Germany and the War Guilt Clause

[The Ibis]

Self-determination as a theory was already very influential to nationalists. The idea continued to spread as more heard the message and saw that it was possibly achievable.

This was one of the problems in the run-up to WWII, places that had self-determined were not always sustainable as soon as a larger neighbour decided it needed annexing. That said, if there had been a will to enforce the terms of Versailles fully, a second war would have been avoided, at least in the form it took. Self-determination is a fine principle, but as to if it could have been implimented better post-WWI is another matter.

Yup. Too many stakeholders for it ever to have been a smooth process.

[South]

Good afternoon Ibis,

No; data is not a prime ingredient. The correct interruption is what's important.

For example, there is much data on the US being absent from the League. The US later sent "official observers" for non-political matters. We have a better vantage point than the US observers. We know what happened.

Stifle: to suppress, repress, hold back. That's the definition I used. Recall my example of Japan obtaining the German colony of Tsingtao. Don't recall Wilson's approval of this. Did China join the League ?

When you write something - applicable to me and others also - readers are allowed.....actually they're required to make the inferences. You did introduce here "provisional governments", "most powerful statement" and etc. Regardless, I know what happened.

The thread did morph. I was a participant by responding to points that I placed in quotes when I addressed them, eg "provisional governments", "most powerful statement".

~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

[The Ibis]

Good afternoon Ibis,

No; data is not a prime ingredient. The correct interruption is what's important.

Hi,
Doesn't the saying go garbage in, garbage out? Without the data, the interpretation can be quite flawed.

For example, there is much data on the US being absent from the League. The US later sent "official observers" for non-political matters. We have a better vantage point than the US observers. We know what happened.

There is a ton of information about US participation in world affairs in the interwar years. Recent reexamination in connection with archival research is leading to many new and interesting works on the subject. Perhaps our understanding isn't as complete as it will be.

Stifle: to suppress, repress, hold back. That's the definition I used. Recall my example of Japan obtaining the German colony of Tsingtao. Don't recall Wilson's approval of this. Did China join the League ?

We're on different sides of a coin here, Bob.

When you write something - applicable to me and others also - readers are allowed.....actually they're required to make the inferences. You did introduce here "provisional governments", "most powerful statement" and etc. Regardless, I know what happened.

I wrote what I wrote and so did you. The comments are on the internet. They will be there forever, to haunt readers now and in the future.

The thread did morph. I was a participant by responding to points that I placed in quotes when I addressed them, eg "provisional governments", "most powerful statement".

In that case, until a moderator tells us different, this is as good a place as any.

[South]

Good afternoon The Ibis,

To minimize us working the semantics route, will just throw in that the data could be garbage. Politics is far from a sterile environment. Lodge was no friend of Wilson.

Concur; Our understanding is still limited.

Time for a Tsingtao cyber beer.

Concur; Even with broad approaches to the thread, as long as we're working the material, this is as good a place as any.

A sidebar: I made a mistake on a point I made. The US initially sent some "unofficial" observers to the League committees if no political matters being dealt with. It was later -1927 - that the US sent OFFICIAL observers to the League committees with the same no-political matters allowed for US participation. (How do you say "semantics" in French ?!)


~ Bob
eastern Virginia

[Latze]

After thinking about ist: why did no one come up with the obvious solution to blame Russia for everything? The czar was gone, the Bolsheviks would shrug it of (and nobody that mattered had diplomatic ties to them that could be strained or broken), it would have been an excellent lever to normalize matters with Germany and Austria in the manner of the Congress of Vienna...

[Terry Duncan]

After thinking about ist: why did no one come up with the obvious solution to blame Russia for everything? The czar was gone, the Bolsheviks would shrug it of (and nobody that mattered had diplomatic ties to them that could be strained or broken), it would have been an excellent lever to normalize matters with Germany and Austria in the manner of the Congress of Vienna...

For many of the same reasons it was not really possible to blame Austria for everything. As you say, the state had effectively ceased to exist as it had been pre-war, and was not likely to pay any reparations other than purely local ones. As the US was unwilling to waive the war debts of other nations, then they were needing to recoup money from where they in turn had lent cash, notably in the case of Britain who did exit the war as a net creditor. The other problem is that if Russia is to blame for everything, then the Entente in general has more guilt/responsibility than the Central Powers, something unlikely the victors were going to say.

[Latze]

After thinking about ist: why did no one come up with the obvious solution to blame Russia for everything? The czar was gone, the Bolsheviks would shrug it of (and nobody that mattered had diplomatic ties to them that could be strained or broken), it would have been an excellent lever to normalize matters with Germany and Austria in the manner of the Congress of Vienna...

For many of the same reasons it was not really possible to blame Austria for everything. As you say, the state had effectively ceased to exist as it had been pre-war, and was not likely to pay any reparations other than purely local ones. As the US was unwilling to waive the war debts of other nations, then they were needing to recoup money from where they in turn had lent cash, notably in the case of Britain who did exit the war as a net creditor. The other problem is that if Russia is to blame for everything, then the Entente in general has more guilt/responsibility than the Central Powers, something unlikely the victors were going to say.

Well, one could have got reparations and harsh terms without any guilt clauses as other peace settlements show. The line would have been: Ok, Russia provoked you but you still invaded France and Belgium - so you have to make good on that but we are open to cooperation if that is settled. But this scenario is probably something for the what-if board.

[MarkN]

After thinking about ist: why did no one come up with the obvious solution to blame Russia for everything?

Whilst it may seem "the obvious solution" to you, it was and is a completely nonsensical proposition.

... it would have been an excellent lever to normalize matters with Germany and Austria in the manner of the Congress of Vienna...

But why would France, Britain and others want to "normalize matters with Germany and Austria"? Germany and Austria-Hungary had deliberately provoked war and been responsible for untold material, economic and human destruction on others' lands. Why would they want to "normalize matters"? They wanted compensation and they wanted 'justice' through acceptance of responsibility/guilt and punishment (reparations).

Well, one could have got reparations and harsh terms without any guilt clauses as other peace settlements show. The line would have been: Ok, Russia provoked you but you still invaded France and Belgium - so you have to make good on that but we are open to cooperation if that is settled. But this scenario is probably something for the what-if board.

What is your problem with the guilt clauses? Germany and Austria-Hungary bear almost complete responsibility (ie guilt) for provoking the war. The war that left large parts of Europe devastated. A war prosecuted, in the main, on lands outside the borders of Germany and Austria-Hungary - which is not a coincidence. The very least Germany and Austria-Hungary should have done was to accept their responsibility/guilt and compensate fully for the damage and suffering they inflicted directly and indirectly.

[Latze]

But why would France, Britain and others want to "normalize matters with Germany and Austria"? Germany and Austria-Hungary had deliberately provoked war and been responsible for untold material, economic and human destruction on others' lands. Why would they want to "normalize matters"? They wanted compensation and they wanted 'justice' through acceptance of responsibility/guilt and punishment (reparations).

To stabilize regime change and prevent a complete Rapallo.

What is your problem with the guilt clauses? Germany and Austria-Hungary bear almost complete responsibility (ie guilt) for provoking the war. The war that left large parts of Europe devastated. A war prosecuted, in the main, on lands outside the borders of Germany and Austria-Hungary - which is not a coincidence. The very least Germany and Austria-Hungary should have done was to accept their responsibility/guilt and compensate fully for the damage and suffering they inflicted directly and indirectly.

Why do you assume I have one?

[MarkN]

But why would France, Britain and others want to "normalize matters with Germany and Austria"? Germany and Austria-Hungary had deliberately provoked war and been responsible for untold material, economic and human destruction on others' lands. Why would they want to "normalize matters"? They wanted compensation and they wanted 'justice' through acceptance of responsibility/guilt and punishment (reparations).

To stabilize regime change and prevent a complete Rapallo.

That thought is based upon the assumption that the Allies were concerned about (a) instability, (b) regime change and (c) had a crystal ball to know what Germany would do 4 years later.

It's just more of your muddled thinking and incoherent logic.

What is your problem with the guilt clauses? Germany and Austria-Hungary bear almost complete responsibility (ie guilt) for provoking the war. The war that left large parts of Europe devastated. A war prosecuted, in the main, on lands outside the borders of Germany and Austria-Hungary - which is not a coincidence. The very least Germany and Austria-Hungary should have done was to accept their responsibility/guilt and compensate fully for the damage and suffering they inflicted directly and indirectly.

Why do you assume I have one?

Because the only constant in your muddled thinking and incoherent logic is your apparent belief that Germany should not have been required to sign up to a guilt clause. That, somehow, by not signing that into the Versailles Treaty, the world would have been a far better place thereafter.

[Latze]

That thought is based upon the assumption that the Allies were concerned about (a) instability, (b) regime change and (c) had a crystal ball to know what Germany would do 4 years later.

They wanted the Kaiser to abdicate, didn't they? And make the world save for democracy? What better way to do that than to establish a stable German republic. As we are dealing in historical speculation anyway crystal balls are fine with me. But even if they aren't: could the Allies with certainty say that a bolshevik revolution was not possible in Germany in early 1919? Please read Rappalo as the concept of Russian-German rapprochement and not as the actual treaty (in Germany this is known as "Rappalo-Komplex").

Because the only constant in your muddled thinking and incoherent logic is your apparent belief that Germany should not have been required to sign up to a guilt clause. That, somehow, by not signing that into the Versailles Treaty, the world would have been a far better place thereafter.

Mark, could you please dial it back a bit? Just suppose that we two are standing in a bar having a beer and I said: ah, you know, if somebody in 1919 had the good sense to blame it on the czar we could have had a NATO like thing in 1919. Funny that nobody thought about it. I guess you would probably say that this is bollocks but maybe in a much nicer way?

[MarkN]

That thought is based upon the assumption that the Allies were concerned about (a) instability, (b) regime change and (c) had a crystal ball to know what Germany would do 4 years later.

They wanted the Kaiser to abdicate, didn't they? And make the world save for democracy? What better way to do that than to establish a stable German republic. As we are dealing in historical speculation anyway crystal balls are fine with me. But even if they aren't: could the Allies with certainty say that a bolshevik revolution was not possible in Germany in early 1919? Please read Rappalo as the concept of Russian-German rapprochement and not as the actual treaty (in Germany this is known as "Rappalo-Komplex").

The Allies wanted many things. The Versailles Treaty was/is a reflection of the things they wanted the most. Given the demand for (or expectation of) the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into numerous small and competing states, stability and certainty in Central Europe was clearly NOT at the top of their agenda. Forcing democracy, a special form of democracy, upon others is a more modern American invention

Because the only constant in your muddled thinking and incoherent logic is your apparent belief that Germany should not have been required to sign up to a guilt clause. That, somehow, by not signing that into the Versailles Treaty, the world would have been a far better place thereafter.

Mark, could you please dial it back a bit? Just suppose that we two are standing in a bar having a beer and I said: ah, you know, if somebody in 1919 had the good sense to blame it on the czar we could have had a NATO like thing in 1919. Funny that nobody thought about it. I guess you would probably say that this is bollocks but maybe in a much nicer way?

Dial what back???

What happens at your imaginary bar will depend entirely upon what flows from your lips. If you decide to start the conversation by dictating what I am supposed to believe is true, and then follow it with the expectation that I have to accept all of the historical assumptions that you have layered into your narrative to produce the result/converation that you want, then I suspect the conversation will be very short as I choose to ignore you. The muddled thinking that you exhibit is a direct consequence of the assumptions you make not fitting historical realities and your forcing them together to produce the conversation you desire.

[Latze]

The Allies wanted many things. The Versailles Treaty was/is a reflection of the things they wanted the most. Given the demand for (or expectation of) the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into numerous small and competing states, stability and certainty in Central Europe was clearly NOT at the top of their agenda. Forcing democracy, a special form of democracy, upon others is a more modern American invention

But I think it is clear that "the Allies" is a term that itself obscures that there was a host of different opinions and interests at play. So yes, possibly the treaty text was the 'best' interpretation of the competing demands. Equally well can be read as just the compromise "the Allies" settled on.See the case of Maynard Keynes as an illustration. The ordering of the post-war political landscape and the various conferences occupied European politicians for a decade didn't it.
Concerning the desire for regime change let me quote Woodrow Wilson from 2nd April 1917:
"Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people."

Dial what back???

The rudeness.

What happens at your imaginary bar will depend entirely upon what flows from your lips. If you decide to start the conversation by dictating what I am supposed to believe is true, and then follow it with the expectation that I have to accept all of the historical assumptions that you have layered into your narrative to produce the result/converation that you want, then I suspect the conversation will be very short as I choose to ignore you. The muddled thinking that you exhibit is a direct consequence of the assumptions you make not fitting historical realities and your forcing them together to produce the conversation you desire.[/quote]

After reading your exchanges with Don71 in the other thread I get the impression that you think that my initial remarks are to be read as a "political" statement re the guilt clause. Please re-read them as an inquiry as to why (what structural forces did shape events) a certain quite plausible path (given the trends visible in finally during the Locarno conference) was not even proposed by someone (like Keynes did). I hope that we can then discuss the matter than in a more amicable tone.

Last thought: Possibly Stephen White's "The origins of detente" could sheed some light on this. Has anybody read it? Would have to get it through interlibrary loan and have a host of competing demands right know. So a pointer if it is useful would be greatly appreciated.

[The Ibis]

Last thought: Possibly Stephen White's "The origins of detente" could sheed some light on this. Has anybody read it? Would have to get it through interlibrary loan and have a host of competing demands right know. So a pointer if it is useful would be greatly appreciated.

Hi Latze,

White's book might be more narrow than what you're looking for. I'd recommend Adam Tooze's "The Deluge." Typical strong effort from Tooze and it has the benefit of covering more ground. Good luck.

[MarkN]

The rudeness.

I am being (brutally) honest. It is not rude to call a spade a spade. Your nonsense is nonsense. If anybody is being 'rude' it is you with your expectation that I have to accept all your nonsense as credible thought and ahistorical twaddle as being preconditions for serious discussion.