confirm the 2nd Army Corp as being part of the 2nd Army starting on the 8th of August.
The reports received on the morning of September 15 in Dommartin-sur-Yèvre, confirm this forecast. At 9:20, information from the colonial corps indicates that this body at the northern edge of Bois de Ville, the brickyard, and set foot in hill 191(The brickyard is located west of the Ville-sur-Tourbe road, Cernay-en-Dormois, 100 meters north of Ville-sur-Tourbe. Hill 191 is 800 meters north of Massiges.). The combat progresses more quickly than yesterday, the artillery pushes forward. The connection exists with neighboring bodies. Favorable impression (see Situation of the colonial body at 9 a.m., 9 20, 15 September 1914, Anaexe 96)
A little later, the 2nd corps reports that an attack has just been triggered, starting from the Servon front, hill 176, in the general direction
north, northeast, while in the east, a brigade about, spawning a path through the thickets of the Grurie wood, begins to emerge near Pavilion (The Pavilion is not marked on the map at 1 / 80,000 ', it is at the crossroads of the route Vienne-le-Château, Binarville, with the road from Servon via hill 166.), towards Binarville and hill 212 (Situation of the 2nd Army Corp at 11:00 AM).
From the 17th Army Corp, no precise news seems to have been received. The General de Langle de Cary is not unaware of his situation, however. He wakes up against the "far too soft and irresolute" way in which the attacks are carried out. He told the corps commander, General J. B. Dumas, and requests him to transmit to the heads of the troops of the 17th corps, "The expression of all his dissatisfaction"
This information does not appear to have been the only information sent to the General of Langle de Cary. From 1 o'clock in the morning, this one summarizes in thus the situation of his army and its idea of maneuver: "The enemy today offers less resistance on the front of his rearguards. The 2 Corp is advancing on Binarville. The colonial Corp on Cernay-en-Dormois. The 17th corps is still arrested in front of Perthes-les-Hurlus. My
right has orders to reach Grandpré, Monthois as soon as possible.
This idea of maneuvering indicates to the commander of the Fourth Army the hope of continuing, at least by his right, the pursuit to the north. This hope is again found in the request addressed at 12 noon to the general-in-chief. For ten days, the Fourth Army has been deprived of cavalry. This absence of mobile and rapid lights was felt during the chase, particularly on September 13, in the Aisne valley. "I consider that it would be necessary to assign to the Fourth Army at least one brigade of dragons or light, with a battery on horseback, which would be used to cooperate in the pursuit on its front.
A communication from the Ninth Army, indicating that, according to information from airmen and residents of Somme-Py, the enemy is carrying out shipments at the station in this village, reinforces the commander of the Fourth Army in his intention to continue his progression north. "Push your attacks," he orders, specifying the objective to be reached: the Somme-Py railroad, Manre2.
This objective represents a particularly valuable supply route for the enemy, since from Grandpré in the east to Bazancourt in the west, it supplies all German units engaged against a short distance, over a route of over sixty kilometers the armies of the center. His abduction would mark a very clear success for the Fourth Army; General de Langle de Cary therefore endeavored to make himself master of it.
On the colonial front, all attempts to advance north are shattered by enemy fire.
On the left wing, in front of the 7th C.A., progress is insignificant. The 34th division took root on the nipple of the Perthes mill and on the slopes north of Hurlus. On its right, the 33rd division holds the Mesnil, but has been unable, almost anywhere, to cross the road between this village and the farm of Beauséjour.
Thus, the railroad, final objective of the attacks of the Fourth Army on September 15, is not reached. At no point even, it is under the fire of artillery.
This unexpected resistance from the enemy is not, after the information of the morning, without surprising the executors. It shows that the German line, already fixed the day before in front of the left of the Fourth Army, has gradually stabilized from west to east.
Despite this new situation, General de Langle de Cary persists with the intention of developing, the next day, the offensive movement already started. He recommends to his corps commanders, as the general-in-chief has just prescribed, to "take methodical attack measures, with all our means, by gradually organizing the conquered ground." It therefore fixes closer points of direction than those indicated the day before.
The 2nd corps will seek to overtake the enemy through Binarville; the colonial body will make its effort in the direction of Séchault, in connection with Maisons de Champagne with the 1st 7th corps. This one will take as objective the mound of Tahure.
No sooner had these arrangements been made when, in the night, in Dommartin-sur-Yèvre, a request for support from the IXth Army. General Foch considers his maneuver on the 16th achievable if the Ninth Army is guaranteed against any threat from his adversary targeting his right flank. Only the Fourth Army, with the reserve at its disposal, can assure it the cover of this flank. "The support of the Fourth Army, acting in the northwest direction, is greatly desired in the Somme-Py region1".
This support, the commander of the Fourth Army did not spare it. He prescribed, in fact, to General Roques, commanding the 1st 2nd Corps, to be able to emerge, at 10 am, with a division, from the Souain front, rump marked source of the Ain2, in the direction of Somme-Py. The other division will follow, in echelon behind on the right, ready to engage on the left of the 17th corps, on the order of the army commander3.
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