Germany's handling of the July crisis.

[Jon Clarke]

It was imperative for Russia to mobilize first and as quick as possible if it had any intention to pursue a successful offensive campaign.

A quick decision & mobilization would have the added benefit of reducing the Austrian forces facing Serbia thereby reducing the threat of a quick defeat. If there was no quick Austrian victory, the Russians would then be able to act whilst the Austrians would still be entangled in Serbia. A delayed decision or mobilization would run the risk that Austria would have defeated Serbia before Russia would be ready to act & would then be able to have more troops facing Russia.

In the OTL Conrad's plan for war against Serbia was to pin the Serbian army in the north using the 12 divisions of B-Staffel while the main thrust would come from Bosnia in the west. The Russian mobilization meant that Conrad had to redeploy B-Staffel to Galicia almost immediately - Churchill would later write that B-Staffel 'left Potiorek before it could win him a victory; it returned to Conrad in time to participate in his defeat'.

[MarkN]

It was imperative for Russia to mobilize first and as quick as possible if it had any intention to pursue a successful offensive campaign.

A quick decision & mobilization would have the added benefit of reducing the Austrian forces facing Serbia thereby reducing the threat of a quick defeat. If there was no quick Austrian victory, the Russians would then be able to act whilst the Austrians would still be entangled in Serbia. A delayed decision or mobilization would run the risk that Austria would have defeated Serbia before Russia would be ready to act & would then be able to have more troops facing Russia.

In the OTL Conrad's plan for war against Serbia was to pin the Serbian army in the north using the 12 divisions of B-Staffel while the main thrust would come from Bosnia in the west. The Russian mobilization meant that Conrad had to redeploy B-Staffel to Galicia almost immediately - Churchill would later write that B-Staffel 'left Potiorek before it could win him a victory; it returned to Conrad in time to participate in his defeat'.

I agree entirely with your words that splitting the Austro-Hungarian forces along two fronts from the very outset benefitted both Serbia and Russia. History shows us that Austro-Hungary couldn't cope with the two-front conflict: it failed in its initial thrust into Serbia and lost its border areas to Russia.

However, I believe there is an even more fundamental and simple reason why it was imperative for Russia to mobilize as soon as possible and as quickly as possible if it had any desire to go on the offensive against Austro-Hungary: Germany.

Circa 1914, I think it is impossible to imagine a scenario where Germany stands aside in a Russia v Austro-Hungary conflict where Russia is the aggressor. Unless the Czar and his advisors had completely lost their senses, any offensive intent towards Austro-Hungary (whether to crush it completely or just a border land grab) has to presume German involvement. Whether Russia pursues a strategy of attack everywhere or offense/defense posture is neither here nor there, Germany is in the game. And given that everybody knew the massive advantage Germany held in the 'mobilization race', for any hope of success, Russia has to be well ahead of them.

To me, for Russia to be only partially mobilizing, and not being in a particular hurry about it, tells me that this was not a mobilization for offensive action; it was principally a mobilization for diplomatic effect (coerce/influence Austro-Hungarian decision-making) but with a secondary defensive purpose if the diplomacy went wrong. As it did.

If the Czar truely had an intent to exploit the Sarajevo murder to jump start an offensive drive into Austro-Hungary, mobilization would have begun at the beginning of July if not earlier. It would have progressed as rapidily as possible and have been along their entire western border - not just facing Austro-Hungary.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the combined Austro-Hungarian and German forces standing in their way was about the very minimum that could reasonably be calculated. And yet, even with that masssive advantage, the Russians could only manage a temporary boder land grab before being pushed back. That poor performance is a direct product of the 'failure' to gain advantage in the 'mobilization race'. But then, historically, they weren't trying to, were they? Russia was involved in a conflict that they had been trying to prevent!

[ljadw]

Grey was not interventionist : Britain did not move when Germany declared war on Russia on August 1,neither was it intervening when Japan attacked Russia, when the Balkan states and Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire or when the Balkan states fought amongst each other .

[Terry Duncan]

Grey was not interventionist : Britain did not move when Germany declared war on Russia on August 1,neither was it intervening when Japan attacked Russia, when the Balkan states and Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire or when the Balkan states fought amongst each other .

Britain said, and remained committed to the position that a German attack on France would see her intervention fairly quickly. This was said in the early 1900's and pretty much at every attempted negotiation leading up to July 1914 when the Germans asked Britain to commit to a circumstance where they could attack France and be sure Britain remained neutral. Grey was very much interventionist in this case, as was Lansdowne before him.

[MarkN]

Grey was not interventionist : Britain did not move when Germany declared war on Russia on August 1,neither was it intervening when Japan attacked Russia, when the Balkan states and Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire or when the Balkan states fought amongst each other .

Britain said, and remained committed to the position that a German attack on France would see her intervention fairly quickly. This was said in the early 1900's and pretty much at every attempted negotiation leading up to July 1914 when the Germans asked Britain to commit to a circumstance where they could attack France and be sure Britain remained neutral. Grey was very much interventionist in this case, as was Lansdowne before him.

I agree. I think Grey himself was indeed of the opinion that Britain ought to fight alongside France should Germany attack.

However, a majority of the Cabinet at the time (July 1914) saw it differently. They were so set in this opinion that Grey and the PM clearly decided it was best not to take anything to them that they could veto. That all changed when the Tory opposition made its own position known and the PM hinted that if the Cabinet wouldn't back him, he'd take it to the House.

Also, it is worth noting that Grey's willingness to support France did not extend to Russia; it was a concern for the Entente but a concern for a neigbor.

[glenn239]

Odd then he did so little about the Russian secret mobilizations in 1912/1913 that led the Germans to conclude that when the Russian army announced mobilisation, it would in fact already have mobilised. Moltke did not insist on mobilization & war then but a year later, the simple posting of red notices in Russia would cause him to demand Germany mobilize & start a world war. Perhaps he just didn't like the colour red?

Just got around to checking my notifications. The one said to check this post from November 2018. The Russian 1912 mobilization measures seem to have been a real wake up call for Moltke. After that, I think he was quite worried about the possibility. In 1914, he seems to have been caught a bit offguard by the idea of partial mobilization as well, hence a memo written in the middle of the crisis that should have been on Bethmann's desk years previously.

What military district did the Russian mobilize in 1912? All classes to the colours, all divisions mobilized? Odessa, perhaps? Warsaw? Kiev? None of the above?

Which isn't what the Russian military concluded pre-war. They believed that, if they adopted a passive role, Austria would be able to transfer 'overwhelming forces' to quickly beat Serbia. A quick decision on early mobilization would cause the Austrians to divide their forces thereby reducing the forces to Serbia which of course is exactly what in the OTL.

I said that Russia had no need of a fast mobilization, that is, any defensive reason related to Russian national security. If the purpose was a two-front war with Serbia against Austria done as quickly as possible, then a faster mobilization makes sense, but at the cost of demonstrating that war was inevitable from the moment of the Austrian DOW - and Moltke's petitioning for general mobilization around that time was correct.

In terms of Austria crushing Serbia, the idea that even 20 Austrian divisions could have done much more than take Belgrade and perhaps into the mountains a way beyond by November or December 1914 seems fanciful bordering on impossible. Certainly not a risk worth destroying the Romanov Dynasty over.

Apart from 'Slav brotherhood' concerns, the Russians couldn't afford to allow Austria to crush Serbia as this would mean that Austria would be able to concentrate the bulk of her forces against Russia.

Between the Entente and Central Powers, any calculation along the lines of tiny Serbia mattering at all in the overall balance of power veer towards outright pretext. Hence the Balkans laying outside the scope of the Dual Alliance for the first two decades of its existence.

[waldopepper]

Russia did not mobilize in 1912/13.

See this thread:

viewtopic.php?f=31&t=234286&p=2130440&h ... 2#p2130440

Each nation's handling of the July crisis was more tangled & complex than can be stated in the brief format of forum messages. I recommend a through study of

Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, particularly Vol 2 and the beginning of vol. 3.

wp

[glenn239]

Russia did not mobilize in 1912/13.

Jon I assume is referring to various measures the Russians took in 1912, such as retaining classes in service even while calling up new recruits for training. No military district was mobilized at that time - that is, the placards displayed in all towns calling up all classes to the colors - for the simple reason that had they done so it would have been war with Germany within days.

[Terry Duncan]

Russia did not mobilize in 1912/13.

Jon I assume is referring to various measures the Russians took in 1912, such as retaining classes in service even while calling up new recruits for training. No military district was mobilized at that time - that is, the placards displayed in all towns calling up all classes to the colors - for the simple reason that had they done so it would have been war with Germany within days.

Except that in 1914 it is perfectly clear that it was the pre-mobilisation measures that Germany objected to and which led her to declare war, not the public posting of mobilisation orders, as the ultimatum made perfectly clear. All the mobilisation order did was to provide a handy propaganda pretext for Germany to enact her own mobilisation. The idea that seeing little red notices with no extra manpower taken into the Russian army was more dangerous to Germany that a situation with no little red notices and over 400,000 extra men under arms in the Russian army is utterly absurd. After all, in 1914 Germany went to war without even waiting to hear what the outcome of the meeting between Sazonov and Pourtales had been, leading to the strange situation where Russia could have complied with the ultimatum and still seen Germany declare war.

[Terry Duncan]

Russia did not mobilize in 1912/13.

See this thread:

viewtopic.php?f=31&t=234286&p=2130440&h ... 2#p2130440

Each nation's handling of the July crisis was more tangled & complex than can be stated in the brief format of forum messages. I recommend a through study of

Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, particularly Vol 2 and the beginning of vol. 3.

wp

Albertini is very useful for knowledge that was public up to the WWII period, but obviously covers nothing found out afterward, so really needs to be supplemented with other works taking in the entire Fischer era to the present day too as far too much was still hidden even comparatively recently.

[glenn239]

Except that in 1914 it is perfectly clear that it was the pre-mobilisation measures that Germany objected to and which led her to declare war, not the public posting of mobilisation orders, as the ultimatum made perfectly clear.

The 1912 and 1914 Russian mobilization measures were two different cases. In the former the Russians did not mobilize any military districts, but did undertake measures short of this that alarmed Moltke upon later analysis. In 1914 the Russians at first mobilized 4 military districts, under the claim that the measures were not aimed at Germany and not necessarily warlike towards Austria. This appears to have caught Moltke offguard - the reason I think this is because he penned a memo on why a partial mobilization meant war; he need not have bothered had he forcefully made a case on partial mobilization to the diplomatic staff at an earlier date. What the 1912 Russian measures did not do was mobilize even one military district - that would have triggered a head-on confrontation with Germany within days, if not hours.

All the mobilisation order did was to provide a handy propaganda pretext for Germany to enact her own mobilisation. The idea that seeing little red notices with no extra manpower taken into the Russian army was more dangerous to Germany that a situation with no little red notices and over 400,000 extra men under arms in the Russian army is utterly absurd. After all, in 1914 Germany went to war without even waiting to hear what the outcome of the meeting between Sazonov and Pourtales had been, leading to the strange situation where Russia could have complied with the ultimatum and still seen Germany declare war.

Yes, that's been the gist of the Entente argument since 1914. The German doctrine that mobilization meant war was drilled into the Entente Power's heads throughout the 1914 crisis. Russia knew perfectly well that its partial mobilization would escalate, hence the nearly immediate decision to order full mobilization rather than draw back. And, if the French and Russians had not seen merit in the German position, then they would not have bothered to falsify the documents in their Orange and Yellow Books to alter the apparent order of mobilization. That is to say, if the Russians and French didn't agree that mobilization meant war, why falsify their records on precisely that point?

[MarkN]

Yes, that's been the gist of the Entente argument since 1914. The German doctrine that mobilization meant war was drilled into the Entente Power's heads throughout the 1914 crisis. Russia knew perfectly well that its partial mobilization would escalate, hence the nearly immediate decision to order full mobilization rather than draw back. And, if the French and Russians had not seen merit in the German position, then they would not have bothered to falsify the documents in their Orange and Yellow Books to alter the apparent order of mobilization. That is to say, if the Russians and French didn't agree that mobilization meant war, why falsify their records on precisely that point?

Serbia mobilizing didn't mean war.
Austria-Hungary mobilizing didn't mean war.
Russia mobilizing didn't mean war.
France mobilizing didn't mean war.
Belgium mobilizing didn't mean war.
Britain mobilizing didn't mean war.

The only mobilization that meant war was Germany's because its war plan was predicated on being the aggressor at the earliest moment and before they had completed their mobilization.

Your contrived argument that Russia and the Entente are responsible for the war because they began a partial mobilization for diplomatic effect is the same as blaming the girl for being raped on the basis of wearing a short skirt.

[glenn239]

Your contrived argument that Russia and the Entente are responsible for the war because...<snip>

Austria-Hungary's mobilization at Serbia meant war with Serbia was a virtual certainty - any argument to the contrary would is completely infeasible in light of the entirety of the Austrian diplomatic records in the period up to the decision for mobilization at Serbia.

The Russians knew perfectly well what they were doing and how the Germans would respond. There was no innocence, no misunderstanding, between the two sides. The Germans were marching into France and in the meantime, the Russians would smash the Austrians. That the Russians even bothered to falsify their Orange Book simply confirms that they thought the Germans had a point - otherwise, why bother with the lies about who mobilized when?

[MarkN]

Your contrived argument that Russia and the Entente are responsible for the war because...<snip>

Austria-Hungary's mobilization at Serbia meant war with Serbia was a virtual certainty - any argument to the contrary would is completely infeasible in light of the entirety of the Austrian diplomatic records in the period up to the decision for mobilization at Serbia.

Mobilization is an administrative and logistic exercise/process. On a stand alone basis it does not imply war is inevitable. Mobilization can be halted at any point the decision-makers so choose. Mobilization can be fully completed and troops standing-to at the border, but without the 'attack' order, there is no war - they are just a very expensive border guard.

However, it is true that mobilization is a prerequisit for many states wishing to go to war. How many states embarked on a war of aggression of their choice without first mobilizing? I fear you are deliberately manipulating this reality to pass off your theory.

Austro-Hungarian moblization was a prelude to war not because moblization made it inevitable but because the decision-makers had instigated mobilization for the purpose of war. That is what the Austrian diplomatic records validate. They do not validate your theory that mobilization meant war.

The Russians knew perfectly well what they were doing and how the Germans would respond. There was no innocence, no misunderstanding, between the two sides.

The rapist announces to the community that any girl wearing a short skirt will be raped as he cannot control himself.

If a girl wears a short skirt and is raped, do you start reapportioning the blame: Hmmm. Rapist 55%, girl 45%? Or is it Rapist 5%, girl 95% - she "knew perfectly well what [she was] doing and how the [rapist] would respond."

That is the argument you are making. I don't buy into it. It seems to me to be a very lame and dishonest attempt to apologise for and deflect German war responsibility.

[Terry Duncan]

Except that in 1914 it is perfectly clear that it was the pre-mobilisation measures that Germany objected to and which led her to declare war, not the public posting of mobilisation orders, as the ultimatum made perfectly clear.

The 1912 and 1914 Russian mobilization measures were two different cases. In the former the Russians did not mobilize any military districts, but did undertake measures short of this that alarmed Moltke upon later analysis. In 1914 the Russians at first mobilized 4 military districts, under the claim that the measures were not aimed at Germany and not necessarily warlike towards Austria. This appears to have caught Moltke offguard - the reason I think this is because he penned a memo on why a partial mobilization meant war; he need not have bothered had he forcefully made a case on partial mobilization to the diplomatic staff at an earlier date. What the 1912 Russian measures did not do was mobilize even one military district - that would have triggered a head-on confrontation with Germany within days, if not hours.

All the mobilisation order did was to provide a handy propaganda pretext for Germany to enact her own mobilisation. The idea that seeing little red notices with no extra manpower taken into the Russian army was more dangerous to Germany that a situation with no little red notices and over 400,000 extra men under arms in the Russian army is utterly absurd. After all, in 1914 Germany went to war without even waiting to hear what the outcome of the meeting between Sazonov and Pourtales had been, leading to the strange situation where Russia could have complied with the ultimatum and still seen Germany declare war.

Yes, that's been the gist of the Entente argument since 1914. The German doctrine that mobilization meant war was drilled into the Entente Power's heads throughout the 1914 crisis. Russia knew perfectly well that its partial mobilization would escalate, hence the nearly immediate decision to order full mobilization rather than draw back. And, if the French and Russians had not seen merit in the German position, then they would not have bothered to falsify the documents in their Orange and Yellow Books to alter the apparent order of mobilization. That is to say, if the Russians and French didn't agree that mobilization meant war, why falsify their records on precisely that point?

The Kaiser obviously was also misled by events, when on reading the telegram from the Tzar he wrote 'That means I have got to mobilise as well!' rather than any reference to meaning he had to go to war

The same confusion seems to have infected Bethmann as the ultimatum to Russia reads;

In spite of the still pending negotiations for mediation and although we had up to the present taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized entire army and navy, that is also against us. By these Russian measures we have been compelled for the security of the Empire, to proclaim imminent danger of war, which does not yet mean mobilization. But mobilization must follow unless within twelve hours Russia suspends all
war measures against ourselves and Austria-Hungary and gives us a definite assurance to that effect. Please notify M. Sazonov of this at once, and wire hour of notification. I know that Sverbeev yesterday telegraphed to St. Petersburg that we had mobilized, which to the present hour is still not the case.

Note 'Russia suspends all war measures against ourselves and Austria-Hungary' with no mention of mobilisation, ALL measures must cease, including all pre-mobilisation measures, including all those against Austria-Hungary also. This shows it is not mobilisation itself causing offense, or that it is only mobilisation against Germany, and that mobilisation against Austria would be acceptable, as Jagow had already advised Russia! It is unacceptable for Russia to take any military action whatsoever.

I could also add that the ultimatum to Belgium was written by 28th July and already in Brussels, albeit awaiting delivery, complete with excuses. Belgium could not be allowed to complete its own mobilisation as that effectively killed the only German war plan at inception. Germany was seeking a pretext to excuse its policy at this point.

As to the coloured books, did Germany withhold information and lie it its book? Did every power do the same to make iteslf look entirely blameless and place all the blame on enemy powers? Why should we give propaganda releases any significance today when we have full accounts of events? I am sure you would not find it very convincing if I said that Germany accepted its guilt when it signed up to Article 231.

The German doctrine that mobilization meant war was drilled into the Entente Power's heads throughout the 1914 crisis.

So why did Germany folow a policy that they recognised from the outset would see Russia mobilise against Austria at least, and even tell it such a mobilisation was acceptable? That the German government was confused is beyond doubt, but that does not excuse it from being responsible for the result of that confusion.