The Argonne.

[Plain Old Dave]

Tomorrow is the centennial of the start of the single largest military campaign in American history. Background may be in order.

By the late Summer of 1918, the US involvement in the Great War had already proven essential to halting two Allied collapses:

Spring of 1917; Russia was in chaos, France had mutinied, and England was played out. Admiral Sims' destroyermen made the convoy system possible, and the iconic July 4 1917 American parade in London was an important morale boost.

And the Summer 1918 offensive. Americans proved they would and could fight at Cantigny, the Marne, and at the gates of Paris in what the French still call, "The Forest of the American Marine Brigade," Belleau Wood. The Army's Third Infantry Division is still called "The Rock of the Marne," and the 5th and 6th Marines still wear the Fourragiere earned at Belleau Wood. USS Belleau Wood, LHA-3, was in the Fleet until 2005.

Just like Hitler shot the works a generation later at the Bulge, the Kaiser's warlords had bet the works on an all out offensive, and failed. They had done everything in human power to win, and without the AEF the results would probably have been a lot different.

But, like Bedford Forrest said, one man defending is worth ten attacking. While the Summer 1918 offensive had failed, the Germans were still dug in in the most heavily fortified and dense forest in Europe: the Argonne Forest.

Colonel George Marshall, a Virginian, along with the rest of the staff at AEF HQ had to see the historical parallel. A fresh American Army facing an outnumbered, exhausted yet still determined enemy fighting a defensive campaign on ground they had fortified and knew well. Just like their grandfathers in Central Virginia in 1864. And just like the Summer of 1864, they HAD to know it would be a brutal slugfest; Brigadier General John Clem, the last Civil War veteran in the Army, had only retired three years before and every town in the US had its cohort of still living Civil War veterans, many of which marched through Virginia with Grant or Georgia with Sherman. The AEF grew up hearing their grandfathers' stories of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, or Franklin and Kennesaw Mountain in the West.

So, bright and early 100 years ago tomorrow, the AEF stepped off on the endgame of the War to End All Wars: the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

[Sheldrake]

Jolly well said. It cost 122,000 casualties over 47 days - a loss rate of 2,500+ per day compared to 125,000 odd over the 87 days from D Day to 1st September - a loss rate of 1,450 per day.

Though you could ad that this was part of a series of Allied offensives that kicked off in Mid July with the Marne counter stroke, mounted by French American British and Italian troops. The British lost 330.000 casualties over the last hundred days from the first British offensive 8th August . 3,300 per day. Open warfare was a bloodier proposition than trench warfare.

Don't forget that, despite ershing's desire to keep the AEF together, American army Corps of around 60,000 men also served under British Belgian and French Command in less well known battlefields such as Flanders, Bellicourt and Champagne. The II US Corps serving initially under Australian command lost some 13,500 men between 27th September and 11 November.

[Plain Old Dave]

Valid. Let's let history speak for itself, though.

From the Tennessee Great War Commission Facebook page:

Below is an excerpt from Capt. Everett R. Cook's diary, a Tennessean from Memphis who was the commanding officer of 91st Aero Squadron, an observation and reconnaissance unit based near Vavincourt, France. Spelling has not been changed.

“Wednesday, September 25th – Rotten day again for flying. However, we are sending missions out regularly, hoping to find a hole in the clouds so we can see something or get pictures of something beyond our lines. Almost every flight meets a Boche. A meeting at the Major’s tonight. The Argonne-Meuse venture starts tomorrow. The attack starts at 1 A.M.”

[Plain Old Dave]

https://aminewswire.org/stories/wwi_argonne/

Puill:

The offensive simply exhausted the will and resources of Germany after four years of constant war.

People here keep saying that the AEF was "ignorant" of modern warfare. Hardly. The Argonne was heavy forest, and that's a challenge for supprting fire, even today. The German Army was going to have to be forced out of the Argonne, by rifle, grenade and bayonet. One trench at a time, one machine gun nest at a time, one tree at a time. AEF was just going to do what their grandfathers had done 50 years before: find the enemy and keep finding them. The following image gives an idea of the savage nature of the fighting.

[Plain Old Dave]

From the Tennessee Great War Commission Facebook page.

One hundred years ago this week, from September 26-29, 1918, Sergeant Robert Hazen Goodwin from Bristol, Tennessee, assigned to Company H, 117th Infantry, 30th Division, earned the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest award for heroism in the U.S. Military. Near Bellicourt, France, and during an attack on the Hindenburg Line, Goodwin was badly gassed and ordered to hospital, but he insisted on remaining at his post though suffering intense pain. On September 29, he was wounded by a shell fragment, but again refused to withdraw to the rear. He remained at his post until relief troops arrived at the front after the Hindenburg Line was breached.

Update. The other image didn't work for some reason. See this link for the August 2018 cover art from the NRA's American Rifleman magazine. The feature story is the history of the Model 1917 rifle, cover art features Doughboys using the 1917 to good effect in the Marne.

http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/nra/ar_201808/index.php

[Plain Old Dave]

Letting history speak for itself again, again from the Tennessee Great War Commission Facebook page.

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

100 Years Ago Today:

Below is an excerpt from Sgt Allen Barnes' diary, a Tennessean was was inducted into the Army in Nashville and was eventually assigned to Company C of the 105th Field Signal Battalion of the 30th Division. Spelling has not been changed.

“Sept. 29 – Sunday and what a day suppose last night and today will be some day in history this Div has broken the Hindenburg line in several places and are still on the go, over 12000 prisoners have been taken and a good many guns ammunition. . . . The last report we had here that the Germans had about quit fighting a hard. 117th was first over and all gave a good account of them selves. I was up for a while but had to come back to the Dump and was after things going out to the different co.[companies] Hear good reports from all fronts today have been here all morning getting supplys and lorries out have a few minutes now while waiting for some of them to return.

Saw some awfull good fighting in the early part of the night several air fights and certainly can say there some brave and gritty Germans in the air but for what they say that is the prisoners they have about lost courage on the ground. But I do not put as much confidence in what they say and the last ones I saw was dead ones.”

[pugsville]

People here keep saying that the AEF was "ignorant" of modern warfare.

Mainly because that's the actual facts,

They were badly trained, badly organized, badly coordinated and badly led,

Aside from that they were good. The training and organization in the USA of the AEF was abysmally bad. Their officers were barely trained, the NCO''s basically the guys who arrived on Monday for the soldiers who arrived trues day, Some of that was rectified with the training in France, but the AEF was an army with almost zero experience, with barely adequate training in a confused tactical doctrine, with a green inexperience and badly trained leadership.

It's performance was modest Success was achieved at a high cost against a beaten enemy. the Actual impact of the AEF as a fighting force was minimal.
It's moral effect and it's existence definitely had large effects on the strategic planning and outlook of both sides,



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZxU9vRb_x0&t=336s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4PIj0sHhFKs&t=6s

[Plain Old Dave]

"Beaten enemy."

Interesting phrase, especially in light of the Summer 1918 offensive and the Argonne; while not successful, they did a remarkable job of not losing, with the offensive only stopped 40 miles from Paris by the United States Marines . Evidently nobody bothered to tell the German Army they were beaten.

But, history should speak for itself. More from the Tennessee Great War Commission Facebook page.


Below is an excerpt from Edward G. Melvin's diary, a Tennessee National Guardsman who enlisted in Crossville and was eventually assigned to Company G, 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry, 30th Division:

“We were in the trenches in front of Bellicourt on Sept. 28th. An officer came down the trenches and told us we were to go over the top at 5:54 a.m. the next morning, Sept. 29th. A big shell was to be fired way back behind the line and that was the signal for us to start. You wouldn’t have thought there was a war going on in a hundred miles of there, it was so quiet that morning. . . . I always said I knew how a man felt that was condemned to die for we all thought that was our last night.”

“It was a great relief when we heard that big shell come over and burst. We were to fight through the town of Bellicourt and stop and the Australian soldiers were to leap frog over us and go on after the Germans and then we would come and relieve them. That was the way they did until the war was over.”

“Our 119th and the 120th were named as the main assault units. Our Colonel sent us word to break that (Hindenburg) line or not a one of us come back, so we wanted to come back so we broke it. Most of our company was killed or wounded. . . . The St. Quentin Canal was underground at Bellicourt and there was room in the tunnel to hide a whole battalion of soldiers. It was believed that they were hiding in there and would come out behind us after we crossed over the canal. However, our soldiers discovered the entrance and made them come out and captured them. The entrance had a house over it and looked just like a dug well and had a ladder leading down into it. When we came back later, the Americans had all the German machine guns stacked up along the road. It looked like long ricks of firewood.”

[MarkN]

Valid. Let's let history speak for itself, though.

Letting history speak for itself again, ....

Shame you are incapable of "letting history speak for itself" and feel the need to constantly insert your own (inaccurate) interpretations of history alongside.

Should we assume that "letting history speak for itself" is LessThanPlain Old Dave codespeak for 'I'd rather others don't point out my historical garbage'.

[The Ibis]

"Beaten enemy."

... with the offensive only stopped 40 miles from Paris by the United States Marines .

Wrong. The Germans had been stopped by the French by the time the United States Marines entered the line at Belleau Wood. The forward movements the Americans faced were German attempts to seize good ground to use to stem the inevitable French counterattacks, which, in fact, were underway in other sectors impacted by Blücher-Yorck.

[The Ibis]

People here keep saying that the AEF was "ignorant" of modern warfare.

Mainly because that's the actual facts,

They were badly trained, badly organized, badly coordinated and badly led,

Aside from that they were good. The training and organization in the USA of the AEF was abysmally bad. Their officers were barely trained, the NCO''s basically the guys who arrived on Monday for the soldiers who arrived trues day, Some of that was rectified with the training in France, but the AEF was an army with almost zero experience, with barely adequate training in a confused tactical doctrine, with a green inexperience and badly trained leadership.

At first. It got better. Not across the board, of course, as we are discussing a very short time period. But there is no question some American units dramatically improved, as did certain officers in leadership, etc. The AEF's learning curve was real and a significant achievement. POD's exaggeration shouldn't distract from that.

the Actual impact of the AEF as a fighting force was minimal.

Oh, I disagree with this. Without the Americans, Foch's ability to launch his counteroffensive would have been diminished - one wonders if he would have done so - and the Germans would have had a greater reserve of available forces to stem BEF and French attacks wherever they would have occured. The presence of the AEF also allowed the BEF to remain concentrated. Its questionable whether it could have remained so in the absence of an AEF (the inability to concentrate forces was a problem for the French in late 1918, as Fayolle's diary recounts).

In addition, the attacks in the Argonne did threaten vital German interests. They had to fight in the Argonne and it was a grind. The Americans didn't win the war in the Argonne, but the battle was important and the impact of the fighting was more than minimal.

It's moral effect and it's existence definitely had large effects on the strategic planning and outlook of both sides,

I think it was Mike Neiberg (but might be mistaken) who wrote something to the effect that it was the fear of a mass American army that caused the Germans to launch the Spring Offensive which in fact caused of the acceleration of the movement of a mass American army to Europe. Not exactly a novel thought, but the actual turn of phrase (and I didn't quote it accurately) was well done.

[Plain Old Dave]

I think it was Mike Neiberg (but might be mistaken) who wrote something to the effect that it was the fear of a mass American army that caused the Germans to launch the Spring Offensive

This makes sense. Just like the Bulge a generation later, they decided to go for broke before the Americans could launch an offensive.

[Terry Duncan]

This makes sense. Just like the Bulge a generation later, they decided to go for broke before the Americans could launch an offensive.

Curiously you didnt agree with it when I posted exactly the same thing (it is the origin of your quote from Hindenburg) a few posts back! However, what do you imagine the Germans had been doing from July 1944 - mid Dec 1944, sightseeing? The Bulge was an attempt to split the British and Americans (I will let you look up why Hitler thought this would work, you will enjoy it) so the entire German forces in the west could concentrate against the Soviet forces. The rationale that the forces would make little difference in the east was sound enough, there were simply too many enemy forces there, so using them where it was felt they may change something for the long term made sense. What was felt would work and why are quite another matter entirely though.

[Sheldrake]

Letting history speak for itself again, again from the Tennessee Great War Commission Facebook page.

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

100 Years Ago Today:

Below is an excerpt from Sgt Allen Barnes' diary, a Tennessean was was inducted into the Army in Nashville and was eventually assigned to Company C of the 105th Field Signal Battalion of the 30th Division. Spelling has not been changed.

“Sept. 29 – Sunday and what a day suppose last night and today will be some day in history this Div has broken the Hindenburg line in several places and are still on the go, over 12000 prisoners have been taken and a good many guns ammunition. . . . The last report we had here that the Germans had about quit fighting a hard. 117th was first over and all gave a good account of them selves. I was up for a while but had to come back to the Dump and was after things going out to the different co.[companies] Hear good reports from all fronts today have been here all morning getting supplys and lorries out have a few minutes now while waiting for some of them to return.

Saw some awfull good fighting in the early part of the night several air fights and certainly can say there some brave and gritty Germans in the air but for what they say that is the prisoners they have about lost courage on the ground. But I do not put as much confidence in what they say and the last ones I saw was dead ones.”

History is indeed speaking,

This isnlt a quote about the Argonne, but the breach of the Hindenburg line near Bellicourt by XIth British and Australian Corps with, IInd US Corps under command of the Australians, as part of the Fourth British Army.

The 27th and 30th Divisions were green. They had undertaken one operation at the end of August near Ieper in Belgium. Their memorial is at Vierstraat and two US soldiers are buried in the Commonwealth War Cemetery at Lijssenhoek. Monash, the Australian Commander thought them very inexperienced and assigned an Australian Officer ans NCO as adviser to each US Battalion. The plan was for the two US divisions to beak into the Hindeburg Line and the second objectives to be taken by the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions which would take up the advance to the depth.

At the time the Australians reported that in their enthusiasm the US soldiers charged ahead and neglected to systematically mop up the German defences. Germans which had been over-run but not rounded up then mounted their weapons shooting the advancing troops from the rear and interdicting reserves. The Australian, in the second echelon of divisions had to fight their way forward and mop up the Germans themselves.

The official historian C E Bean did not think so. (You can read the relevant chapter here) https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com ... 519057.PDF

He argues that the Americans did not have enough officers for their larger companies. This extract illustrates the problems that probably also occurred in the Argonne.

In the attack on September 27th the 106th Infantry went in, according to General O’Ryan, with about 2,000 rifles, but as its commander, Col. Taylor, pointed out was exceedingly short of officers actually with only 18 officers in its twelve companies. This shortage appears to have been general in the two American divisions and, says O’Ryan, was due to American G.H.Q’s sending away many officers to schools. On September 27th the front of attack was 4,000 yards, rather over 1,300 yards to a battalion, and the depth 1,000-1,500. An Australian brigade at that time, though reduced to 1,200 rifles, might have undertaken the task, but would have put in at least 40 company officers, and many N.C.O’s with equal experience, and would have required all its skill and “bluff” to succeed. The barrage that morning included 15 per cent. of smoke
shell-5 per cent. more than covered the Australians on September 18th. The day was wet and the smoke-mist apparently less dense than on the 29th, but the light was very dim and both tanks and troops found it difficult to see. The task of the few American officers in trying with their compasses to keep direction for the troops may be judged by the experiences of the Australian officers, three times more numerous, on August 8th or September 18th. Inevitably the regiment split into small groups out of touch with each other. Parts of the mopping up companies, advancing where there were gaps in the line ahead, necessarily acted as front line ; Germans unseen in the mist were left behind.
The attack reached the Hindenburg Outpost-Line but at separated points. It captured the Knoll, a sector between Gillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, and another south of this. Some Americans at leach then tried to work right and left, but the fighting was very heavy; the company officers
sacrificed themselves most devotedly, and, of the eighteen, seventeen were killed or wounded. The men, left leaderless, were too inexperienced to know their tasks or even to recognise many of the dangers threatening them. -

[Max Payload]

The rationale that the forces would make little difference in the east was sound enough

Really?
The deployment of VI SS Pz Army and the panzer divisions of V Pz Army in Poland in December ‘44 could possibly have facilitated the elimination of the Soviet Vistula and Narew bridgeheads, which would have made the Soviet January ‘45 offensive much more problematic.

... using them where it was felt they may change something for the long term made sense.

True enough, based on Hitler’s faulty assumptions, the most serious of which was that any Soviet winter offensive would be in Hungary, not Poland.