Germany's handling of the July crisis.

[MarkN]

I have given the proof that the function of president of the republic was insignifiant , the proof is the declaration of the man who was president : Poincaré who in 1920,refused a second term of office .
One of his predecessors ,Casimir-Périer, said the same and resigned .

Your 'proofs' are irrelevant to this thread. They are garbage designed by you to push your historical falsehoods.

The de jure authority of the French Presidents and Prime Minister are easy to read and understand. Just open up the French Constitution etc. I don't need your walls of attention seeking garbage to tell me that.

However, this thread is about the de facto words, decisions and actions of Poincare and Viviani during the July Crisis. What matters is how their words were received in Petersburg, Berlin, London and Vienna. Their authority and relevence during the July Crisis is defined by what the Russians, Germans, British and Austrians thought (how they received, understood and acted upon the words); it has nothing to do with what legal words appearing on a bit of paper defining their authority.

Similarly, the words Poincare said over cognac to celebrate his inauguration are irrelevant to the July Crisis for the very same reason.

You 'proofs' may have some relevance in a discussion about whether Poincare and Viviani exceeded their authority during the July Crisis. Here they have no relevance.

Your 'proofs' are irrelevant and intellectual garbage in this discussion.

[MarkN]

Nobody has to protest a mobilisation, in this case the first mobilisation drew a protest and a demand that it cease, once that failed the chain reaction set in across Europe, making further protests pointless. Moltke explained this series of events perfectly in his memorandum, they all ended in war.

As understood by everybody except the Germans at the time, mobilization was a time to concentrate minds on finding a diplomatic solution to avoid bloodshed.

Moltke's memorandum was a deliberate and quite mendacious part of his strategy to bring about a pan-European conflagration. Mobilizations here and there did not have to lead to war; for Moltke's war plan to produce a victorious outcome he needed the Kaiser to approve his plan according to very tight deadlines. History shows he got what he wanted from the Kaiser but didn't get the timelines he needed. I guess that's why glenn239 is so resentful of Russia, France and Grey's actions....

[MarkN]

At this moment France gave notice that it was opting for a military posture no matter what you say was causing it, and given the already heightened tensions, such an act was never going to calm the situation. German embassy staff and spies would be aware of the initial posting within the hour, rather like they knew that war with Russia was declared and that France was the ally of Russia. Despite your insistence that the alliance existed only on paper, France had never withdrawn from it, and when given the opportunity no member of the French government gave any indication to the Germans that they were inclined to do so. The only possible conclusion for Germany was that France was going to fight, indeed the Russians seem to have worked under the same conclusion, so it is very much up to you to prove rather than just repeat the claim, that France was not going to honour her alliance.

The Moltke war plan had German troops crossing into neutral Luxemburg and Belgium on the way to France at about the time Pourtales delivered Berlin's declaration of war on Russia.

ljadw's fantasy narrative is based upon the above not being historical reality and the bizarre analysis that since Paris did not respond with the speed of internet real time communication, the Franco-Russian Alliance was not going to be respected.

Buffoonery of the highest order.

If France had no intention of honoring thie alliance with Russia, they could and should have said so to Berlin and prevented an attack on themselves. We know from history that this was possible given the Kaiser's response to the Grey/Lichnowski mixup.

If evidence that they tried that exists, then ljadw would have his proof. He doesn't! But of course, ljadw has a completely different narrative of what happened in Berlin on 1 August - it was all lies, lies and more lies.

This thread has little to do with historical reality and everything to do with attention seeking trolls pushing their historical fantasies (ljadw) and / or ahistorical agenda (glenn239).

[ljadw]

I have given the proof that the function of president of the republic was insignifiant , the proof is the declaration of the man who was president : Poincaré who in 1920,refused a second term of office .
One of his predecessors ,Casimir-Périer, said the same and resigned .

Your 'proofs' are irrelevant to this thread. They are garbage designed by you to push your historical falsehoods.

The de jure authority of the French Presidents and Prime Minister are easy to read and understand. Just open up the French Constitution etc. I don't need your walls of attention seeking garbage to tell me that.

However, this thread is about the de facto words, decisions and actions of Poincare and Viviani during the July Crisis. What matters is how their words were received in Petersburg, Berlin, London and Vienna. Their authority and relevence during the July Crisis is defined by what the Russians, Germans, British and Austrians thought (how they received, understood and acted upon the words); it has nothing to do with what legal words appearing on a bit of paper defining their authority.

Similarly, the words Poincare said over cognac to celebrate his inauguration are irrelevant to the July Crisis for the very same reason.

You 'proofs' may have some relevance in a discussion about whether Poincare and Viviani exceeded their authority during the July Crisis. Here they have no relevance.

Your 'proofs' are irrelevant and intellectual garbage in this discussion.

YOU have to give the proof that there were ANY actions and decisions from Poincaré in this period, what you have failed to do .
And if there were such actions and decisions, YOU have to prove that they had any influence outside France : YOU have to prove that Russian, German, Austrian and British were acting upon the words from Poincaré .
And, last point : words are not actions: words from Poincaré are not decisions from Poncaré .
Example : what Poincaré said in St Petersburg to the ambassador of Austria (Mensdorf ? ) is not a decision or action from Poincaré .
Politicians do not act on what other politicians are saying, but on what other politicians are doing .
And it is on YOU to prove
a that Poincaré did things
b that these things influenced the start of WWI .
Poincaré had been a lawyer,paid to talk, a senator,paid to talk, foreign secretary,paid to talk ,and in 1914 ,he was a president, paid to talk about insignifiant things .
He was not paid to do things ,to make political statements .
And unless you can prove the opposite, the reality is that his role was insignifiant .

[Terry Duncan]

YOU have to give the proof that there were ANY actions and decisions from Poincaré in this period, what you have failed to do .

Poincare to Szapary 21st July;

‘Of course I am anxious about the results of this inquiry. . . I can remember two previous inquiries which did not improve relations with Serbia. Don’t you remember the Friedjung affair and the Prohaska affair?’ Szápáry replied in a dry tone: ‘Monsieur le Président, we cannot suffer a foreign government to allow plots against our sovereignty to be hatched on its territory I’ In a more than conciliatory tone Poincaré endeavoured to point out that in the present state of public feeling in Europe every Government should be twice as cautious as usual. ‘With a little good will this Serbian business is easy to settle. But it can just as easily become acute. Serbia has some very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!’

Here you have both the affirmation of the alliance and a far from subtle warning that if pushed this crisis could end in war. From a diplomatic point of view, this threat is as extraordinary as von Bulow's threat of allowing Austria to decide for war or peace in 1909. If I recall correctly, Clark's The Sleepwalkers records the reaction of Szapary and the other diplomatic staff to this warning, it was far from laughed off and unimportant.

And if there were such actions and decisions, YOU have to prove that they had any influence outside France : YOU have to prove that Russian, German, Austrian and British were acting upon the words from Poincaré .

Szapary's report to Berchtold after his meeting with Poincare on 21st July;

The threatening attitude of the President, so strikingly in contrast with the reserved, circumspect bearing of Sazonov, confirms the anticipation that M. Poincaré will exercise anything but a calming influence here.

Clearly, Szapary (and Berchtold) found the words of Poincare to be significant and likely to have an influence in St Petersburg. So far you have offered absolutely nothing to indicate that anyone was willing to dismiss Poincare and Viviani as 'unimportant' or unable to enact a policy in order to support your claim. Please do so.

And, last point : words are not actions: words from Poincaré are not decisions from Poncaré .

Unless you can offer some form of proof to the contrary, where Poincare or Viviani's words match later French deeds it is up to you to show that the two are not linked, or that either man was unable to put forward a statement of intent for the French nation.

Example : what Poincaré said in St Petersburg to the ambassador of Austria (Mensdorf ? ) is not a decision or action from Poincaré .

Mensdorf was in London, Szapary was the man in St Petersburg and on the receiving end of the warning from Poincare. What Poincare said was clearly seen as representing the official French view, and it outlined the intention of the French state, not his personal view. Poincare did not say 'I am a friend to Russia, he stated that France was a friend to Russia.

And unless you can prove the opposite, the reality is that his role was insignifiant.

You are the person putting forward the unconventional claim that in this case runs in the face of what the majority of historians accept as correct, therefore the onus of proof is upon yourself to provide significant supporting evidence if you expect people to take you seriously. To quote the late great Christopher Hitchens;

"What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence".

[Terry Duncan]

Poincaré had been a lawyer,paid to talk, a senator,paid to talk, foreign secretary,paid to talk ,and in 1914 ,he was a president, paid to talk about insignifiant things .
He was not paid to do things ,to make political statements .
And unless you can prove the opposite, the reality is that his role was insignifiant .

Poincare clearly did talk, and it is also clear that people did listen to him and not dismiss his words and insignificant. The fact remains that he DID say things, even if he went beyond his supposed job limits, as some people are prone to do. What is clear is that he was never reprimanded or dismissed and having no right to make those comments.

Unless you can offer something to support your claims, the only insignificant thing here is your opinion. It is very rare here on this particular topic for any single poster to unify everyone else against their views, and whilst Glenn has not commented on this subject I am sure we can look back and see where Glenn has cited Poincare and Viviani as speaking for France - even Peterhof would not dispute that they did so.

[MarkN]

YOU have to give the proof that there were ANY actions and decisions from Poincaré in this period, ...

No I don't.

It is you that is posting ahistorical fantasy drivel. The onus is upon you to evidence your claims if you wish to be taken seriously.

You accept that Poincare and Viviani spoke and wrote to emissaries in Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and London on behalf of France. If their words were irrelevant and nobody was listening to them, it should be easy for you to present some evidence that their opposite numbers in Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and London just ignored them.

It would be even easier for you to show that French Ambassadors in Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and London ignored their words and acted upon those of ...

Jaures ,who de facto ruled France,

I mean, one cannot expect a foreigner to abide by the French Constitution, but surely it is obligatory for their own Ambassadors to do so.

Crack on!

[ljadw]

YOU have to give the proof that there were ANY actions and decisions from Poincaré in this period, what you have failed to do .

Poincare to Szapary 21st July;

‘Of course I am anxious about the results of this inquiry. . . I can remember two previous inquiries which did not improve relations with Serbia. Don’t you remember the Friedjung affair and the Prohaska affair?’ Szápáry replied in a dry tone: ‘Monsieur le Président, we cannot suffer a foreign government to allow plots against our sovereignty to be hatched on its territory I’ In a more than conciliatory tone Poincaré endeavoured to point out that in the present state of public feeling in Europe every Government should be twice as cautious as usual. ‘With a little good will this Serbian business is easy to settle. But it can just as easily become acute. Serbia has some very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!’

Here you have both the affirmation of the alliance and a far from subtle warning that if pushed this crisis could end in war. From a diplomatic point of view, this threat is as extraordinary as von Bulow's threat of allowing Austria to decide for war or peace in 1909. If I recall correctly, Clark's The Sleepwalkers records the reaction of Szapary and the other diplomatic staff to this warning, it was far from laughed off and unimportant.

And if there were such actions and decisions, YOU have to prove that they had any influence outside France : YOU have to prove that Russian, German, Austrian and British were acting upon the words from Poincaré .

Szapary's report to Berchtold after his meeting with Poincare on 21st July;

The threatening attitude of the President, so strikingly in contrast with the reserved, circumspect bearing of Sazonov, confirms the anticipation that M. Poincaré will exercise anything but a calming influence here.

Clearly, Szapary (and Berchtold) found the words of Poincare to be significant and likely to have an influence in St Petersburg. So far you have offered absolutely nothing to indicate that anyone was willing to dismiss Poincare and Viviani as 'unimportant' or unable to enact a policy in order to support your claim. Please do so.

And, last point : words are not actions: words from Poincaré are not decisions from Poncaré .

Unless you can offer some form of proof to the contrary, where Poincare or Viviani's words match later French deeds it is up to you to show that the two are not linked, or that either man was unable to put forward a statement of intent for the French nation.

Example : what Poincaré said in St Petersburg to the ambassador of Austria (Mensdorf ? ) is not a decision or action from Poincaré .

Mensdorf was in London, Szapary was the man in St Petersburg and on the receiving end of the warning from Poincare. What Poincare said was clearly seen as representing the official French view, and it outlined the intention of the French state, not his personal view. Poincare did not say 'I am a friend to Russia, he stated that France was a friend to Russia.

And unless you can prove the opposite, the reality is that his role was insignifiant.

You are the person putting forward the unconventional claim that in this case runs in the face of what the majority of historians accept as correct, therefore the onus of proof is upon yourself to provide significant supporting evidence if you expect people to take you seriously. To quote the late great Christopher Hitchens;

"What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence".

What Poincaré said to the Austrian ambassador in a very conciliatory (sic ) tone was nothing new : he repeated the official French POV ,which was that both parties ( Austria and Russia ) should be cautious,because a war between Austria and Serbia could result in a war between Austria and Russia,which could result in a war between Germany and Russia which could result in a war between Germany and France ( The Schlieffen Plan was not a secret ) .This was also the POV of Britain . He did not say anything new . And I doubt that it had any effect in Vienna, as France was not obliged to intervene in a war between Russia and Austria . Besides : it could not : how would France help Russia ? It had no border with Austria .

[MarkN]

Waste of time trying to discuss with an attention seeking troll...

Szapary's report to Berchtold after his meeting with Poincare on 21st July;

The threatening attitude of the President, so strikingly in contrast with the reserved, circumspect bearing of Sazonov, confirms the anticipation that M. Poincaré will exercise anything but a calming influence here.

...followed by...

What Poincaré said to the Austrian ambassador in a very conciliatory (sic ) tone

The "threatening attitude" becomes "a very conciliatory (sic ) tone" in the fantasy narrative of the troll.

[Terry Duncan]

What Poincaré said to the Austrian ambassador in a very conciliatory (sic ) tone was nothing new :

As per Szapary's report;

The threatening attitude of the President, so strikingly in contrast with the reserved, circumspect bearing of Sazonov, confirms the anticipation that M. Poincaré will exercise anything but a calming influence here.

The tone of the last part of what Poincare said was clearly not 'conciliatory' and this is borne out by the observation that Szapary turned white and left. It is also clear that Poincare was able to influence things. It is at least nice you note that the Franco-Russian alliance was functioning perfectly.

he repeated the official French POV

Please demonstrate who had previously stated that what Poincare said was the 'official point of view'? According to you nobody in France was able to make such a decision, the people were all irrelevant.

And I doubt that it had any effect in Vienna, as France was not obliged to intervene in a war between Russia and Austria . Besides : it could not : how would France help Russia ? It had no border with Austria .

As per the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, Section 2 reads;

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

Even Section 1 covers exactly how France is to aid Russia;

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

In the July Crisis Germany was very obviously supporting Austria.

https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_F ... Convention

If you are unwilling to actually provide some form of supporting evidence for your case, then I will have to consider deleting further 'opinion only' posts for non-compliance with forum rules for providing evidence when asked for it.

[ljadw]

Waste of time trying to discuss with an attention seeking troll...

Szapary's report to Berchtold after his meeting with Poincare on 21st July;

The threatening attitude of the President, so strikingly in contrast with the reserved, circumspect bearing of Sazonov, confirms the anticipation that M. Poincaré will exercise anything but a calming influence here.

...followed by...

What Poincaré said to the Austrian ambassador in a very conciliatory (sic ) tone

The "threatening attitude" becomes "a very conciliatory (sic ) tone" in the fantasy narrative of the troll.

WHO is the troll and who is lying ?
Post 275 : In a more than conciliatory tone Poincaré endeavoured .......
And the author of post 275 is TD, not me .

[ljadw]

What Poincaré said to the Austrian ambassador in a very conciliatory (sic ) tone was nothing new :

As per Szapary's report;

The threatening attitude of the President, so strikingly in contrast with the reserved, circumspect bearing of Sazonov, confirms the anticipation that M. Poincaré will exercise anything but a calming influence here.

The tone of the last part of what Poincare said was clearly not 'conciliatory' and this is borne out by the observation that Szapary turned white and left. It is also clear that Poincare was able to influence things. It is at least nice you note that the Franco-Russian alliance was functioning perfectly.

he repeated the official French POV

Please demonstrate who had previously stated that what Poincare said was the 'official point of view'? According to you nobody in France was able to make such a decision, the people were all irrelevant.

And I doubt that it had any effect in Vienna, as France was not obliged to intervene in a war between Russia and Austria . Besides : it could not : how would France help Russia ? It had no border with Austria .

As per the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, Section 2 reads;

2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.

Even Section 1 covers exactly how France is to aid Russia;

If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

In the July Crisis Germany was very obviously supporting Austria.

https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_F ... Convention

If you are unwilling to actually provide some form of supporting evidence for your case, then I will have to consider deleting further 'opinion only' posts for non-compliance with forum rules for providing evidence when asked for it.

Russia was attacked by Germany on August 1 , and France did not employ all her available forces to attack Germany .
Russia was also not attacked by Austria, supported by Germany, but by Germany, supported later by Austria .
And this is not a sophism , but the reality ; Between August 1 and August 6 there was a war between Germany and Russia only, Austria remained neutral .Austria was very obviously not supporting Germany .

[ljadw]

Please demonstrate who had previously stated that what Poincare said was the 'official point of view'? According to you nobody in France was able to make such a decision, the people were all irrelevant.

French foreign policy was made, not by the president, not by the foreign secretary, not by the government, but by parliament .
The official French POV was the same since the alliance was signed : France needed an ally, in 1887 there was almost a war with Germany, and the only ally available was Russia, that was still remembering that in the Crimean War France and Britain had attacked her, and that in 1877 there was almost again a war with Britain . Thus Russia needed to prevent a future hostile coalition .
French POV was ,and remained the same in 1914, that Russia should fight for France but that France should not fight for Russia : a unilateral alliance, which is not uncommon in diplomatie . Russia did the same .
Proofs ?
During the Bosnian crisis , France abandoned Russia,that had no other solution than to accept the annexation .
During the war with Japan, France refused to supply the Russian fleet with coal when it passed Saigon .
France refused to help Russia in the Liman von Sanders crisis .
Russia did the same at the time of Fachoda, and during the 2 Morocco crises .
Jaures said a few days before he was shot that the French government, of which he was an opponent, tried to preserve peace .
France could only preserve peace if it remained neutral, if it was solidary with Russia, it would hasten war and would have to fight for Russia, something the majority of parliament would refuse .
If Viviani and Poincaré ( political enemies ) would suddenly pursue a different foreign policy, government would fall and parliament would refuse to accept this new policy .And parliament had the last word .

[ljadw]

Other proofs .
From the French historian Pierre Renouvin in Les Relations franco-russes a la fin du 19ieme siecle et au début du vingtiéme siecle
There was in 1897 a conflict between Turkey and Greece ,which could result in a mobilisation of Austria and war between Austria and Russia : France said that it would remain neutral .
On P 132 : France wanted to exclure the problems of the Orient from the alliance .
In 1909, Russia fears an Austrian attack against Serbia, and asks France to help her,if this results in war between Austria and Russia.France refuses .
And Renouvin writes :
Chacun des contractants s'applique á restreindre la portée des engagements mutuels .
Rough translation : both signatories want to minimize their engagements .
En Juillet 1912 Poincaré dit qu'il veut freiner la politique balcanique russe . In July 1912 Poincaré said that he wanted to stop,to slow down the Russian policy in the Balkans .
I think that these proofs are sufficient .

[Terry Duncan]

Russia was attacked by Germany on August 1 , and France did not employ all her available forces to attack Germany .

1. Germany did not attack Russia on 1st August, she declared war. The German armies were to attack in the west.

2. France did mobilise, exactly as required by the treaty, which did not require a declaration of war even by the point on day 15 of mobilisation when both powers were to move their respective forces to the German borders.

Russia was also not attacked by Austria

Did Austria decide to fully mobilise on 31st July? That alone is enough to trigger the Franco-Russian alliance.

supported by Germany, but by Germany, supported later by Austria .
And this is not a sophism , but the reality ; Between August 1 and August 6 there was a war between Germany and Russia only, Austria remained neutral .Austria was very obviously not supporting Germany .

None of which matters. The mobilisation of one or both of the Central Powers was enough to trigger the mobilisation of the Franco-Russian alliance, and that alliance did not require any declaration of war or further hostile intent until at least Day 15 of mobilisation.