Frontiers battles in the Eastern Front 1914.

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CAVALRY COMBAT AT GORODOK (17 August, 1914).

On 27 July 1914, the Russian 2d Cavalry Division, commanded by General Gigaline, was under orders to move to the Austro-Russian frontier. It had the mission to cover the mobilization, and then the concentration in Podolia along the line: Nikolaiev-Tcherniostrov-Iarmalinci-Dovaievci, of the Russian Eighth Army under General Broussilov. (See Sketch No. 1).

The 2d Cavalry Division was composed of:

One brigade of Don Cossacks: the 16th and 17th Regiments
One mixed brigade of Cossacks: the 1st Regiment of Kouban Regulars and the 1st Terek Regiment (Volgski)
A detachment of 8 machine guns
Two batteries of Cossack horse artillery
Comprising a total of 24 troops (Sotnias), 8 machine guns and 12 cannons.

The front assigned to the division extended from Satanov to Skala (measuring more than 24 miles) along the Zbroutch River which formed the frontier. The 12th Cavalry Division extended the line to the north of the 2d Cavalry Division, while between Skala and the Dniester River there were only the groups of frontier guards.

The 2d Cavalry Division was disposed along two lines:

In the first line were the 1st Kouban Regiment at Lisovody, and the 1st Terek Regiment on the outskirts of Koupine. The brigade of the Don was in reserve near Gorodok. Several troops were on outposts with patrols along the Zbroutch River.

Information concerning the enemy was very indefinite. Every effort of the Cossacks to cross the river failed under fire of a vigilant Austrian infantry. A few prisoners who were taken declared that they belonged to the Landsturm and that they had behind them large units of cavalry.

The situation remained the same until the Russian Eighth Army, having finished its, concentration, and intending to penetrate into Galicia, sent its cavalry to reconnoiter the region betwen the Zbroutch and Serete Rivers.

On 14 August, General Gigaline recalled the 1st Terek Regiment from Koupine and moved his forces to the west, covering himself to the north by the Kouban Regiment left in place; two companies of the 60th Infantry covered the passage at Gorodok. On the morning of 15 August, the Russians occupied Ousiatyn, which the Austrians had evacuated during the night, retiring on Tchotkov. The advance guard of the 2d Cavalry Division organized the necessary bridgeheads to the North along the Zbroutch River and sent patrols toward Exerjany, Proboutna and Krogoulets to reconnoiter, but no enemy was met.

Source: ["Un combat de cavalerie: Gorodok (17 aout 1914)" by General Inostransev, Russian Army. Revue de Cavalerie, November-Decembe 1935] Abstracted by Major N. During, Infantry.

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CAVALRY COMBAT AT GORODOK (17 August, 1914).

However, during the afternoon the commander of the 1st Kouban Regiment reported on his front a reinforcement of the enemy and increasing activity in the region of the Serete River, and had been obliged twice to reinforce troops on outpost duty.

General Gigaline decided that the enemy was marching on Gorodok and directed immediately that his division march in the direction of this locality.*

On the side of the Austro-Hungarians, the 5th Cavalry Division (General Frohreich)composed of the 11th and 23d Cavalry Brigades (1st, 6th, 7th, and 8th Honved, Hussars) assembled early in August in the region of Tarnopolia, with the mission to cover the line of the Serete between Ostrov and Trembovlia. On 14 August, the division having been reinforced by the 15th Cavalry Brigade (2d Dragoons and 11th Uhlans), received orders to march to the south of the line: Tarnopol-Proskourov along the axis: Satanov-Gorodok-Kapoigorod. To carry out this mission the mass of the division was moved to Kosina, preceded to the crossings at Satanov by the light elements, which, during 15 August made contact with the advance guards of the 1st Kouban Regiment.

Attempts were made by the Austrians in the morning and early afternoon of 16 August to cross the Zbroutch River in the face of adjusted fire from the Cossacks. Beginning at 5:00 PM, the Austro-Hungarian artillery entered into action, and the Russian troops engaged before Satanov broke off the combat and retired on Lisovody.

In the meantime, a message from Kamenets Podolsk indicated that a division of Austrian cavalry had arrived in front of the sector held by the Russian frontier guards which indicated that the Austrians desired to start an offensive along the whole front.

The new commander of the 2d Cavalry Division, General Pavlov, estimated that he could better carry out his covering mission by taking a position near Gorodok, and, with his entire force united, giving battle to the enemy who was approaching from Tarnopol. By 10:00 PM, considerable reinforcements had joined him: a battalion of the 14th Rifle Regiment with 2 machine guns and 2 cannons, which the Eighth Army placed at his disposition and which came up in automobiles that he had requisitioned. These elements were detrucked at Gorodok, where they prepared the western part for defense.

* This precipitated decision and action was probably the reason for the relief of General Gigaline of his command by General Broussilov and his replacement on 16 August by General Pavlov, who commanded the Russians during the combat at Gorodok.

Source: ["Un combat de cavalerie: Gorodok (17 aout 1914)" by General Inostransev, Russian Army. Revue de Cavalerie, November-Decembe 1935] Abstracted by Major N. During, Infantry.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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CAVALRY COMBAT AT GORODOK (17 August, 1914).

The Austrian General Frohreich had issued his orders for the 17th as follows:

"The division will march tomorrow by Satanov on Gorodok and Kapoigorod.
"It will have: three squadrons as covering guard to gain contact with the enemy infantry.
"An advance guard (under command of General Bessingen-Ripenburg) composed of the 1st Honved, a group (3 squadrons) of the 7th Honved, and one company of cyclists.
"The main body (under command of General Coblentz) comprising the 2d group of the 7th Honved, the 6th and 8th Honved Hussars, the 15th Cavalry Brigade and the combat and heavy train. Main body will march at 7:00 AM.
"The 32d Rifle Battalion (Colonel Strauer) will cover the crossing of the Zbroutch River."

At 3:40 AM, the advance guard of this Division reached Satanov and after crossing the Zbroutch attacked in the direction of Lisovody.

At 10:00 AM, the 1st Kouban Regiment, after a short fight, began to fall back on Gorodok. At the same time, towards the south, the Austro-Hungarian cavalry forced the passage of the Zbroutch and menaced Kamenets podolsk. General Pavlov directed his troops to take their places of combat at Gorodok (See Sketch No 2).

A battalion of the 14th Chasseurs occupied the outskirts to the west of Gorodok, trenches having been dug the night before. At their right he placed the dismounted Cossacks of the 1st Kouban Regiment, the machine guns, being distributed among the troops, assuring protection to the extreme right. On the left he brought up the Don Brigade, several troops having been dismounted, the remainder forming a reserve, partially mounted. In the market place of Gorodok the 1st Terek Regiment constituted his general reserve. Behind and to the north of this position, the artillery had been put in position.

Toward noon, the Austrian cavalry appeared to the south of Lisovody advancing on the Russian position (See Sketch No 1). Furious saber hand-to-hand fighting developed between the Cossacks and their adversaries.

The main action began about 2:00 PM. The Austrian artillery, from positions near the Kremenny Farm, opened fire on a Russian convoy which spread out from Gorodok toward Jarmalinci; this fire was immediately returned by the Russian artillery. At the same time the lines of dismounted cavalry debouched from the wooded area bordering the outskirts south of Gorodok.

About 3:00 PM, the main body of the Austrian 5th Cavalry Division debouched in the region of Kremenny Farm. General Frohreich, commanding the division, immediately gave the following order to attack:

"The 23d Brigade on the left will advance in direction of the red houses on the Efimov factory; the 15th Brigade on the right will advance on the southern edge of Gorodok."

All initiative was left to the brigade commanders as to the manner of attack; no indication was given them as to artillery fire-support.

In each brigade the cavalrymen dismounted and, when the artillery opened fire on the Russian positions, each advanced in their zone of action along the Satanov road. The advance of the Austrians, under the heavy artillery and machine-gun fire of the Russians, was very slow.

Source: ["Un combat de cavalerie: Gorodok (17 aout 1914)" by General Inostransev, Russian Army. Revue de Cavalerie, November-Decembe 1935] Abstracted by Major N. During, Infantry.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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CAVALRY COMBAT AT GORODOK (17 August, 1914).

At 4 :00 PM the fire became intense. Projectiles destroyed the Russian trenches, but the Russian infantry and the 1st Kouban Regiment did not suffer greatly. Realizing that the dismounted cavalry action was doing very little to decide the issue, General Frohreich decided to try to penetrate the center of the Russians by a mounted attack. Three squadrons of the 2d group of the 7th Honved, Hussars, under Major Barzay, assembled under cover behind the small knoll on the Kremenny Farm in preparation for the attack, which was in three lines, each with a squadron in line, with a distance of 200 paces between squadrons.

The Russians having noticed the approach of the Austrian cavalry by a cloud of dust which they raised, took then under fire. Men and horses fell, but in reduced numbers the charge advanced, followed by a line of dismounted cavalrymen whose horses had fallen. The Russian position was overwhelmed by the fire of the Austrian artillery which took part in the action from positions to the west of Gorodok. Not a single shot was fired by the Russian front lines until the Austrian cavalry arrive within 800 paces of the Russian position, when the battalion of the 14th Rifles and the two companies of the 60th Infantry opened with rifle and machine-gun fire. When troops of the 1st Kouban Regiment began to fire machine guns into the left flank of the attackers, the lines of the attacking cavalry wavered, thinned, and broke; small groups formed and galloped in all directions, extending the front of the charge and scattering bodies of horses and men in all directions.

The mounted attack was repulsed. The group of the 7th Honved Hussars was almost entirely wiped out. All its officers and most of the men were dead or wounded, the latter being made prisoners.

The Russians had a group of machineguns at the extreme right of the Russian line, a most favorable position for flanking fire against the oncoming attack of the enemy. This group of machine guns was protected by the 3d and 5th Troops of the 1st Kouban Regiment. The machine guns covered about 1000 yards to their front, up to the Kremenny Farm, where the Austrian artillery was in action supporting the charge.

Taken suddenly under bursts of machinegun fire, the Austrian artillery turned two cannons on hill 326, and two squadrons of Austrian cavalry left in two waves to attack the machine-gun nest. At the same time the 3d and 5th Troops of the 1st Koubans appeared and charged into the 2 squadrons of the Austrian cavalry.

A very short but extremely bloody hand-to-hand fight followed. Into the ranks of the disorganized Hussars, the Cossacks, insensible to losses, charged with fury.

The Kouban Cossacks were noted fencers, and literally pierced their adversaries with the points of their sabers. Very soon, the Hussars having lost, among others, the two squadron commanders, and seeing other troops coming to the aid of their enemy, retired, pursued by the Cossacks, who continued pursuit until they came under fire of the Austro-Hungarian infantry.

Likewise the attack of the Austrian 23d Brigade, not only had been blocked but was seriously menaced on its left because its artillery, too exposed near the Kremenny Farm,was obliged to retire to the rear, abandoning the support of the brigade. Toward the south, the Austrian 15th Brigade could not advance farther than the line it had attained in the morning's fight.

The Russian 17th Don Regiment advanced mounted against the exterior flank of the 15th Brigade, and one troop of the 1st Terek Regiment tried to enter Satanov to prevent the retreat of the enemy.

Source: ["Un combat de cavalerie: Gorodok (17 aout 1914)" by General Inostransev, Russian Army. Revue de Cavalerie, November-Decembe 1935] Abstracted by Major N. During, Infantry.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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CAVALRY COMBAT AT GORODOK (17 August, 1914).

General Frohreich, in order to save what he could while time permitted, gave the order for a general retreat, which was executed in the greatest disorder. Three cannons, many vehicles, and much equipment were abandoned along the route. At the same time, the Austrian 32d Rifle Battalion, which held Satanov, took the Austrian cavalry, in the ebbing light, for Cossacks, and began firing on them. A panic ensued which was augmented because of lack of all responsible command-the commander of the Austrian 5th Cavalry Division, desperate because of his defeat, having committed suicide.

The Austro-Hungarian losses were serious-more than 500 Hussars were buried in the cemetery of Gorodok-their material and moral state was destroyed to such an extent that the division (what was left of it) had to be assembled in the rear for reconstitution in men and material.

The Russian losses did not exceed 60 killed and wounded, 50% of whom pertained to the two groups of Cossacks which went to the right flank to succor the machine guns and fought hand-to-hand with the Honved Hussars.

The Austrian cavalry that had crossed the Zbroutch in the sector held by the frontier guards, occupied Kamenets Podolsk on 17 August, and pushed on to the east on the 18th. But after the annihilation of the Austrian 5th Cavalry Division at Gorodok, and under pressure of a division of Kouban Cossacks recently arrived, they withdrew behind the Zbroutch.

On 18 August Russian territory was completely free of the enemy, and the Army of General Brussilov was able to pass at once to the offensive.

The battle of Gorodok presents on the Russian side, an example of a fight wherein the combined action of cavalry and infantry terminated happily.

The Russian commander had organized a center of resistance at Gorodok with his infantry and artillery, placing his cavalry on the flanks, where the possibilities of movement most favored it.

During most of the combat, the Russian division utilized its fire to stop the efforts, mounted and dismounted, of the Austrians.

The Russian General Pavlov had an excellent chance of completely cutting off the retreating Austrians, but he sent only one troop to Satanov. This force was entirely inadequate for the mission. It would have been better if he had used a regiment (1st Terek) which had not been employed in the attack. On the Austrian, side great heroism was displayed, particularly in the attack against the Russian position, but the Austrian commander failed to use his infantry to support the cavalry; even though superior in numbers he was practically annihilated. He employed his cavalry separately and not at all under the rules governing the use of combined arms.

Source: ["Un combat de cavalerie: Gorodok (17 aout 1914)" by General Inostransev, Russian Army. Revue de Cavalerie, November-Decembe 1935] Abstracted by Major N. During, Infantry.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

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Catastrophe: The Battle of Gnila Lipa 1914.

Following the declaration of war on Russia, the Graz’s III Corps, commanded by General Emil Colerus von Geldern, had to abandon their initial assignment of guarding the Minimal Group Balkan as the latter had been dispatched to Serbia, despite being part of the Second Army, which had also boarded the trains for the Balkans. Instead, the Corps was allocated to the Army Detachment Kövess, which joined Echelon-A on their way to Galicia. Its 6th and 28th divisions arrived at the assigned locations south of Lviv (Lemberga) on August 19 (its 22nd Landwehr Division was still on its way on that day)142 – a day after the first major Russian invasion of Austro-Hungarian territory, when the newspapers had already been reporting on the conflicts with the Russians, about the heroism of "our soldiers", and about the captured enemy ones.

Three days later, on August 22, the III Corps was assigned to Brudermann's Third Army, that had been in preparation of the executing order Op. Nr. 838 since August 18. The order stated that Brudermann’s troops should protect the Galician capital Lviv (German Lemberg) and the surrounding area from potential Russian incursions. However, the victory at Kraśnik had encouraged the AOK to such an
extent that they now pursued a similar outcome in eastern Galicia, on the triangle Lviv (German Lemberg) – Zolochiv (German Solotschiw) – Ternopil (German Tarnopol).146 The official statement from the AOK for the advancement of the Third Army and its adjacent Army Detachment Kövess on August 25 denies such claims; there it states that they wanted to protect the right flank of the advancing Auffenberg's Fourth Army in the north (the so-called Ostsicherung) and prevent a potential merger of the Russian armies.

On the Russian side, there is no doubt that the Stavka had wanted to achieve a striking victory in Galicia, which is why they sent two powerful armies in the direction of the Galician capital. In charge of the Russian Eighth Army was General Aleksei Brusilov while General Nikolai Ruzsky commanded the adjacent Russian Third Army. On the hilly and wooded terrain east of Lviv (German Lemberg) where the Gnila and Zlota Lipa rivers flowed, and on the wet marshy plain to the north, a gigantic battle broke out on August 26, which culminated on August 29 and 30 along the banks of the Gnila Lipa.

Source: The battle of galicia: The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian land forces on the eastern front in the First World War. David Hazemali.
https://alchetron.com/Battle-of-Galicia
https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Schlacht_an_der_Gnila_Lipa

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Catastrophe: The Battle of Gnila Lipa 1914.

According to the data of the scarce Austro-Hungarian reconnaissance units, contact with the enemy was scheduled for August 26. On August 25, the Third Army issued the order Op. Nr. 209, within the framework of which a further disposition Op. Nr. 133/15, which required the III Corps to cross the Gnila Lipa and position itself along the Zlota Lipa. On the same day, the Corps Command received a further disposition – Op. Nr. 209/1, which prohibited the crossing of the second river due to the weariness of the adjacent XII Corps. The divisions of the III Corps therefore positioned themselves along the river Zlota and made camps for the night.

At the centre of the Austro-Hungarian formation was the 6th Division. On its left flank rested the 28th, while its right flank was guarded by the 22nd Landwehr Division. The III Corps was guarded by the XI Corps to the left, which rested west from the town of Busk, and the XII Corps of the Army Detachment Kövess to the right; the latter rested south of the village Peremyschljany, with the city of Ternopil nearby (German Tarnopol). Late in the evening the Corps Command issued one final disposition - Op. Nr. 133/40; and with it, the troops received the order to cross the Zlota Lipa the following morning.

On the morning of August 26, the Austro-Hungarian Third Army and the Army Detachment Kövess with a combined strength of about 115 battalions of infantry, 91 squadrons of cavalry and 376 guns collided with the Russian Eighth, which had amassed more than twice as many men and firepower: 292 battalions of infantry, 162 squadrons of cavalry and 720 guns. The epicentre of the battle took place about 20km west of Zolochiv (German Solotschiw), where the 40,000 men of the Austro-Hungarian III Corps came into contact with the main enemy force. There, a road which connects Lviv (German Lemberg) to Zolochiv (German Solotschiw) divides the terrain into two geographically completely different shapes.

To the south, extends a hilly and wooded terrain, whereas northward from the road begins a lowland area with marshes, which significantly impeded larger manoeuvres. On such terrain the outnumbered soldiers of the 22nd Landwehr Division were among the first to step into battle. At 9:00 am, the ground beneath the front-most units of the division shook with tremendous force. After a few moments, the soldiers were bombarded with shells by a powerful artillery fire, for which nobody knew where it came from. Almost simultaneously, the XII Corps underwent a similar baptism of fire. To the left of the 22nd Landwehr Division, Major General Ludwig von Fabini pushed the 6th and 28th Divisions into a general offensive along the road towards Zolochiv (German Solotschiw) and across the adjacent hill of Lisa Gora.

A report of the battle shows that the soldiers of Ljubljana’s 17th Infantry Regiment were subjected to particularly violent bombardment from enemy artillery. Near the village of Gologory, specifically near the small village of Majdan Gologirski, the Russians allowed the predominantly "Slovenian" regiment to get near to their positions and then overwhelmed them with artillery and machine gun fire from the surrounding hills.157 Other units of the 6th Division and the adjacent 28th fell victims to such traps as well. The Austro-Hungarian forces withstood the Russian pressure until the late afternoon, when a general retreat was sounded. The Corps Command had sounded the retreat as early as 17:30pm, but the 28th Division kept fighting until they learned of the retreating 22nd Landwehr Division. By then, the latter had already crossed the Zlota Lipa.

Source: The battle of galicia: The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian land forces on the eastern front in the First World War. David Hazemali.
https://alchetron.com/Battle-of-Galicia
https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Schlacht_an_der_Gnila_Lipa
https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Schlacht_be ... ocz%C3%B3w

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Catastrophe: The Battle of Gnila Lipa 1914.

The breakdown of the first day of the battle was catastrophic for the Austro-Hungarian forces. The fighting exposed all their crumbling weaknesses, which in the following days only further debunked the possibility of a favourable outcome of the battle and the war in the east as such. Due to a general lack of so-called special maps of the surrounding area and reconnaissance units, most of the Austro-Hungarian forces were completely disoriented and uninformed about the power of the enemy (the Corps Command of the Third Corps, for example, had no overview of the situation the 22nd Landwehr Division was in until the end of the day, when the said division was already in full retreat).

What is more, due to the glorification of the obsolete military strategies by the AOK, which empowered reckless bayonet charges by the infantry, the Austro-Hungarian forces suffered terrible losses. The account of the baptism of fire of the 28th Division exposes all of these weaknesses, while at the same time offered an insight into the gruesome reality of war in general. The soldiers of its 47th Infantry Regiment infantry regiment, among them many Slovenians, drove into enemy fire in an almost parade-like formation, screaming "Morgenrot, Morgenrot, leuchtest mir zum frühen Tod!" (Morning sun, morning sun, will you illuminate an early death?!).

According to the regimental officer Ludwig von Vogelsang, his regiment sustained 168 dead, 702 wounded, and 417 missing in a matter of hours (most of them proved dead). Its sister regiment, the 87th had suffered 350 dead and more than a thousand wounded, which is approximately half of all men sent to battle on that day. Similarly the 17th and the Trieste’s 97th Infantry Regiment were decimated, first as part of the 6th Division, the latter part of the 28th. Among the fallen were also an unprecedented high percentage of non-commissioned officers, which were often at the very front of the assaults.

The following morning, the Corps Command managed to obtain information on the status of the individual divisions. After the arrival of the courier troops of the 6th Division and the 97th Infantry Regiment, it became clear that any re-attempt of an offensive would be in vain, as the smaller units were still in disarray and the soldiers were shell-shocked. However, the AOK did not want to hear about any of this and insisted on another offensive. The 22nd Landwehr Division was ordered to absorb the pressure of the Russian forces on the highlands on the west bank of the Zlota Lipa, and only as a last resort were they allowed to retreat to the nearby village Peremyschljany.

The rest of the Third Army’s divisions and adjacent Corps received the same or similar orders on that day. Together, they tried to hold off the extremely aggressive Russian enemy, only to find that the onslaught was too overwhelming. Not long after the order was given, the frontline began to collapse. Around 16:00 it was reported to the Corps Command that the whole of the XI Corps was in full retreat. The fleeing units of the latter were joined by the 28th Division of the III Corps. Its 97th Infantry Regiment had received such a mauling from enemy artillery that it de facto ceased to function as a military unit for several hours.

On that day (August 27), the first major outbursts of panic and cases of severe friendly fire were documented, both at the divisional level of the 6th Division and in the Corps Command. In one such case, a smaller retreating unit was presumably attacked by "Cossacks with artillery fire", and it took their commanding officers five minutes to calm the fearful troops and normalize the situation. However, the friendly fire resulted in the death of more than 30 men. Later in the war on the Eastern Front, friendly fire became devastatingly common, and the fear and panic that these men had shown on that day were harbingers of what was to come: dread, horror, psychological disorders, desertion, and suicide among their brothers in arms.

Source: The battle of galicia: The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian land forces on the eastern front in the First World War. David Hazemali.
https://alchetron.com/Battle-of-Galicia
https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Schlacht_an_der_Gnila_Lipa

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Catastrophe: The Battle of Gnila Lipa 1914.

On August 28, there was no significant change in the military situation in this sector. The Austro-Hungarian forces achieved a handful of smaller victories, but these were completely nullified the very next day when the defining battle broke out on both banks of the Gnila Lipa, at the river’s northernmost reach.

While Dankl’s First army continued to make progress in the direction of Lublin, and Auffenberg’s Fourth Army threatened to encircle the Russian Fifth Army, the Third Army of Brudermann was on the brink of disintegration. Even though its III Corps received the much needed reserve battalions on that day, its offensive capabilities were non-existent. The adjacent XI Corps had already disintegrated, and its surviving men were fleeing to Lviv (German Lemberg). The situation was equally abysmal for the Army Detachment Kövess, which until then had been the strongest link of the Austro-Hungarian forces in this sector.

On August 30, the Russian forces succeeded in penetrating the Austro-Hungarian frontline where the Army Detachment Kövess had been positioned. The Army Detachment Command found itself under shrapnel fire, while its battalions were replaced by a seemingly endless line of fleeing men, leaving behind their weapons, artillery guns, food, and even the wounded. Slovenian soldiers and the remains of the III Corps managed to absorb a 48-hour long shelling near Peremyschljany, but because both its northern and southern flank had collapsed, their defeat was imminent.

In this difficult situation, General Brudermann had no other option but to call for a full retreat, which he signed for 10:45 am on the same day, as visible from disposition Op. Nr. 332. Four days later, Lviv (Lemberg) fell into Russian hands without a fight, which sent geopolitical tremors across Europe. According to Major General Josef von Paitz of the Austro-Hungarian Land Forces, for the Russians, their "operatively misguided idea bore undeserved fruit".

Source: The battle of galicia: The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian land forces on the eastern front in the First World War. David Hazemali.
https://alchetron.com/Battle-of-Galicia
https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Schlacht_an_der_Gnila_Lipa

Cheers. Raúl M .