Reevaluating FM Sir Douglas Haig

[South]

https://www.historyextra.com/period/fir ... h-general/


Per ...

Note "...that won the greatest series of victories in British military history..."


~ Bob

eastern Virginia, USA

[Sheldrake]

This is Gary Sheffield and John Bourne. This is the mainstream view among modern British military historians. 1918 was the high point of British military achievement.

I don't like Haig. He was a nasty man to work for. I donlt think he uhnderstood what was happening tactically on the battlefield. The disaster on 1st July 1916 was directly attributable to him over-ruling subordinates with valid objections. He wanted top achieve a deep and broad penetration of the German line despite having artillery with the range and mobility to achieve his goal. ........ Haig insisted that if they just tried harder they could find a solution to a practical impossibility...

Edited by this Mod to remove a reference to a present day political situation, which is forbidden by forum rules.

Terry Duncan

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Sheldrake,

....... I take this as an endorsement of Haigh.

The UK's problem was that the distribution of its small regular army round the globe on imperial policing against technically inferior foes, meant that nobody had the opportunity to prepare on an army scale for continental scale European warfare against technical equals. By contrast, that is all the mass conscript armies of the other European powers were prepared for.

Thus the British had to go through a far greater learning and adaptation experience than anyone else (until the USA entered the war). They did this successfully, though at some cost in trial and error, and mostly under Haigh's leadership. He therefore deserves some credit.

Cheers,

Sid.

Edited by this Mod to remove a further reference to a present-day political situation, for the same reason.

Terry Duncan

[Terry Duncan]

This is Gary Sheffield and John Bourne. This is the mainstream view among modern British military historians. 1918 was the high point of British military achievement.

I believe the number of successive victories is a matter of record, I remember John Terraine listing them decades ago so it clearly pre-dates Sheffield and Bourne, even if you believe they were too costly to achieve.

I don't like Haig. He was a nasty man to work for.

Well, it is good to know you knew the man and worked for him, until this point I had only ever seen or heard from people passing on their own experiences with him at best, and most often only third-hand information. People who make the rank of general are usually not the nicest of people in all respects, though some are clearly better than others, what made Haig worse as a person to work for than say French, Montgomery, or Wellington?

I donlt think he uhnderstood what was happening tactically on the battlefield. The disaster on 1st July 1916 was directly attributable to him over-ruling subordinates with valid objections.

The 'disaster' in 1st July 1916 was due to the politicians insisting Haig attack where the French wanted to attack, despite being told it was unsuitable ground by himself and Robertson, rather than where they wished to attack. The politicians were the ones wanting a major victory and insisting on an attack, and as such, they should take the majority of the blame.

He wanted top achieve a deep and broad penetration of the German line despite having artillery with the range and mobility to achieve his goal.

The only way to create the pressure needed to force the Germans to cease their pressure on the French at Verdun would be to threaten a major penetration of the German line and thus the need to move reserves from Verdun. A purely attritional battle was not acceptable to the politicians, ruling out the small bite and hold tactics as being most unlikely to cause any effect on the Germans as desired. It was also the politicians who had funded and equipped the army, as well as engaging it in alliances that forced its deployment, so a lack of equipment once again really comes down to them. I am sure Haig could have said 'wait until you provide me with suitable guns, shells, tanks and planes in about 1918 and I will attack then' but that would also not have helped the French at Verdun.

The simple fact none of the other British army commanders (with the possible exception of Henry Wilson who everyone saw as unacceptable) were ever willing to replace Haig should tell you he was not in an enviable position, and that there was nobody else to replace him - Smith-Dorrien having been made impossible to use by French. The British army had a lot to learn in 1916, and the only way to learn was to fight the Germans (who were themselves learning and adapting at the same time) and gain the experience and knowledge of what equipment was needed to win the war, and that was always going to cost a lot of lives.

[Sheldrake]

This is Gary Sheffield and John Bourne. This is the mainstream view among modern British military historians. 1918 was the high point of British military achievement.

I believe the number of successive victories is a matter of record, I remember John Terraine listing them decades ago so it clearly pre-dates Sheffield and Bourne, even if you believe they were too costly to achieve.

I don't like Haig. He was a nasty man to work for.

Well, it is good to know you knew the man and worked for him, until this point I had only ever seen or heard from people passing on their own experiences with him at best, and most often only third-hand information. People who make the rank of general are usually not the nicest of people in all respects, though some are clearly better than others, what made Haig worse as a person to work for than say French, Montgomery, or Wellington?

I donlt think he uhnderstood what was happening tactically on the battlefield. The disaster on 1st July 1916 was directly attributable to him over-ruling subordinates with valid objections.

The 'disaster' in 1st July 1916 was due to the politicians insisting Haig attack where the French wanted to attack, despite being told it was unsuitable ground by himself and Robertson, rather than where they wished to attack. The politicians were the ones wanting a major victory and insisting on an attack, and as such, they should take the majority of the blame.

He wanted top achieve a deep and broad penetration of the German line despite having artillery with the range and mobility to achieve his goal.

The only way to create the pressure needed to force the Germans to cease their pressure on the French at Verdun would be to threaten a major penetration of the German line and thus the need to move reserves from Verdun. A purely attritional battle was not acceptable to the politicians, ruling out the small bite and hold tactics as being most unlikely to cause any effect on the Germans as desired. It was also the politicians who had funded and equipped the army, as well as engaging it in alliances that forced its deployment, so a lack of equipment once again really comes down to them. I am sure Haig could have said 'wait until you provide me with suitable guns, shells, tanks and planes in about 1918 and I will attack then' but that would also not have helped the French at Verdun.

The simple fact none of the other British army commanders (with the possible exception of Henry Wilson who everyone saw as unacceptable) were ever willing to replace Haig should tell you he was not in an enviable position, and that there was nobody else to replace him - Smith-Dorrien having been made impossible to use by French. The British army had a lot to learn in 1916, and the only way to learn was to fight the Germans (who were themselves learning and adapting at the same time) and gain the experience and knowledge of what equipment was needed to win the war, and that was always going to cost a lot of lives.

Terry,

I don't disagree with Gary or John over the achievement of the British Army in 1918 nor with Haig's inspirational leadership, in March and April

Rawlinson put forward some serious objections to taking the two German lines in one day. #1 Cutting the wire protecting the German second Line trenches. #2 moving enough guns forward to support the assault on the second line and protect the attackers from German counter attack. Haig's response was to ignore the problem. The limitations of the artillery were well know by the second year of the war. By October 1915 Haig's concept for day one of the Somme had been rubbished at a briefing for the Royal Artillery Institute.

The idea that the politicians would not accept the Somme as anything other than a one day breakthrough battle is simply untrue. The politicians did accept that there would be a day 2 and indeed over a hundred more days on the Somme. It was Haig's and Robertson's responsibility to set expectations for the politicians. It raises a question of lack of moral courage to press ahead with a plan which could not work. Worse still Haig's response was a willful disinclination to face facts and instead pressure his subordinates to come up with miracles. I have worked for people like this in the past, fortunately never where the result was catastrophic loss of lives.

[Terry Duncan]

Do you think there was a solution to what the politicians wanted and what the French needed that could also be achieved without incurring large numbers of casualties given the resources available in July 1916? I don't think Haig was perfect, but he was probably the best available in the period of WWI. At the Somme, the army is not exactly well trained, the majority of the officers are only just coming to terms with their jobs, the shells are far from perfect for the task set even when they are not duds, and the artillery is not large enough either, so it really is a recipe for disaster.

[Sheldrake]

Do you think there was a solution to what the politicians wanted and what the French needed that could also be achieved without incurring large numbers of casualties given the resources available in July 1916? I don't think Haig was perfect, but he was probably the best available in the period of WWI. At the Somme, the army is not exactly well trained, the majority of the officers are only just coming to terms with their jobs, the shells are far from perfect for the task set even when they are not duds, and the artillery is not large enough either, so it really is a recipe for disaster.

The only tactical solution is the one adopted by the French by 1916 and proposed by Rawlinson. A series of Bite and hold operations which was within the capabilities of the troops. The capabilities of WW1 artillery were well known by the end of 1915. These tactics cost the French 1500 casualties on 1st July 1916 on the southern quarter of the Anglo French assault.

I don't believe Haig had a clear idea of how he was going to win even if, by some miracle there was a "breakthrough" on 1st July. The conditions for a breakthrough only occurred once the enemy had been exhausted, or very imbalanced. I have asked Gary Sheffield this on each occasion and he offered an explanation involving the cavalry corps (worth about an infantry division in fighting power). Sorry not convinced.

To illustrate the absurdity of Haig's wishful thinking, just think about how the artillery - 90% of the firepower was going to move forwards IIIrd British Corps planned for success on 1st July and planned how it would bring its 240+ artillery pieces forward to support operations NE of Pozieres, the German second Line. There were six routes which would need to be cleared for thousands of vehicles, requiring between six and nineteen bridges to cross identified ditches and trenches. III Corps envisaged getting 48 guns between la Boiselle and Pozieres on 1st July and it taking a further 48 hours to bring the guns weighing less than five tons. The heavies 6" guns, 8" & 9.2" howitzers could not be brought forwards for about a week.

Haig either did not understand or want to understand what was happening on the battlefield. He was the sort of boss who manages by telling subordinates to bring him solutions not problems. There is merit in this approach, and there is a long pedigree of commanders who feel that the art of command is to motivate subordinates to deliver the desired outcome. But sometimes, problems are not the result of lack of will, intelligence or application by subordinates, but a reflection of reality. There is a modern parallel, Haig was indulging in Boris-esque cakeism. He thought he could, by will power, enable his artillery to support an attack that was both broad and deep. 60,000 soldiers paid the price.

[Terry Duncan]

The only tactical solution is the one adopted by the French by 1916 and proposed by Rawlinson. A series of Bite and hold operations which was within the capabilities of the troops. The capabilities of WW1 artillery were well known by the end of 1915. These tactics cost the French 1500 casualties on 1st July 1916 on the southern quarter of the Anglo French assault.

But small bite and hold attacks would not cause the Germans to transfer troops away from Verdun, which is what the government were demanding, and did not benefit the British in a manner that the attack desired by the military in Flanders would have. If the government simply wanted small bite and hold attacks they didn't need to force the military to attack the military considered unsuitable just to suit the French.

He thought he could, by will power, enable his artillery to support an attack that was both broad and deep. 60,000 soldiers paid the price.

Given the artillery was not heavy enough, and forced to fire mostly shrapnel shells, even before we look at the huge numbers of duds that are still turning up by the thousands a hundred years later, it is unlikely the wire would have been cut very well anywhere. A lot of soldiers became casualties, but more of them were down to the government than to Haig, as they had equipped and stocked the army that advanced on 1st July, and they insisted it advanced where it did against military advice, even if you can blame Haig for how it advanced.

[Sheldrake]

The only tactical solution is the one adopted by the French by 1916 and proposed

But small bite and hold attacks would not cause the Germans to transfer troops away from Verdun, which is what the government were demanding, and did not benefit the British in a manner that the attack desired by the military in Flanders would have. If the government simply wanted small bite and hold attacks they didn't need to force the military to attack the military considered unsuitable just to suit the French.

He thought he could, by will power, enable his artillery to support an attack that was both broad and deep. 60,000 soldiers paid the price.

Given the artillery was not heavy enough, and forced to fire mostly shrapnel shells, even before we look at the huge numbers of duds that are still turning up by the thousands a hundred years later, it is unlikely the wire would have been cut very well anywhere. A lot of soldiers became casualties, but more of them were down to the government than to Haig, as they had equipped and stocked the army that advanced on 1st July, and they insisted it advanced where it did against military advice, even if you can blame Haig for how it advanced.

Nonsense.

#1 The adjective "small" is yours. "Bit and hold that eliminated the German first line and slaughtered counter attacks worked well enough for the French on 1st Juily and from 14th July for the British,. Read "Through German eyes" by Chris Duffy or Jack Sheldon's works on the Somme for the German view of the tactics.

#2 Given all the KNOWN problems with the technology and training of the British artillery it made sense that Haig should have listen to the Gunners and not asked them to stretch their resources and squeeze their timescales. But no: Haig demanded that the Gunners should work miracles.

[The Ibis]

I don't really accept the argument that there was no one to replace Haig. Had he suffered an accident, he would have had to have been replaced. I think there was simply less of a desire to fire him rather than a lack of options to replace him.

[The Ibis]

The WFA just posted a 2016 lecture by Gary Sheffield entitled "The Battle of the Somme reassessed" that some here might find interesting.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxS9GhiQ6kI

[Max Payload]

Haig either did not understand or want to understand what was happening on the battlefield.

That must be the most damning indictment that could be levelled at any commander, no matter how meticulous advanced planning may have been.
Is it not likely that had the cavalry been available on the right wing, a breakthrough would have been achieved, and was it not incumbent on Haig to ensure that the army had a sufficiently effective situational reporting system to enable him to identify and reinforce success in a timely manner?

[Terry Duncan]

Nonsense.

The adjective "small" is yours.

I believe that is how Rawlinson himself described his proposal.

#1 "Bit and hold that eliminated the German first line and slaughtered counter attacks worked well enough for the French on 1st Juily and from 14th July for the British,. Read "Through German eyes" by Chris Duffy or Jack Sheldon's works on the Somme for the German view of the tactics.

#2 Given all the KNOWN problems with the technology and training of the British artillery it made sense that Haig should have listen to the Gunners and not asked them to stretch their resources and squeeze their timescales. But no: Haig demanded that the Gunners should work miracles.

1. You are suggesting an approach that is unlikely to see reserves moved away from Verdun rapidly, which was after all the objective for the operation to start with.

2. The known problems from Neuve Chappelle suggested more artillery and more ammunition would have worked there, which is what was allowed for on the Somme.

The other major problem you seem to be intent on ignoring is that Haig was instructed to fall in with Joffre's plans for an offensive only five weeks after taking command, told his political masters that the ground was not favourable for what was desired and would lead to a lot of losses, and did implement a number of improvements from previous attacks.

When the military have said they feel what is asked for is not going to work, how much do you suggest that they and not the politicians are responsible for what then takes place?

[Terry Duncan]

I don't really accept the argument that there was no one to replace Haig. Had he suffered an accident, he would have had to have been replaced. I think there was simply less of a desire to fire him rather than a lack of options to replace him.

At the end of 1915 Haig is the senior commander in the field, only Smith-Dorrien has seniority over him and French has made him unusable, so where exactly do you look at that point? I would agree that several of the Western Front generals could have replaced him later on, though as they all agreed none would do so it is impossible to know what would happen if he were sacked.

[Terry Duncan]

That must be the most damning indictment that could be levelled at any commander, no matter how meticulous advanced planning may have been.

It is a nice line to attack with, but a shame it is not provable.

Is it not likely that had the cavalry been available on the right wing, a breakthrough would have been achieved, and was it not incumbent on Haig to ensure that the army had a sufficiently effective situational reporting system to enable him to identify and reinforce success in a timely manner?

Cavalry probably would not have made a difference, but in 1918 the Germans did find they could have used theirs but had left it all in the east. The reporting system was almost impossible for all armies at this point, as mobile radios would have to wait a couple of decades and even the laying of telephone lines was far from foolproof even with tanks dedicated to the task later in the war. Given the French were pressing for an attack urgently, how long do you hold off attacking?