Germany's handling of the July crisis.

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MarkN
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#76

Post by MarkN » 19 Nov 2018, 21:34

glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
The Saudi murder in Turkey last month appears to have been authorized by Saudi government at the highest levels, which now seeks to cover its tracks and pretend that what was a state-ordered killing was instead a rogue operation. Are you certain this is the example you wish to use for Sarajevo in 1914?
Absolutely. Even though there appears to be direct links to the Saudi rulers, Turkey is not talking about war as the way to resolve this and the US (at least the WhiteHouse) is doing everything it can to appease the Saudis!!!!!

The key to this is not who gets angry with whom and why, but that Austro-Hungary decided the only solution was war.
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
You first indicated that the attack was local, meaning Austrian in origin.
Correct. The group was called Mlada Bosna and came from Bosnia which had been annexed by Austria. They were citizens of Bosna, ie Austro-Hungarian citizens, acting against their own ruler. They were acting against what they saw as Austro-Hungarian occupation and oppression.
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
I replied by observing it was not my understanding that the Chief of Intelligence for the Serbian army was a member of the Austrian General Staff. Now you're suggesting that perhaps Apis - a Serbian army officer - was involved, but perhaps acting independently of the Serbian government. So what of it even if so? He's still not Austrian and the origins of the attack are still not orchestrated on Austrian soil.
So? The point is: was war with a neighboring state that was not responsible for perpetrating the crime the only solution?
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
Rejecting the threadbare conclusion that the CP were not "99.8" percent responsible for WW1 is not apologising for the CP, it's correcting for your quite frankly apologist attitudes towards the Entente Powers, which collectively were every bit as willing for war as their CP counterparts. There is a range of perfectly reasonable assignment of responsibility around the 50% or 66% mark for the CP - zero to one standard deviation. 99.8% is four standard deviations, far off the mark for an average guess in any situation with such convoluted origins and counterclaims.
99.8% is deliberately meant as a bit of fun. Clearly lost on you. Remember, I attributed 1% to Belgium for having sickly chocolate and dreadful beer. :lol:
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
So now you get to set the "rules" as to who gets to have which war.
I set the collective response of Europe to the Austro-German invasion of Denmark in 1864, did I?
blah blah blah snipped....
Yes, you've decided that you set the rules. You've decided that "Austria had a sufficient case to justifying Russia staying her hand" based upon "My personal guesses are that the origin of the attack was in Serbia and that Apis had to know of it". Even if the latter were true, it doesn't automatically grant the former.

I have noticed this is a common posting tactic (probably thought process too) of yours: introduce your own personal opinion into a wider historical context, conflate the two then, when questionned on your opinion, counter by referencing the historical.

In my opinion, Austro-Hungary had no case to justify war against Serbia.
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
The Czar tried to prevent that war and his efforts seem to have been working. However, the Germans (in particular Moltke) were unhappy with this turn of events and put in motion the steps that turned a criminal act (murder) into a Europe-wide conflaguration.
The manner of such wars prior to 1914 was that mediation did not attempt to avert fighting, but worked to finalize the peace terms of the fighting after the war was underway. This was an entirely different approach than what Russia chose in July 1914. Why did Russia choose to act differently? I conclude because Russia's intention was to smash the Austro-Hungarian Empire once and for all -
Trying to prevent a war without any bloodshed sounds like a damn good idea to me.

But good of you to reinterpret it as 'evidence' of "Russia's intention was to smash the Austro-Hungarian Empire once and for all".

If Russia's (sole) intent was to go to war with Austro-Hungarian, it could have declared war on 26 July immediatly after the Austro-Hungarian declaration against Serbia. But it didn't. The Czar mobilized against Austro-Hungary to try to influence its decisionmaking and prevent war. Even after, Austro-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, even after it had shelled Belgrade and elsewhere, even after the Germans had declared war on them, the Czar still held back hoping for a peaceful resolution. The Czar's hopes and plans failed because some in Austro-Hungary were determined to have their war with Serbia and Moltke was exploiting the situation to have his grand European war.
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
Quite so! The idea that Russia, France and Britain must shoulder responsibility for WW1 because they didn't "respect" Austro-Hungary's desire to smash up Serbia and "respect" Germany's desire to support Austro-Hungary smashing up Serbia is laughable. :lol:
Inserting a fanciful outcomes to a war that had not happened yet might be necessary to pursue your thesis, but entirely unconvincing as a likely occurence in the real world; Russia mobilized not because it feared the annexation of Serbia but because it feared that Austria would perform a Straffexpedition and withdraw, thereby having set a precedent for future unilateral action against Serbian irresponsibility that would strip Russia of the pretense to breaking up Austria-Hungary.
Wow!!! :lol:
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 20:17
Mind you, Grey did offer to throw Serbia completely under the Teutonic bus if it meant Britain could stay out of the conflict. But I doubt that had anything to do with "respect" and everything to do with clinging to domestic power. :wink:
Grey's position was that if Russia would hold the ring so too would Britain. This was not an offer so much as it was a statement of common sense. For Grey to have stated otherwise would be similar to Germany declaring war on Serbia when Austria did not want to.

During the crisis, Grey's tone was generally neutralist prior to July 29th and generally interventionist afterwards. Why that date? I think because Austria declared war on Serbia the day prior. So, was Grey actually interventionist prior to July 29th, but awaiting the Austrian DOW? I think this was so.
Grey's position throughout was governed by the Cabinet. When the Cabinet's 'mood' changed, then Grey could act differently.

MarkN
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#77

Post by MarkN » 19 Nov 2018, 21:44

glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 19:41
If Russia is not to be blamed for undertaking a policy of national suicide to fight in a war whose stated purpose did not yet look like the most probable outcome and when Russian national security itself was not threatened, then I know not what the purpose of censuring governments for their poorest decisions would be; Tzarist Russia risked its existence on a luxury conflict only tangential to its national interests.
The Czar's policy was not "to fight in a war" but to prevent a war between a bullying aggressor attacking a smaller ally of his. As regal dictator, his method was to use his army to stand on the border. Regal dictators tend not to be the smartest of thinkers, nor the greatest diplomats. Nevertheless, his single failing was to not recognise that Moltke was manipulating the situation to create a grand European war.
glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 19:41
An Austro-Serbian 3rd Balkans war might have ended with a defeat of Serbia, but Russian and Entente influence would have continued in the region as before. Given the poor showing of Austrian arms in 1914 and the expectation of tough Serbian resistance in the mountains south of Belgrade, it is entirely possible that Russia would have emerged with increased influence in the Balkans from such an Austrian adventure. I disagree completely that there was any possibility of Entente/Russian influence being eliminated at a stroke. It simply could not happen.
So what?

I appreciate that you seem quite happy for Austro-Hungary to smash up Serbia willy nilly - or at least based upon a tenuous link and chasm leap between crime and punishment. The rest of what you post is attempting to then appease that initial warmongering attitude and act.


glenn239
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#78

Post by glenn239 » 20 Nov 2018, 21:41

MarkN wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 21:34

Absolutely. Even though there appears to be direct links to the Saudi rulers, Turkey is not talking about war as the way to resolve this and the US (at least the WhiteHouse) is doing everything it can to appease the Saudis!!!!!

The key to this is not who gets angry with whom and why, but that Austro-Hungary decided the only solution was war.
I didn't think an example of where a state ordered an attack and then tried to cover it up, now by moving to execute its own officials, would be the example you were looking for to convince people that the Serbians weren't covering up in 1914, also executing their own officials.
The group was called Mlada Bosna and came from Bosnia which had been annexed by Austria. They were citizens of Bosna, ie Austro-Hungarian citizens, acting against their own ruler. They were acting against what they saw as Austro-Hungarian occupation and oppression.
According to the Serbians, their Chief of Intelligence of the Serbian general staff orchestrated the attack. Was this man an Austrian or a Serbian?
So? The point is: was war with a neighboring state that was not responsible for perpetrating the crime the only solution?
No, the point is that after the Austrian overreacted the Entente had longstanding precedent to mediate while fighting continued. All the talk of "crushing" and "swallowing" and "annexing was just that - talk. The Germans had vowed none of this, so if they'd tried to alter the deal the Russians could mobilize in January 1915 and the Germans couldn't effectively attack France in response because of the weather.
99.8% is deliberately meant as a bit of fun. Clearly lost on you. Remember, I attributed 1% to Belgium for having sickly chocolate and dreadful beer. :lol:
So what's the actual estimate then? I can live with 66% CP, but I personally think it more like 50/50 between the sides. The Austrians overreacted, but then having done so, the Entente also overreacted.
Yes, you've decided that you set the rules.
No, the pattern was that wars broke out then were mediated before they could spread. Why did the Entente reverse that rule of thumb and spread the conflict before the war broke out? The Entente professed worry over the fate of Serbia, but I think it closer to the mark that the Russians were concerned about the fate of Austria-Hungary.
I have noticed this is a common posting tactic (probably thought process too) of yours: introduce your own personal opinion into a wider historical context, conflate the two then, when questionned on your opinion, counter by referencing the historical.
It was you, not I, that suggested the Entente was acting properly to draw lines in the sand before an Austrian campaign against Serbia was even underway. I would have thought, when challenged on that point, you'd have provided more examples in the 100 years prior of wars that drew neutral power in before the fighting had even started. Yet, you have provided not a single one. Where is this war, where a Great Power attacked a large or small country, and the neutral powers poured into the war before the fighting had even begun?
In my opinion, Austro-Hungary had no case to justify war against Serbia.
Insufficient I can see. "No" case at all veers back towards that 99.8% figure you said was a joke.
Trying to prevent a war without any bloodshed sounds like a damn good idea to me.
The Russians had let Serbia fight two Balkans wars without getting involved, there was no need to dive into a third before it had even started. Now, if the Central Powers had proved completely incorrigible on terms and gone back on their word in the fall, and moved towards annexations, maybe the Russians need to review their neutrality. But that never happened, the Russians jumped the gun, so eager were they to get at the Austrians before the winter made campaigning in Galicia too difficult.
But good of you to reinterpret it as 'evidence' of "Russia's intention was to smash the Austro-Hungarian Empire once and for all".
Perhaps then the Russians were desiring to invite the Austrians to a picnic by sending in 50 divisions and trying to go over the Carpathians to Budapest?
If Russia's (sole) intent was to go to war with Austro-Hungarian, it could have declared war on 26 July immediatly after the Austro-Hungarian declaration against Serbia.
Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July, Russia commenced mobilization on 29 July. They could not have pulled the trigger on a pretext any faster.
But it didn't. The Czar mobilized against Austro-Hungary to try to influence its decisionmaking and prevent war.
The Russians mobilized for the purpose of attacking Austria-Hungary. If the point was to influence decision making they'd have held back and put pressure on the Germans to reign in their ally in exchange for holding off mobilization.
Grey's position throughout was governed by the Cabinet. When the Cabinet's 'mood' changed, then Grey could act differently.
Which cabinet ruling on 28 or 29 July are you referring to with regards to the Austro-Serbian war?

glenn239
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#79

Post by glenn239 » 20 Nov 2018, 21:49

MarkN wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 21:44
I appreciate that you seem quite happy for Austro-Hungary to smash up Serbia willy nilly - or at least based upon a tenuous link and chasm leap between crime and punishment. The rest of what you post is attempting to then appease that initial warmongering attitude and act.
The Russians wanted to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all. That's why in September 1914 the Entente Powers made the London declaration rather than talk to the Austrians - to give Russia a blank cheque it coveted to do what it wanted in Austria, in exchange for the Anglo-French blank cheque with respect to Germany. You are appeasing this aggression - by which Russia destroyed itself - by overplaying the Serbian sympathy card.

Now true, had Austria backed away from war in 1914 so too the Russians. But the war to smash Austria would come so long as the Entente itself held, for the motive was paramount and aggressive. I know not how anyone can look at a war where Russia acted at all turns to crush a Great Power, even to the point of utter self-destruction rather than swerve from that intention, and then conclude that Russia bore no responsibility for the obviousness of its aims.

You tell me 66/33 on responsibility, I can live with that, even while holding to 50/50 myself. So what's the ratio?

MarkN
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#80

Post by MarkN » 21 Nov 2018, 00:03

glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
MarkN wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 21:34

Absolutely. Even though there appears to be direct links to the Saudi rulers, Turkey is not talking about war as the way to resolve this and the US (at least the WhiteHouse) is doing everything it can to appease the Saudis!!!!!
I didn't think an example of where a state ordered an attack and then tried to cover it up, now by moving to execute its own officials, would be the example you were looking for to convince people that the Serbians weren't covering up in 1914, also executing their own officials.
The two cases are quite, quite different. But have no more, or less, in common than with your attempt to equate Russia today with Austro-Hungary in 1914.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
The group was called Mlada Bosna and came from Bosnia which had been annexed by Austria. They were citizens of Bosna, ie Austro-Hungarian citizens, acting against their own ruler. They were acting against what they saw as Austro-Hungarian occupation and oppression.
According to the Serbians, their Chief of Intelligence of the Serbian general staff orchestrated the attack. Was this man an Austrian or a Serbian?
3 years later the Serbs wanted to get rid of Dragutin Dimitrijevic. That seemed another 'good' charge to level against him. The Serbian accusation is no stronger than the Austro-Hungarian one earlier. It's now been over a 100 years since the event and plenty of people have spent an enormous amout of time trying to come up with the evidence. Still looking.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
So? The point is: was war with a neighboring state that was not responsible for perpetrating the crime the only solution?
No, the point is that after the Austrian overreacted the Entente had longstanding precedent to mediate while fighting continued. All the talk of "crushing" and "swallowing" and "annexing was just that - talk. The Germans had vowed none of this, so if they'd tried to alter the deal the Russians could mobilize in January 1915 and the Germans couldn't effectively attack France in response because of the weather.
What are you on about????

Do you really think it is OK to smash up a country on false pretenses as long as a friend such a Germany promises that you won't annex or swallow?

The Russians were trying to prevent bloodshed. I appreciate that's too much for you to swallow as it undermines your argument.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
99.8% is deliberately meant as a bit of fun. Clearly lost on you. Remember, I attributed 1% to Belgium for having sickly chocolate and dreadful beer. :lol:
So what's the actual estimate then? I can live with 66% CP, but I personally think it more like 50/50 between the sides. The Austrians overreacted, but then having done so, the Entente also overreacted.
I believe it is quite wrong to see this as a zero-sum equation. Divvying up blame into 100 parts and allocationg to one or another is just plain wrong. The idea that as one 1% part gets allocated to a certain party that 1% cannot be allocated to someone else is daft. It is the calculation of those trying to unburden responsibility onto another.

WW1 became the conflaguartion that it was due to a series of events and decisions. Clearly it takes two to party and some of those decisions were made by Russia, France and Britain. Some of those decision made were done in the best interest of peace, but were then manipulated and exploited by others to their advantage to get the war they wanted. The idea that an exploited 'good' decision gets awarded 'responsibility percentage' is, as I wrote, an attempt by some to unburden responsibility onto another.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
Yes, you've decided that you set the rules.
No, the pattern was that wars broke out then were mediated before they could spread. Why did the Entente reverse that rule of thumb and spread the conflict before the war broke out? The Entente professed worry over the fate of Serbia, but I think it closer to the mark that the Russians were concerned about the fate of Austria-Hungary.
OK. It is quite clear, from across a series of exchanges that we have had, that you have an understanding of the world and history quite different to mine and what has been documented.
I challenged you on making up the rule that you get to decide that Austro-Hungary should smash up Serbia and that that decision should be accepted and respected by Russia and everone else. Continuing to ignore that challenge by banging on about your own ahistorical theory does not help.

States who want war tend to just get on with it. Like Austro-Hungary and Germany in 1914.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
I have noticed this is a common posting tactic (probably thought process too) of yours: introduce your own personal opinion into a wider historical context, conflate the two then, when questionned on your opinion, counter by referencing the historical.
It was you, not I, that suggested the Entente was acting properly to draw lines in the sand before an Austrian campaign against Serbia was even underway. I would have thought, when challenged on that point, you'd have provided more examples in the 100 years prior of wars that drew neutral power in before the fighting had even started. Yet, you have provided not a single one. Where is this war, where a Great Power attacked a large or small country, and the neutral powers poured into the war before the fighting had even begun?
Russia was trying to prevent bloodshed. Drawing a line before the bloodshed starts is a bit of a no brainer. It least it is to me.

And no "neutral powers poured into the war before the fighting had even begun" in 1914. You're making up nonsense.

It seems so you have got so wrapped up in your own theory, you've lost the plot.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
In my opinion, Austro-Hungary had no case to justify war against Serbia.
Insufficient I can see. "No" case at all veers back towards that 99.8% figure you said was a joke.
I repeat, In my opinion, Austro-Hungary had no case to justify war against Serbia. For that part of the chain of events, I award 99.99% to Austro-Hungary and 0.01% to Belgium for supplying the murder weapon. I would award more to Belgium, but no sickly chocolates or dreadful beer had any part in this element of the narrative. :lol:
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
Trying to prevent a war without any bloodshed sounds like a damn good idea to me.
The Russians had let Serbia fight two Balkans wars without getting involved, there was no need to dive into a third before it had even started. Now, if the Central Powers had proved completely incorrigible on terms and gone back on their word in the fall, and moved towards annexations, maybe the Russians need to review their neutrality. But that never happened, the Russians jumped the gun, so eager were they to get at the Austrians before the winter made campaigning in Galicia too difficult.
The connection between this and the decision-making in 1914 is entirely of your own making to somehow lend credibility to your theory. Just like all the references back to invasions of Denmark and so on.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
But good of you to reinterpret it as 'evidence' of "Russia's intention was to smash the Austro-Hungarian Empire once and for all".
Perhaps then the Russians were desiring to invite the Austrians to a picnic by sending in 50 divisions and trying to go over the Carpathians to Budapest?
You have lost the plot.

The Russians invaded Austro-Hungary and were making their way to Budapast before Austro-Hungary declared war on Russia? I think not!!!! :lol:

The Czar mobilized some of his army to leverage/influence Austro-Hungarian thinking over its aggressive stance towards Serbia. It was a plan that didn't work. In fact, it backfired, because that mobilization was then used and manipulated by Moltke initially, and then Germany as a state.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
If Russia's (sole) intent was to go to war with Austro-Hungarian, it could have declared war on 26 July immediatly after the Austro-Hungarian declaration against Serbia.

Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July, Russia commenced mobilization on 29 July. They could not have pulled the trigger on a pretext any faster.
My apologies on the typo. 28 was indeed the date.

The direction, incremental nature and time of each step of the Russian mobilization were direct responses to Austro-Hungarian efforts pointed at Serbia. If, as you want us to believe with your theory, that Russia truely was exploiting the Austro-Hungarian/Serbia matter for their own ends, then they would have been pro-actively mobilizing according to their own strategic and tactical demands - just like the Austro-Hungarians did; just like Germans did.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
But it didn't. The Czar mobilized against Austro-Hungary to try to influence its decisionmaking and prevent war.
The Russians mobilized for the purpose of attacking Austria-Hungary.
That's your ahistorical theory designed to shift responsibility for the bloodshed.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
If the point was to influence decision making they'd have held back and put pressure on the Germans to reign in their ally in exchange for holding off mobilization.
Which is exactly what Moltke would have had a wet dream over!

Russian diplomatic efforts (perhaps others to) seem to have been working on Austro-Hungary. They dillied and dallied for what, 4 weeks, before they finally got around to declaring war on Serbia. And will still far from ready themselves militarily. And it was only that early based on support and 'encouragement' from Berlin.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:41
Grey's position throughout was governed by the Cabinet. When the Cabinet's 'mood' changed, then Grey could act differently.
Which cabinet ruling on 28 or 29 July are you referring to with regards to the Austro-Serbian war?
I haven't mentionned any cabinet ruling on 28 or 29 July. That was something you introduced. Another of your tricks?
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:49
MarkN wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 21:44
I appreciate that you seem quite happy for Austro-Hungary to smash up Serbia willy nilly - or at least based upon a tenuous link and chasm leap between crime and punishment. The rest of what you post is attempting to then appease that initial warmongering attitude and act.
The Russians wanted to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all.
Yes. I know that's your ahistorical theory designed to shift responsibility for the bloodshed.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:49
Now true, had Austria backed away from war in 1914 so too the Russians. But the war to smash Austria would come so long as the Entente itself held, for the motive was paramount and aggressive. I know not how anyone can look at a war where Russia acted at all turns to crush a Great Power, even to the point of utter self-destruction rather than swerve from that intention, and then conclude that Russia bore no responsibility for the obviousness of its aims.
It was certainly Moltke's, probably most other people's too - probably by mine too if I studied the details closely enough - that the relative strength of Russia against Germany (and Austro-Hungary) was growing with time but that, in 1914, Germany still had a head in front. That's why Moltke felt he stood a chance in 1914 and was not willing to wait any longer for the European war.

If the Czar truely had his eyes on breaking up Austro-Hungary, and I see that as being a reasonable long term goal, 1914 was NOT the time to do it. It was very much in the Czar's interests to wait. History shows that to be correct. The Czar lost everything because the war started in 1914.
glenn239 wrote:
20 Nov 2018, 21:49
You tell me 66/33 on responsibility, I can live with that, even while holding to 50/50 myself. So what's the ratio?
As mentionned above, the zero-sum equation is not appropriate.

Austro-Hungary is FULLY responsible for annexing Bosnia and governing it in the way that they did.

The members of Mlada Bosna who planned and implemented their murder in Sarajevo are FULLY responsible for their actions.

Austro-Hungary is FULLY responsible for turning a domestic criminal act into an international incident and for commencing a war against a neigbor without credible justification or reason.

Germany is FULLY responsible for turning that incident into a pan-Europe wide conflaguration.

Russia is FULLY responsible for trying to prevent the initial, unjustfied and unnecessary Balkan bloodshed and then being outmanouvered and having its good intentions manipulated and exploited.

France is FULLY responsible for its decision to stand by its alliance with Russia.

Luxembourg and Belgium are FULLY responsible for being in an inconvenient geographical location.

Belgium is additionally FULLY responsible for seeking help when attacked by Germany.

Britain is FULLY responsible for honouring its prior obligation to Belgium.

And finally, Belgium is 100% guilty of having sickly chocolates, dreadful beer and for supplying the weapon that started this terrible mess.

glenn239
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Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#81

Post by glenn239 » 21 Nov 2018, 20:40

MarkN wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 00:03
Do you really think it is OK to smash up a country on false pretenses as long as a friend such a Germany promises that you won't annex or swallow?
Austria should not have acted so rashly. But, once it had done so, there was no compelling reason Entente should have reacted so aggressively, your ideas that a world war was a lesser transgression against European progress than a 3rd Balkans War notwithstanding.
The Russians were trying to prevent bloodshed. I appreciate that's too much for you to swallow as it undermines your argument.
The Russian intention was to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all, then rule over the pieces. Had the Austrians backed down in July 1914 that intention would not have altered one bit.
I believe it is quite wrong to see this as a zero-sum equation. Divvying up blame into 100 parts and allocationg to one or another is just plain wrong. The idea that as one 1% part gets allocated to a certain party that 1% cannot be allocated to someone else is daft. It is the calculation of those trying to unburden responsibility onto another.
Courts have assigned responsibility in this manner - in parts - for a very long time. It's fundamental to anything that requires blame be assigned, where the participants are all claiming their innocence, (and when in fact, none were). The biggest strike against the Austro-Germans was that Sarajevo did not rise to the level of requiring war. The biggest strike against the Entente was that a 3rd Balkans War did not either.
I challenged you on making up the rule that you get to decide that Austro-Hungary should smash up Serbia and that that decision should be accepted and respected by Russia....
Again, you jump the gun and insert an outcome favorable to your ideas, but that we have no evidence for. Austria will 'smash up' Serbia? No, it would not have. Had Russia not mobilized and the Austrian campaign continued the most likely outcome was that Belgrade would fall and the Austrian offensive bogs down in the mountains, the adverse weather causing a stalemate during the winter of 1914-1915 that Austria cannot break until the spring. The diplomats would have had plenty of time to work out a solution satisfactory to both sides, which would have to include an Austrian withdrawal, and if this were not so, the French and Russian armies could have mobilized if need be for the spring 1915 campaign. But, what would be different is - the Schlieffen plan's key premise was fair weather when Russia mobilized.
And no "neutral powers poured into the war before the fighting had even begun" in 1914. You're making up nonsense.
Russia and France both mobilized at Germany before Germany mobilized at them, and both did so before the Austrian offensive into Serbia had commenced.
The connection between this and the decision-making in 1914 is entirely of your own making to somehow lend credibility to your theory. Just like all the references back to invasions of Denmark and so on.
You've imposed a frame of reference onto 1914 that didn't actually exist in 1914. An Austro-Serbian war was an unremarkable event - there had actually been fighting already in the Austrian Bosnian war.
The Russians invaded Austro-Hungary and were making their way to Budapast..
Correct, the Russian campaign objective was to cross the Carpathian mountains and occupy Budapest, after which the Austrian Empire could be dissolved. The dissolution of the Austrian Empire was made politically possible by the September Declaration. Contrary to expectation, the Austrian army stopped them.
If, as you want us to believe with your theory, that Russia truely was exploiting the Austro-Hungarian/Serbia matter for their own ends, then they would have been pro-actively mobilizing according to their own strategic and tactical demands - just like the Austro-Hungarians did; just like Germans did.
The Russians had no military need to speed their mobilization at Austria in July 1914. Nor were the Russians fixed on causing a war in 1914 no matter what - had the Austrians been cowed, then no doubt Sazonov would have been perfectly content to have left off a war to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all to another year - on the basis of the fact that time was on Russia's side. (The possible exception was the Ottoman Empire, whose rapid recovery after 1912 was causing concern in Russia, their aggressive intentions there as well, part of the equation).
Which is exactly what Moltke would have had a wet dream over!
Moltke didn't care about non-Russian mobilization. What concerned him was secret mobilizations, or if the German government got tied up in diplomatic soap bubbles intended to tie his hands, then allowing the Franco-Russians to throw off the mask after their mobilizations were complete. This too was not a new feature - in both 1866 and 1870 the then Prussian army had experienced some difficulty getting the Kaiser to commit to mobilization. (In 1870 the French declared war quickly, solving the problem, but in 1866 it went on for weeks and left Moltke the Elder at a considerable disadvantage in the first weeks of the campaign).
Russian diplomatic efforts (perhaps others to) seem to have been working on Austro-Hungary. They dillied and dallied for what, 4 weeks, before they finally got around to declaring war on Serbia. And will still far from ready themselves militarily. And it was only that early based on support and 'encouragement' from Berlin.
Russian diplomacy in 1914 was to the effect that Serbia was in their sphere of influence, when it was not, and that the Ottomans were also within their sphere of influence, when it was not.
I haven't mentionned any cabinet ruling on 28 or 29 July. That was something you introduced. Another of your tricks?
No, you stated that Grey's policy in the July Crisis was set by cabinet, but cabinet made no ruling between 28 and 29 July that accounts for his reversal. On 28 July the Germans thought the British would remain neutral, on 29 July Grey told them if France came in, Britain would have to make some very hard, very fast decisions. Cabinet never made this change. Grey did.
It was certainly Moltke's, probably most other people's too -
Correct, Moltke wished to smash the French army just as Joffre wished to smash the German army, and the Russians wished to smash the Austrian army. However, where there is a difference is that only the Russians could anticipate the complete annihilation of their enemy as a political entity if victorious - the Austrian Empire being polyglot meant that a victorious power could always opt to break it up.
If the Czar truely had his eyes on breaking up Austro-Hungary, and I see that as being a reasonable long term goal, 1914 was NOT the time to do it. It was very much in the Czar's interests to wait. History shows that to be correct. The Czar lost everything because the war started in 1914.
The first steps to the dissolution of the Austrian Empire were taken in mid-August 1914 when the Russians declared a new Poland to be hacked out of Austrian and German territory. No doubt the proclimations would have followed with the Russian armies, had the CP armies not stopped them at the Carpathians.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#82

Post by Terry Duncan » 21 Nov 2018, 21:06

glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
The Russian intention was to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all, then rule over the pieces. Had the Austrians backed down in July 1914 that intention would not have altered one bit.
I don't suppose you have any particular source for such a claim? I have no doubt that Russia would have enjoyed seeing the Hapsburg Empire fall apart, or even to take some land if the chance arose, but I have never seen any documents to suggest Russia intended to use her military force to effect this, indeed, most authors claim it was Constantinople that the Russians were fixated upon.
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
Moltke didn't care about non-Russian mobilization. What concerned him was secret mobilizations, or...
Moltke was clearly not bothered by mobilisation, the ultimatum made it clear it was all mobilisation measures that were the offence. All the pre-mobilisation measures such as requisitioning horses and fodder measures that Austria had already begun and Germany herself was also in the process of enacting with the canceling of officers leave etc. That Russia had decided to mobilise made no difference, it was the initiation of preliminary measures that was enough to tip the Germans into action.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#83

Post by MarkN » 21 Nov 2018, 23:15

glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
MarkN wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 00:03
Do you really think it is OK to smash up a country on false pretenses as long as a friend such a Germany promises that you won't annex or swallow?
Austria should not have acted so rashly. But, once it had done so, there was no compelling reason Entente should have reacted so aggressively, your ideas that a world war was a lesser transgression against European progress than a 3rd Balkans War notwithstanding.
Really? Do you really think I can take you seriously when you completely reverse my words to push your ahistorical theory/nonsense?
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
The Russians were trying to prevent bloodshed. I appreciate that's too much for you to swallow as it undermines your argument.
The Russian intention was to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all, then rule over the pieces. Had the Austrians backed down in July 1914 that intention would not have altered one bit.
Yeah, yeah, yeah! So you keep saying. I know it's your theory.
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
I believe it is quite wrong to see this as a zero-sum equation. Divvying up blame into 100 parts and allocationg to one or another is just plain wrong. The idea that as one 1% part gets allocated to a certain party that 1% cannot be allocated to someone else is daft. It is the calculation of those trying to unburden responsibility onto another.
Courts have assigned responsibility in this manner - in parts - for a very long time. It's fundamental to anything that requires blame be assigned, where the participants are all claiming their innocence, (and when in fact, none were). The biggest strike against the Austro-Germans was that Sarajevo did not rise to the level of requiring war. The biggest strike against the Entente was that a 3rd Balkans War did not either.
Fine.
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
I challenged you on making up the rule that you get to decide that Austro-Hungary should smash up Serbia and that that decision should be accepted and respected by Russia....
Again, you jump the gun and insert an outcome favorable to your ideas, but that we have no evidence for. Austria will 'smash up' Serbia? No, it would not have.
So Austro-Hungary was going to invade Serbia without smashing it up. One of the first rounds they fired from Bezanija went into a high school. Indescriminate artillery rounds into a city centre. No, not smashing up at all.... :roll:
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
Had Russia not mobilized and the Austrian campaign continued the most likely outcome was that Belgrade would fall and the Austrian offensive bogs down in the mountains, the adverse weather causing a stalemate during the winter of 1914-1915 that Austria cannot break until the spring. The diplomats would have had plenty of time to work out a solution satisfactory to both sides, which would have to include an Austrian withdrawal, and if this were not so, the French and Russian armies could have mobilized if need be for the spring 1915 campaign. But, what would be different is - the Schlieffen plan's key premise was fair weather when Russia mobilized.
So there you go. You're happy for Austro-Hungary to smash up Serbia because you've made up your mind that Serbia will manage to block them and give everybody time to chinwag. Who considered that possible at the time? The fact that Serbia surprised everybody with it's resilience is only available to us with hindsight.

The Kaiser thought along your lines too: quick smash and grab of Belgrade to satisfy the Emporer for his personal loss and then chinwag their way out of further both. Most people consider his plan as mad as box of frogs. And here you are presenting it as the centre piece of your theory to demonstrate how everybody else got it wrong by trying to stop the bloodshed at its source before it even happened!

Wow! :roll:
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
And no "neutral powers poured into the war before the fighting had even begun" in 1914. You're making up nonsense.
Russia and France both mobilized at Germany before Germany mobilized at them, and both did so before the Austrian offensive into Serbia had commenced.
Mobilization is not war. Austr-Hungary started war with Serbia on 28 July. Germany started war with Luxembourg on 1 August. Then up came Belgium. Who did Britain, France and Russia attack BEFORE somebody had attacked them or declared war upon them? Britain of course!
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
The Russians invaded Austro-Hungary and were making their way to Budapast..
Correct, the Russian campaign objective was to cross the Carpathian mountains and occupy Budapest, after which the Austrian Empire could be dissolved. The dissolution of the Austrian Empire was made politically possible by the September Declaration. Contrary to expectation, the Austrian army stopped them.
You wrote: Perhaps then the Russians were desiring to invite the Austrians to a picnic by sending in 50 divisions and trying to go over the Carpathians to Budapest?
In response to my: But good of you to reinterpret it as 'evidence' of "Russia's intention was to smash the Austro-Hungarian Empire once and for all".
The Russians were NOT marching on Budapest even when Austro-Hungary had declared war on Russia. Why am I not surprised that you don't see that as problematic in trying to use it as proof or Russian responsibility? :roll:
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
If, as you want us to believe with your theory, that Russia truely was exploiting the Austro-Hungarian/Serbia matter for their own ends, then they would have been pro-actively mobilizing according to their own strategic and tactical demands - just like the Austro-Hungarians did; just like Germans did.
The Russians had no military need to speed their mobilization at Austria in July 1914.
If they had any aspirations to take some or all of Austro-Hungary, it was imperative they mobilize as early as possible and as quickly as possible. It is because they were not doing this that tells me that your theory is a pile of reinterpreted agenda-driven nonsense.
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
Nor were the Russians fixed on causing a war in 1914 no matter what - had the Austrians been cowed, then no doubt Sazonov would have been perfectly content to have left off a war to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all to another year -
Oh dear! I'm not sure whether this is a deliberate backtrack or one of the common contradictions that pop out as you try to square your very ahistorical theory.

If Russia had any interest in deliberately pushing the Balkan spat into an opportunity "to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all" they HAD to mobilize as early as possible and as quickly as possible. If Austro-Hungary backed down, bonus. Wait for another opportunity. But without getting mobilization in early, they wouldn't stand a chance. Just as history played out. Did they get to Budapest?
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
Which is exactly what Moltke would have had a wet dream over!
Moltke didn't care about non-Russian mobilization.
Now you're just being silly....
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
What concerned him was secret mobilizations,
Box. Frogs. :lol:
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
Russian diplomacy in 1914 was to the effect that Serbia was in their sphere of influence, when it was not, and that the Ottomans were also within their sphere of influence, when it was not.
They still do.
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
I haven't mentionned any cabinet ruling on 28 or 29 July. That was something you introduced. Another of your tricks?
No, you stated that Grey's policy in the July Crisis was set by cabinet, but cabinet made no ruling between 28 and 29 July that accounts for his reversal. On 28 July the Germans thought the British would remain neutral, on 29 July Grey told them if France came in, Britain would have to make some very hard, very fast decisions. Cabinet never made this change. Grey did.
I see you're reading something into that that is not there. And for some reason, think I'm the one pushing the dead horse.... :roll:
... the Germans thought ... // ... Grey says the British would make hard and fast decisions ...
Where, pray tell in there, do get from Grey has changed his mind?
It's off the top of my head, it was about this time that Grey seems to have finally recognised that Germany was no longer (if ever) working for peace and, of course, Austro-Hungary had started war against Serbia. It doesn't seem out of sorts for him to start rethinking his approach. But, that doesn't mean - historically it didn't mean - the Cabinet was changing direction. They needed the Conservative opposition to persuade them to do that 3-4 days later.....
glenn239 wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 20:40
If the Czar truely had his eyes on breaking up Austro-Hungary, and I see that as being a reasonable long term goal, 1914 was NOT the time to do it. It was very much in the Czar's interests to wait. History shows that to be correct. The Czar lost everything because the war started in 1914.
The first steps to the dissolution of the Austrian Empire were taken in mid-August 1914 when the Russians declared a new Poland to be hacked out of Austrian and German territory. No doubt the proclimations would have followed with the Russian armies, had the CP armies not stopped them at the Carpathians.
And a month later, September 1914, the Germans came up with a policy document to take over the world. But be careful, Fischer's already run that one.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#84

Post by glenn239 » 22 Nov 2018, 19:54

Terry Duncan wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 21:06
I don't suppose you have any particular source for such a claim? I have no doubt that Russia would have enjoyed seeing the Hapsburg Empire fall apart, or even to take some land if the chance arose, but I have never seen any documents to suggest Russia intended to use her military force to effect this, indeed, most authors claim it was Constantinople that the Russians were fixated upon.
I am aware of no statements indicating that the Tzar or Sazonov ever expressed their maximum aims against Austria assuming total victory in the form of the occupation of Budapest and/or Vienna. However, we know for certain that Serbia would have annexed Bosnia and up the Adriatic coast, that Russian had already declared in mid-August 1914 (ie, before even defeating Conrad in Galicia), that it would annex Austrian Galicia to form the new Greater Poland (with Nicholas as its Tzar), and that the Czechs (and therefore the Slovaks) would also leave the Empire. We also know that Russia was wooing Rumania in 1914, in the form of Rumanian annexations in Hungary along the Rumanian border. Also, that Italy had ambitions that Russia encouraged in the direction of Austrian Trieste. That's all adds up to over half the territory of the Empire known to be at stake as of August 1914 - what would be left would be a rump in Austria and rump in Hungary, for which it would be political child's play for the Russians to arrange would not be the same country. For Austria in August 1914, the stakes were extremely high.
Moltke was clearly not bothered by mobilisation, the ultimatum made it clear it was all mobilisation measures that were the offence. All the pre-mobilisation measures such as requisitioning horses and fodder measures that Austria had already begun and Germany herself was also in the process of enacting with the canceling of officers leave etc. That Russia had decided to mobilise made no difference, it was the initiation of preliminary measures that was enough to tip the Germans into action.
Moltke was very bothered by the possibility of secret mobilizations - anything that could upset his timetables. In terms of the decision for war itself, Moltke had no say. As in 1866 and 1870, constitutionally, the head of the army could not order mobilization, and those that could, (the Emperor and his Chancellor) would not do so without, at the least, a partial Russian mobilization at Austria. .

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#85

Post by glenn239 » 22 Nov 2018, 20:33

MarkN wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 23:15
Really? Do you really think I can take you seriously when you completely reverse my words to push your ahistorical theory/nonsense?
It's the basis of why there was a war in 1914. Germany and Austria were aware they were pushing the bounds in their July script (hence the need for a German blank cheque). But they were doing so in a manner that the Entente could have accepted had the Entente been inclined to do so. The Entente, as it turned out, was not inclined to do so. Why it was not inclined to do so is up for debate. My conclusion is that for Russia their ambitions in the Balkans and Turkey at the expense of Austria and Germany cannot be, as you attempt to do, divorced from their decision for war. Therefore, that for Russia, Serbia was a pretext. Had Austria backed down, some other pretext would serve, perhaps in 1915 or 1916.
So Austro-Hungary was going to invade Serbia without smashing it up.
Correct, the Austrians were going to invade Serbia, fight the Serbian army for some months, then withdraw without annexations after winning compliance with the terms of their ultimatum. This was the level of support Germany had given. If Austria attempted to go beyond the scope of their ultimatum in the fall of 1914 then the Entente would have declared war on Austria, for the exact terms of the ultimatum - and nothing more -would have been what the Entente had agreed to while staying their hands.
The Kaiser thought along your lines too: quick smash and grab of Belgrade to satisfy the Emporer for his personal loss and then chinwag their way out of further both. Most people consider his plan as mad as box of frogs. And here you are presenting it as the centre piece of your theory to demonstrate how everybody else got it wrong by trying to stop the bloodshed at its source before it even happened!
The Tzar's actions saw himself, his dynasty, and his family all wiped out, whereas the Kaiser retired to exile in luxury. You'll forgive me if I decline to agree that it was the Kaiser making the worse decisions that summer.
Mobilization is not war.
The German doctrine was that mobilization was war. The German army did not require anyone's permission to have that doctrine.
The Russians were NOT marching on Budapest even when Austro-Hungary had declared war on Russia.
As previously stated, since the Russians continued their concentration of 5 armies against Austria and 3 against Germany even after the German DOW, but before the Austrian DOW, the Russians would have declared war on Austria on or about August 18th. Therefore, at the time of the German DOW on Russia (1 August) the Russians were already intending to cross the Carpathians.
If Russia had any interest in deliberately pushing the Balkan spat into an opportunity "to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all" they HAD to mobilize as early as possible and as quickly as possible.
Russia had no military need for a quick mobilization against Austria.
Where, pray tell in there, do get from Grey has changed his mind?

It's off the top of my head, it was about this time that Grey seems to have finally recognised that Germany was no longer (if ever) working for peace and, of course, Austro-Hungary had started war against Serbia. It doesn't seem out of sorts for him to start rethinking his approach.
That's the interpretation I would be inclined to if my doctrine on this matter was to be as apologist as possible towards the Entente Powers. But mine is not that idea - I am rather the other way around and inclined to see all Powers motives - Germany and Austria included - in less flattering terms. With Grey, you say 'rethink'. I say, he'd been waiting all along, biding his time, to see whether Austria would make that step.
And a month later, September 1914, the Germans came up with a policy document to take over the world.
Check google and let me know which came first - the Entente's September Declaration, or Bethmann's memo.

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#86

Post by MarkN » 22 Nov 2018, 21:30

glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
MarkN wrote:
21 Nov 2018, 23:15
Really? Do you really think I can take you seriously when you completely reverse my words to push your ahistorical theory/nonsense?
It's the basis of why there was a war in 1914. Germany and Austria were aware they were pushing the bounds in their July script (hence the need for a German blank cheque). But they were doing so in a manner that the Entente could have accepted had the Entente been inclined to do so. The Entente, as it turned out, was not inclined to do so.
Opposite of what the documentary evidence suggests.

Whilst it is true the Czar was not prepared to accept the Austro-Hungarian demands and aspirations regarding Serbia, Grey proposed that the Austro-Hungarians do as the wish if it meant Britain could remain out of war. Russia was not the Entente.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
Why it was not inclined to do so is up for debate.
No, it is not up for debate. You may want it to be debated in order to give some form of credibility to your theory, but it is simply contrary to documentary evidence extant. Not worth debating it at all unless you introduce it in the what if part of the site.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
So Austro-Hungary was going to invade Serbia without smashing it up.
Correct, the Austrians were going to invade Serbia, fight the Serbian army for some months, then withdraw without annexations after winning compliance with the terms of their ultimatum. This was the level of support Germany had given. If Austria attempted to go beyond the scope of their ultimatum in the fall of 1914 then the Entente would have declared war on Austria, for the exact terms of the ultimatum - and nothing more -would have been what the Entente had agreed to while staying their hands.
I see. You have decided that devastation, bloodshed and death is OK as you have decided that does not equate to "smash up".

Perhaps it would help if you grasped the reality of a simple point. The Czars objection to Austro-Hungary's intentions in Serbia were NOT about annexing; it was all about the more basic idea of war itself: death and destruction. The Czar wanted to prevent that.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
The Kaiser thought along your lines too: quick smash and grab of Belgrade to satisfy the Emporer for his personal loss and then chinwag their way out of further both. Most people consider his plan as mad as box of frogs. And here you are presenting it as the centre piece of your theory to demonstrate how everybody else got it wrong by trying to stop the bloodshed at its source before it even happened!
The Tzar's actions saw himself, his dynasty, and his family all wiped out, whereas the Kaiser retired to exile in luxury. You'll forgive me if I decline to agree that it was the Kaiser making the worse decisions that summer.
I don't think the Kaiser was a complete idiot either. But it was rather an arrogant idea that he could order Austro-Hungary to smash up Serbia, flounce off on holiday, and then have a hissy fit later when it turns out it hasn't happened.

How did the Austro-Hungarian royal dynasty fare? The Kaiser only survived because he managed to get a peace agreement through before Germany was smashed up.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
Mobilization is not war.
The German doctrine was that mobilization was war. The German army did not require anyone's permission to have that doctrine.
Germans can have whatever doctrine they want. When you have a doctrine of offensive warfare, where invasions of neutral neighbours occur on day 1 of the mobilization, mobilization certainly means war.

However, more arrogance on their behalf to assume that everybody else must follow their doctrine and demands.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
The Russians were NOT marching on Budapest even when Austro-Hungary had declared war on Russia.
As previously stated, since the Russians continued their concentration of 5 armies against Austria and 3 against Germany even after the German DOW, but before the Austrian DOW, the Russians would have declared war on Austria on or about August 18th.
So?

Russia's war with Austro-Hungary was predicated on Austro-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July - and indescriminately bombing a civilian city immediatly thereafter. Russia's response was reactive to Austro-Hungarian aggression.

glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
Therefore, at the time of the German DOW on Russia (1 August) the Russians were already intending to cross the Carpathians.
Was that after Austro-Hungary had declared war and indescriminately bombed a civilian city? Oh yes, it was!!!! Russia's response was reactive to Austro-Hungarian aggression.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
If Russia had any interest in deliberately pushing the Balkan spat into an opportunity "to smash the Austrian Empire once and for all" they HAD to mobilize as early as possible and as quickly as possible.
Russia had no military need for a quick mobilization against Austria.
It was imperative for Russia to mobilize first and as quick as possible if it had any intention to persue a successful offensive campaign.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
Where, pray tell in there, do get from Grey has changed his mind?
It's off the top of my head, it was about this time that Grey seems to have finally recognised that Germany was no longer (if ever) working for peace and, of course, Austro-Hungary had started war against Serbia. It doesn't seem out of sorts for him to start rethinking his approach.
That's the interpretation I would be inclined to if my doctrine on this matter was to be as apologist as possible towards the Entente Powers. But mine is not that idea - I am rather the other way around and inclined to see all Powers motives - Germany and Austria included - in less flattering terms. With Grey, you say 'rethink'. I say, he'd been waiting all along, biding his time, to see whether Austria would make that step.
I know. You've got your theory and you've reinterprted everything to fit that theory. That's why these exchanges are so fun: the credibility and coherence of your reasoning has more flaws than the empire state building (pun intended).
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
And a month later, September 1914, the Germans came up with a policy document to take over the world.
Check google and let me know which came first - the Entente's September Declaration, or Bethmann's memo.
Once again you dishonestly shift the goalspost in the middle of an exchange.

Still, which of those two came first is irrelevant. They were both written POST commencement of hostilities.

The greatest flaw in Fischer's theory is that it is predicated on a document written after the war has begun whereupon he then spends his enitre book trying to explain that that is proof of German thought before the war started!!!!

You seem to be doing exactly the same with regards to Russian war aims - take a document drafted after the war has started - and then assume it proves pre-war intent.

And now you seem to be doing it with the Entente too. :roll:

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#87

Post by Terry Duncan » 22 Nov 2018, 22:19

glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 19:54
I am aware of no statements indicating that the Tzar or Sazonov ever expressed their maximum aims against Austria assuming total victory in the form of the occupation of Budapest and/or Vienna. However, we know for certain that Serbia would have annexed Bosnia and up the Adriatic coast, that Russian had already declared in mid-August 1914 (ie, before even defeating Conrad in Galicia), that it would annex Austrian Galicia to form the new Greater Poland (with Nicholas as its Tzar), and that the Czechs (and therefore the Slovaks) would also leave the Empire. We also know that Russia was wooing Rumania in 1914, in the form of Rumanian annexations in Hungary along the Rumanian border. Also, that Italy had ambitions that Russia encouraged in the direction of Austrian Trieste. That's all adds up to over half the territory of the Empire known to be at stake as of August 1914 - what would be left would be a rump in Austria and rump in Hungary, for which it would be political child's play for the Russians to arrange would not be the same country. For Austria in August 1914, the stakes were extremely high.
The war began on 28th July 1914, so whatever Russia was promising anyone in August 1914 is hardly proof of a long-standing intent to destroy the Hapsburg Empire. Once you decide to go to war you open up the chance that the other side may decide on some unpleasant annexations and policies that they would otherwise never have enacted.
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 19:54
Moltke was very bothered by the possibility of secret mobilizations - anything that could upset his timetables. In terms of the decision for war itself, Moltke had no say. As in 1866 and 1870, constitutionally, the head of the army could not order mobilization, and those that could, (the Emperor and his Chancellor) would not do so without, at the least, a partial Russian mobilization at Austria. .
So it was not Russian mobilisation, but the preliminaries that would force Germany's hand in July 1914.

Only the Kaiser could order mobilisation, he could do so at any time as it was his sole prerogative, he did not need the approval of the Chancellor or Chief of Staff to do so although it would have been ill-advised for him to do so in 1914 given he was not viewed too favourably by many in Germany. As events transpired he made it clear that he could and would order mobilisation without Bethmann as when the time came, Bethmann arrived to find Moltke with the Kaiser and the mobilisation order signed. Bethmann then demanded to sign it too as a matter of principle, but with odds of 2-1, the order was going through at that point even if he resigned! It is also clear from the Moltke Memorandum that the moment Austria orders full mobilisation, Germany must do likewise unless she is going to throw off the alliance at this late stage. It didn't require the Entente to do anything, only for Austria to act, the subject of the Moltke - Conrad telegrams, and Berchtold's 'Who rules in Berlin! Moltke or Bethmann?'

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#88

Post by Max Payload » 23 Nov 2018, 02:38

glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 20:33
My conclusion is that for Russia their ambitions in the Balkans and Turkey at the expense of Austria and Germany cannot be ... divorced from their [Russia’s] decision for war. Therefore, that for Russia, Serbia was a pretext. Had Austria backed down, some other pretext would serve, perhaps in 1915 or 1916.
The decision for war was effectively taken by Austria in the first half of July and formally declared on the 28th, and by Germany on 31 July and formally declared the next day. On what date was Russia’s ‘decision for war’? And your prediction of what Russia would have done in 1915 or 1916 in some alternative time line is pure speculation, particularly since, in your own words ...
glenn239 wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 19:54
I am aware of no statements indicating that the Tzar or Sazonov ever expressed their maximum aims against Austria

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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#89

Post by ljadw » 23 Nov 2018, 11:14

glenn239 wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 19:21
ljadw wrote:
19 Nov 2018, 18:36
The best explanation is that the Russians never had the intention to attack Germany and that the official German reasons for the DoW were lies :AH did not protest against the mobilisation of 4 armies on its border,it did not declare war ,it did not issue an ultimatum, it did not ask help from Germany, the mobilisation of these 4 armies was not mentioned in the German DoW, thus why did Germany declare war for the mobilisation of 2 armies ?
If Russia had no intention of attacking Germany, but, as she did, continued to mobilize 4+1 armies against Austria while at war with Germany but not Austria, then the soundest conclusion is that Russia intended to attack Austria when her armies were ready to march, and the Austrian DOW occurred prior to that point being reach, (by about 12 days). That is, on 1 August 1914 Russia had already made the decision to declare war on Austria on or about 18 August 1914.

Germany declared war first because it did not know how many armies were going to attack Germany, (two did so historically but up to 5 was feasible in German calculations). Second, because what German policy makers feared was an 1866-like mobilization creep where the Russians - like the Austrians then - kept talking while continuing mobilization, proposing all sorts of mediation ideas where the common them was that mobilization continued; German doctrine demanded a clean break, no mobilizations by osmosis.
No : Russia and AH were birds of a feather who flock together : the fall of Franz Jozef would mean the fall of Nicholas and vice versa : there was no benefit for Russia if AH collapsed ,only the independence of millions of Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, etc, who were hostile to Russia and whom Russia could not dominate as it had not the forces to do it .Almost the half of the population of the empire of Nicholas were non Russians, thus why should he want more of them .
These two birds were Ancien Regime states,threatened by the advancing twins of nationalism and democratisation :the lost was against Japan had almost destroyed the tsaristic regime, the lost war against Prussia had resulted in the Ausgleich and in a de facto independent Hungary .Russia would never declare war on AH unless AH forced it to do .
Russia would also never declare war on Germany ,because there was no reason to do it and because France would not support Russia (it never did before WWI ) : the elections in France had resulted in a majority that was hostile to Russia and friendly to Germany .Jaures ruled in France , not Poincaré and Jaures wanted peace .Not revanche . Neither did Poincaré.
Clememceau abandoned Russia in 1908, Viviani did the same in 1914.

Jon Clarke
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Re: Germany's handling of the July crisis.

#90

Post by Jon Clarke » 23 Nov 2018, 12:57

glenn239" wrote: Moltke was very bothered by the possibility of secret mobilizations - anything that could upset his timetables.
Odd then he did so little about the Russian secret mobilizations in 1912/1913 that led the Germans to conclude that when the Russian army announced mobilisation, it would in fact already have mobilised. Moltke did not insist on mobilization & war then but a year later, the simple posting of red notices in Russia would cause him to demand Germany mobilize & start a world war. Perhaps he just didn't like the colour red?
glenn239 wrote: Russia had no military need for a quick mobilization against Austria.
Which isn't what the Russian military concluded pre-war. They believed that, if they adopted a passive role, Austria would be able to transfer 'overwhelming forces' to quickly beat Serbia. A quick decision on early mobilization would cause the Austrians to divide their forces thereby reducing the forces to Serbia which of course is exactly what in the OTL.

Apart from 'Slav brotherhood' concerns, the Russians couldn't afford to allow Austria to crush Serbia as this would mean that Austria would be able to concentrate the bulk of her forces against Russia.

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