Why didn't Britain stay neutral?

[Terry Duncan]

Hello Terry Duncan,

I found the following in Albertini's 'The Origins Of The War Of 1914 Vol III' (p415/416) on the subject of how Belgian neutrality was viewed at times prior to WWI;

Thank you for taking, what looks like, a large amount of time and effort typing all that up. I hope you don't mind if I continue to cut&paste digitally...

From the above, I sense a definite and consistent strand through the years in what became British official understanding, thought and policy. That's not to say there were not digressions by some and at various times. In 1870, for example, whilst the legal opinion stated an obligation existed, Gladstone seemed to be in two minds about it - but accepted the legal advice albeit with the reservation that it needed new treaties to convince others of Britain's position.

That strand seems to have two components: Britain acted on the assumption that the 1839 Treaty bound it to act to preserve/defend/make good Belgium's neutrality; and, in its diplomatic efforts recognised that the other 4 Powers didn't feel similarly bound. Which may seem a bit strange. Why feel obliged oneself and yet accept others are not when you all signed the same document? I can only presume that 'honour' dictated policy and diplomacy. Honour, of course, was very prominent in Grey.

Well I started off looking to see what had been said but in the end it seemed better to just try to find all the quotes on the subject and let readers decide how confused people were. I think the key part is the comment where someone said Britain would be compelled to act if she had an ally.

There is a quote (from Bismarck's time iirc) where it is said emphatically that Germany would never violate Belgian neutrality as they recognize this would be in breach of their treaty obligations. The continental powers have a slightly more pragmatic stance in that they were all willing to consider violating Belgium as long as someone else did do first, and that there were other important considerations such as potential allies viewpoints on the matter. The major difference is that the only power who benefits at having the Low Countries as perpetually neutral states was Britain, whilst France and Germany only benefit in that the other does not control them. Britain was the only power that could be relied upon to make re-establishing a neutral Belgium, Germany made it clear in WWI that Belgium would become a puppet state if they should win, whilst there is little reason to suspect France would not have acted in a similar manner if she had not been trying to keep inside of British sensibilities, and especially if Belgium had not opposed the German invasion.

[Felix C]

deleted text

[MarkN]

Napoleon had kept a rather large number of ships stations on the Scheldt, so it is incorrect to say the area never hosted a hostile fleet that posed a threat. Antwerp was a very large port, it had good facilites for maintaining warships, so it was a potential threat for it to be in the hands of a hostile power with a large fleet.

You are quite right.

I wrote my previous comment in the context of our discussion. Perhaps I should have been pedantic and written: History shows that Antwerp during WW1 never became the source of a naval threat to the Britiah mainland or serve as a launchpad for invasion.

However, your timely response offers nothing to help the understanding of whether British establishment circa 1914 viewed German occupation of Antwerp as a genuine threat or not and, if so, what they planned to to about it - if anything. It would be wrong to assume that since the French having a fleet thereabouts a good while earlier is evidence that the British feared the Germans would/could use Antwerp in WW1 and that fear was enough for Britain to join WW1 from the offset rather than to, for example, wait-and-see.

On the otherhand, it does remind us that the concept of a major foreign power in charge of continental Channel ports was hardly a new thing to British thought. Britain had lived with just such a security paradigm virtually its entire history. How many forts, the ruins thereof, can still be found around the south/south-east coast, up the Thames, the Medway and elsewhere. Anti Napolean, anti-Dutch, anti-Spanish - the list goes on.

[MarkN]

I think the key part is the comment where someone said Britain would be compelled to act if she had an ally.

That, I believe, flows from Crowe's 1908 memorandum. The text showing belief of a guarantee to act irrespective - even in the instance of ALL the other signatories deciding Belgiums neutrality was no longer necessary - but the concluding advice being "Great Britain is liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever either Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers are in need of, and demand, assistance in opposing its violation."

There is a quote (from Bismarck's time iirc) where it is said emphatically that Germany would never violate Belgian neutrality as they recognize this would be in breach of their treaty obligations.

The can be no doubt that all of the 5 Powers understood their obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium. In otherwords, they each understood that they would not be the ones who marched into Belgium univited in breach of the 1939 Treaty - then broken by Germany in 1914.

Bismark's words - and those of several others down the years - are all consistent with this understanding.

That understanding is quite different to the understanding of an obligation to act upon, and "make good" anybody else breaking their promise.

The continental powers have a slightly more pragmatic stance in that they were all willing to consider violating Belgium as long as someone else did do first, and that there were other important considerations such as potential allies viewpoints on the matter.

Indeed. But the notion of not being the first to violate Belgium territory is a bit of a diplomatic mumbo-jumbo.

The major difference is that the only power who benefits at having the Low Countries as perpetually neutral states was Britain, whilst France and Germany only benefit in that the other does not control them.

I don't follow your thinking at all. It seems patently obvious to me that France and Germany had infinitely more to benefit from Belgium's neutrality than Britain.

Britain was the only power that could be relied upon to make re-establishing a neutral Belgium,...

Indeed. But that is a product or consequence of Britain being the only Power that saw it as an obligation to act. If any of the other four Powers had thought similarly then they could be relied upon in equal measure to Britain. Of course, theory and practice are often not the same thing. For example, Austria's ability to act decisively - irrespective of its political allegiance - had waned to the point of inconsequence by 1914.

Germany made it clear in WWI that Belgium would become a puppet state if they should win, whilst there is little reason to suspect France would not have acted in a similar manner if she had not been trying to keep inside of British sensibilities, and especially if Belgium had not opposed the German invasion.

Maybe. But what became "clear" during WW1 was not the basis of British decision-making prior to WW1.

[ljadw]

German fleet could not be stationed there. In 1914 that would have been the threat.

Ger. did occupy Antwerp in 1914 and never sent/stationed a heavy warship there.

This is hindsight .

If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

For Antwero to be a threat, it was not necessary for the HSF to be stationed there .

[MarkN]

German fleet could not be stationed there. In 1914 that would have been the threat.

Ger. did occupy Antwerp in 1914 and never sent/stationed a heavy warship there.

This is hindsight .

If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

For Antwero to be a threat, it was not necessary for the HSF to be stationed there .

This is hindsight !!!!

... and 2017 WHAT IF wargaming by ljadw :roll:

What was the thinking of Grey and Asquith in July/August 1914?
What was the thinking of the Liberal Cabinet in July/August 1914?

ljadw's thinking in 2017 does not help anybody understand why Britain chose war in August 1914.

[Felix C]

German fleet could not be stationed there. In 1914 that would have been the threat.

Ger. did occupy Antwerp in 1914 and never sent/stationed a heavy warship there.

This is hindsight .

If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

For Antwero to be a threat, it was not necessary for the HSF to be stationed there .

I think some of you guys are blinded by Antwerp just like the Brits were in 1914 and earlier. Big difference between a civilian harbor in an occupied country with a waterway flanked by a neutral country and a purpose built naval harbour(s) in secure waters in the homeland where security(and security of movements) is much facilitated plus the ability to move from one theater of operations to the other via the Kiel Kanal.

As for Ger. occupying the whole coast etc. that was not known at the time or even that Ger. might be successful in defeating France. That is hindsight.


If the Brits actually entered the war to stop Ger. dominance of the west european coast that is one item and a good one. To say they entered the war due to concerns about Antwerp being Ger. occupied is the problem here.

As for what someone said that " that is what the fellows back then thought" well WW1 is replete with poor reasoning and decision making by both diplomats and military leaders. No reason to follow in their poor example.

Fleets need to exercise at sea- gunnery, navigation, tactics. Just like in 1814 as in 1914. HSF frequently detached ships and squadrons for training and operation in the Baltic. HSF required a great deal of support in the form of both sea and shore based units. Already stretched in the Baltic.

The best occupied Antwerp would have been is as a refuge point in case a sortie towards the SE Coast or Channel was met defeated and the fleet or damaged ships could not make the Bight.

Antwerp was a major warship building and servicing center in the Nappy era. Not so in the years leading up to 1914. That was the issue with Antwerp in 1814 vs. 1914. Nada, zip, nothing.

Cripes, not to mention the Scheldt waterway was under observation from the neutral side to report comings and goings of any ships. So much for operational security. Well that is hindsight.-maybe. The Bight had Helgoland as an outpost and was much easier to protect and patrol and obstruct British observation and there were several German naval harbours to choose from and of course, you folks are ignoring the Kiel Canal and the Baltic.

[Terry Duncan]

Napoleon had kept a rather large number of ships stations on the Scheldt, so it is incorrect to say the area never hosted a hostile fleet that posed a threat. Antwerp was a very large port, it had good facilites for maintaining warships, so it was a potential threat for it to be in the hands of a hostile power with a large fleet.

You are quite right.

I wrote my previous comment in the context of our discussion. Perhaps I should have been pedantic and written: History shows that Antwerp during WW1 never became the source of a naval threat to the Britiah mainland or serve as a launchpad for invasion.

However, your timely response offers nothing to help the understanding of whether British establishment circa 1914 viewed German occupation of Antwerp as a genuine threat or not and, if so, what they planned to to about it - if anything. It would be wrong to assume that since the French having a fleet thereabouts a good while earlier is evidence that the British feared the Germans would/could use Antwerp in WW1 and that fear was enough for Britain to join WW1 from the offset rather than to, for example, wait-and-see.

On the otherhand, it does remind us that the concept of a major foreign power in charge of continental Channel ports was hardly a new thing to British thought. Britain had lived with just such a security paradigm virtually its entire history. How many forts, the ruins thereof, can still be found around the south/south-east coast, up the Thames, the Medway and elsewhere. Anti Napolean, anti-Dutch, anti-Spanish - the list goes on.

My point was that Britain had always viewed the Sheldt area as sensitive to British security, in 1914 they made sure to sush badly needed troops to Antwerp when they heard the Begian government was about to abandon it, so it was clearly something they were willing to invest vital assets towards defending. I think you will find policy on this was very much a product of the past as Antwerp is behind Dutch waters, so technically illegal for any warships to enter in 1914, the mouth of the Scheldt being Dutch territory, so a hostile power will be opposed by Britain if it looks likely to control the area. Often official policy on these matters is an attachment to events in the past, coupled with a few brief conversations along the lines of 'I dont think we can allow that' type comments, then orders issued to react at decided. Remember in 1914 one of the most critical decisions to be taken was to send the British fleet to its war station, and when approached on the matter 'Asquith grunted' which was taken as approval by Churchill, who then sent out the order. Outside of somewhat untrustworthy memoirs it is almost impossible to know what happened or why, all you can do is to look at events that followed.

[South]

Good morning Felix,

Well received your reply.

I knew you considered Antwerp something different that perhaps Matadi, Belguim Congo.

Appreciate you "fleshing out" your views.

~ Bob
eastern Virginia

[ljadw]

German fleet could not be stationed there. In 1914 that would have been the threat.

Ger. did occupy Antwerp in 1914 and never sent/stationed a heavy warship there.

This is hindsight .

If Britain did nothing and France was defeated, Germany would occupy the Atlantic/Channel coast from the Pyrenees to Denmark (the Netherlands would be a German satellite .)

For Antwero to be a threat, it was not necessary for the HSF to be stationed there .

I think some of you guys are blinded by Antwerp just like the Brits were in 1914 and earlier. Big difference between a civilian harbor in an occupied country with a waterway flanked by a neutral country and a purpose built naval harbour(s) in secure waters in the homeland where security(and security of movements) is much facilitated plus the ability to move from one theater of operations to the other via the Kiel Kanal.

As for Ger. occupying the whole coast etc. that was not known at the time or even that Ger. might be successful in defeating France. That is hindsight.


If the Brits actually entered the war to stop Ger. dominance of the west european coast that is one item and a good one. To say they entered the war due to concerns about Antwerp being Ger. occupied is the problem here.

As for what someone said that " that is what the fellows back then thought" well WW1 is replete with poor reasoning and decision making by both diplomats and military leaders. No reason to follow in their poor example.

Fleets need to exercise at sea- gunnery, navigation, tactics. Just like in 1814 as in 1914. HSF frequently detached ships and squadrons for training and operation in the Baltic. HSF required a great deal of support in the form of both sea and shore based units. Already stretched in the Baltic.

The best occupied Antwerp would have been is as a refuge point in case a sortie towards the SE Coast or Channel was met defeated and the fleet or damaged ships could not make the Bight.

Antwerp was a major warship building and servicing center in the Nappy era. Not so in the years leading up to 1914. That was the issue with Antwerp in 1814 vs. 1914. Nada, zip, nothing.

Cripes, not to mention the Scheldt waterway was under observation from the neutral side to report comings and goings of any ships. So much for operational security. Well that is hindsight.-maybe. The Bight had Helgoland as an outpost and was much easier to protect and patrol and obstruct British observation and there were several German naval harbours to choose from and of course, you folks are ignoring the Kiel Canal and the Baltic.

This is not relevant : the debated point is not if Antwerp would be a good base for the HSF, but that for London, the occupation of Antwerp was considered as a casus belli .

I don't see why the Baltic is mentioned, unless someone could tell me why the Baltic would be a casus belli for Britain .

[ljadw]

If Antwerp was not important for Britain, why was the Naval Brigade sent to Antwerp ?

[South]

Good morning Mark,

I believe it was me who introduced here the terminology / semantics problem.

My key example mentioned the diplomatic usage versus the British common law jurisprudence.

Residential mortgage defaults don't fit into the scheme of communication as per our thread discussions - at least from my inferences. It's better to look at ship mortgages, maritime liens, hull insurance.

The word "lying" is volatile. It's a common-enough rhetorical technique used by leaderships but not for here.

When decision-makers discuss going to war what does not get discussed ?!

A nation-state can live with an existential threat next to or near it. The thread is factored into just about everything. Note that insurance policies deal with "war, acts of war, both declared and undeclared" and variations on this.

Grey's speech of ~ 3 August is a component on a tile of public political views. The tile itself is a component of the mosaic. It wasn't only the UK "concerned" about the rise of Germany. Isolationist USA contributed to components of the tile(s) in the mosaic. For example the US Naval Militia was strengthened in 1914 and helped set the domestic US political environment for the 3 March 15 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Grey's policy position must be viewed within the total picture.

Yes, back to terminology;

A start: "Harbor" and "Port" have various meanings - especially in British English versus American English - and their definitions and implications.

By "field", I meant - NOT your specific illustration of an embarkation constituting a "policy" or "military strategy" - ....... I meant to set out; to deploy. For example: "England's first expeditionary force landed at Ostend, Calais and Dunkirk". I believe - my inference - is you're commingling military strategy with military tactics. This is common enough on military websites because, here too, there are different definitions to "strategy" and "tactics".

I cannot recall my saying that the UK's principle concern were the Channel ports.

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[MarkN]

My point was that Britain had always viewed the Sheldt area as sensitive to British security, in 1914 they made sure to sush badly needed troops to Antwerp when they heard the Begian government was about to abandon it, so it was clearly something they were willing to invest vital assets towards defending.

If so inclinded, one could make an argument that just about every single port in the world was "sensitive to British security" given its maritime strategy and status as the preeminent trading Power.

I think you will find policy on this was very much a product of the past as Antwerp is behind Dutch waters, so technically illegal for any warships to enter in 1914, the mouth of the Scheldt being Dutch territory, so a hostile power will be opposed by Britain if it looks likely to control the area. Often official policy on these matters is an attachment to events in the past, coupled with a few brief conversations along the lines of 'I dont think we can allow that' type comments, then orders issued to react at decided. Remember in 1914 one of the most critical decisions to be taken was to send the British fleet to its war station, and when approached on the matter 'Asquith grunted' which was taken as approval by Churchill, who then sent out the order. Outside of somewhat untrustworthy memoirs it is almost impossible to know what happened or why, all you can do is to look at events that followed.

I see little, if anything, in the immediate lead up to the declaration of war that suggests Antwerp was on the radar as posing a threat to Britain. At best, the 'fear' in London was that if it fell into German hands, or Belgium sided with Germany it could become a major point for goods to be landed for onward transit to Germany.

And looking to the events suggest that Antwerp was not on their radar. Remember, what issues and decisions they fell upon once the war had started are hardly relevent to decision-making to go to war.

[MarkN]

This is not relevant : the debated point is not if Antwerp would be a good base for the HSF, but that for London, the occupation of Antwerp was considered as a casus belli .

"the occupation of Antwerp was considered as a casus belli" ???

Have you just made that up????

[MarkN]

If Antwerp was not important for Britain, why was the Naval Brigade sent to Antwerp ?

If Antwerp was so important to Britain, why didn't they send anybody in August? :roll: