Why didn't Britain stay neutral?

[Terry Duncan]

When the German states formed the 2nd Reich, German Confederation, or whatever other names you wish to apply, they took on the treaties signed by Prussia, as it was Prussia that very much forced the issue leading to the creation of the German state. There may well have not been a single 'German army' in 1914, though people generally use that term rather than specify Saxon, Prussian, Wurttemberg or even Austrian troops as being the invading troops, the troops still belonged to the German Confederation which itself had Kaiser Wilhelm II as its head of state. Do you really expect people to be so anal-fixated as to completely abandon the common terminology used in the vast majority of textbooks? You are doing your own cause more harm than good with such replies.

With regard British feelings of obligation with regards the treaty, the key point is that they felt such an obligation would only apply where they had an ally, and not apply if they did not. That is a very selective application of the term 'obligation', to such a degree that it shows the decision makers in 1914 made their decisions based purely on British self-interests.

[glenn239]

I wanted to focus on a specific incident that happened at the start of the war. So from what I've read the Kaiser on Aug 1 had just agreed to the attack west when a message from Britain came from prince Lichnowsky, I believe the German ambassador to Britain. The gist was that Britain would stay neutral and even guarantee French neutrality if Germany promised not to invade France. The Kaiser jumped at the deal - to Moltke's dismay who said the troops were already heading west and sent messages to make the deal official. However he soon got an answer from Grey saying he was mistaken and so the invasion of France was back on. Please correct me if I have any details wrong. The incident is usually mentioned in passing in most of what I've read but is there something more to it? Why did Lichnowsky believe there was such a deal in the first place? I recently got finished reading a rather long thread on this forum about the war. https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 1&t=138664 Glenn239 seemed to suggest there was something sinister about this on the part of Britain, see page 47. So what was going on?

The reason why Lichnowsky thought there was a bargain in the offering is because both Tyrell and Grey told him, in several separate conversations, that an offer of British neutrality would be forthcoming later that afternoon. There was nothing "sinister" in Grey' dangling the bait of British neutrality, but neither was he being honest about it - the actual terms Grey fleshed out to Bertie in Paris later that day were that the French and German armies would mobilize but remain frozen in place and Britain could remain neutral in the meantime.

The reason why Grey made this offer, IMO, is that he wanted to smooth the way in Cabinet for French mobilization - which was about to commence - by getting the Germans to agree to it on their own. German and French mobilization orders went out around 4-5pm on the 1st. Grey's neutrality balloon was floated earlier during the Cabinet session, then continued later in person with Lichnowsky about when mobilization had commenced. The fact that Grey sent word out of a Cabinet meeting might suggest he had it in his mind before 1 August. Despite a conditional 'yes' response from Berlin, Grey ignored the German counteroffer and backed off his own proposal later that night, once both France and Germany were mobilizing.

Why Grey made the offer is unknown, but the traditional explanation, that he wanted to present neutrality to cabinet, I do not think correct - he never mentioned any of this to cabinet, nor the Kaiser's neutrality offer that came in direct response to his own initiative. More importantly, he treated the German neutrality offer of 1 August as a tar baby and claimed to the King there had to have been some sort of "misunderstanding". I reasoned that, since Grey's proposal featured Germany giving France permission to mobilize, and that he was uninterested in the German counteroffer of Franco-German neutrality in the west, that the easing the impact of a French mobilization even before the German, in Cabinet, was probably the purpose of it. Occam's Razor.

[glenn239]

Terry As Glenn239 doesnt appear to be going to comment on this, I think you could try a search of this forum for posts from Glenn239 and mentioning Grey to see that his general opinion of Grey is not high thouigh the reason for why has never surfaced.

My opinion of Grey I've conveyed any number of times to you - that he was a devout Entente loyalist determined to stand by France, but operating within a political party and environment where British neutrality was a key plank.

You could always look up the discussion with myself where he said I should say 'Grey lied' to prove I was not biased, even though he would provide no example of Grey actually lying for me to make such a statement about.

A famous example was in late August where he rose in the House and said that Lichnowsky had made a proposal that the British documents show that Grey had made. A lesser known example occurred on the afternoon of 1 August when he told Lichnowsky that he would undertake no act to make the crisis worse, yet as soon as Lichnowsky was out the door, he told Cambon he would ask Cabinet to pledge the British fleet to France.

What makes you think Germany attacking France would be acceptable to Britain?

The Liberal policy plank of neutrality meant that if Germany attacked France or vice versa, Britain could remain neutral. While this was at odds with Grey's belief in the Entente as a military alliance, the Germans really had no idea what the coin flip would be. They just knew that with Russian mobilization it was time for the coin toss.

[glenn239]

MarkN Why did the British Cabinet choose to go to war when staying out of it was not just a realist possibility, but one actively championned by many?

Cabinet chose to go to war after Germany invaded Belgium, an act which made not agreeing to go to war an act of political suicide. Your question might be reframed as, why didn’t Cabinet more forcefully propose to Germany that Anglo-German neutrality be founded on the neutrality of Belgium? That policy was theoretically feasible, but not pursued. The answer appears to be that, even for most of the neutralists, Belgium was a secondary factor for British interests.

They signed their agreement to respect Belgium's neutrality not to guarantee it.

I think the obligation was to uphold the ‘perpetual neutrality’ of Belgium, which is more than just respecting it, but less than fighting to make it happen. Clear as mud, and significantly, the 1839 Treaty was an orphan amongst treaties. (Obligations that give countries the freedom to act according to their interests are no different than if a treaty did not exist in the first place).

Ljadw If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

The Kaiser’s neutrality offer of 1 August was that the German army would march east into Poland and the British would prevent the French from falling on Germany's undefended rear. My knowledge of European geography is admittingly not perfect, but I don’t think the Pyrenees are in Poland.

[Terry Duncan]

Welcome back Glenn, it is nice to see you after all this time. I cannot say I agree with everything you have written, but it is still good to see you back.

[ljadw]

Ljadw If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

The Kaiser’s neutrality offer of 1 August was that the German army would march east into Poland and the British would prevent the French from falling on Germany's undefended rear. My knowledge of European geography is admittingly not perfect, but I don’t think the Pyrenees are in Poland.

There was no such offer : on 1 August Germany invaded Luxemburg, besides the Kaiser was in no position to offer anything, as he no longer was commanding .

On 1 August, the attack in the West had already begun .

[MarkN]

Cabinet chose to go to war after Germany invaded Belgium, an act which made not agreeing to go to war an act of political suicide. Your question might be reframed as, why didn’t Cabinet more forcefully propose to Germany that Anglo-German neutrality be founded on the neutrality of Belgium? That policy was theoretically feasible, but not pursued. The answer appears to be that, even for most of the neutralists, Belgium was a secondary factor for British interests.

I think the policy you suggest was attempted and it failed - albeit a day or so earlier and in a different manner. Grey had sought assurances from both France and Germany that they would continue to respect Belgium neutrality. Whilst British neutrality in a German-French war was not explicitly offered as part of that, one can see it as being offered implicitly. If they could keep their affairs out of Belgium, Britain could stand aside. The responses indicated that a French-German war was not going to be limited to just their common border. Both saw Belgium as a battleground.

From that understanding two things flow. First, it suggest that Belgium was indeed central to the British position (of neutrality) and interests. Second, it forces Grey to accept that he now has to find a solution of keeping France and Germany apart if Britain has any chance of staying out of the conflict.

The reason why Grey made this offer, IMO, is that he wanted to smooth the way in Cabinet for French mobilization - which was about to commence - by getting the Germans to agree to it on their own. German and French mobilization orders went out around 4-5pm on the 1st. Grey's neutrality balloon was floated earlier during the Cabinet session, then continued later in person with Lichnowsky about when mobilization had commenced. The fact that Grey sent word out of a Cabinet meeting might suggest he had it in his mind before 1 August. Despite a conditional 'yes' response from Berlin, Grey ignored the German counteroffer and backed off his own proposal later that night, once both France and Germany were mobilizing.

Why Grey made the offer is unknown, but the traditional explanation, that he wanted to present neutrality to cabinet, I do not think correct - he never mentioned any of this to cabinet, nor the Kaiser's neutrality offer that came in direct response to his own initiative. More importantly, he treated the German neutrality offer of 1 August as a tar baby and claimed to the King there had to have been some sort of "misunderstanding". I reasoned that, since Grey's proposal featured Germany giving France permission to mobilize, and that he was uninterested in the German counteroffer of Franco-German neutrality in the west, that the easing the impact of a French mobilization even before the German, in Cabinet, was probably the purpose of it. Occam's Razor.

If Occam's Razor is to be applied, then cut out all the frivolity regarding the Cabinet and cunning diplomacy and get back to basics. If Grey could find a way to stop France and Germany going to war with each other, then Britain could keep out too.

The entire British effort was linked to keeping Britain out of the war. Unfortunately, Grey's sense of honour in upholding Belgium neutrality placed Britain right in the frontline as soon as Germany (or France) step across the Belgium border. The 1912 naval agreement to protect French Channel ports also added to the mix at a crucial point, but were of lesser concern as that obligation would only kick in if the Germans were daft enough to think they could run the Channel unchallenged.

Britain's inability to remain out of the war, to remain neutral, was determined by...
1) the German intent to pass/fight through Belgium
2) Grey's narrow-minded sense of honour
3) Asquith's decision to back Grey
4) Tory pledges to support Asquith

If you take any one of those out of the list, then the chances of the Cabinet coming to a diferent decision on 2 August (or later) are quite understandable if not likely.

[MarkN]

Ljadw If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

The Kaiser’s neutrality offer of 1 August was that the German army would march east into Poland and the British would prevent the French from falling on Germany's undefended rear. My knowledge of European geography is admittingly not perfect, but I don’t think the Pyrenees are in Poland.

There was no such offer : on 1 August Germany invaded Luxemburg, besides the Kaiser was in no position to offer anything, as he no longer was commanding .

We've had pages of absurd reasoning and absurd logic. Now we have to suffer complete falsehoods!

[Terry Duncan]

There was no such offer : on 1 August Germany invaded Luxemburg, besides the Kaiser was in no position to offer anything, as he no longer was commanding .

I am genuinely curious about the claim the Kaiser no longer commanded, what can be offered to support such a claim? I have looked into this myself and found very little to support it, though it must be noted that Falkenhayn told the Kaiser he was no longer in command at about this time, and was not removed or even reprimanded - something that I believe is supported by his own diary. Did Falkenhayn mean the Kaiser had lost control of events on an international scale or that the military were not in command in Germany?

[ljadw]

No one took any notice of what the Kaiser was saying,because he was panicking and talking nonsense : before the war, when some one argued that the BEF would intervene if Germany invaded Belgium, he boasted that when they would land on the continent, they would be taken prisonner.And now, he was talking about not attacking in the West, but limiting the war to the East, although he knew very well that the only meaning for the war in the East was to trigger and make possible the war in the West;besides, there were NO plans for a war in the East.

As von Jagow said in 1926 :War kein Krieg mit Russland, so bestand überhaupt kein Anlass für uns zum Kriege im Westen .

If there was no war in the East, there was no reason for war in the West .

Source : Willibald Gutsche:Sarajevo 1914: Vom Attentat zum Weltkrieg .

What Wilhelm proposed ( Aufmarsch Anweisung Ost ) was impossible (Russia was unbeatable in a short war), senseless (without war in the West, there was no reason for war in the East) and suicidal (if the war in the East was won, Germany would be broken, and be infected by revolutionary ideas);that's why everyone did as if they did not hear it,with the exception of Moltke who said flatly : it is militarily impossible .
There was nothing to gain by fighting in the East, only to lose .

[ljadw]

Cabinet chose to go to war after Germany invaded Belgium, an act which made not agreeing to go to war an act of political suicide. Your question might be reframed as, why didn’t Cabinet more forcefully propose to Germany that Anglo-German neutrality be founded on the neutrality of Belgium? That policy was theoretically feasible, but not pursued. The answer appears to be that, even for most of the neutralists, Belgium was a secondary factor for British interests.

I think the policy you suggest was attempted and it failed - albeit a day or so earlier and in a different manner. Grey had sought assurances from both France and Germany that they would continue to respect Belgium neutrality. Whilst British neutrality in a German-French war was not explicitly offered as part of that, one can see it as being offered implicitly. If they could keep their affairs out of Belgium, Britain could stand aside. The responses indicated that a French-German war was not going to be limited to just their common border. Both saw Belgium as a battleground.

From that understanding two things flow. First, it suggest that Belgium was indeed central to the British position (of neutrality) and interests. Second, it forces Grey to accept that he now has to find a solution of keeping France and Germany apart if Britain has any chance of staying out of the conflict.

The reason why Grey made this offer, IMO, is that he wanted to smooth the way in Cabinet for French mobilization - which was about to commence - by getting the Germans to agree to it on their own. German and French mobilization orders went out around 4-5pm on the 1st. Grey's neutrality balloon was floated earlier during the Cabinet session, then continued later in person with Lichnowsky about when mobilization had commenced. The fact that Grey sent word out of a Cabinet meeting might suggest he had it in his mind before 1 August. Despite a conditional 'yes' response from Berlin, Grey ignored the German counteroffer and backed off his own proposal later that night, once both France and Germany were mobilizing.

Why Grey made the offer is unknown, but the traditional explanation, that he wanted to present neutrality to cabinet, I do not think correct - he never mentioned any of this to cabinet, nor the Kaiser's neutrality offer that came in direct response to his own initiative. More importantly, he treated the German neutrality offer of 1 August as a tar baby and claimed to the King there had to have been some sort of "misunderstanding". I reasoned that, since Grey's proposal featured Germany giving France permission to mobilize, and that he was uninterested in the German counteroffer of Franco-German neutrality in the west, that the easing the impact of a French mobilization even before the German, in Cabinet, was probably the purpose of it. Occam's Razor.

If Occam's Razor is to be applied, then cut out all the frivolity regarding the Cabinet and cunning diplomacy and get back to basics. If Grey could find a way to stop France and Germany going to war with each other, then Britain could keep out too.

The entire British effort was linked to keeping Britain out of the war. Unfortunately, Grey's sense of honour in upholding Belgium neutrality placed Britain right in the frontline as soon as Germany (or France) step across the Belgium border. The 1912 naval agreement to protect French Channel ports also added to the mix at a crucial point, but were of lesser concern as that obligation would only kick in if the Germans were daft enough to think they could run the Channel unchallenged.

Britain's inability to remain out of the war, to remain neutral, was determined by...
1) the German intent to pass/fight through Belgium
2) Grey's narrow-minded sense of honour
3) Asquith's decision to back Grey
4) Tory pledges to support Asquith

If you take any one of those out of the list, then the chances of the Cabinet coming to a diferent decision on 2 August (or later) are quite understandable if not likely.

Grey's sense of honour : Grey was a politician, and as such honour was a luxury he could not afford .

[ljadw]

Ljadw If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

The Kaiser’s neutrality offer of 1 August was that the German army would march east into Poland and the British would prevent the French from falling on Germany's undefended rear. My knowledge of European geography is admittingly not perfect, but I don’t think the Pyrenees are in Poland.

There was no such offer : on 1 August Germany invaded Luxemburg, besides the Kaiser was in no position to offer anything, as he no longer was commanding .

We've had pages of absurd reasoning and absurd logic. Now we have to suffer complete falsehoods!

You don't know that Germany invaded Luxemburg on 1 August ?

[Terry Duncan]

There was no such offer: on 1 August Germany invaded Luxemburg, besides the Kaiser was in no position to offer anything, as he no longer was commanding .

On 1 August, the attack in the West had already begun.

The following is from Albertini's 'The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol III p174-175

‘Germany is prepared to accede to the English proposal if England guarantees with her entire armed strength the unconditional neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict, a neutrality which must last until the final settlement of this conflict. It must rest with Germany to decide when this settlement is attained.’

‘German mobilization took place today on grounds of the Russian challenge and before Telegram No. 205 [No. 562 of the German Diplomatic Documents] was received. Consequently, it is too late to change our concentration on the French frontier. But we engage until Monday, 3 August, 7 p.m., not to cross the French frontier if by that time acceptance by England has been received.’

This message was dispatched at 19.02 on 1st August 1914. The acceptance came from the Kaiser and the telegram was drafted by Bethmann, Jagow, Moltke, and Falkenhayn. Clearly the German leadership was willing to make an offer for no war in the west on 1st August.

[MarkN]

Ljadw If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

The Kaiser’s neutrality offer of 1 August was that the German army would march east into Poland and the British would prevent the French from falling on Germany's undefended rear. My knowledge of European geography is admittingly not perfect, but I don’t think the Pyrenees are in Poland.

There was no such offer : on 1 August Germany invaded Luxemburg, besides the Kaiser was in no position to offer anything, as he no longer was commanding .

We've had pages of absurd reasoning and absurd logic. Now we have to suffer complete falsehoods!

[ljadw]

The only reason for a war against Russia was political = to make a war in the West possible . If therre was no war in the West, there was no reason for a war in the East .

When, a few hours before the DoW to Russia, ballin asked B-H why such a hurry, the answer was : otherwise the SPD will not support me (= the SPD will not support a war in the West ) .
Source : Lüder Meyer-Arndt: Die Julikrise 1914: Wie Deutschland in den Ersten Weltkrieg stolperte .
Thus,what the Kaiser proposed proved that he had lost some of his marbles,he was all loopity-doopity-doopy, that he had no guts.