypical phrase “ammunition will be given priority” could not be eliminated from orders. The realization that trucks were required to haul ammunition from the railheads to the combat zone, and that in return, the trucks could only move if supplied with gasoline, was a lesson learned only slowly.
• Eight mobile gas stations—tanker trucks (bewegliche Kraftwagen-Tankstellen).
• Twelve communications zone motor transportation columns (Etappen-Kraftwagenkolonnen). By having 12 motor transportation columns assigned, the First Army was equipped better than all other German armies in 1914.

The events of the first few days of advance, with the quickly increasing distance between railheads and combat troops, convinced the Commander of the First Army that his 12 Etappen-Kraftwagenkolonnen were insufficient to meet the needs of his army, particularly since the extent of the Belgian railway destruction and the repair capabilities of the railroad formations were still unclear. He asked the OHL for more motor transport capacity and received six additional light motor transport columns.

But even with eighteen motor transport columns at their disposal, First Army and Etappeninspektion 1 doubted their ability to meet the demands of the troops. That being the case, the commander of the motor transport formations was ordered to mobilize further motor transport columns. Since all available standard military trucks (standard army trucks of six tons load capacity—four tons on the truck and two on the trailer, and light trucks of three tons load capacity of the light and cavalry motor transport columns) were already requisitioned to mobilize the existing motor transport columns, Captain Petter had to source civilian trucks and delivery vehicles of one, one and a half, and two ton load capacity into military service in order to set up a further 12 improvised motor transport columns.

After only four weeks of campaigning, the motor transport columns were in an increasingly poor condition. The trailers turned out to be too heavy and unwieldy and were frequently either abandoned or left behind in the railheads or in field depots. This reduced the load capacity of the motor transport columns from 102 tons to 68 tons. In addition, the breakdown of the trucks led to further loss of carrying capacity. By 12 September about 60 percent of the trucks at the disposal of First Army had become unserviceable; and, to make things worse, no reserve vehicles were available.

All these little quotes come from chapter 17 of The Great War Dawning.

[tigre]

Hello joerookery ; thanks for that useful info and table . reading before.....................

Munitions and supplies were brought by columns allotted to the depot services to the refilling points where the columns of the second echelon were supplied. By an exchange of columns between the different echelons, munitions and supplies arrived at the combat echelon, which organized a distributing point for the columns or vehicles from the front. All of these columns thus constituted mobile depots of munitions and food.

So I assume that due to the disorder in the Army Corps' echelons supply, the motorized depot columns took charge of the supply up to the front (See below). More follows........

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

During the evening of the 9th, the disorder and jamming in the services of the rear was complete and interfered considerably with the retreat of the troops. Since the retreat was to continue on the 10th, the commander of the army artillery was charged with regaining order in the parks and convoys and of replacing them on the lines of communication of their army corps. To accomplish this the parks and convoys were taken under control on their passage over the Aisne and after considerable movements to the north of the Aisne the echelons found themselves on their assigned routes by the evening of the 10th. Most of the echelons were pretty well emptied; until they were filled the army had to assure the supply of its corps by use of the convoys of the depots; it also arranged for the supply of munitions by having all the depot columns advance as far as Soissons.

By the evening of 10 September, the army was again in the hands of its commanders, and the day of the 11th served for the reconstitution of the army corps and for continuing the placement of the echelons and trams on the lines of communication of their respective corps. At this moment the front of the army was south of the Aisne; the supply head was still at Chauny, about 25 miles in the rear, and the supply echelons on the roads about half way between the front and the supply head.

During the day of the 11th, three divisions were to act as rear guards south of the Aisne while the rest of the army crossed the river. The supply echelons were withdrawn still further in the rear and the army again charged itself with the responsibility of supply.

In two days the army commander had not only regained order in his corps, but also in the regimental trains and the parks and convoys. He still had to establish order in the depot services where the confusion was great as a result of the direct supply established with the front. Beginning with the 12th, supplies were to be reestablished normally, that is to say by the intermediary of the supply echelons and the regimental trains.

On 12 September the First Army was to follow the withdrawal of the Second Army; to do this it obliqued to the northeast and withdrew its right to prevent any effort at envelopment. The rear guards were withdrawn north of the Aisne and the supply echelons toward the rear, almost to the supply head.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[joerookery]

So I assume that due to the disorder in the Army Corps' echelons supply, the motorized depot columns took charge of the supply up to the front (See below). More follows........

No. There is a significant difference between motorized and mobile. They were just not a lot of Kraftwagon available in August and September 1914.

[tigre]

Hello joerookery ; you took my quote wrongly or I'm bad explaining it.............

There is a significant difference between motorized and mobile.

agree. All the type of vehicles within the First Army supply services (motorized, horse-drawn wagons, carts, trams) constituted mobile depots at their level (Army, Army Corps, Regiments)....but due to the disarray in the retreat, only the motorized depot units (Army level) were available (I mean). Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.