Why didn't Britain stay neutral?

[South]

Did I commit a "Freudian slip" ?!

Look at my spelling in my rambling to Terry.

This is a classic. It is verbotten to edit classics !

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[Don71]

Very good summary South,

but what I can't see is, that Germany did something "special", they did the same things that all Great Powers at this time have done, but Germany is the only Great power of this time, that is inculpated to have planed a great european war.

Besides what on earth is terrible for a Nation/State to have a successful economy and produce a lot of steel the main engine of a successful economy at the beginning of the 20th century?

A BIG concern of the Americans was Germany's economic base-especially its steel production.

When I read this statement, what is the concern?
Is this the same concern of your current President, who is very annoyed that the Germans have a much better trade surplus to the USA then the other way round and therefore the much better economic base to produce products that are selling very well on the world market?

[South]

Good afternoon Don,

Re preface: Danke.

I had mentioned there are a few / several different "camps" or "schools of thought" among historians dealing with this era.

I belong to the historians' camp that treats Germany as just one of the several Great Powers - all the domestic political problems, all the problems of foreign affairs, all the economic problems both domestic and throughout the world.

Now, some historians do single out Germany as an instigator. A major reason for this camp to be around was the large and powerful German military establishment with a presence at the apex of the German government. This "camp" of historians looks at the Franco-Prussian War and links all this together. Again; I am not in this camp.

A successful national economy can be a threat to the economy of another nation-state. For focus purposes, think of the later petroleum conflicts. Benevolence is not involved. Wealth acquisition and wealth transfers are.

Re American steel industrialists - and their financiers - and their "concerns" re German steel production and the German steel industry outproducing Britain's; to save some time:
- Andrew Carnegie
- John D. Rockefeller
- Cornelius Vanderbilt
- J.P. Morgan

The last question is verbotten. Current political matters and events are off limits. I will squeeze in here that you're on the right track if you glance at Versailles and the Bank of International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland. BIS was involved with the reparations processing.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[glenn239]

So, you want to fixate on the word "we" from the sentence: "I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone." "We" could refer to the Cabinet, the Government or the country as a whole. It is mere speculation as to what Grey meant. However, what is not open for speculation is the preceeding words: "I did not think ...". Clearly, he is replying for himself on what he thinks others (Cabinet/Govt/country) may accept or reject.

No, he's stating that "we", meaning cabinet, would not be able to make neutrality on the basis of Belgium,

"If the German government had replied...with a promise to respect....Belgium...and...whether on this condition we would remain neutral there presumably would have been discussion on this new feature in the Cabinet. The discussion might have been a counterpart...<to>...giving a pledge to help France. In this case the group that thought we should stand by France would presumably have opposed given any pledge of neutrality to Germany."

Grey, Twenty Five Years.

.... if Germany did not violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral[/i] - but a huge change in the meaning. In otherwords, Britain is being asked to remain neutral on the provision of a promise. A promise that could be broken. But Britain would still be required to remain neutral because that neutrality was based on the provision of the promise not the promise being upheld. Of course the Cabinet would dismiss it!

As above. The barrier for Grey was not Germany making the offer, it was the fact that the Cabinet would be brought down and the Liberal government ended before such a pledge was ever given. When Grey said, "the group that thought we should stand by France", he meant himself and Asquith, which meant that it was impossible for "we", meaning Cabinet, to make neutrality on the basis of Belgium.

To remain 'no war' compliant, Germany had to avoid entering Belgium - not just make promises.
For Belgium to remain neutral, Germany had to stick to the 1839 Treaty - not make a new promise.

"no war" compliant is something you've imagined, so has no bearing on the actual outbreak of the war. For Belgium to remain neutral three things had to happen. First, as you rightly point out, that Germany does not invade. Second, (this you overlooked) that France and Britain do not violate its neutrality. Third, that Belgium does not take one side or another.

Remember, Moltke's trick was to invent a pretext for invading Belgium.

Moltke was hell bent on invading Belgium whether a pretext offered itself or not.

Whilst it is unlikely that Lichnowsky was aware of Moltke's specific scheme, I think it reasonable to assume he was up to speed on the Moltke's intent of taking the Germany army through Belgium and was just clutching at straws.

Lichnowsky was probably aware in general on the German plan of march and seeking a diplomatic basis to cancel it. He needed first off, Grey to come on board, but Grey couldn't play ball for the reason Grey himself stated in Twenty Five Years - he would have brought down the government before agreeing to any pledge of neutrality to Germany for any reason.

It was quite right for Grey - under ALL possible scenarios - to reject Lichnowsky's off the cuff proposal.

No. Since Moltke was hell bent on invading Belgium, if Grey had accepted, then Berlin presumably refuses the offer and the British have an iron lock on Germany's absolute responsibility for the war with nothing lost, because Britain's neutrality was guaranteed had Germany not invaded Belgium. So why didn't Grey accept? Because Grey feared the exact opposite, that Lichnowsky could overturn Moltke and get the German agreement, at which point Grey has to go to cabinet, and by his own account, either break up the Liberal government, or go back on his own agreement.

[glenn239]

I think its a bit a con game... Everyone knew what was doing Germany... : trying to dominate Europe. That's why Russia intervened, that's why France intervened and that's why GB intervened.

I agree, it was about the future of Europe. Germany was trying to break the Triple Entente, the Triple Entente was ready to fight rather than see itself be weakened. Everything else was secondary.

[glenn239]

That rather bad trait....<snip>

Hold the phone sunshine. As per my reply to Jon, I didn't think he was at all correct to state there was any doubt but that Grey would have resigned if any other policy but British entry into the war in support of France. I needed to double-check before responding. Double check means consulting books I don't have at my fingertips. I have now double checked. My recollection is correct, Grey would have resigned in any scenario where France was at war and Britain was not. Runciman's account of Cabinet on the 2nd (Politicians at War, 93),

Grey says that to niggle is not worthwhile. If the Channel is closed against Germany it is in favor of France and we cannot take half measures - either we must declare ourselves neutral, or in it. If we are to be neutral, he will go....He therefore asks for a sharp decision."

That's what Grey said at the time. In Twenty Five Years,

That, if war came, the interests of Britain required that we should not stand aside, while France fought alone in the West, but must support her. I knew it to be very doubtful whether Cabinet, Parliament, and the country would take this view on the outbreak of war, and through the whole of this week I had in view the probable contingency that we should not decide at the critical moment to support France. In that event I should have to resign; but the decision the country could not be forced, and the contingency might not arise, and meanwhile, I must go on."

Grey, Vol II, 158

The reason was any policy that was in any form neutral was a disgrace to Britain that Grey would have nothing to do with,

I had contemplated resignation if war came and we declined to stand by France, and I had therefore thought nothing as to making conditions for our neutrality....If this was dishouring and impossible to accept the price on conditions here offered, what other price or condition could they require in British interests that were not dishonouring to Britain? The answer is clear - there were none. If it were decided to remain neutral we must...remain neutral without conditions.

All Britain had to do was decide whether they were going to join in, on whose side and when.

So much for your 'no war' fantasy. I take it we can bury it out back with the cat without further ceremony? Because Grey is clear he had already decided that the "who" was France and the "when" was shortly after France entered the war.

[Terry Duncan]

Very good summary South,

but what I can't see is, that Germany did something "special", they did the same things that all Great Powers at this time have done, but Germany is the only Great power of this time, that is inculpated to have planed a great european war.

Besides what on earth is terrible for a Nation/State to have a successful economy and produce a lot of steel the main engine of a successful economy at the beginning of the 20th century?

What Germany did was to make her challenge to British sea power very public and sustained! German ships were a few hours from the Thames Estuary and London, and the most powerful army in Europe was also German. Gray, Haldane, Lloyd-George all said much the same thing about the German challenge; if Germany were to gain naval superiority in the North Sea, even for a short time, she could invade with her armies and effectively dictate things to Britain, whereas no matter how superior the British fleet was to the German fleet, it would bring the British army no closer to Berlin.

Germany did nothing special other than that, and it was hardly unique for Britain to stand opposed the nations most likely to be able to make itself a continental hegemon or threaten British interests in trade. Spain, The Netherlands, and France had all found themselves in a similar position, France as recently as the time of the Franco-Russian war.

As to the nonsense about planning a European war, such things are propagated by people with little knowledge and who have swallowed the 'the allied forces fought for freedom in two world wars' that the press like to trot out to make the public feel good. This particular myth doesn't seem to be centered in Britain it is in the US that it appears to have gained most traction (maybe starting there). It is ironic that for all the planning that did take place, the war arose from bungled diplomacy and blinkered foreign policy, rather than any military plan or act of malice.

[DavidFrankenberg]

Well, let's agree on this :
France intervened because : if Germany eats Russia, France is easily eaten by Germany.
And GB intervened because : if Germany eats Russia+France, GB is easily eaten by Germany.

Notice what's missing there? Belgium. GB can be eaten for lunch by Germany later, even if Belgium is left alone in the meantime.

I think its a bit a con game... Everyone knew what was doing Germany... : trying to dominate Europe. That's why Russia intervened, that's why France intervened and that's why GB intervened.

Where are the primary sources and documents for this claim.
Please show me one single document of the german governments or german governments authorites before September 1914, where the leading politicans or the leading administration of Empire Germany wanted to dominate Europe or had expansionary goals at Europe. Please show me one single document or primary source?!

May i suggest that we dont need primary sources at this point, but only an analysis.
Why Prussia fought Austria in the XIXth century if not to dominate Germany ? Why Germany fought France in 1870/1 if not to dominate western Europe ?
Why Wilhelm II wanted to get the second biggest navy in the world, if not to challenge the british supremacy ?
Why Wilhelm supported austrian claims against Serbia if not to control the whole Balkans ?
Wilhelm II has consecrated his whole life to prepare his army to a world war impying England on sea, and France and Russia on land. He tought he could do it. He failed. Adolf would try again, and fail again.

I think its a bit a con game... Everyone knew what was doing Germany... : trying to dominate Europe. That's why Russia intervened, that's why France intervened and that's why GB intervened.

I agree, it was about the future of Europe. Germany was trying to break the Triple Entente, the Triple Entente was ready to fight rather than see itself be weakened. Everything else was secondary.

Great. Thank you. I knew we could agree on something.

[MarkN]

So, you want to fixate on the word "we" from the sentence: "I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone." "We" could refer to the Cabinet, the Government or the country as a whole. It is mere speculation as to what Grey meant. However, what is not open for speculation is the preceeding words: "I did not think ...". Clearly, he is replying for himself on what he thinks others (Cabinet/Govt/country) may accept or reject.

No, he's stating that "we", meaning cabinet, would not be able to make neutrality on the basis of Belgium,
"If the German government had replied...with a promise to respect....Belgium...and...whether on this condition we would remain neutral there presumably would have been discussion on this new feature in the Cabinet. The discussion might have been a counterpart...<to>...giving a pledge to help France. In this case the group that thought we should stand by France would presumably have opposed given any pledge of neutrality to Germany."
Grey, Twenty Five Years.

.... if Germany did not violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral[/i] - but a huge change in the meaning. In otherwords, Britain is being asked to remain neutral on the provision of a promise. A promise that could be broken. But Britain would still be required to remain neutral because that neutrality was based on the provision of the promise not the promise being upheld. Of course the Cabinet would dismiss it!

As above. The barrier for Grey was not Germany making the offer, it was the fact that the Cabinet would be brought down and the Liberal government ended before such a pledge was ever given. When Grey said, "the group that thought we should stand by France", he meant himself and Asquith, which meant that it was impossible for "we", meaning Cabinet, to make neutrality on the basis of Belgium.

To remain 'no war' compliant, Germany had to avoid entering Belgium - not just make promises.
For Belgium to remain neutral, Germany had to stick to the 1839 Treaty - not make a new promise.

"no war" compliant is something you've imagined, so has no bearing on the actual outbreak of the war. For Belgium to remain neutral three things had to happen. First, as you rightly point out, that Germany does not invade. Second, (this you overlooked) that France and Britain do not violate its neutrality. Third, that Belgium does not take one side or another.

Remember, Moltke's trick was to invent a pretext for invading Belgium.

Moltke was hell bent on invading Belgium whether a pretext offered itself or not.

Whilst it is unlikely that Lichnowsky was aware of Moltke's specific scheme, I think it reasonable to assume he was up to speed on the Moltke's intent of taking the Germany army through Belgium and was just clutching at straws.

Lichnowsky was probably aware in general on the German plan of march and seeking a diplomatic basis to cancel it. He needed first off, Grey to come on board, but Grey couldn't play ball for the reason Grey himself stated in Twenty Five Years - he would have brought down the government before agreeing to any pledge of neutrality to Germany for any reason.

It was quite right for Grey - under ALL possible scenarios - to reject Lichnowsky's off the cuff proposal.

No. Since Moltke was hell bent on invading Belgium, if Grey had accepted, then Berlin presumably refuses the offer and the British have an iron lock on Germany's absolute responsibility for the war with nothing lost, because Britain's neutrality was guaranteed had Germany not invaded Belgium. So why didn't Grey accept? Because Grey feared the exact opposite, that Lichnowsky could overturn Moltke and get the German agreement, at which point Grey has to go to cabinet, and by his own account, either break up the Liberal government, or go back on his own agreement.

The reasoning is so poor here that it doesn't warrant a serious response.
1) Grey's answer to Lichnowsky began, "I do not think that ...". It was his answer not the Cabinet's however much you obsess over the word "we".
2) Your cherry-pick from 25 Years (carefully eliminating the unhelpful - to your theory - words) was in relation to the formal British note to Germany regarding Belgium's neutrality which they responded to poorly. It was not in relation to the Lichnowsky's off the bat offer. Two different offers/proposals with completely different implications and consequences. Your conflation of the two is a product of your inability to handle the complex mental gymnastics you are forced into.

If the German Government had replied to our question with a promise to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that France also respected it, and if they had asked whether on this condition we would remain neutral, there would presumably have been discussion on this new feature in the Cabinet.

3) 'No war' as in 'Britain not at war' was the determined ambition of a majority of the Cabinet up to, and including the 2 August. Not my imagination. Historical fact as recorded at the time and evidenced throughout the issue and decision-making.
4) Your fluff is no substitute for historical evidence. Your fluff, deflection and deliberate misdirection do nothing to lend credibility to your arguments or theories.

That rather bad trait....<snip>

Hold the phone sunshine. As per my reply to Jon, I didn't think he was at all correct to state there was any doubt but that Grey would have resigned if any other policy but British entry into the war in support of France. I needed to double-check before responding. Double check means consulting books I don't have at my fingertips. I have now double checked. My recollection is correct, Grey would have resigned in any scenario where France was at war and Britain was not. Runciman's account of Cabinet on the 2nd (Politicians at War, 93),
Grey says that to niggle is not worthwhile. If the Channel is closed against Germany it is in favor of France and we cannot take half measures - either we must declare ourselves neutral, or in it. If we are to be neutral, he will go....He therefore asks for a sharp decision."

That's what Grey said at the time. In Twenty Five Years,
That, if war came, the interests of Britain required that we should not stand aside, while France fought alone in the West, but must support her. I knew it to be very doubtful whether Cabinet, Parliament, and the country would take this view on the outbreak of war, and through the whole of this week I had in view the probable contingency that we should not decide at the critical moment to support France. In that event I should have to resign; but the decision the country could not be forced, and the contingency might not arise, and meanwhile, I must go on."

Grey, Vol II, 158
The reason was any policy that was in any form neutral was a disgrace to Britain that Grey would have nothing to do with,
I had contemplated resignation if war came and we declined to stand by France, and I had therefore thought nothing as to making conditions for our neutrality....If this was dishouring and impossible to accept the price on conditions here offered, what other price or condition could they require in British interests that were not dishonouring to Britain? The answer is clear - there were none. If it were decided to remain neutral we must...remain neutral without conditions.

All Britain had to do was decide whether they were going to join in, on whose side and when.

So much for your 'no war' fantasy. I take it we can bury it out back with the cat without further ceremony? Because Grey is clear he had already decided that the "who" was France and the "when" was shortly after France entered the war.

More of the same.
5) Grey did not get the 'all in for France' you claim he was after - and yet he didn't resign. Why? Coz he got what he wanted - the Cabinet stuck by the agreement that it had helped draft just 2 years earlier.
6) It is clear that, at some point which cannot be precisely stated, Grey recognised war was inevitable. I suggest late on 29 July. And having come to that understanding, it was obvious that Britain would/should fight on France's side rather than Germany's or find a third way. But, as you quote, it was to stand by France NOT stand by the Triple Entente. Again, the mental gymnastics prove to complex for you to handle.

[MarkN]

What Germany did was to make her challenge to British sea power very public and sustained! German ships were a few hours from the Thames Estuary and London, and the most powerful army in Europe was also German. Gray, Haldane, Lloyd-George all said much the same thing about the German challenge; if Germany were to gain naval superiority in the North Sea, even for a short time, she could invade with her armies and effectively dictate things to Britain, whereas no matter how superior the British fleet was to the German fleet, it would bring the British army no closer to Berlin.

The 'strength' of the Germany army was overstated at the time - by some deliberately, by others through ignorance.

After the event, and as you rightly posted near the beginning of this thread, the Germany army of 1914 was not the one which swept through France in 1940. Far too many people seem to conflate the two and give far too much deferrence to the German army. They had eight armies of which seven attacked France - AND FAILED! They didn't fail because Moltke didn't stick to the Schlieffen Plan - that would have failed too. They didn't fail because Britain got 5 divisions into the line south of Mons. The German army failed because the success of Moltke's plan was predicated on the French doing what he needed them to do - but they didn't.

Just 2 days ago I posted 2 quotes from Grey that indicate that, at the time, he didn't believe the German's would succeed in defeating France. I am quite sure he was not a lone wolf in this foresight.

British decision-making was NOT based upon the fear of Germany winning.

[Max Payload]

the war arose from bungled diplomacy and blinkered foreign policy, rather than any military plan or act of malice.

A German military plan predicated on 'mobilisation means war' and a 'kurz und vives' philosophy was a contributory factor to the inability of diplomacy to prevent events from tipping over into war so quickly. And could not the duplicity of Austro-Hungarian and German diplomacy through much of July be considered one long act of malice?

[Terry Duncan]

the war arose from bungled diplomacy and blinkered foreign policy, rather than any military plan or act of malice.

A German military plan predicated on 'mobilisation means war' and a 'kurz und vives' philosophy was a contributory factor to the inability of diplomacy to prevent events from tipping over into war so quickly. And could not the duplicity of Austro-Hungarian and German diplomacy through much of July be considered one long act of malice?

The German military plan was certainly a factor in the war starting when it did, but not in the failure of diplomacy itself. Austria was refusing to negotiate even when asked to by Germany and was set on going to war on 12th August, whilst Russia began its mobilization with the intent to go to war with Austria when the latter invaded Serbia. Diplomacy had failed by 29th July.

The duplicity of certain people in both Austria and Germany was aimed at starting a localized war, not a general war, and even then their acts were less official national policy than one of a personal determination to force through a failed policy. Bethmann and Jagow should have followed the orders of the Kaiser from 28th July, or even better acted late on 27th, but were determined to see their failed policy through against explicit instructions for Halt in Belgrade, and even when 'following instructions', totally altered the proposal the Kaiser had issued. In the end, they got the 'war for the greater glory of Berchtold' as Lichnowsky had warned!

The policy was stupid and lacked almost any realistic understanding of the international reality in 1914, it was one of reckless brinksmanship in pushing through the 'localized war' idea even when the idea was obviously failing badly, but there was no malicious intent to start the general war so long feared.

[ljadw]

I see people talking about the Kaiser as a man of peace : a man of peace who told Bülow in december 1905 : before we start our war abroad (against France ), we must first eliminate the socialists .

I see people talking about BH as a man of peace:the same BH of whom Admiral von Müller wrote in his diary on August 1 : Die Regierung hat eine glückliche Hand gehabt,uns als die Angegriffenen hinzustellen .

Translation : the government has succeeded to present us to the German people as those who are attacked .(Meaning : we are the aggressors ) .


I see that people are saying that Germany wanted a localised war,meaning that Germany wanted to localise the Austrian war against Serbia: if so, how to explain that at the moment there was a localised war between Austria and Serbia ,which had all chances to remain localised, if Germany was not meddling, Germany transformed this localised war in a general war by attacking Russia and France ?

The logical explanation is that Germany wanted NOT a localised war, but a general war ,because a localised war would have no benefit for Germany .


I see people claiming that the war happened because German diplomacy was stupid , but as we know that already in december 1905 Wilhelm and Bülow wanted a general war, and that they had him finally in august 1914, should the conclusion not be that German diplomacy was not stupid but succesful ?

[Terry Duncan]

I see people talking about the Kaiser as a man of peace : a man of peace who told Bülow in december 1905 : before we start our war abroad (against France ), we must first eliminate the socialists .

So tell us how many Socialists he Kaiser had arrested in 1905 or even in 1914 if you wish to keep advancing this?

I see people talking about BH as a man of peace:the same BH of whom Admiral von Müller wrote in his diary on August 1 : Die Regierung hat eine glückliche Hand gehabt,uns als die Angegriffenen hinzustellen .

Translation : the government has succeeded to present us to the German people as those who are attacked .(Meaning : we are the aggressors ) .

Please cite an example of somebody making this claim here? If not are you simply tilting at windmills as a new hobby?

I see that people are saying that Germany wanted a localised war,meaning that Germany wanted to localise the Austrian war against Serbia: if so, how to explain that at the moment there was a localised war between Austria and Serbia ,which had all chances to remain localised, if Germany was not meddling, Germany transformed this localised war in a general war by attacking Russia and France ?

The records from all concerned indicate German policy was for a localised war as a preference. If you have anything predating all Russian mobilisation that suggests Germany was trying to start a general war please cite it here.

The logical explanation is that Germany wanted NOT a localised war, but a general war ,because a localised war would have no benefit for Germany .

So you will be having no problem in supplying quite a few relevant quotes from documents to show you at least not just relying on opinion alone.

I see people claiming that the war happened because German diplomacy was stupid , but as we know that already in december 1905 Wilhelm and Bülow wanted a general war, and that they had him finally in august 1914, should the conclusion not be that German diplomacy was not stupid but succesful ?

If they wanted a general war in 1905 then why did they not press the Moroccan Crisis to enable a war, you are the one who likes to make much of the fake attacks documented in the DoW in 1914, why could not a similar falsified claim of being attacked have worked in 1905 or 1906? I await your mental gymnatics on this subject.

[Don71]

@ Terry Duncan

From a rational military and political viewpoint, the years 1905 to 1907 would have been the best choice for Germany to start a preventive war against France, if Germany had ever planed or wanted a preventive war. to dominate France and Europe.
Russia lost it's war to Japan and would be not able to ntervene or take part at a "big" war at this timeline and the british army was at reorganisation after the Boer wars.
So France would be more or less on its own against Germany and KuK.
But there is not a single hint at the archives that the Germans ever thought about such a war.