Germany's handling of the July crisis.

[Terry Duncan]

Terry Duncan

My guess is that the first ultimatum had no input from the military beyond what they wanted Russia to cease doing ie: all mobilisation measures. The second ultimatum and communications to other powers were after consultation with the military as to if it was possible to avoid war any longer, and upon deciding that it was no longer avoidable, they were written to make sure the diplomatic situation looked as good as it could for Germany, whilst ensuring Germany entered the war in the most favourable situation for winning it ie: following the only available war plan.

That's certainly an interesting theory but I think the ultimatums to France and Russia were the last to go out? (from the 5 being sent)

I think my wording may have been a bit unclear. I was meaning the German ultimatums, of theirs the first technically was that to Belgium as it was written and held in Brussels days before the others were sent. By the first I meant the ultimatum to Russia, the second being that to France.

[Max Payload]

The ultimatum to Russia seems to have been genuine and to have come after getting advice from the military ... Bethmann was now trying to reign in Austria (who was determindly stalling, knowing delay must result in continued German support) and prevent a war his army insisted must follow unless something prevented Russia mobilising in any form, even preparatory mobilisation was unacceptable as the ultimatum makes clear. ... at the time of writing [the ultimatum to Russia], the politicians were still working under the impression that mobilisation did not have to lead to war and that there must be a point at which they could still stop it. We can speculate that it was designed to mislead Russia into believing she had more room to maneuver than she really had, but we have no evidence that can confirm this.

In that case why did Bethmann, in the early hours of the 31st, put a stop on the delivery by Tschirschky of his previous evening’s communication that stated, “…we can only advise that Austria accept the [British] proposal”? That stop came before any decision by AH to apply impossible preconditions to mediation.
If by the early afternoon of the 31st Bethmann had become aware of the Austria preconditions (and I don’t know that he had) that would strengthen the argument for the ultimatum to Russia being deliberately misleading because by then he would have have been aware that AH had no intention of being constrained.

[Terry Duncan]

In that case why did Bethmann, in the early hours of the 31st, put a stop on the delivery by Tschirschky of his previous evening’s communication that stated, “…we can only advise that Austria accept the [British] proposal”? That stop came before any decision by AH to apply impossible preconditions to mediation.
If by the early afternoon of the 31st Bethmann had become aware of the Austria preconditions (and I don’t know that he had) that would strengthen the argument for the ultimatum to Russia being deliberately misleading because by then he would have have been aware that AH had no intention of being constrained.

Albertini goes over this in detail, but there is also the need to commit the army by this point. Russia is mobilising, Austria likewise, and Austria must be told by 1st August where to send the reserve army, either to the Balkans or the Carpathians. Germany didnt hold too much hope of Russia ceasing to mobilise, least of all in the time limit allowed as Moltke stated it would take Russia 48 hours to cease mobilisation, she was allowed 12 hours, almost certainly due to the need to tell Austria where to deploy the critical army. That Conrad was so focused on the Balkans that he sent the reserve army there anyway doesnt take away from the fact Germany needed to tell him where to send it by 1st August at the latest. A similar deadline applied to Liege too, German troops had to be there by the fourth of fifth day of mobilisation (I cannot remember which at the moment) as otherwise the Belgians would be able to fully man the fortress with the allocated reserves, again, something that would happen iirc seven days after Belgium proclaimed her own mobilisation. If anything the mobilisation of The Netherlands and Belgium lit a fire under Germany, as by 5th/6th August it would be too late for the coup-de-main against Liege to work, and would also threaten the fall-back of passing through the Maastricht Appendix if Liege could not be taken.

Germany could either procede with her war plan or give it up entirely and hope the Russians and French did not attack, and nobody was willing to place such trust in the other alliance at this time.

The Austrian conditions were a total non-starter, Russia could never agree to them. 'You back down and we get everything our way' was a way of answering the British proposal to do as Germany asked and also making such an answer pointless. It was Austria that was not trying at all to secure peace, not Germany, who did try albeit rather too late. If Austria did not back away Germany would be forced to support her no matter what, all Austria had to do was delay.

[ljadw]

You forget 2 things :
1 Russia did not declare war on AH even not when AH declared war on Serbia .
2 AH declared war on Russia,but only on August 5 ,after very heavy German pressure .
The reality is that on 31 July,there was still a big chance to avoid war between AH and Russia ,and that Germany torpedoed this chance by its unneeded DoW on Russia, unneeded because the Russian mobilisation did not represent a danger for Germany .

[MarkN]

To MarkN

I doubt very very much that I have debunked Copeland's claims.

One of Copeland's claims was that Bethmann only wanted Austria to talk to Russia as a ruse to blame the war on them. Germany was to act as mediator giving them control over the discussions. The Germans would at a suitable point cause the discussions to break down blaming Russia for the war. Of course Austria refused to enter into any kind of talks with Russia so we don't know how that would of went. I said you debunked Copeland because I don't know anyone else who has proposed such a theory and what you said seemed to make sense - that one needed more evidence then simply reinterpreted telegrams. Perhaps "debunked" was too strong a term. More like "called into question" would be better.

Your comment that I had debunked Copeland was taken by me as a compliment, so thank you! However, I felt it unjustified given that I have not read his work and thus have no idea of the true nature and extent of his claims.

WW1 happened a long time ago, yet late enough in history to have been well reported and masses of documentation retained. This means there exists a huge quantity of material to work from and enough time has lapsed for every (and any barking) historical theory and interpretation to be have been floated. Many of the less reliable narratives have been specifically written, under state or national sponsorship, to deliberately shift responsibility and guilt. That sponsorship or backing lends them weight which the do not deserve.

I have a hobby. I enjoy researching and reading primary documentation, analysing it, and making up my own mind based upon what I read. I rarely pick up a book to find out what some other person has decided to tell me what they think happened. I am even less likely to do a google search and trust the words of anonymous posters polluting the internet.

The bulk of the historical evidence currently known to exist, depicts a Germany foreign policy (following the Kaiser's demands) of encouraging the Austrians to a swift slapping of the Serbs. Official German efforts demand swift to avoid a wider conflagration - get it all over and done with before the Russians can react. Austro-Hungarian pedestrianism indicate a major worry of Russian intevention and a desire to avoid it. Subsequent German effort, following the failure of the Austro-Hungarians to act swiftly, is an attempt to create a context where the Austrians can still have their Balkan victory without a Russian response. All this failed, and by the very end of July, events had moved so far further down the line (largely due to Moltke's unofficial manipulation), that Berlin collectively chose to deluded themselves (principally through Moltke's lobbying) that a pan-European conflagration was inevitable. In reality, it was only inevitable because of this decision/delusion by/in Berlin. From that point on, just a few days in length, it is accurate to depict Berlin/Germany driving the events to a pan-European war - but one with Britain not involved (hence the need for continuing diplomatic double-speak and attempts to shift/imply responsibility elsewhere) and one where the timelines have been manipulated to German's military advantage.

The historical evidence does not point to a long standing German foreign policy of starting a pan-European conflagration. The evidence of the period points to the complete opposite. Thus, writers, historians and internet trolls have to find ways to ignore, explain away or reinterpret to their satisfaction all of that evidence. One prominent AHF troll, ljadw, simply takes the line that any evidence pointing to Berlin/Germany putting breaks on the move to war as "lies" - you may recall the previous thread. Other writers and historians tend to use less direct methods; simply ignoring documentation is favoured. Almost all diplomatic cables have some form of double-speak which can be exploited by those needing to reinterpret and sell a new narrative. Writers do not even have to be that creative in finding way to reinvent history - the 'arts' of politics and diplomacy makes it easy for them.

Once Berlin had collectively decided (deluded themselves) that a wider war was inevitable, to be victorious, they had to gain military advantage through manipulation of the timelines and they had to try and keep Britain on the sidelines. The Russians required a long time to fully mobilize. So the Germans could allow them a head start (which can be made to look like responsibility) - but could not allow forever - and they could even go as far as to officially start the war without firing a shot. On the otherhand, whilst it was desirable to the Moltke plan for the French to get about 48 hours head start on mobilization, the actual start needed to be unannounced and initiated by the Germans to effect maximum advantage. In otherwords, the sequencing of each of these moves, had to be very carefully coordinated. Any change to them would seriously affect German chances of victory. Once set in motion, for Germany, it was do or die. WW1 became a self-fulfilling delusion: Berlin deluded itself that war was inevitable, and thus set in motion the steps that made war inevitable.

Thus, yes, you will find quite a bit of deliberate misleading and deceit in telegrams in the last days of July and August. But a handful of telegrams in the dieing days of peace do not present any form of evidence that a pan-European war was a longstanding German foreign policy aim nor that Germany was overtly trying to encourage one during June-July 1914.

Are the telegrams you point to a deliberate attempt to manipulate Russia and France's responses? I am sure they are. Is it evidence of a longstanding policy to start a European war? How can they be on their own??? Evidence of lonstanding requires longstanding evidence!

[Terry Duncan]

A very good post MarkN.

Where the problem starts (from the perspective of some posters/authors) with 'longstanding evidence' is that people will cite people or publications calling for something, or saying it would be nice if X were the case, where X is a variable of any future that would favour Germany. There is no need to link these things to actual policy, the fact they were aired at all is seen as some sort of 'policy'. Given Germany had no plan or even study for how to knock Britain out of a war Britain decided to continue if France surrendered is a pretty good indication there was never a plan for European conquest and even that domination was hardly possible given their experience in France in 1871. Germany would have liked to change the status quo if the chance arose, which it sort of did in 1905 and was refused, and again in 1914. The action in 1914 was to try and change the status quo from a German perspective, notably to split Britain and France from Russia when the latter would object too late after a swift Austrian conquest of Serbia (or as much of Serbia as could be taken swiftly) and the former would refuse to support her. You can say it was brinkmanship, poorly thought out, idiotic or whatever to indicate rashness, but it was not designed to start a general war. Anyone can find a single book or a few books from one author that make a claim of almost anything, but the weight of evidence, and there is a hell of a lot of it, really does not support what happened was as a result of a deliberate long term policy.

[ljadw]

Longstanding evidences are :
the letter of the Kaiser from December 1905 to Bülow where he said : befowe we will start our big war, we must eliminate the socialists
the attempts (1905/1911) to have this war by provoking France to a DoW for something Germany was not interested in:Agadir
the attempt to have this war by provoking Russia to a DoW for something which was not the business of Germany : the annexion of Bosnia-Herzegovina
the attempt to have this war by forcing AH to declare war on Serbia,hoping that this would cause war between AH and Russia.
the attempt to have this war by declaring war on Russia on a false accusation, because there was no war between AH and Russia
the attempt to have this war by declaring war on France with a DoW founded on a lie
the fact that already BEFORE 28 July (AH DoW on Serbia ) the Schlieffen Plan was activated .

[MarkN]

Longstanding evidences are :
the letter of the Kaiser from December 1905 to Bülow where he said : befowe we will start our big war, we must eliminate the socialists
the attempts (1905/1911) to have this war by provoking France to a DoW for something Germany was not interested in:Agadir
the attempt to have this war by provoking Russia to a DoW for something which was not the business of Germany : the annexion of Bosnia-Herzegovina
the attempt to have this war by forcing AH to declare war on Serbia,hoping that this would cause war between AH and Russia.
the attempt to have this war by declaring war on Russia on a false accusation, because there was no war between AH and Russia
the attempt to have this war by declaring war on France with a DoW founded on a lie
the fact that already BEFORE 28 July (AH DoW on Serbia ) the Schlieffen Plan was activated .

Others may wish to try and engage with this is in a serious manner, but to me it is just the nonsense of a committed troll. A serious response identifying each and every point as being invalid (which can be easily done) will most likely illicit another wall of trolling nonsense. Don't feed the troll.

[ljadw]

Identify each point as being invalid, starting with the letter of the Kaiser to Bülow .I am waiting.

[Terry Duncan]

Identify each point as being invalid, starting with the letter of the Kaiser to Bülow .I am waiting.

I believe, as the person putting forward the claim for these points representing a longstanding German policy for the domination of Europe, you, ljadw, are the person required to make some substantiation for them. What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. Now everybody is waiting.

Terry Duncan

[MarkN]

Identify each point as being invalid, starting with the letter of the Kaiser to Bülow .I am waiting.

On several occasions previously on this forum alone you have presented EXACTLY the same arguments with EXACTLY the same words. On each occasion a credible poster, a different one each time, has responded with thoughtful words to highlight the contradictions, the errors and the outright nonsense of your assertions.

The reality that you have come back AGAIN with the EXACT same garbage demanding response is evidence that you are nothing more than an attention seeking troll.

[ljadw]

Identify each point as being invalid, starting with the letter of the Kaiser to Bülow .I am waiting.

I believe, as the person putting forward the claim for these points representing a longstanding German policy for the domination of Europe, you, ljadw, are the person required to make some substantiation for them. What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. Now everybody is waiting.

Terry Duncan

The letter from the Kaiser to Bülow ,where he is talking about Germany's coming war is a fact and easy to find on the internet .
Source : The Chancellor as courtier : B.von Búlow and the governance of Germany :1900-1909 P 144 .
If the chief of state is talking to his PM of a war abroad and 8 years later is starting such a war, this proves that he was preparing this war already in 1905 .'If the same person is saying publicly (August 31 1907 )'' Am deutschen Wesen wird einmal noch die Welt genesen '',which means : Germany has the mission to bring Ruhe und Ordnung in the world and 7 years later is starting a war, this proves that what he said in 1907 was relating to what happened in 1914 .
If the same chief of state is declaring war on Russia,saying that the Russian mobilisation was threatening Germany, something everyone knows is a lie, it is obvious that it was the German intention to declare war on Russia, for whatever reason it couild invent.
If the Schlieffen plan was activated BEFORE the AH DoW on Serbia,(source :Api-Api and the Netherlands'mobilisation ),this proves that Germany had the intention to attack France at the first best occasion and that Sarajevo was only an excuse , besides ,the German chancellor wrote to the governor of the Alsace that he was not interested in Sarajevo .
It is a FACT that France never had the intention to help Russia if there was a war between Russia and Germany,who ever was starting him .
And ,when France did not help Russia, Germany still invaded France, WITHOUT DoW, because the DoW had to come from France,and when France did not move, Germany invented a French air attack on German cities and declared war .
And, let's not talk about the 2 Morocco crises ,and the German intervention in the Bosnian-Herzegowina crisis : since the letter, Germany intervened in every European crisis by inflaming the situation . Why ? Because it wanted a war .
And why did Germany want a war ? Because it was convinced that its time had come, the 18th century was the French century, the 19th the British century, the 20th would be the German century.It wanted the best place in the sun, but France and Britain occupied this place,they had to move, and this could only happen by war .
Other countries were also infected by this imperialistic illness,( see the role of the senators Sherman R Ohio and Morgan D Alabama ) ,but they were more careful and modest .

[ljadw]

4 other people confirm what I am saying :
1 Admiral von Müller : the government has succeeded very well in making us appear as the attacked
2 Moltke : I prepared and initiated this war
3 The British historian Röhl : WWI has broken out as the result of a deliberate long-term policy .
Germany wanted the war, prepared it since long time and started it .Germany declared war on Russia and France on false pretexts, Russia, France and even AH did not declare war (AH only on August 5, after heavy German threats ) .
4 Bethmann on July 30 :Russia did not want war, it had been forced by Austria to take this step .

[Max Payload]

Albertini goes over this in detail, but there is also the need to commit the army by this point. Russia is mobilising, Austria likewise, and Austria must be told by 1st August where to send the reserve army, either to the Balkans or the Carpathians. Germany didnt hold too much hope of Russia ceasing to mobilise, least of all in the time limit allowed as Moltke stated it would take Russia 48 hours to cease mobilisation, she was allowed 12 hours, almost certainly due to the need to tell Austria where to deploy the critical army.

Having not read Albertini, in what sense was the direction of deployment of the reserve army critical and why the tight deadline? Germany’s war plan was not dependent on Austria’s. Conrad had already mobilised eight corps against Serbia. Where else would the reserve army be critically required if not Galicia?


“Germany could either procede with her war plan or give it up entirely and hope the Russians and French did not attack”

But this was also true at 9:00pm on the 30th. What changed over the subsequent few hours that caused Bethmann to withdraw his advice that Austria accept the British mediation proposal?

[MarkN]

Albertini goes over this in detail, but there is also the need to commit the army by this point. Russia is mobilising, Austria likewise, and Austria must be told by 1st August where to send the reserve army, either to the Balkans or the Carpathians. Germany didnt hold too much hope of Russia ceasing to mobilise, least of all in the time limit allowed as Moltke stated it would take Russia 48 hours to cease mobilisation, she was allowed 12 hours, almost certainly due to the need to tell Austria where to deploy the critical army.

Having not read Albertini, in what sense was the direction of deployment of the reserve army critical and why the tight deadline? Germany’s war plan was not dependent on Austria’s. Conrad had already mobilised eight corps against Serbia. Where else would the reserve army be critically required if not Galicia?

My own thoughts (not Albertini's) are that, in the German's eyes, deploying the Reserve Army to deal with (little) Serbia was overkill and better placed in Galicia against a much more threatening Russian force. Moreover, he Germans planned to keep a minimum of their own forces on the Eastern Front, if the Austro-Hungarians put the Reserve Army against Serbia, they (the Germans) may well have to put more of their own forces on the East.

Remember, the German 'blank check' was not an offer to deal with the Russians on their own (leaving the Austro-Hungarians to deal exclusively with Serbia) but that they would stand-by Austro-Hungaria if the Russians interfered.

“Germany could either procede with her war plan or give it up entirely and hope the Russians and French did not attack”

But this was also true at 9:00pm on the 30th. What changed over the subsequent few hours that caused Bethmann to withdraw his advice that Austria accept the British mediation proposal?

Don't have time to check the timelines, but off the top of my head two events around this time could have had that effect. First, Bethmann now goes along with Moltke's assertion that war is inevitable and full steam ahead is required as any delay will have a direct and negative consequence on German military effort. Second, Bethmann had been stringing Grey along for a couple of days or so as regards German policy in order to keep alive the possibility of Britain staying out AND giving the illusion of German as the 'victim' of Russia. At some point Grey realised this was happening and his approach took a major change - so why waste further time with the ruse. Whilst writing this, I have a feeling that Grey change of approach may well have been after, and because of, Bethmann's change - thus ruling out my second suggestion. And finally, a third has come to mind, he was following the Kaiser's instructions as a loyal servant.

The relevant Albertini volume (no.3) can be downloaded for free from the internet.