Germany's handling of the July crisis.

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MarkN
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#46

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2018, 10:11

Max Payload wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 09:52
It seems to me that this is a legitimate forum for those interested in the subject and faced with conflicting information or gaps therein to ask for clarification or even opinion. There is no obligation on the part of anyone to respond, not even those with strong opinions on Belgian beer and chocolate.
Absolutely nothing wrong with asking for others' opinion. I was merely pointing out that if a poster has become confused or unable to discern the credible from the uncredible by reading differing opinions in different books, getting yet more differing opinions fromm anonymous online posters is only going to worsen the situation. What makes one opinion more reliable than another? Confirmation bias? I suggest the way forward would be to form one's own opinion by taking the time to read the prime documentation oneself.
Perhaps you disagree.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#47

Post by Max Payload » 09 Oct 2018, 10:57

MarkN wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 10:11
.. if a poster has become confused or unable to discern the credible from the uncredible by reading differing opinions in different books, getting yet more differing opinions fromm anonymous online posters is only going to worsen the situation. What makes one opinion more reliable than another? Confirmation bias? I suggest the way forward would be to form one's own opinion by taking the time to read the prime documentation oneself.
Perhaps you disagree.
No I don’t. And I guess it’s also incumbent on the poster to formulate a query succinctly and in a way that doesn’t require a dissertation on early twentieth century history by means of reply. But there is a lot of primary source material out there and much of it is not readily accessible. Some time ago I came across an on-line listing of much of the diplomatic telegraphic communication in late July ‘14; now I can’t find it. I would not consider it inappropriate or laziness on my part to ask on this forum for a specific piece of information or for a clarification on something that could be extremely time consuming to resolve by sourcing the prime documentation. And from the source material we get explanation, interpretation or opinion, and even conflicting opinion is not without value, it forces further critical examination of the ‘facts’.


MarkN
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#48

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2018, 11:33

Max Payload wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 10:57
MarkN wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 10:11
.. if a poster has become confused or unable to discern the credible from the uncredible by reading differing opinions in different books, getting yet more differing opinions fromm anonymous online posters is only going to worsen the situation. What makes one opinion more reliable than another? Confirmation bias? I suggest the way forward would be to form one's own opinion by taking the time to read the prime documentation oneself.
Perhaps you disagree.
No I don’t. And I guess it’s also incumbent on the poster to formulate a query succinctly and in a way that doesn’t require a dissertation on early twentieth century history by means of reply. But there is a lot of primary source material out there and much of it is not readily accessible. Some time ago I came across an on-line listing of much of the diplomatic telegraphic communication in late July ‘14; now I can’t find it. I would not consider it inappropriate or laziness on my part to ask on this forum for a specific piece of information or for a clarification on something that could be extremely time consuming to resolve by sourcing the prime documentation. And from the source material we get explanation, interpretation or opinion, and even conflicting opinion is not without value, it forces further critical examination of the ‘facts’.
Quite agree. I have no issue with somebody seeking help with a bit of confusion or in search of a bit of information that cannot be readily accessed. Unfortunately, what I have discerned here is quite different. What the original poster seems to be asking for appears disconnected with the words actually written.

First, the request is not for a bit of help with some info, but a request to debunk a complete theory. As you point out that would require a dissertation level effort. Hence my earlier comments about getting others to do the work.

Second, the way the requests are formulated are biased and indicate to me a predisposed position - despite the denials to the contrary. The original poster is presenting a series of single events and asking for explanation. What he's looking for is somebody to explain how that event ties to a decision taken at that time - to debunk the longterm policy theory. That approach implies a predisposition towards that theory; it is not for posters to 'prove' that events and decisions were concurrent, it is for those behind the theory to prove they were part of a grander scheme. It seems to me that the original poster has in his head an idea that unless all the events he throws up for question can be adequately explained to his satisfaction, his default position (that it was a grand longterm strategy) must be valid.

Third, following from the second, the determination to get others to accept the bizarre understanding and logic that an event today is 'proof' that it was decided upon earlier indicates the very same bias and predisposition.

It is generally accepted that from the very end of July onwards, Berlin was, collectively, moving to war and playing deliberate diplomatic games with allies and foes alike to gain military advantage. Finding evidence of that is simple. It is numerous. However, NOTHING will be learned by going through those days AGAIN - even at the nitty gritty level - to evidence a longstanding policy of using military effort to dominate Europe. To evidence that, one needs to go through - at the nitty gritty level - all of the events prior to July and especially the entire period 1905-1914. In otherwords, the original poster is looking at the WRONG timeframe. Why? Why is he just parotting the illogical reasoning of those claiming events at the end of July prove earlier policy decisionmaking? I am sure Copeland et al have turned archives upside down looking for the earlier evidence - and what have they come up with?

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Terry Duncan
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#49

Post by Terry Duncan » 09 Oct 2018, 12:52

I think that sometimes it is useful to be able to talk through with others points you have read, especially if they seem to be convincingly put forward, and are in many cases contradictory. The July Crisis is hardly a straight-forward subject, if it were we wouldnt still be arguing about it over 100 years later.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#50

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2018, 14:37

Terry Duncan wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 12:52
I think that sometimes it is useful to be able to talk through with others points you have read, especially if they seem to be convincingly put forward, and are in many cases contradictory.
Indeed. And isn't that exactly what we are doing?
Terry Duncan wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 12:52
The July Crisis is hardly a straight-forward subject, if it were we wouldnt still be arguing about it over 100 years later.
How much of the lack of straight-forwardness is invented rather than actual. When I first decided to look at this subject some years ago, I only looked at the primary documentation contained in the 'colored books'. Just from those (which I believe are online and free to download) I was able to build a picture of the wider context into which I was able to piece together a coherent narrative of the events. That process, over several months (it is a hobby you know not a full time occupation), was what provided the foundation of my understanding and opinion. The first 'book' I picked up was Albertini - principally because he provides so much additional primary evidence within his own writing (diary extracts etc). A few modification to my understanding and opinion were needed. In effect, given that my opinion seemed to dovetail pretty closely with that of Albertini (remember, I made mine before I read his) indicated to me that it was not that difficult to follow the history - just take the time and effort to read it all with a clear head and a blank piece of paper that you add notes to (don't try to fit what you read to a preconceived narrative).

For me, the confusion is not an 'original confusion' because the subject is too complex for anybody to grasp, it is because there have been numerous attempts by various parties with an agenda to retell history a different way. This thread seems to be evidence of that. We are not being asked to clarify a historical point around which 'true' doubt exists, we are being asked to determine which narrative/theory/opinion of the many holds up!

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#51

Post by john2 » 09 Oct 2018, 17:06

MarkN said:
What the original poster seems to be asking for appears disconnected with the words actually written.
The original point of this thread was to talk about Copeland's claims. However as with most threads it drifted off topic. I sensed that Copeland was wrong as I know the prevailing theory today is that Germany didn't want a general war however I didn't know enough to disprove him. What I thought was interesting was how he was trying to reinterpret telegrams Bethmann had sent. However Copeland only summarized the telegrams he didn't actually show them. I have actually been hunting for them online - as reading the primary source material is exactly what I want to do. I guess perhaps instead of starting this thread I should have asked more what to read on the war.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#52

Post by MarkN » 10 Oct 2018, 16:39

john2 wrote:
09 Oct 2018, 17:06
What I thought was interesting was how he was trying to reinterpret telegrams Bethmann had sent. However Copeland only summarized the telegrams he didn't actually show them. I have actually been hunting for them online - as reading the primary source material is exactly what I want to do.
Here are the two ultimatums and the two corresponding telegrams sent to London and Rome at the same time.

Image Image Image Image

Enjoy!

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#53

Post by MarkN » 10 Oct 2018, 16:47

And here's what Albertini has to say about it....

Image Image Image Image Image Image Image Image

I downloaded Albertini and the documents at the beginning of the year after a brief google search.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#54

Post by john2 » 10 Oct 2018, 19:14

Somebody on here had actually just helped me get a hold of Albertini - which I am reading now a massive work and thank you for posting the ultimatums and telegrams. I will read up now and try to have a better discussion when I come back. Thanks everyone!

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#55

Post by glenn239 » 16 Nov 2018, 19:34

john2 wrote:
03 Oct 2018, 22:52
MarkN I think you did a good job debunking Copeland's claims regarding the telegrams as no one else as far as I know shares his view. But what about the ultimatums Germany sent to Russia and France that's what I'm curious about. As I mentioned in my last post:
Afternoon of the 31st. Germany sent out the ultimatums. The French ultimatum specifically mentioned war while the Russian ultimatum did not. Copeland claims the Germans were afraid the Russians would give in so they didn't mention war. I don't know what was going on but as I mentioned before it seemed strange what the Germans were doing. Why was the Russian ultimatum toned down? Especially if their mobilization was the entire reason Germany was supposed to be going to war! Again it is important to point out the French ultimatum was more threatening. It is also worth pointing out no matter how France or Russia answered they weren't to be let of the hook as Germany had rejection answers prepared in advance.
The answer to this question is sufficiently obvious I'm surprised Copeland didn't provide it. (I haven't read anything past the first couple posts of this thread yet). During the 1909 Bosnian Crisis in which Austria was slowly drifting towards war with Serbia, Berlin originally tried to stay in the background, but eventually warned the Russians quite sharply that if they continued down their anti-Austrian path it would mean war between Germany and Russia. The reaction in Russia then and in subsequent years was extreme indignity that the Germans would make such a threat.

Fast forward to 1914. The reason why Bethmann couched his wording to Russia was the memory of the Russians in 1909 - harsh wording would corner the Tzar into a negative response. The reason why Bethmann was more open with the French was in hopes that they would restrain Russia with knowledge of the gravity of the situation, but without feeling insulted directly themselves. So, Bethmann's motive was the opposite of Copeland's yarn. If Bethmann wanted war, then he sends the over-the-top threats to the Tzar, threats so humiliating that the Tzar cannot possibly back down and submit to Germany.

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Terry Duncan
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#56

Post by Terry Duncan » 16 Nov 2018, 19:42

If Germany were in some way trying to treat Russia with unusual outstanding sensitivity, this policy was somewhat destroyed when Jagow told Sverbeev that it was time to let the cannons do the talking. This is one of the reasons I think Jagow was working to a different agenda than Bethmann at the end of the crisis.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#57

Post by glenn239 » 16 Nov 2018, 19:46

MarkN wrote:
04 Oct 2018, 12:44
And finally, do not make the mistake that so many others do (almost everybody): mobilization does NOT mean war; war is not inevitable because of or after mobilization has begun. States can de-escalate by de-mobilizing before hostilities commence. WW1 became inevitable at two connected points in time: 1) when the belligerants chose not to de-escalate and pull back before hostilities had begun; and 2) shortly after hostilities had begun, failing to recognise the stupity and call it all off. In both cases, the Germans have prime responsibility since (by that time) it was they who were driving the events.

We've discussed this idea for years in the past. If mobilization did not almost inevitably mean war, then there should be more examples of general mobilizations of Great Powers followed by diplomatic comprimise. Can't give an exact figure, but if overall, war followed mobilization in 90%+ of all cases, I would not be surprised at that. Certainly, in 1914, all the Continental Powers were very concious that their mobilization moves could be taken for warlike acts. This is why Austria ordered a partial mobilization to begin with, why Russia attempted a partial mobilization in response, why Austria only ordered general mobilization after Russia did theirs against Galicia, and why the French bent over backwards with declarations of 10km limits even while calling something that resembled a partial mobilization. This is also why the Germans had a doctrine that mobilization meant war - because alone of the Great Powers, they had no plan for half-measures on the mobilization front. It's also why the French and Russians took the pain to fabricate their Orange and Yellow books to alter the chronology of mobilization - because mobilization was a warlike act and the order was important.

The exception to the rule was Great Britain, which did not feel its naval mobilization would be provocative, being ships.
Last edited by glenn239 on 16 Nov 2018, 20:02, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#58

Post by glenn239 » 16 Nov 2018, 20:00

Terry Duncan wrote:
16 Nov 2018, 19:42
If Germany were in some way trying to treat Russia with unusual outstanding sensitivity, this policy was somewhat destroyed when Jagow told Sverbeev that it was time to let the cannons do the talking. This is one of the reasons I think Jagow was working to a different agenda than Bethmann at the end of the crisis.
Jagow was of a different breed than Bethmann, to be sure.

The question in my mind was why Copeland would not provide the obvious answer I outlined for Bethmann's motives. Was Copeland being misleading or disingenious? Probably not. Fanatically convinced of his own opinion? Probably closer to the mark.

In fact, no matter what Bethmann did in his wording, Copeland could have spun the result to suit an agenda. If Bethmann had badgered the Russians with stiff threats but pulled his punches in Paris, Copeland would say that Bethmann was trying to goad the Tzar towards war while claiming innocence elsewhere by way of their false wording with the French. If Bethmann did not threaten war in either Paris or St. Petersburg, Copeland would say that Bethmann was being passively deceptive to goad the Russians to continue their mobilization and fall into his trap, knowing full well what he intended to do.

So what does Copeland say Bethmann should have done on July 31st, given that in any option involving a warning/ultimatum, it can be spun to suggest sinister motives?

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#59

Post by glenn239 » 16 Nov 2018, 20:11

ljadw wrote:
05 Oct 2018, 21:54
You forget 2 things :
1 Russia did not declare war on AH even not when AH declared war on Serbia .
2 AH declared war on Russia,but only on August 5 ,after very heavy German pressure .
The reality is that on 31 July,there was still a big chance to avoid war between AH and Russia ,and that Germany torpedoed this chance by its unneeded DoW on Russia, unneeded because the Russian mobilisation did not represent a danger for Germany .
When Germany declared war on Russia, the Russian army was mobilizing under the "A" variant, meaning 4 armies against Austria and 2 armies against Germany, with a 7th Army that would concentrate in Warsaw and could swing either way. (Historically, 9th Army swung south to face Austria).

After the German DOW on Russia, but before the Austrian DOW on Russia, the Russians CONTINUED with their "A" variant mobilization to place 5 armies on the Austrian frontier. This is despite the fact that at that moment they were at peace with Austria and at war with Germany. They did not alter their concentration to the "G" variant, which they could have done right up to August 6th or 7th. The best explanation from this is that despite the German DOW, on 1 August the Russians had every intention of attacking Austria when their mobilization was complete around the 20th of August.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#60

Post by glenn239 » 16 Nov 2018, 20:20

MarkN wrote:
07 Oct 2018, 20:16
. At some point Grey realised this was happening and his approach took a major change - so why waste further time with the ruse. Whilst writing this, I have a feeling that Grey change of approach may well have been after, and because of, Bethmann's change
Austria's DOW on Serbia occurred on July 28th, then Grey switched his tone on July 29th and warned the Germans that a chain of DOW's out of the Danube and across Germany into France could draw the British in. Did Grey suddenly grasp this truth on July 29th? I doubt it. Did Grey's change of heart come because of Bethmann's 29 July neutrality offer? No - Grey changed course and warned Lichnowsky before he had word from Berlin of this offer.

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