Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

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Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#1

Post by john2 » 01 Jan 2018, 05:47

Lately I have been studying how world war 1 got started. The origins of this war are of course more complex then the second world war. Alright so for those familiar with the subject the basic sequence of events was: Austria attacks Serbia - Russia mobilizes - Germany says Russia is going to attack and declares war. To me the Russian mobilization is the key here as without it it's hard to see how the war with Serbia could become a general war. All the books I have read to seem to gloss over it. Everything that I've read basically says the Russian mobilization was benign and that either the Germans were genuinely mistaken in thinking they were going to attack or used it was as a pretext. However it was common military doctrine that mobilization meant war - you don't mobilize unless you're about to attack. So the question is why did Russia mobilize in the first place? And how could their mobilization be benign when it was accepted that mobilization meant war?

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#2

Post by ljadw » 01 Jan 2018, 09:33

Mobilisation does not mean war .

Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .

The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .


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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#3

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Jan 2018, 16:34

john2 wrote:Lately I have been studying how world war 1 got started. The origins of this war are of course more complex then the second world war. Alright so for those familiar with the subject the basic sequence of events was: Austria attacks Serbia - Russia mobilizes - Germany says Russia is going to attack and declares war. To me the Russian mobilization is the key here as without it it's hard to see how the war with Serbia could become a general war. All the books I have read to seem to gloss over it. Everything that I've read basically says the Russian mobilization was benign and that either the Germans were genuinely mistaken in thinking they were going to attack or used it was as a pretext. However it was common military doctrine that mobilization meant war - you don't mobilize unless you're about to attack. So the question is why did Russia mobilize in the first place? And how could their mobilization be benign when it was accepted that mobilization meant war?
I am curious as to what sources on this topic you have been looking through, as at least one or two of the more recent 'popular' books, The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark and July 1914 by Sean McMeekin, go out of their way to maximise almost every Russian action and even omit rather important things like German urging Austria to hurry up and 'declare war that day or the next at the latest as the diplomatic situation will not hold much longer' because the Entente will enforce a peaceful settlement of the crisis through a conference, in one of the above cases, claiming Germany was taken entirely by surprise by the declaration of war she had just told Austria to hurry up with. When you need to omit information like that to present a case, when it has been known for at least 80 years, then your case is probably badly flawed

As to mobilisation, did it really mean war? Austria had mobilised in the during the recent Balkan Crisis without going to war (the cost was something like five times the military budget and was going to take many years for them to pay off), and in the July Crisis signed their own order for full mobilisation without knowing Russia had done the same, rather like Germany also did. There was a planned full Russian mobilisation scheduled for the autumn, this had caused concerns, but no communications telling Russia they could not do so as it would lead to war. Zuber even lists some of the Russian so-called 'secret mobilisations' where German military intelligence recorded that the Russian frontier military formations were at above their war strengths, rather unlike in 1914 when the display of a red mobilisation notice was enough to declare war even though the reserves would not get to their units for a few days yet.

The nations all had suspicions of each other, but the decision had been taken in isolation before confirmation of other nations actions had been received. Indeed Germany declared war on Russia without knowing if Sazonov had accepted the ultimatum, as the communication lines with St Petersburg had already been cut and a reply coming by one of the indirect routes would have taken much longer. This is not important as such, but it does highlight the very different state of communications at the time when all diplomatic communication was via telegram and nobody once actually phoned the head of an opposing alliance nation in order to speed communications up or to just clarify things. Because all communications took hours even at the best of times due to encoding and decoding, and as the network slowed to a crawl as more and more traffic was moving by indirect routes, quite often people were reacting to what they thought had happened or for reasons they suspected but had not confirmed, nobody was willing to allow a day or so of preparations to their opponents. There was not the slightest inclination for anyone that they should back down and accept a diplomatic defeat, and both alliances worked under the concept that they should take a very firm stance to deter the opponent, who would back away from moving to war unless they had already decided to take that step already. This had the obvious effect that both alliances moved to the most dangerous setting very quickly, and in the words of Bulow, allowed themselves no room to back down and the art of bluffing is to know precisely when to back down.

In 1914 there were several other factors that need to come under consideration, some showing possible intent other showing how time itself was causing pressure on the decision makers. The Germans borrowed the Austrian Skoda 30.5cm siege howitzers for the attack at Liege, but did so very early, before the Austrians rejected the Serbian reply to the Note, the request being sent about 20th July. The East Asia Squadron was told war with Britain was likely in mid-July, before the Note was even sent, and is why von Spee was able to arrange to be well away from Tsingtao by the time war broke out. Why were the Germans telling him war with Britain was likely at a point they supposedly knew nothing about Austrian intent, before Austria had even finished deciding what to demand from Serbia, and when German policy was supposedly attempting to localise things and keep Britain neutral. I wish I had kept the details but I did read a book that provided the actual ship name, time of sailing and arrival in South America for a German merchant steamer that carried artillery pieces to mount on German merchants in the South Atlantic, with the ship arriving on 31st July iirc and with a maximum speed of only about 10-12kts indicating there was a certain level of consideration that war was likely taking place long before the supposed shock news of Austria going to war on 28th July. Another curious incident was with Jagow approaching Tirpitz to enquire as to if he had a plan to launch a surprise attack on the British fleet when it was at anchor and prior to a declaration of war, which took place on 30th July, at a time when Germany was supposedly only intent on making sure Britain staed out of the war. Certainly this was a strange request for the head of the diplomatic service to make to the military to the extent Tirpitz noted it and recounted it later (I believehe says in his memoirs that he was astonished by such a suggestion, told Jagow no such plan existed, and walked away.

The first nations to mobilise were actualy The Netherlands and Belgium, unknowingly lighting a fire under the Schlieffen/Moltke plan by the preparations of the Belgian fortresses which would totally derail the plan by having the Belgians at full strength before they could be attacked with activities to prepare bridges and tunnels in both nations begining on about 26th July, whilst this made the latest date the Germans would have to move into Belgium the 4th August. The Austrians needed to decide where to send their reserves, to the Balkans or the Carpathians, by 1st August at the latest, oddly a date Germany just happened to go wowar with Russia and thus expect the Austrians to deploy in the Carpathians, which they did not do due to gross confusion. But the significance of the dates is still there, a decision needed to be taken by a certain date, and a reason was found to take that decsion on that date in time, despite their really being no diplomatic imperitive to do so. For example, Germany declared war on 1st August, when the only really pressing matter at that time was the need to ensure Austria moved troops to the Carpathians, as no troops were needed to move for a further few days. This meant that until the German invaion of Belgium took place on 4th August, there was absolutely no need to be at war with anyone, all activities up to that point did not need Germany to be at war with anyone. She could have mobilised and still attacked as she did on 4th August, but used the last hours of 31st and from 1st August until 4th of August to continue to seek a peaceful settlement. There was no reason to cut away all hope of a diplomatic solution in these last few days unless Germany had long since taken the decision that war was her preferred outcome. Oddly the Kasier noted that if only the Russians had not burnt some German homes after the declaration of war, a peaceful solution would still have been possible even then, but as they had done so this was no longer possible! This is in Albertini, as is a lot of other good information, and raises the question again as to why not hold back on the declarations of war, as only Germany was planning to move inside the next 4 days anyhow.

Russian mobilisation is a massive event in the July Crisis, it was, however, entirely predictable unless Austria backed down and did not go to war with Serbia. This is where it really gets confused, as there were few doubts that Russia would sit by and allow Serbia to be crushed, in which case her mobilisation was inevitable the moment Austria moves against Serbia. The Central Powers placed their hope on France not supporting Russia, and Russia having to back down becuse of this, but there were several warnings long before 28th of July that this was not going to happen. From the Russian point of view, they were able to mobilise inside their borders and maintain the troops there indefinately (Moltke and Bethmann agreed with this ability for Russia) without going to war, but knew mobilising their troops would add pressure onto Austria to back down and to open negotiations. Austria sabotaged this (as with so much else) by refusing to talk at all, whilst Sazonov was trying to get a settlement as late as 31st July with his proposal that all Austria had to do was to remove the elements in the Note that infringed upon Serbian sovereignty. Russia is guilty of stupidity, but not of wanting war. Generations of historians have looked, but nobody has found any indication Russia had any plan at all of what to do after mobilising, as in no plan to attack either Central Power, only to force Austria to back down.

The key is to look and see who was willing to talk, and curiously it is Austria that refuses to do so at every step of the way, even gaining censure from Bethmann for telling each nation what it thought they wanted to hear whilst being as obstructive as possible. Germany refused to talk and sabotaged attempts at talks, but did also make a belated attempt to do so, whilst Austria ploughed merrily onward not caring what mess it dragged Germany into. Russia did try to talk, albeit on terms that would not see Serbia attacked, but they were still trying to settle things short of any war. Berchtold was specific though, a diplomatic success was useless and only war against Serbia was of any use, it was the only acceptable outcome for Austria. Only one nation had that goal, and that same nation did not deviate from the path towards it, even if it did move at a snails pace. For Germany, Austria needed to be supported, but the form of that support became the problem later, as in Bismarck's terms it handed all the critical decision making process to the junior power in the alliance, to the point Germany was not kept informed at critical times.

I have sort of covered some aspects here, between a lot of problems at home, so if you would like to discuss any point I have raised please let me know.

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#4

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Jan 2018, 16:36

ljadw wrote:Mobilisation does not mean war .

Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .

The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .
Mobilisation did not prevent Austria invading Serbia, Austria planned to attack Serbia on 12th August from the outset and did exactly that. All Russian mobilisation achieved was to involve Germany directly in the crisis by mobilising troops in areas on the German borders and not just Austrian borders.

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#5

Post by The Ibis » 01 Jan 2018, 18:31

Terry Duncan wrote:
john2 wrote:Lately I have been studying how world war 1 got started. The origins of this war are of course more complex then the second world war. Alright so for those familiar with the subject the basic sequence of events was: Austria attacks Serbia - Russia mobilizes - Germany says Russia is going to attack and declares war. To me the Russian mobilization is the key here as without it it's hard to see how the war with Serbia could become a general war. All the books I have read to seem to gloss over it. Everything that I've read basically says the Russian mobilization was benign and that either the Germans were genuinely mistaken in thinking they were going to attack or used it was as a pretext. However it was common military doctrine that mobilization meant war - you don't mobilize unless you're about to attack. So the question is why did Russia mobilize in the first place? And how could their mobilization be benign when it was accepted that mobilization meant war?
I am curious as to what sources on this topic you have been looking through, as at least one or two of the more recent 'popular' books, The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark and July 1914 by Sean McMeekin, go out of their way to maximise almost every Russian action and even omit rather important things like German urging Austria to hurry up and 'declare war that day or the next at the latest as the diplomatic situation will not hold much longer' because the Entente will enforce a peaceful settlement of the crisis through a conference, in one of the above cases, claiming Germany was taken entirely by surprise by the declaration of war she had just told Austria to hurry up with. When you need to omit information like that to present a case, when it has been known for at least 80 years, then your case is probably badly flawed
I sort of wondered the same thing. Perhaps he recently read War of Illusions?
As to mobilisation, did it really mean war?
It turned out that way, but didn't have to if the CP was willing to negotiate.
There was not the slightest inclination for anyone that they should back down and accept a diplomatic defeat, and both alliances worked under the concept that they should take a very firm stance to deter the opponent, who would back away from moving to war unless they had already decided to take that step already.


Except that Austria-Hungary wanted a war, not a diplomatic victory and didn't really care what the war looked like after it had German support. The Russians knew this when they saw the ultimatum to Serbia. They comingled Austria and Germany, but given German intentions are still fuzzy 100 years on, who can blame them!
Russian mobilisation is a massive event in the July Crisis, it was, however, entirely predictable unless Austria backed down and did not go to war with Serbia.
I agree it was entirely predictable, but because of it being predictable, I disagree with its import in 1914 - everyone knew it was coming so it didn't change the game. That said, its turned into a massive event in the post-war blame game.
This is where it really gets confused, as there were few doubts that Russia would sit by and allow Serbia to be crushed, in which case her mobilisation was inevitable the moment Austria moves against Serbia.
I'm not sure that is confusing.
The key is to look and see who was willing to talk,
Always a good place to start.

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#6

Post by The Ibis » 01 Jan 2018, 18:35

Terry Duncan wrote:
ljadw wrote:Mobilisation does not mean war .

Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .

The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .
Mobilisation did not prevent Austria invading Serbia, Austria planned to attack Serbia on 12th August from the outset and did exactly that. All Russian mobilisation achieved was to involve Germany directly in the crisis by mobilising troops in areas on the German borders and not just Austrian borders.
Hold the phone. Germany was directly involved in the crisis once they gave the blank check. The Germans doubled down when they told the Russians that any preparations, even short of mobilization, would cause German mobilization. In short, the Russians didn't cause Germany to do anything. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians were driving this train.
Last edited by The Ibis on 01 Jan 2018, 18:48, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#7

Post by The Ibis » 01 Jan 2018, 18:40

ljadw wrote:Mobilisation does not mean war .
It didn't have to mean war. It could.
Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .
War was declared and Belgrade was fired upon in July. So no, mobilization did not prevent war.
The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .
What other type of aim could it have had?
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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#8

Post by john2 » 01 Jan 2018, 18:42

I am curious as to what sources on this topic you have been looking through
Well the books I have concentrate mainly on the war itself. I recently got the book "Europe's Last Summer" by Fromkin - my first book exclusively on how the war got started. He claimed that there were 2 wars being being planned- Austria wanted to fight against Serbia and Germany wanted to fight Russia/France. The war with Serbia was to get Russia involved with Austria so Germany could go to war claiming to protect them - they wanted to portray the war as defensive, it was an added bonus that Russia mobilized against Germany as well. That way they could say the war was to defend Germany. He does a good job leading up to the war with Serbia but the events from Serbia to general war are a bit fuzzy. He mentions the Russian mobilization but doesn't go into details about the decisions going on in Russia instead moving back to the German side and their reaction to it. He ultimately concludes Germany and Austria were guilty. Your book the "The Sleepwalkers" sound like it goes into more detail here so I will have to read it sometime.

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#9

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Jan 2018, 19:50

john2 wrote:Your book the "The Sleepwalkers" sound like it goes into more detail here so I will have to read it sometime.
It is quite good, but very much a case of smoke and mirrors. Clarke has time to tell you how diplomatic accommodation in Russia was nowhere near as good or modern as in western Europe, but then misses out entirely one of the most significant diplomatic exchanges of the entire crisis! Not to detract from his work, but it does deserve to note that Clarke (a Cambridge historian of note) got a knighthood 'for his services to improving Anglo-German relations' which is hardly something historians usually get honours for! He points out how Austria planned a war, didn't care much if it went into a wider war as long as their ally would bail them out, and then went out of their way to not talk to anyone, but then pretty much blames Russia for everything despite already having pointed out that Russia reacting as it did was almost inevitable! He even finishes with the modern equivalent to the old Lloyd-George excuse that the nations somehow slithered over the edge into war when he says that it is pointless to assign or even attempt to assign blame/responsibility. If he really believed that why would he bother examining the subject in the first place?

Fromkin is ok, he has a useful timeline method of compiling the events, but he also tends to take a hard line with not too much evidence to support his conclusions sometimes.

The two wars line does have a lot to it, Austria certainly would have been happy with a Balkan War with Serbia, as would Germany too. Indeed they were both willing to risk war with Russia and France as well as Serbia, it was only when war with Britain too became all too obvious that they finally thought it might be time to talk, and even then Austria just ignored the request from Germany! The problem arises in the claim Germany wanted a general war as opposed to no war or a limited war outcome or deliberately used the assassination to start a general war as there is very little to support the claim, although given the Germans spent the interwar years shredding and hiding documents we will never likely know everything from that side. I am sure ljadw will point out many of the things Germany would have liked to gain from the war, the problem is with linking most of it to any of the decision making process in the July Crisis.

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#10

Post by Terry Duncan » 01 Jan 2018, 20:08

The Ibis wrote:I agree it was entirely predictable, but because of it being predictable, I disagree with its import in 1914 - everyone knew it was coming so it didn't change the game. That said, its turned into a massive event in the post-war blame game.
The import is that it legitimately spreads the crisis to effect Germany too as the Galician salient would be an area of worry to Germany as a surprise attack would have been possible. The ultimatum and threats surrounding the 'cease all mobilisation activity' are certainly high handed and show it is not mobilisation itself that was causing the war, but they are not evidence of a premeditated war to achieve continental hegemony.
The Ibis wrote:
This is where it really gets confused, as there were few doubts that Russia would sit by and allow Serbia to be crushed, in which case her mobilisation was inevitable the moment Austria moves against Serbia.
I'm not sure that is confusing.
Badly edited thoughts four hours apart lead to poor wording! The confusion is that we then start discussing intent, and enter the territory of trying to guess almost everything as there is little to show anyone was planning a general war. It is easy to show Austria was planning a war, it is next to impossible to show such reasoning for anyone else without relying on circumstantial evidence and conjecture.

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#11

Post by waldopepper » 01 Jan 2018, 21:56

At a Cabinet meeting on the 24th it was decided to order a partial mobilization to put pressure on AH. This from Lieven ? who quotes from notes taken by Bark the finance minister. The notes are now at Columbia University. Janushkevich who was present at the meeting was apparently unaware that there was no plan for partial mobilization and that to partially mobilize would seriously disrupt a subsequent general mobilization.

For the ensuing events that led Russia to order a general mobilization see this link which relies heavily on the recollections of Dobrorolski then chief of the mobilization section of the Russian General Staff

http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archiv ... 0831b.html

wp

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#12

Post by ljadw » 01 Jan 2018, 22:18

Terry Duncan wrote:
ljadw wrote:Mobilisation does not mean war .

Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .

The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .
Mobilisation did not prevent Austria invading Serbia, Austria planned to attack Serbia on 12th August from the outset and did exactly that. All Russian mobilisation achieved was to involve Germany directly in the crisis by mobilising troops in areas on the German borders and not just Austrian borders.
On the day Germany declared war on Russia, AH was still not invading Serbia . The invasion of Serbia started only AFTER there was a war between Russia and AH .

That raises the question : would there have been an invasion of Serbia without a war between Russia and AH,war which had been forced upon AH by Germany ?

It was AH that declared war on Russia,after a German ultimatum .

It is also not correct to say that Germany was involved in the crisis by the Russian mobilisation .

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#13

Post by ljadw » 01 Jan 2018, 22:43

Terry Duncan wrote:
john2 wrote:Your book the "The Sleepwalkers" sound like it goes into more detail here so I will have to read it sometime.


The two wars line does have a lot to it, Austria certainly would have been happy with a Balkan War with Serbia, as would Germany too. Indeed they were both willing to risk war with Russia and France as well as Serbia,

No :
AH would have been happy with a small war against Serbia . Something as the occupatio of Belgrade and a financial compensation.

Russia would have accepted this :it did not declare war on AH when, after a month of dawdling and eexhortations of an irritated Germany, AH declared war on Serbia,DoW not followed by an invasion .

Germany was interested in a war between AH and Serbia only if this war triggered a war between Russia and AH,which would give Germany the excuse to declare war on Russia, war, which had as only importance that it would trigger a French intervention which would make possible a war between Germany and FRance .

The AH DoW on Serbia did not result in war between AH and Russia .

AH was not impressed by the Russian mobilisation, thus there was no reason for German to be impressed .

The Russian threat for Germany did not exist.

There was no French threat, otherwise Germany would have mentioned it in its DoW on France .

When there was no war in the east, Germany started him, hoping that it would start a war in the west,and when there was no war in the west, Germany was forced to invent a lame excuse to start him .

After Sarajevo, the Emperor said : it's now or never,but everyone -Serbia, AH, Russia and France sabotaged the German plan, because they were unwilling to start an European war,only Germany wanted this war;and prepared him before there was a DoW and before ONE soldier was killed .

Remember the Api Api telegram of July 25, remember the occupation of Luxembourg which was ordered and started before the DoW on Russia .

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#14

Post by ljadw » 01 Jan 2018, 22:48

The Ibis wrote:
ljadw wrote:Mobilisation does not mean war .
It didn't have to mean war. It could.
Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .
War was declared and Belgrade was fired upon in July. So no, mobilization did not prevent war.
The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .
What other type of aim could it have had?
1) DoW does not mean war

2 )The political aim was to put pressure on AH and it succeeded .
The war against /invasion of Serbia did not result in war between AH and Russia . The war between Russia and AH resulted in the invasion of/war against Serbia .

The war between AH and Russia started on August 5, the invasion of Serbia a week later .

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Re: Origins of the war - Why did Russia mobilize?

#15

Post by The Ibis » 01 Jan 2018, 23:18

ljadw wrote:
The Ibis wrote:
ljadw wrote:Mobilisation does not mean war .
It didn't have to mean war. It could.
Russia mobilised (against AH) to prevent AH from invading Serbia, and it succeeded .
War was declared and Belgrade was fired upon in July. So no, mobilization did not prevent war.
The Russian mobilisation had a political aim .
What other type of aim could it have had?
1) DoW does not mean war
That's interesting. What does it mean?
2 )The political aim was to put pressure on AH and it succeeded .
The war against /invasion of Serbia did not result in war between AH and Russia . The war between Russia and AH resulted in the invasion of/war against Serbia .
If the aim was to avoid invasion of Serbia but by succeeding, the result was Germany declaring war ... umm, I'm not sure that's a success.
Last edited by The Ibis on 01 Jan 2018, 23:43, edited 1 time in total.
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